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ABSTRACT 
Internat.iona1 Pol i t ics .  and Internat ional  Science 
A Study of Sc ien t i s t s ‘  Att i tudes 
by 
Albert H. Teich 
Submitted t o  the Department of P o l i t i c a l  Science a t  t h e  Massachusetts 
Inst i tute  of Technology on May 5 ,  1969, i n  partial  fu l f i l lment  of t he  
requirement f o r  the  degree of Doctor of Philosophy. 
This d i s se r t a t ion  reports  on a study of the  a t t i t u d e s  of near ly  
400 s c i e n t i s t s  and engineers working i n  the  in te rna t iona l  laborator ies  
of Western Europe. 
play i n  the fu ture  development of European science and technology and 
European p o l i t i c a l  integrat ion.  The vehicle  of an a t t i t u d e  survey a t  
CERN ( the European Organization f o r  Nuclear Research), ESTEC (the European 
Space Technology Centre), ISPRA (the la rges t  EURATGV J o i n t  Research Centre), 
as well  as several  smaller establishments, has been employed i n  order 
t o  examine the poten t ia l  of t h i s  rgle.  The work i s  divided i n t o  four pa r t s .  
set, the  place of in te rna t iona l  laborator ies  is defined within the  general 
framework of science and in te rna t iona l  r e l a t ions .  
establishments t o  perform a p o l i t i c a l  ( in tegra t ive)  function i s  examined 
i n  two ways : through performance on the  scientific/technological l eve l ,  
and through e f f e c t s  on the d i r e c t l y  p o l i t i c a l  plane. The ideas of func- 
t i o n a l i s t  theory a r e  s t ressed  with regard t o  t h i s  second aspect .  Chapter 
I1 out l ines  the  h is tory  of the study i t s e l f  and discusses the methodology 
which was employed i n  i t s  execution. The t h i r d  chapter presents the h i s -  
t o r i e s  of the  various organizations whose laborator ies  were incorporated 
i n  the study. Included here  is a qua l i t a t ive  descr ipt ion of each labora- 
tory as it appeared a t  the time of  the study. 
cha rac t e r i s t i c s  of the s c i e n t i s t s  who were drawn t o  the laborator ies  as 
well as t h e i r  personal and professional react ions t o  the experience. 
appears t h a t  desp i te  large differences i n  the nature  of the various labora- 
t o r i e s ,  the sample is  characterized by broad demographic homogeneity. How- 
ever, important cont ras t s  do show up i n  examining the motivations which 
o r ig ina l ly  brought the  s c i e n t i s t s  t o  the several  laborator ies .  In par t icu-  
lar¶ a higher degree of  professionalism is evident i n  the expressed motives 
of CERN s c i e n t i s t s  i n  comparison with scientists from ESTEC and ISPRA. 
Chapters V and V I  discuss the  in te rna t iona l  laboratory experience from the  
point  of view of the  personal and’professional l i f e  it of fers .  
t h a t  extra-national influences seem t o  c rea t e  a predisposi t ion among the  
s c i e n t i s t s  t o  seek out  an in te rna t iona l  laboratory,  and t h a t  as they re- 
main longer i n  the  lab,  they tend t o  lose  much of t h e i r  des i r e  and a b i l i t y  
Such laborator ies  are s a i d  t o  have a special r o l e  t o  
Part One presents  introductory and background material. A t  the  out- 
The a b i l i t y  of  such 
In Part Two, data  from the survey i s  employed i n  analyzing outstanding 
It 
I t  is  found 
_ _  - -. - 
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t o  re turn  home. While s c i e n t i s t s  a t  two of t h e  three  major centers (ISPRA 
and ESTEC) found t h e i r  work disturbed by an unstable p o l i t i c a l  s i t ua t ion ,  
s c i e n t i s t s  a t  a l l  labora tor ies  agreed t h a t  t h e  in te rna t iona l  character of 
the  environment was both personally rewarding and a source of professional 
st imulation. 
Part Three, devoted t o  the  s c i e n t i s t s '  p o l i t i c a l  views, begins with a 
discussion of t he  place of p o l i t i c s  i n  t h e i r  l ives .  
t i s t s '  pos i t ions  a re  by nature a p o l i t i c a l ,  they do maintain strong i n t e r -  
ests i n  public affairs on a primarily in t e l l ec tua l i zed  plane. Within the  
conventional p o l i t i c a l  spectrum, the  l a rges t  number of respondents place 
themselves i n  a moderate l e f t i s t  pos i t ion .  
represents something of a p o l i t i c a l  norm within these  communities is re in-  
forced by the  finding t h a t  those who rate themselves as r i g h t i s t s  repor t  
s ign i f i can t ly  lower l eve l s  of p o l i t i c a l  i n t e r e s t  and discussion. 
The remainder of Part Three follows up t h i s  general p i c tu re  with an 
elaboration of the  s c i e n t i s t s '  opinions on s p e c i f i c  current i s sues .  O f  
g rea tes t  i n t e r e s t  a r e  opinions on issues r e l a t i n g  t o  a l t e rna t ive  European 
fu tures .  
spread enthusiasm among the s c i e n t i s t s  f o r  expanding economic in tegra t ion  
and eventual p o l i t i c a l  in tegra t ion  of Europe. 
of opinion among European eli tes i n  non-scientific f i e l d s  suggest t ha t  t h e  
s c i e n t i s t s  d i f f e r  mainly i n  t h e  i n t e n s i t y  of t h e i r  des i r e  f o r  c loser  i n t e -  
gra t ion ,  and i n  the  breadth of t h e i r  consensus, which transcends, f o r  the 
most part, differences i n  na t iona l  viewpoint. 
was designed t o  t e s t  the  func t iona l i s t  notion t h a t  t he  European o r i en ta t ion  
should grow s t ronger  as the  scientist remains i n  the laboratory. So strong 
is the  consensus t h a t  it is impossible t o  de tec t  any va r i a t ion  over time. 
An examination of t h e  in t e rac t ion  between European regionalism and broader 
internationalism (measured i n  terms of commitment t o  a world-wide community 
of nations) shows t h a t  no conf l i c t  of l oya l t i e s  e x i s t s  i n  the minds of t he  
respondents. I t  is pe r fec t ly  poss ib le  (and even?-mutually supportive) t o  
be a r eg iona l i s t  and an i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s t  a t  the  same time. 
concluding chapter i n  which the  implications of t he  survey responses f o r  
the labora tor ies '  s c i e n t i f i c  and p o l i t i c a l  ro l e s  a re  weighed. 
conclusions are reached which s t r e s s  first of a l l  the  fact t h a t  p o l i t i c a l  
cohesion i s  a p re requ i s i t e  of such large-scale s c i e n t i f i c  and technological 
collaboration r a t h e r  than an outcome of it, and second t h a t  the  d i r e c t  
p o l i t i c a l  r o l a  which these labora tor ies  and t h e i r  s c i e n t i s t s  might be 
expected t o  play i n  the  near fu tu re  i s  r a the r  small. 
Although t h e  scien- 
The notion t h a t  "leftism" 
Although there  i s  some disagreement over d e t a i l s ,  there  i s  wide- 
Comparisons with s tud ies  
One por t ion  of t he  survey 
The fourth and f i n a l  p a r t  of the d i s se r t a t ion  cons is t s  of a s ing le  
A number of 
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PREFACE 
S c i e n t i s t s  (outside of the s o c i a l  sciences) 6ften ,resent' %he attempts 
of  s o c i a l  s c i e n t i s t s ' t o  treat them as a "classt* and to  study t h e i r  charac- 
t e r i s t i c s  and t h e i r  behavior. Why, they ask, should one want t o  study 
f f s c i e n t i s t s f l  any more than o r  "canasta players"? IR l a rge  
measure t h e i r  fee l ings  are understandable. S c i e n t i s t s ,  l i k e  a l l  o ther  
human beings, a r e  ind iv idua ls ,  and t o  the ex ten t  one loses sight of t h e i r  
i nd iv idua l i t y  through statist ical  ana lys i s ,  it is a dehumanizing process. 
Nonetheless, i f  one maintains the  proper perspective on such ana lys i s ,  it 
need not d e t r a c t  from the  value of the individual,  and may i n  fact enhance 
it. 
The most pressing problems which confront man today a re  of a d i f f e r e n t  
Instead genre than those with which he d e a l t  i n  e a r l i e r  h i s t o r i c a l  epochs. 
of  problems which devolve from h i s  environment, they are problems which 
stem from man's own existence--problems of human in t e rac t ion .  
t i o n  of scientific method t o  the  study of man i n  social s i tua t ions  r a t h e r  
than s l i g h t i n g  the  human s p i r i t  by dealing with aggregates, gives one hope 
t h a t  tdrough the  a b i l i t y  t o  understand and p red ic t  man's behavior, one may 
eventually a r r i v e  a t  some so lu t ions  to these pressing problems--an e n t i r e l y  
tghuman" goal. 
The applica- 
7 
8 
In t h i s  l i g h t  then, s c i e n t i s t s  may indeed be considered a class 
apar t  from other  members of society;  i n  f a c t  a small but very important 
c lass ,  worthy of study by those who hope t o  understand the  workings of 
society.  
i n  t ha t  enterpr ise  which has a l l  but 
problems while exacerbating many of h i s  soc ia l  problems. 
What dis t inguishes  s c i e n t i s t s  is t h e i r  intense p a r t i c i p  
d most of man's environmental 
To understand 
the ways i n  which the s c i e n t i f i c  enterpr ise  r e l a t e s  t o  other  elements of 
society i s  the goal of the r e l a t ive ly  new soc ia l  science f i e l d  (Science 
and Public Policy) within which the present study was conceived. The 
s c i e n t i s t s  whose individual i d e n t i t i e s  were necessar i ly  comniingled'in the  
execution of  t h i s  study doubtless share t h i s  ambition i n  some sense, and, 
w e  hope, w i l l  understand the need f o r  t h i s  s o r t  of excursion i n t o  t h e i r  . 
pr iva te  affairs. 
In another sense, there  is an inherent risk--well discussed by Gunnar 
yrl-dal i n  the preface t o  An American Dilemma--in allowing a member of one 
cul ture  t o  attempt an analysis  within another cu l ture .  
native-born American studying a group of Europeans of  diverse nat ional i -  
t i e s ,  surely the  influence of my cu l tu ra l  background was f e l t  i n  the  
design of t h i s  study and the in te rpre ta t ion  of i t s  r e s u l t s .  
as Myrdal suggests, there  are some advantages t o  being i n  the  posi t ion of 
an outsider  looking in .  Despite t he  f a c t  t ha t  f was t o l d  a few times by 
respondents t h a t  I had a "charac te r i s t ica l ly  American" tendency t o  speak 
Since I am a 
Nevertheless, 
0 
It  is f i n a l l y  somewhat disappointing f o r  a scholar t o  s i t  back af 
9 
devoting a significant portion of h i s  l i f e  t o  a task  such as t h i s ,  and 
reflect on the  fact tha t  what he has t o  say cannot j u s t l y  be ca l l ed  
def in i t ive ,  even within i t s  highly special ized area. 
classed--in the  sense t h a t  Herbert Gans classed h i s  study The Urban 
This work must be 
Villagers--as a reconnaissance, a foray i n t o  a r e l a t i v e l y  unexplored 
realm which might y i e l d  some t en ta t ive  ana ly t i c  schemes, and w i l l  hope- 
f u l l y  stimulate i n t e r e s t ,  criticism, and b e t t e r  work. In any case, my 
disappointment is of'cousse an artifact of t h e  novelty of the  f i e l d  which 
I chose t o  invest igate;  it i s  minor compared t o  the  i n t e l l e c t u a l  reward 
which I have gained from t h i s  project .  
Compared with t h a t  of the average doctoral  d i s se r t a t ion ,  the  number 
of persons who rendered assis tance t o  me i n  t h i s  study, and i n  whose debt 
I stand,is large indeed. The lengthy l i s t  of names which follows is by 
no means exhaustive. Professor Eugene B. Skolnikoff of  M.I.T., who was 
largely responsible f o r  s t imulat ing my i n t e r e s t  i n  the f i e l d  of Science 
and Public Policy, served as a member of my d i s se r t a t ion  committee from 
i t s  inception, and as chairman during the pas t  year.  His guidance, 
encouragement, and cr i t i c i sm were invaluable t o  my e f f o r t .  Professors 
Lincoln P .  Bloomfield and Harvey Sapolsky, who were kind enough t o  serve 
as the o ther  two members of my committee, provided many useful  comments 
and suggestions as well as  some much-needed encouragement during the  pas t  
year.  Professor Daniel Lerner, whose European El i te  Panel Survey was i n  
many ways the  grandfather of t h i s  study, was the  or ig ina l  chairman of my 
committee and my mentor f o r  several  years. A voyage around the world took 
him away from M.I.T. during the  1968/69 academic year, and i n  an in t e l l ec -  
t ua l  as well as a personal sense, I f e l t  his absence most keenly. Mr. 
10 
Jean-Jacques Salomon, head of the Science Policy Division 
vided major ass i s tance  t o  me during the ear ly  s tages  of the  s 
I was i n  Paris, and t o  my good fortune, arr ived a t  M.I.T. as a v is  
scholar  at the  time I was working on t h i s  manuscript. 
he rendered upon reading it a5 well as the  s t imulat ing discussions we 
had were most valuable f o r  m e .  
The commen 
Without the agreement of a few key individuals it would have been 
impossible t o  carry out survey research i n  the various organizations 
incorporated i n  t h i s  study. 
(Director-General of ESRO))* Professor Bernard P. Gregory (Director- 
The gracious assent of Professor Pierre  Auger 
General of CERN), and M r .  Ju les  Gueron (Director-General of Research and 
Training a t  EURATOM] i s  hereby acknowledged. Individuals i n  charge of 
the  laborator ies  a l so  played a major r o l e  i n  f a c i l i t a t i n g  my data  collec- 
t ion :  D r .  Hans Kramers (Director of ISPRA), M r .  P. Schalin and M r .  R. 
Gibson (Acting Director and Director of Administration a t  ESTEC), D r .  
S t ig  Comet (Director of ESDAC), M r .  Sam Lloyd (Interim Director of PETTEN), 
D r .  Henry Seligman (Deputy-Director-General, Department of Research and 
Isotopes, IAEA), M r .  S te inar  Aas (Project Manager, HALDEN). A number of 
persons played spec ia l  roles i n  our v is i . t s  t o  the labora tor ies  and several  
became good f r iends  i n  the  process. 
call of duty-done by M r .  CPaude Deplanche (Pub1i.c Relations Department, 
ISPRA), Mr. EdwiniShaw (Chief Information Offices, CERN), M r .  H. 0. Schuster 
(Manager of General Services, ESTEC), Miss Suzanne Debatty (Administrative 
The many favors--above and beyond the  
* 
Positions are given as of t he  t 
persons no longer hold the  indicated p 
f the study. Many of these 
11 
staff, PETTEN), and Mr. Rainer Grumbach (Sc ien t i f i c  staff, HALDEN) are 
remembered and gra te fu l ly  acknowledged. 
and engineers who generously gave of t h e i r  time i n  order t o  be in t e r -  
viewed or t o  f i l l  out questionnaires cannot, of course, be thanked by 
name; t h e i r  anonymity is preserved throughout t h i s  report .  They a l l  
have, however, my s incere  appreciation. Many w i l l  receive a b r i e f  report  
ou t l in ing  the  main findings of t h i s  study, as an expression of grat i tude.  
During the  period of t h i s  research, as  throughout most of my career 
- 
The several  hundred scientists 
as a graduate student,  I held a predoctoral  research fellowship (Number 
FOl  Ch 29, 403) from the U.S. Public Health Service. This support 
allowed me  t o  concentrate on my work with a minimum of  f inanc ia l  concerns. 
Research and t r ave l  funds a l so  came, a t  various stages of the pro jec t ,  
from the  M.I.T. Center €or Space Research (under NASA Research Grant 
number NGL 22-009-019), the  M.I.T. Center f o r  Internat ional  Studies,  and 
the  M.I.T. Department of P o l i t i c a l  Science. 
manuscript was handled masterfully by Mrs. Bonnie Harris. Miss Stephanie 
Jones graciously consented t o  ac t  as a proof reader.  
The f i n a l  typing of t he  
The most important acknowledgment i s  reserved f o r  last. My wife 
Carolyn contributed to  t h i s  study i n  many unusual and very major ways. 
While accompanying me on our nine months' sojourn i n  Europe, she served 
as my research a s s i s t an t  (perhaps "partner" would be more appropriate) 
and besides sharing with me t h e  respons ib i l i ty  for  interviewing and 
d is t r ibu t ion/co l lec t ion  of questionnaires,  she typed some 800-plus single- 
spaced pages of interview t r ansc r ip t s .  
continued t o  work with me i n  coding the data  and handling the ear ly  s tages  
of data  preparation and computer analysis .  
Upon our re turn  t o  Cambridge, she 
Throughout t h i s  period as  
1 2  
well as t he  f i n a l  (and r a the r  hec t ic )  writ ing s t age  during which she 
typed the f irst  d r a f t  of t h i s  volume, she put  up with my long hours of 
work and neglect of other r e spons ib i l i t i e s .  And, as i f  t h i s  and her  
own s tudies  were not enough, she took time out t h i s  Spring t o  give 
b i r t h  to our f i r s t -born  son, Mitchell Craig. 
Cambridge, Massachusetts 
May 1969 
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PART ONE 

CHAPTER I 
INTERNATIONAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 
The study upon which t h i s  volume reports  is a r a the r  special ized 
invest igat ion of a unique group of people. 
i za t ion ,  however, it ra i se s  questions of broad concern i n  the  study of  
science and society.  
and engineers working i n  the  in te rna t iona l  laborator ies  of Western Europe 
The perhaps unfamiliar term "internat ional  laboratory" refers t o  a form 
of organization pecul ia r  t o  modern-day Europe: a research center spon- 
sored and financed j o i n t l y  by several  governments, i n  which s c i e n t i s t s  
and engineers from d i f f e ren t  countries carry out t h e i r  work together.  
Our study of the a t t i t udes  of these individuals is based upon a growing 
recognition of the v i t a l  place which science and science-based technology 
have come t o  hold i n  the modern world. 
Despite i t s  apparent special-  
I t  seeks t o  examine the a t t i t u d e s  of s c i e n t i s t s  
1 We seek here t o  explore the 
I 
Although t h i s  study is the  work of one individual ,  the  e d i t o r i a l  
Itwe" i s  used occasionally f o r  reasons of s t y l e .  
25 
26 
a t t i t u d e s  of these s c i e n t i s t s  and engineers because we feel t h a t  a 
b e t t e r  knowledge of the in t e rac t ion  between these new research environ- 
ments and t h e i r  professional personnel may y ie ld  some s ign i f i can t  i n s igh t s  
i n t o  the  fu ture  s o c i e t a l  r o l e  which large-scale s c i e n t i f i c  collaboration 
may p lay  first of a l l  i n  Europe, but a l s o  i n  o ther  areas of t h e  world. 
A. A New Scale of Cooperation 
Science is by de f in i t i on  a cooperative en terpr i se .  The work of one 
who seeks t o  extend knowledge does not begin i n  a vacuum, but i s  depen- 
dent a t  l e a s t  on the work of h i s  predecessors, and very nearly always on 
tha t  of h i s  contemporaries as well. 
the  content of science must be in te rna t iona l ,  and it is well recognized 
and of ten  repeated t h a t  i n  t h i s  sense science respec ts  no b a r r i e r s ,  
In its cumulative aspect,  therefore,  
including those which delimit na t ion-s ta tes .  That there  is  a long h i s to ry  
of  in te rna t iona l  cooperation i n  science should hence su rp r i se  no one. 
But, i n  the  words of one scholar of science policy,  
i n  less than a quar te r  of a century, i n t e rna t iona l  scien- 
t i f i c  cooperation has changed i t s  scale, its in ten t ions  
and i t s  significance.  As t o  its sca l e ,  it no longer 
involves a few s c i e n t i s t s  meeting b r i e f l y  and in t e rmi t t en t ly .  
I t  is  no longer confined t o  exchanges of research r e s u l t s  
reserved f o r  spec ia l ized  circles but extends t o  the  j o i n t  
conduct of v a s t  en terpr i ses  . . . i n  intergovernmentally 
supported research i n s t i t u t i o n s  employing considerable 
personnel, equipment and cap i t a l .  As t o  i t s  in ten t ions ,  
having or ig ina ted  and developed almost exclusively on t h e  
i n i t i a t i v e  of s c i e n t i f i c  circles and within those circles, 
it is now encouraged and la rge ly  financed by governments 
and within the  framework of i n s t i t u t i o n s  whose aims and 
act ivi t ies  are not exclusively s c i e n t i f i c .  
f icance,  the cost  and advantages of common action are no 
longer t o  be measured so le ly  i n  the  l i g h t  of the  general 
As t o  i t s  s ign i -  
i n t e r e s t s  of science,  but a l so  i n  t h a t  of the  general aims 
pursued by the  individual countries of t h e i r  own programmes 
This new scale of cooperation, while conceptually relevant t o  a l l  
of s c i e n t i f i c ,  economic or mil i ta ry  expansion. 2 
areas of the  world, is presently of p rac t i ca l  impart only t o  Western 
Europe. The United S ta t e s  and the  Soviet Union possess, i n  t h e i r  status 
as cont inental  super-powers, su f f i c i en t  resources t o  economically pursue 
research i n  expensive fields of science and technology on a nat ional  
bas i s .  
exceptions) have not yet reached s tages  of  development where they can 
benef i t  from large-scale cooperation i n  research. 
hand, is i n  many ways idea l ly  su i ted  f o r  j o i n t  e f f o r t s .  
t h a t  continent a re ,  on the  whole, highly developed, with powerful economic 
and indus t r i a l  bases. Europe is of course t h e  b i r thp lace  of madern sci- 
ence, and nearly a l l  of the  scholars upon whose work rests the  en t i r e  
s c i e n t i f i c  edifice--from Galileo t o  Einstein--were Europeans. Neverthe- 
less ,  despi te  these deeply-rooted s c i e n t i f i c  t r ad i t i ons  and considerable 
economic s t rength,  the level of resources most European nations are able 
t o  commit t o  research is  no longer compatible with the needs of cer ta in  
f i e l d s  of science and technology. 
i n  these f i e l d s ,  these nations have found an obvious solut ion t o  t h e i r  
dilemma i n  j o i n t  act ion,  collaboration, and, i n  some cases, the estab- 
lishment of common faci l i t ies  f o r  research. 
score of in te rna t iona l  research establishments i n  Europe, nearly a l l  of 
Most of the o ther  nations of the world (with a few s ign i f i can t  
Europe, on the other 
The nations on 
Unwilling t o  abandon advanced research 
Thus one finds roughly a 
them created within the last two decades. 
Jean-Jacques Salomon, ' ' International 
11, 4 (Summer 1964), p.  418. 
Sc ien t i f i c  Policy," Minerva, 
28 
Upon the success of such collaboration rests much of Europe's fu ture  
a b i l i t y  t o  pa r t i c ipa t e  at the  f ron t i e r s  of important s c i e n t i f i c  progress. 
In a la rger  sense, it has been suggested tha t  the exigencies of t h i s  new 
s i tua t ion  may i n  fact prove t o  be assets: 
nat ional  character,  j o i n t  technological f a c i l i t i e s  a r e  s a i d  t o  be unique 
as research environments and t o  represent the logical  extension ( a t  l e a s t  
i n  theory) of s c i e n t i f i c  internationalism. More importantly, the labora- 
t o r i e s  and t h e i r  parent organizations offer  spec ia l  opportunities t o  
As a resul t  of t h e i r  i n t e r -  
advance the cause of European in tegra t ion  through j o i n t  e f f o r t s  i n  a 
realm where the need f o r  such integrati0n:i.s evident. 'Accofding.to t h e  
func t iona l i s t  theory, which is  discussed i n  more d e t a i l  below, p o l i t i c a l  
cohesion between the European nations w i l l  be increased through in t e r -  
dependence generated by col laborat ive a c t i v i t i e s .  
vanguard of "Europeanized" s c i e n t i s t s ,  engineers, and administrators,  
Within t h i s  frame, a 
experienced i n  the in te rna t iona l  laborator ies ,  w i l l  emerge t o  f a c i l i t a t e  
the movement 
I t  is  ,not necessary t o  review here e i t h e r  the  comparatively shor t  
h i s to ry  of in te rna t iona l  laborator ies  o r  the long h i s to ry  of s c i e n t i f i c  
cooperation which preceded ' i t .  The former top ic  is covered i n  some d e t a i l  
i n  Chapter 111, and the latter is d e a l t  .with admirably by Salomon i n  h i s  
above-quoted article, as well as i n  the introduction t o  Internat ional  
Sc ien t i f i c  Organizations. Rather, the  remainder of t h i s  chapter is 
OECD, Internat ional  S c i e n t i f i c  Organizations (Paris, 1965). 
29 
devoted t o  sketching the broad out l ines  of the re la t ionship  between 
science and in te rna t iona l  affairs- the re la t ionship  from which t h i s  
study derives its i n t e r e s t  and within whose bounds i ts  conclusions must 
be evaluated, Wt! examine f i r s t  the ro l e  of internationalism i n  the  
s c i e n t i f i c  community and i n  the behavior and a t t i t u d e s  of s c i e n t i s t s .  
Then, taking a r a the r  d i f f e ren t  vantage point ,  we look a t  the  effects 
which science and science-based technology have had and are having on 
t h e  in te rna t iona l  p o l i t i c a l  system, pa r t i cu la r ly  i n  the  European arena. 
B. Internationalism and the Sc ien t i f i c  Community 
1. InstAtutions and Environment 
When speaking of a s c i e n t i f i c  lkommunity,lt it is necessary t o  dis-  
t inguish between various genres of science and technology. 
community--in the sense of a group of individuals with shared i n t e r e s t s ,  
methods, and values, whose work represents a more o r  l e s s  coordinated 
e f for t - -ex is t s  primarily among bas ic  researchers i n  ttpure't science. As 
one moves toward applied sciences and technology, t h e  entrance of p r o f i t  
A genuine 
motives (economic, p o l i t i c a l ,  or mili tary)  increasingly r e s t r i c t s  coor- 
dina t ive  mechanisms and the sense of community is reduced. Remembering 
t h i s  l imitat ion,  there  is  nevertheless considerable value i n  dealing--as 
t h i s  discussion does--primarily wi th  bas ic  researchers.  Sociologists of 
One famous but r a the r  ideal ized view of t h i s  community is pre- 
sented by Michael Polanyi, %'he Republic of Science: 
Economic Theory, I ,  1 (Autumn 1962), p.  54. 
Its P o l i t i c a l  and 
science recognize 
f ac to r  i n  shaping 
30 
t h a t  t he  value s t ruc tu re  of t h i s  group is a majm 
t h e  behavior of other s c i e n t i s t s  and engineers. In 
the  words of Norman Storer :  
. . . t h i s  cen t r a l  cadre of s c i e n t i s t s  [basic researchers] 
cons t i tu tes  the  pr inc ipa l  reference groups for most of 
t he  other groups [applied s c i e n t i s t s  and engineers) . . . 
t he  norms and values characterizing it serve as i d e a l  
standards for t he  others.5 
The s c i e n t i f i c  community is s t ruc tured  upon a communication ne t  which 
supports i t s  coordinative mechanism. 
t i ons :  (1) f a c i l i t a t i n g  t h e  dissemination of  ideas and research r e s u l t s  
This ne t  possesses two main func- 
upon which the  cumulative nature of science is  based--so t h a t  each scien- 
t ist  can define h i s  problems and i n t e r p r e t  h i s  r e s u l t s  i n  l i g h t  of 
r e l a t e d  work by others,  and (2) permitting recognition of those s c i e n t i s t s  
who succeed first i n  formulating key ideas--recognition is  an important 
source of g r a t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  the  s c i e n t i s t  .6 
of t h i s  communication net is  s o  na tu ra l  a p a r t  of the  concept 
The in t e rna t iona l  aspect 
t h a t  it 
should not be understood i n  terms of internaxional cooperation, but r a the r ,  
i n  the  words of S. Dedijer, as in t e rna t iona l  research r e l a t ions .7  Dedijer 
Norman W.  S torer ,  The Social  System of Science (New York: Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston, 1966), p. 15. 
See Robert K. Merton, "P r io r i t i e s  i n  S c i e n t i f i c  Discovery: A 
Chapter i n  the  Sociology of Science," 
6 (December 1957), pp. 535-659; and W 
Community (New York: Basic Books, 1965), pp. 23-56. 
S. Dedijer, "The Future of Research Policies," unpublished paper 
based on a t a l k  delivered at  t h e  Gordon Conference on The Formulation of 
Research Policies,  Santa Barbara, California,  February 1966. We are i n  
debt t o  t h i s  very in t e re s t ing  paper for many of the  ideas presented i n  
this section. 
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defines research re la t ions  as "every pa t te rn  of exchange across nat ional  
borders t h a t  individual groups, organizations,  firms, whole countries or 
groups of them mutually engage i n  (or r e f r a in  from engaging) e i t h e r  t o  
develop j o i n t  research production capac i t ies  or t o  perform jo in t ly  o r  
separately t h e  various types of research work.918 
aspect of these in te rna t iona l  r e l a t ions  is ind i r ec t  comnnanication through 
s c i e n t i f i c  l i t e r a t g r e .  
s o r t s  of re la t ions ,  and where d i r e c t  contacts between scientists are 
The most general 
Even i n  countries which ostensibly have no o ther  
very rare, such ind i r ec t  communication exists. Dedijer c i t e s ,  as a s t r i k -  
ing example of  t h i s ,  a tabulat ion of  the or ig ina l  c i t a t ions  i n  a recent 
issue of a s c i e n t i f i c  journal from the People's Republic of China. 
the  148 papers c i ted ,  38% were from the United S ta tes .  
Of 
9 
Besides ind i r ec t  communication, Dedijer enumerates some of the  other  
pa t te rns  of d i r e c t  in te rna t iona l  communication between s c i e n t i s t s :  
Exchanges of l e t t e r s ,  of  preprints  and of repr in ts ,  patents ,  
designs and l icenses ,  v i s i t s  of  individuals and groups of 
s tudents ,  of researchers and research administrators 
between foreign centers  for longer or  shor te r  periods,  
par t ic ipa t ion  i n  organizations e i t h e r  governmental or non- 
governmental es tabl ished on a b i l a t e r a l ,  mu l t i l a t e ra l ,  
regional and world basis  €or the  systematization, standardi-  
zation and exchanges of da ta  and techniques, par t ic ipa t ion  
i n  in te rna t iona l  symposia, conferences and congresses, the 
publication of in te rna t iona l  research journals,  etc. . . . 
Many of  these . . . occur independently of whether the par- 
t i c ipan t s  a r e  i n  competition with each other  and independently 
of t he  p o l i t i c a l  re la t ions  between t h e i r  countries.  10 
Ibid. ,  p.  2. -
Ibid. -
Ibid pp. 5-6. -* ' 
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The operation of these mechanisms is enhanced through the develop- 
ment--with increasing specialization--of small sub-communities whose 
members share a concern with a more r e s t r i c t e d  set of problems.'' 
i n  the e n t i r e  world, t he  number of centers doing r e a l l y  important work i n  
a highly spec ia l ized  subject-area is  generally r a the r  small. Thus, it i s  
most often t h e  case t h a t  bas ic  researchers working on the  same or similar 
problems a re  mutually aware of the  d e t a i l s  of each o thers '  a c t i v i t i e s .  
Further, 
12 
Formal bodies of i n t  e r n a t i  ona 1 s c i e n t i f i c  re  1 a t  ions encourage i n t e r  - 
change on a la rger  sca le ;  the most important of these i s  the  In te rna t iona l  
Council of S c i e n t i f i c  Unions (ICSU). Functioning ch ief ly  i n  in te rna t iona l  
s c i e n t i f i c  planning (coordination of research),  information exchange, 
and organizaton of congresses, ICSU i s  composed of 57 nat iona l  members 
( the  s c i e n t i f i c  academies -of various countries) and 14 s c i e n t i f i c  members 
( in te rna t iona l  unions i n  f i e l d s  such as astronomy, biology, and chemis- 
t r y ) .  Other formal organizations, specialized functionally or  geographi- 
c a l l y  t o  various extents,  a l so  e x i s t ;  Salomon i n  f a c t  enumerates several  
hundred. l3 
each year by such organizations number more than 1,600. 
In te rna t iona l  s c i e n t i f i c  and technological congresses held 
14 
See Derek J .  de So l l a  Price,  L i t t l e  Science, Big .Science (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1963), p. 83. 
For one s c i e n t i s t ' s  account of t h i s  phenomenon and i t s  inherent 
tension between cooperation and competition, see James D. Watson, The -
Double Helix (New York: Atheneum, 1968). 
l3 OECD, In te rna t iona l  S c i e n t i f i c  Organizations. 
discussion of t h e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  of  such counting procedures. 
See pp. 20-21 f o r  a 
l4 Dedijer, "Future of Research," p .  7. 
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Communication networks, thus,  r e a l l y  do maintain a s c i e n t i f i c  com- 
munity on an i n t e rna t iona l  scale. Although some of t h e  communication 
involves the  pa r t i c ipa t ion  of government ( fo r  example,either as sponsor 
of conferences or as the  body which pays the  b i l l s  f o r  s c i e n t i s t s  par- 
t i c i p a t i n g  i n  individual exchanges) ,most occurs as a na tu ra l  p a r t  of 
science, r e s u l t i n g  from des i res  of s c i e n t i s t s  t o  seek as wide as possible 
a base f o r  cumulation of ideas and recognition. Interchange is limited 
i n  bas i c  science by na tura l  b a r r i e r s  t o  communication which r e s u l t  from 
15 
distance ( l i n g u i s t i c  and c u l t u r a l  as well as physical d i s tance) ,  and i n  
applied science, engineering and technology, by r e s t r i c t i o n s  based on 
economic, p o l i t i c a l ,  o r  mi l i t a ry  motives. 
2. Attitudes of S c i e n t i s t s  
Within the  communication ne t s ,  one major f ac to r  which binds the  
s c i e n t i f i c  community together and permits it t o  function on an in t e r -  
na t iona l  bas i s  is  the  wide sharing of a s e t  of values concerning science. 16 
Several of these values which derive from the  information exchange and 
recognition& needs o f  the s c i e n t i f i c  process a re  pa r t i cu la r ly  functional 
l5 For e a r l y  instances of t he  U.S.  Government's i n t e r e s t  i n  i n t e r -  
na t iona l  s c i e n t i f i c  communication, see  U.S. Department of S t a t e ,  In te r -  
na t iona l  Science Policy Survey Group, Science and Foreign Relations 
(Washington: Government Pr in t ing  Office, 1960); and Walter B. Cannon 
and Richard M. Fie ld ,  "International Relations i n  Science," Chronica 
Botanica, IX, 4 (Autumn 1945), pp. 253-298, which was o r ig ina l ly  wr i t ten  
as a r epor t  f o r  t he  National Research Council. 
l6 Again, as i n  the  previous sec t ion ,  we are speaking, i n  the  main, 
of bas i c  science. 
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with respect t o  science s internationalism. l7 
facts of science a re  t h e  same t o  a l l  men. 
of science are not the properfy of any individual but belong i n  common 
(1) Universalism--the 
(2) Commonality--the ideas 
ad to humanity.18 (3) Absence of bias-- the  r e j ec t ion  of -
hominem, and the  b e l i e f  t h a t  t he  value of a s c i e n t i f i c  work i s  measur- 
ab le  only on s c i e n t i f i c  c r i t e r i a  and not i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  personal q u a l i t i e s  
of i t s  author. 
These values, superimposed on the  common methods, t oo l s ,  and sub- 
j e c t  matter of science, a r e  of great importance i n  shaping t h e  world- 
view of  s c i e n t i s t s .  
tists tends t o  produce persons who a r e  s o  s t rongly  committed t o  the  
cen t r a l  values of science t h a t  they unthinkingly accept them."lg 
not unreasonable t o  suppose t h a t  a cosmopolitan outlook based on science 
influences a s c i e n t i s t  i n  o ther  aspects o f  h i s  behavior. 
As Hagstrom observes, "The soc ia l i za t ion  of scien- 
It  is  
One may fu r the r  
suppose t h a t  cosmopolitanism is functional i n  the in t e rna t iona l  contacts 
of t h e  s c i e n t i s t ,  and tha t  the contacts,  i n  tu rn ,  probably reinforce 
cosmopolitanism. A s  t he  internationalism of science i s  of ten  described 
l7 See Robert K. Merton, "The Ethos of Science," i n  Social  Theory 
Also S. S. West, "The Ideology of Academic Sc ien t i s t s , "  - IRE and Social  S t ruc ture  (New York: 552-561. 
Transactions i n  Engineering Management, Vol. EM-7 (1960), pp. 54-62. 
Free Press, revised ed i t i on  19573, pp. 
l8 Hagstrom, S c i e n t i f i c  Community, p. 12, notes i n  t h i s  connection 
t h e  fact t h a t  articles i n  s c i e n t i f i c  journals a re  ca l l ed  t'contributions'l 
and as the  author generally receives no compensation and sometimes even 
m u s t  pay publishing cos ts ,  they are i n  effect ' 'gifts' ' t o  science. 
l9 Ibid., p. 9. -
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i n  glowing terms, so the  in te rna t iona l  a t t i t u d e s  of s c i e n t i s t s  are fre- 
quently held up (as of ten  as not by s c i e n t i s t s  themselves) as a shining 
example t o  other  mortals: 
. . . i n  s c i e n t i s t s ,  engineers, and technologists,  we have 
a large in te rna t iona l  community of people who understand 
each other,  who think s imi la r ly  on many problems, and who 
tack&& problems from a common point  of view. In general 
they have a l so  a common i n t e r e s t  i n  solving problems and 
a common asp i ra t ion  t o  circumvent the problems of the  
world with new and heretofore  unt r ied  solut ions.  2o 
CERN [ the  European Organization f o r  Nuclear Research] 
might today well be the place where one can f ind  the  ' f i r s t  
Planetar ians , '  ea r th  dwellers who no longer f e e l  loyal ty  
t o  a s ing le  nation, a s ing le  continent,  or a s ing le  pol i -  
t i c a l  creed, but t o  the common knowledge t h a t  they 
advance together.  21 
Based on such evaluations,  one f inds a be l i e f  among many p o l i t i c a l l y  
ac t ive  s c i e n t i s t s  t h a t  they have a %pecial  ro l e f t  t o  play i n  the  affairs 
of nations.  One sect ion of the  well-known Vienna  Declaration" exempli- 
f i e s  t h i s  view: 
We believe t h a t ,  as s c i e n t i s t s ,  w e  have an important con- 
t r i bu t ion  t o  make toward establ ishing t r u s t  and cooperation 
among nations . . Sc ien t i s t s  with d i f f e r e n t  nat ional  
allegiances eas i ly  f ind  a common bas is  of understanding. . 
stand one another, and t o  work together, is  an excel lent  
instrument f o r  bridging the gap between nations and f o r  
uni t ing them around common aims. 22  
. The a b i l i t y  of s c i e n t i s t s  a l l  over t he  world t o  under- 
Donald F. Hornig, ItWorld Comity Through Science and Technology," 
i n  U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics, Govern- 
ment, Science and Internat ional  Policy (Washington: U.S. Government 
Pr int ing Office, 1967), p.  29. D r .  Hornig was Special Assis tant  f o r  
Science and Technology t o  President Johnson from 1964 through 1969. 
21 Robert Jungk, The Big Machine (New York: Scribner 's  Sons, 1968), 
p. 150. 
22 "The Vienna Declaration," Statement from the Third Pugwash Confer- 
ence, held at KitzbGhel and Vienna, Austria, September 14-20, 1958. 
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Such discussion of s c i e n t i s t s '  a t t i t u d e s  is  a e s t h e t i c a l l  
and makes a ce r t a in  amount of i n t u i t i v e  sense. 
f o r  more substantive data,  t he  p i c tu re  becomes somewhat obscure, as 
empirical research on the  p o l i t i c a l  a t t i t u d e s  of s c i e n t i s t s  has h e n  
very limited. 23 One occasionally f inds  passing references t o  t h i s  top ic ,  
If one looks, however, 
such as Anne Roe's comment, from her  analysis of interviews with 64 prom- 
inent American s c i e n t i s t s ,  t h a t  " the i r  p o l i t i c a l  views ranged from 
ra the r  r i g h t i s t  t o  very l e f t i s h ,  with the bulk of them de f in i t e ly -  
l ibera l .1 t24  O r  a similar b r i e f  reference i n  a somewhat l e s s  rigorous 
survey of s c i e n t i s t s  by the  ed i tors  of Fortune magazine, which ind ica tes  
t h a t  they found most of t he  respondents t o  be Democrats. 25 
A recent doctoral  d i s se r t a t ion  i n  M.I.T.'s P o l i t i c a l  Science Depart- 
ment treats t h e  subjec t  i n  a good deal more depth. E n t i t l e d  "The 
23 There is  some l i terature on the  p o l i t i c a l  opinions and a c t i v i t i e s  
of more ac t ive  s c i e n t i s t s ,  f o r  example, Robert Gilpin, American Scien- 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
land, S c i e n t i s t s  i n  P o l i t i c s :  The 
Atomic Sd ien t i s t s  Movement 1945-1946 (Lafayette, Ind.: Purdue University 
Press, 1968) but i t s  s w p e  and method a r e  r a t h e r  l imited.  Recently there  
has a l s o  been some more general and empirical work on opinions of American 
academics (including s c i e n t i s t s )  with regard t o  such s p e c i f i c  i s sues  as 
the  war i n  Vietnam and the  "space race," 
tlProfessors and P o l i t i c a l  Pe t i t ions ,"  Science, C L X I I I  (March 28, 1969), 
pp. 1425-1430, and Donald A. Strickland, "Physicists1 V i e w s  of Space 
P o l i t i c s  ," , XXIX,  2 (Summer 1965), pp. 223-235. 
See Everett  C. Ladd, Jr., 
24 Anne Roe, (New York: Dodd, Mead and 
25 Francis Bello, "The Young Sc ien t i s t s , "  i n  Paul C. Obler and 
Herman A. Es t r in  (eds.), The'Ne$v'Sci6ntist (Garden City,  N.Y.: Michor,Books, 
1962), pp. 64-65. 
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Political Attitudes of a Scientific Elite," this wbrk.by David Nichols 
reports on a series of depth interviews with 37 politically active 
academic American scientists. 
three types according to their political attitudes: 
' 
Nichols separates his respondents into 
The overall political outlook of scientists charged 
with professional responsibilfty for military research 
and development we have found to be characterized by a 
broad satisfaction with the professional-political status 
quo (the conservatives); the outlook of physicists 
men in electrical engineering/computer science, by hope 
for change (the moderates); the outlook of mathematicians 
and biologists, by distrust of government (the radicals) .26 
Nichols' discussion is based largely (but not exclusively) on issues 
relating to political uses of science and relations between scientists 
and politics, and although he considers the divisions he uncovers to 
be rather deep, it is interesting that the self-image of all three of 
his types--radical, moderate, and conservative--is generally that of a 
In any case, his highly interesting paper is concerned 
solely with American scientists and unfortunately does not at all go 
into the question of internationalism 
A recent study in which this author participated [it is discussed 
briefly in the next chapter) looks at the political attitudes of a group 
of European scientistseZ8 This survey found a strong consensus among 
David Nichols, The Political Attitudes of a Scientific Elite, 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Dept. of Political Science, M.I.T., 
1968), p .  192. 
27 Ibid p. 174, 
28 Daniel Lerner and Albert H. Teich, "International Scientists Face 
-* 
World Politics: A Survey at CERN" (M.I.T. Center for International 
Studies, Document No. C/68-2, January 1968). 
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s c i e n t i s t s  of several  na t iona l i t i e s  on a range of p o l i t i c a l  issues ,  and 
a tendency towards internationalism which seemed t o  be manifest not only 
i n  approval of in te rna t iona l  a c t i v i t i e s ,  but i n  evaluation of the worth 
of  such a c t i v i t i e s  i n  an internat ional  frame of reference.  The respon- 
dents i n  t h i s  group were not intended t o  be "typicalff  s c i e n t i s t s  (they 
came from an internat ional  laboratory) and one hes i t a t e s  t o  generalize 
on the bas i s  of t h i s  sample. 
group of s c i e n t i s t s  displayed some unique a t t i t udes  on topics  of i n t e r -  
nat ional  i n t e r e s t  and t h i s  work was i n  par t  responsible f o r  the  genesis 
of the  present study. 
I t  was however apparent t h a t  a t  least t h i s  
Internationalism, thus,  is an in tegra l  pa r t  of the  s t ruc ture  of the 
s c i e n t i f i c  community. I t  is, fur ther ,  highly relevant t o  the  a t t i t u d e s  
and behavior of professional s c i e n t i s t s  and the  log ic  of internat ional  
research f a c i l i t i e s  may be seen i n  t h i s  l i gh t .  
coin, the in te rna t iona l  p o l i t i c a l  system is  increasingly subject t o  pres- 
sures f o r  change based on the progress and products of science.  Examina- 
t i on  of t h i s  phenomenon, which frames the :po l i t i ca l  prospect of i n t e r -  
nat ional  laborator ies ,  requires a s h i f t  i n  one's viewpoint from the  
s c i e n t i f i c  system t o  the p o l i t i c a l  system. 
On the other s ide  of t h e  
C. Science and Internat ional  Relations 
That science and technology have been prime fac tors  i n  the  t ransfor-  
mation of internat ional  r e l a t ions  which the  world has witnessed i n  the 
Twentieth dentury, pa r t i cu la r ly  during t h e  pas t  quarter-century, i s  a 
well-recognized fact. The emergence of the United Sta tes  and the Soviet 
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Union as super-powers--probably the most important s ing le  aspect of t h i s  
transformation--is based i n  la rge  measure on economies of scale which 
allow these two giants  t o  harness science and technology i n  development 
of p o l i t i c a l ,  economic, and mi l i ta ry  power. Science and technology are 
a l so ,  i n  the  words of Eugene B. Skolnikoff, "the predominant force causing 
today's unprecedented rate of change i n  man's physical  and soc ia l  environ- 
ment . J 9  
Skolnikoff has performed a systematic ana lys i s  of the  in te rac t ion  
between science and foreign policy which, i n  i ts  concluding chapter,  
speculates on fu ture  pa t te rns  of in te rna t iona l  affairs.  Central t o  t h i s  
speculation is  the notion t h a t  science and technology a re  operating as  
in te rna t iona l iz ing  forces  i n  the modern world. Its "trends and forces  
. . . raise questions about some of t h e  cherished t r ad i t i ons  of nation- 
hood, about t he  assumptions associated with the present  organization of 
the  in te rna t iona l  p o l i t i c a l  system. . . 1t30 The pressures which science 
can conceivably exert  on the in te rna t iona l  p o l i t i c a l  system may be  dichot- 
omized i n t o  two broad categories:  (1) those pressures stemming from t h e  
consequences of science,  and (2) those stemming from the needs of 
science. The former, although of much broader impact as agents of soc ia l  
change, are of l e s s  spec i f i c  concern t o  t h i s  discussion and hence a re  
given only b r i e f  treatment. The latter,  serving as a bas i s  f o r  function- 
a l i s t  theory, a r e  t r ea t ed  i n  more de t a i l .  
29 Eugene B.  Skolnikoff, Science, Technology and American Foreign 
Policy (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press', 1967), p .  3 .  
30 eo Ibid ' p. 315. 
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1. 
His tor ica l ly ,  products of technology, whose or ig ins  may be traced 
back t o  science, have a f fec ted  v i r t u a l l y  a l l  sec tors  of society.  
t he  present age, perhaps the most profound and c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  develop- 
ment has been the  advent of what Skolnikoff has ca l l ed  "global technolo- 
I n  
gies." Essent ia l ly  these  a r e  der iva t ives  of science, t he  consequences 
of which do not mesh geographically with conventional p o l i t i c a l  bound- 
a r i e s .  
Some such technologies a re  ac tua l ly  global i n  function and define 
t h e i r  own sca l e  of measurement: 
New technology has made large-scale human a c t i v i t y  
possible; but t he re  is  more t o  it than t h a t .  
techniques, by reason of t h e i r  operational charac te r i s -  
tics, are inherently e ansive. I t  is not simply t h a t  
they have f a c i l i t a t e d  "19)"-T the  p e r  ormance of large-scale 
economic, p o l i t i c a l ,  and mi l i t a ry  ac t iv i t ies - - they  spon- 
taneously enlarge the scope of  human ac t io6  by s e t t i n g  
up t h e i r  own l eve l  of operations; a l eve l  imposed by t h e i r  
functional ru l e s  and requirements. 31 
Contact 
We need not look far f o r  an example of t h i s :  communications satel- 
l i tes represent prec ise ly  such a technology; t h e i r  s p e c i f i c  function is  
t h e  broadening of t he  geographical scope of commnications. Supersonic 
a i r  t ranspor t  i s  another example. 
are defined by t h e i r  scale and clearly make sense only i n  in te rna t iona l  
The functions of these technologies 
terms. 
On t he  other hand, c e r t a i n  types of technologies have global 
31 Laurance Reed, Europe i n  a Shrinking 'World: A Technological 
Perspective (London: Oldbourne Book,Co., 1967), p. 29. Reed uses 
"contact techniques" as a general term for communication and transpor- 
t a t ion .  
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consequences not so much because their function is of a 
ter, but merely because the physical nature of the world is not, in 
1 charac- 
these respects, congruent to political boundaries, As one scholar, 
examining the byproducts of technology, remarked, "The earth is one 
ecological unit. 
alteration, which may occur either by intent or  as an tmintentional side- 
effect of another process, 
be a reality. 
Such technologies generally involve environmental 
Intentional weather modification will soon 
0 
Widespread unintentional air and water pollution are 
already unpleasant realities. 
Along these same lines, the technology of modern armaments, mainly 
but not exclusively nuclear weapons, is probably the major cause for 
the profound alterations which have already occurred in the relationships 
between nations, 33 Nuclear weapons, coupled with intercontinental ballis- 
tic missiles (as well as chemical and bacteriological weapons),are 
global in function due to the intended range of their power--i,e., such 
weapons are specifically designed to exercise their function from one 
nation to the territory of any other nation on the globe. 
facto global as the effects of their employment (radioactive fallout in 
They are c de 
I
one sense, the general holocaust which is presumed by many to be an 
inevitable consequence of their use in another sense) are again not con- 
strained by political boundaries. It is evident that weapons with such 
32 Abel Wolman, "Pollution as an International Issue," Foreign Affairs*, 
XLVII, 1 (October 1968), p. 168. 
33 See John Herz, New York: 
Columbia University Pre S 
propos it ion. 
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profound e f f e c t s  must rapidly become objects of concern not only t o  the  
nations which possess them, but t o  the  e n t i r e  world. 
In a l l  of these areas, the  consequences of science and technology 
are capable of producing pressures f o r  change i n  the  in te rna t iona l  
p o l i t i c a l  system. 
same di rec t ion .  In p a r t i c u l a r ,  t o  those who foresee l a rge r  p o l i t i c a l  
u n i t s  developing as consequences of  modern science and technology, Reed 
Nevertheless, the  pressures do not a l l  operate i n  the  
gives some words of caution: 
There i s  nothing inevi tab le  about i t .  
spontaneous but p o l i t i c a l  organization is not.  Manmade 
boundaries do not automatically s h i f t  t o  s u i t  t he  id io-  
syncracies of techniques. 
value of boundaries for the  bounded area. 
t h e i r  relevance, a l t e r  t h e i r  function, or even water-down 
t h e i r  d iv i s ive  s t rength ,  and i n  t h i s  fashion technology 
may exer t  powerful pressures for  the  rev is ion  of p o l i t i c a l  
frontiers-but t h a t  is all .  Modern techniques make large- 
s ca l e  p o l i t i c a l  organizations possi’tile, not c e r t a i n  .34 
Technology may be 
Technology may change t h e  
It may diminish 
2 .  Needs of Science 
In  discussing t h e  consequences of ce r t a in  f i e l d s  of science and 
technology, it was observed t h a t  t he  e f f e c t s  they produce simply do 
not r e l a t e  i n  any meaningful way t o  t h e  ar t i f ic ia l  p o l i t i c a l  boundaries 
which man has drawn upon h i s  planet.  
t o  t h e  subject-matter--and hence t h e  needs--of ce r t a in  s c i e n t i f i c  
d i sc ip l ines .  The sciences dealing with the study of t he  Earth a re  prime 
examples: geodesy, geophysics, and one of t h e i r  most important applica-. 
t i ons ,  seismology, a l l  requi re  da ta  which can only be obtained through 
in te rna t iona l  e f f o r t .  The In te rna t iona l  Geophysical. Year (IGY) 
This, too, is  the  case with respect 
34 Reed, Shrinking World,- pp. 30-31. 
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represented a major world-wide e f f o r t  t o  obtain such data.  
nat ional  Polar Year, which predated I G Y  by more than hal f  a century, 
represented a similar e f f o r t  i n  a somewhat d i f f e r e n t  area of science. 
The effects of such programs on the  in te rna t iona l  p o l i t i c a l  system have 
not  been very s ign i f i can t  t o  date.  
where they realize the  need f o r  more synoptic data ,  as they progress 
towards more p rac t i ca l  applications (e.g. ,  earthquake predict ion) ,  and 
as they become more expensive, thus involving governments more deeply, 
one might expect t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  effects  t o  grow i n  importance. 
The Inter- 
As global sciences advance t o  states 
The existence of in te rna t iona l  laborator ies ,  as noted a t  the begin- 
ning of t h i s  chapter,  i s  based not so much on the da ta  requirements of  
science,  but r a the r  on the scale of investment ( f inanc ia l  and human) 
which ce r t a in  f i e l d s  demand. 
nology of r e ~ e a r c h , " ~ '  has developed i n  such a way as t o  require  
enormous pieces of equipment, large groups of highly-trained personnel 
working together i n  teams, and vas t  expenditures i n  order t o  progress. 
Enough has been wr i t ten  about the  changes t h i s  expansion has wrought 
i n  the s c i e n t i f i c  
"Big science," characterized by a "tech- 
For purposes of t h i s  discussion two of 
35 This very ap t  expression was coined by Spencer K l a w ,  i n  The New 
Brahmins (New York: W i l l i a m  Morrow and Go., 1968). 
36 See, f o r  example, Lew Kowarski, "Psychology and Structure  of - -  
Large-Scale- Physical Research," Bul le t in  of the Atomic Sc ien t i s t s ,  V ,  5 
Daniel S. Greenberg, The 
an Library, 1967); and- 
Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 
1967). 
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i ts  external  consequences are  most important: 
t ists  i n t o  the p o l i t i c a l  arena as  benefactors of governmentls largesse 
and competitors f o r  a s t i l l -growing share of government's budgets-a 
(1) f t  has brought scien- 
process i n  which s c i e n t i s t s  hslve of course been aided by the  perceived 
coupling between s c i e n t i f i c  progress and nat ional  power; and (2) I t  has 
placed the game's ante beyond the  reach of most nations,  thus forcing 
them t o  a c t  j o i n t l y  o r  not a t  a l l .  
Consider the obvious case of high energy physics. Concerned with 
exploring the s t ruc ture  of the  atomic nucleus i n  order t o  probe the  
fundamental nature of matter i t se l f ,  t h i s  f i e l d  of science demands 
devices of Brobdignaggian proportions. The United S ta tes  may be able  
t o  afford spending $35 
at Brookhaven National 
t he  Federal Government 
manner of research and 
annual RED expenditure 
mill ion t o  construct a s ing le  30 BeV accelerator  
Laboratory, and $47 mill ion a year t o  operate it; 
spends on the order of $17 b i l l i o n  a year f o r  a l l  
development. But what of Norway, whose t o t a l  
($42 million) 38 is smaller than Brookhaven's 
37 
annual .operating budget, and whose t o t a l  population of s c i e n t i s t s  and 
engineers working i n  R&D (2 ,290)~ '  is less than the number of persons 
working a t  Brookhaven? Is a country such as Norway {or Belgium, or 
Switzerland, or Austria f o r  t h a t  matter), highly advanced i n  a l l  other  
37 AEC expenditures f o r .  a1 1 of Brookhaven. far fiscal .1964. 
38 OECD, The Overall Level and Structure, of RED Effor t s  i n  OECD 
Member Countries (Paris, 1967), p. 14. 
39 Ibid.  -
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aspects of soc ie ty ,  
i n  t he  exploration o 
In the  p a r t i c u l a r  case of high energy physics, t he  so lu t ion  t o  the  dilemma 
has been an i n t e rna t iona l  laboratory: Norway- as Belgium, Switz- 
erland, and Austria--is a member a f  CERN, the Eu Organization f o r  
Nuclear Research, and pa r t i c ipa t e s  ac t ive ly  i n  i ts  research, An i n t e r -  
governinental i n s t i t u t i o n ,  a very concrete form of in te rna t iona l iz ing  
forced t o  abandon 
bas i c  area of hum 
ac t ion ,  has been created i n  response t o  pressure from the  needs of 
science. 
Dixon Long, i n  a recent paper on science and in te rna t iona l  affairs, 
dist inguishes i n  a manner similar t o  t h a t  used here between in te rna t ion-  
alism i n  t h e  " e f f e c t s  of science" and i n  the  "practice of science. ,140 
While considering together the  p rac t i ce  of t h a t  science which is in te r -  
na t iona l  because of i ts  nature,  and t h a t  science which is in te rna t iona l  
because of i ts  cos t ,  he describes a "spectrum" of a c t i v i t y  which may be 
assigned t o  the  in t e rna t iona l  l eve l .  I t  i s  worth taking note of t h i s  
spectrum here because it i l l u s t r a t e s  the scope of  in te rna t iona l  action 
which science may demand, and thus provides some fee l ing  for the  types of 
p o l i t i c a l  i n i t i a t i v e s  l i ke ly  t o  r e s u l t .  
"decisions about research and development a c t i v i t y ,  through a l loca t ions  
t o  such a c t i v i t y  and f i n a l l y  t o  ac tua l  laboratory or workshop performance. 
The spectrum extends from 
The extreme ends of t he  spectrum represent on the  one hand consultation 
, and Regional 
1 Convention 
, March 30, 
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about research, and on the  other  ac tua l  performance of research.1141 
might suppose t h a t  broadly in te rna t iona l  arrangements are l ike ly  t o  occur 
a t  the  consultation end of the  spectrum, while actual  performance w i l l  be 
more probable among regional groupings. 
One 
In terms of the  p o l i t i c a l  pressures which they a r e  capable of genera- 
t ing ,  the needs of technology, because of t h e i r  d i r e c t  ties with the  
v i t a l  issues of  prosperi ty ,  mi l i ta ry  securi ty ,  and p o l i t i c a l  s e l f -  
sufficiency, are  considerably more important than the needs of science.  
An obvious and very current example of t h i s  type of pressure has' 
materialized i n  terms of the  "technological gap" between the United 
S ta tes  and Europe. 4 2  
Although the has been. used for diverse p o l i t i c a l  purposes by 
public f igures  with widely d i f f e r ing  goals, it should be noted that: t he  
man who i s  generally credi ted with having originated the debate (Pierre  
C ~ g n a r d ) ~ ~  as well as the  man who probably did the  most t o  popularize i t  
(Jean-Jacques ServanGSchreiber) both were primarily in te res ted  i n  a 
"Europeanist" ( integrat ive)  solut ion t o  the problem. The technological 
gap has been analyzed i n  many ways: as an i n a b i l i t y  t o  make p rac t i ca l  
41 Ibid p. 4.  -* ' 
42 See Chapter X f o r  a discussion of European s c i e n t i s t s '  views of 
t h i s  gap. 
43 Cognard's paper, published anonymously i n  the journal of t he  
French D.GIR.S .T . ,  
reprinted under t h  
the Centre de Rech 
graph i n  t h i s  booklet reads: -l'Pour notre  p a r t ,  nous pers is tons B p e k e r  
que seu le  une Europe unie aura les dimensions su f f i s an t s  pour qulune 
rgponse aff i rmat ive puisse &re apportee a ces questions .I1 
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use of new knowledge, as a problem of market s i ze ,  as a matter of mana- 
g e r i a l  o r  organizational technique, as a f a u l t  of antiquated educational 
systems, as a bas ic  cu l tu ra l  o r  sociological  defect ,  or simply as a 
r e s u l t  of a lower leve l  o f  investment i n  research and development. 
is, t o  a grea te r  or lesser degree, a l l  of these.  The main symptoms of 
t h i s  gap have been the feel ings i n  Europe (whether they are based on 
I t  
fact o r  not is not near ly  so important as t h e  fact tha t  they exist)  
t h a t  most o f  the important technological breakthroughs a re  occurring i n  
America, t h a t  American power i s  consequently growing more rapidly than 
e i t h e r  t h a t  of any European country or of Europe considered as a whole, 
t h a t  Europe is f a l l i n g  f a r the r  and f a r the r  behind i n  these respects ,  and 
t h a t  the European economy i s  gradually being taken over by American 
industry.  
Servan-Schreiber, whose somewhat s ensa t iona l i s t i c  concern i n  - The 
American Challenge i s  the take-over of European industry,  argues for a 
delicately-phrased “minimum of  federalism. The point  i s  t h a t  t o  
maintain the pace of  technology which the United S ta tes  i s  se t t i ng ,  Europe 
must organize i tself  i n t o  a more e f f i c i en t  p o l i t i c a l  u n i t  with some 
degree of cen t r a l  d i r ec t ion ,  A n  analogous but l e s s  known Br i t i sh  work 
reaches e s s e n t i a l l y  the  same conclusion: 
If Europe wishes t o  remain a technological ‘ t h i r d  force’  
i n  the world, capable of competing against ,  or partnering, 
others  on a bas is  of equal i ty ,  some progress towards p o l i t i -  
cal un i t  is  absolutely indispensable. Cooperation i s  not 
enough. 4x 
44 Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, The American Challenge (New York : 
Atheneum, 1968). 
45 Reed, Shrinking World, p .  183. 
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The Br i t i sh  government's proposal f o r  a European Technological Community 
i n  1967 embodied much of t h i s  sp i r i t . 46  
regional in tegra t ion  i n  Europe are being strengthened by Europe's des i r e  
t o  maintain a technology on a par  with the  superpowers. 
In  sum, pressures f o r  grea te r  
D. Functionalism and the  Logic of  In te rna t iona l  Laboratories 
I t  i s  a cherished b e l i e f  among many s c i e n t i s t s  t h a t  science i s  an' 
i dea l  medium f o r  in te rna t iona l  cooperation, and, fur ther ,  t ha t  such coop- 
e ra t ion  may lead t o  b e t t e r  understanding between nations and perhaps 
the  reduction of world tensions. 
meshes cdnveniently w i t h  t he  "European s p i r i t "  and cooperation i n  sci- 
ence and technology kas f o r  many years been seen as one of t h e  ins t ru-  
On a European l eve l ,  t h i s  b e l i e f  
ments through which c lose r  p o l i t i c a l  in tegra t ion  of t h e  various nation- 
s t a t e s  might be achieved. 
thinking i s  cent ra l  t o  the  aura which surrounds the  in te rna t iona l  labora- 
This vague yet highly seductive l i n e  of 
t o r i e s  incorporated i n  t h i s  study. 
1. Science: The Ideal Medium 
E a r l i e r  portions of t h i s  chapter l a i d  t h e  groundwork f o r  understanding 
the  ''logict1 of in te rna t iona l  s c i e n t i f i c  cooperation. 
t o  s y l l o g i s t i c  s t y l e  o r  formal log ica l  manner, i ts  es sen t i a l  t h r u s t  should 
be apparent from a number of asser t ions :  
Without recourse. - 
(1) The content and method of 
science a re  in t e rna t iona l .  (2) A s c i e n t i f i c  community, based on formal 
46 New York Times, January 24, 1967, p. 1.. 
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and informal communication networks, exists on an in t e rna t iona l  
science i tself ,  a re  
(4) The e f f e c t s  of science ist  i n  or ien ta t ion .  
areas of human endeavor are grow 
becoming moTe i n f l u e n t i a l  i n  t he  conduct of  publ ic  affairs. (6) Modern 
science,through i ts  consequences as well as its needs, is  crea t ing  a 
va r i e ty  of pressures on na t ion-s ta tes  f o r  in te rna t iona l  ac t ions .  
Most of these asser t ions  are more o r  less impl i c i t  i n  t he  statements 
of many of the  s c i e n t i f i c ,  diplomatic, and p o l i t i c a l  f igures  who deal 
with in t e rna t iona l  science. 
cal po ten t i a l ,  which,though vaguely understood, i s  considerable, 
To them, cooperation i n  science has  a p o l i t i -  
Several 
quotations,  from a va r i e ty -  of sources, i l l u s t r a t e  t he  poin t ;  From a 
panel of the  U.S.  National Academy of Sciences (1950): 
Since science i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  in t e rna t iona l  i n  character,  
i t  provides an e f f ec t ive  medium by means of which men can 
meet and exchange views i n  an atmosphere o f  i n t e l l e c t u a l  
freedom and understanding. I t  i s  therefore  an e f f ec t ive  
instrument of peace. 47 
From Henxi Laugier, spokesman of the French delegation before t h e  Economic 
and Social Council of t h e  United Nations (1946): 
. . . t he  j o i n t  c r ea t ive  e f f o r t  of s c i e n t i s t s  from d i f f e r e n t  
nations [ i n  U . N .  l abora tor ies ]  could cont r ibu te ,  i n  reat 
measure, t o  bringing about an in t e rna t iona l  s p i r i t .  48 
47 U.S. tment of S ta te ,  # P *  3. 
, p. 31. 48 
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From Glenn T. Seaborg, Chairman,of the U.S.  Atomic Energy Commission 
(1967) : 
By the  example of i n s t i t u t i o n s  such as the  Internat ional  
Theoretical  Physics Conference, by the  ac t ive  par t ic ipa-  
t i on  of s c i e n t i s t s  i n  the  affairs of government, and i n  
many other ways, s c i e n t i f i c  internationalism is t rans-  
forming relat ionships  between countries.  
t h i s  f a r  more quickly and more profound1 
I t  is doing 
than most of us, 
even those close t o  the  scene, r ea l i ze .  46 
And f i n a l l y ,  from C. J .  Bakker, former Director-General of CERN (1960): 
. . . CERN is  t ry ing  t o  fu r the r  in te rna t iona l  cooperation 
of s c i e n t i s t s  and s c i e n t i f i c  e f f o r t .  The creators  of CERN 
w i l l  c e r t a in ly  regard it as a great  reward i f  such cooper- 
a t ion not only leads t o  s c i e n t i f i c  progress, but a l so  t o  a 
b e t t e r  understanding of the  peoples of the  world.50 
Within t h i s  notion t h a t  science i s  idea l ly  su i ted  t o  serve as a 
medium f o r  cooperation between nations is  t h e  idea t h a t ,  i n  addition t o  
being aes the t i ca l ly  pleasing, such cooperation must a l so  be i n  some real 
sense necessary for  science i t se l f .  
technology, described i n  d e t a i l  above, have created such a s i tua t ion  f o r  
European science.51 Europe, furthermore, is one area of the world where 
The needs of "big science" and 
49 Glenn T. Seaiborg, "The Promise of the  Internat ional  Atomic Energy 
Agency, , CXVIII (October 13, 1967) pp. 226-230. 
C. J. Bakker, 'TERN as an I n s t i t u t e  f o r  Internat ional  Cooperation," 
Bul le t in  of t he  Atomic Sc ien t i s t s ,  X V I ,  2 (February 1960), p. 57. 
5f One prominent European s c i e n t i s t  has extended the  conventional 
sphere of such needs (extra-national subject  matter, large investment 
of money and/or manpower) t o  include thepooridition "when the  number of 
special ized research workers within the  n a t i o n ' i s  too l imited t o  staff 
committees (always subject  t o  rapid turnover) which are asked t o  e laborate  
s c i e n t i f i c  po l ic ies  and evaluate research proposals i n  the  ever increasing 
number of special ized discipl ines ."  Adrian0.A. Buzza 
t i f i c  Research: The Case f o r  Internat ional  Support," 
(June 11, 1965), p. 1442. 
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cooperation between nations appears to be capable of producing, in the- 
foreseeable future, some form of permanent supranational political 
entity. 
pean leaders have sought domains of joint action. Pressure from the 
demands of science and technology made it an obvious choice for such 
joint action, and the suitability of science for international coopera- 
tion seemed to create conditions for a long and happy marriage. 
Thus, with the ultimate goal of political unity in mind, Euro- 
2.  Functionalism 
The theory which views international cooperation in various sectors 
of society as leading to political integration of the nations concerned 
is known as "functionalism," or in its specifically European incarnation, 
"sector integration." In conventional usage, the theory is more broadly 
conceived than is relevant for purposes of this discussion. 52 Neverthe- 
less, a brief description of its main points is important as a context 
in which to view the role of international laboratories. 
The most direct application of functionalist theory to international 
scientific cooperation resulted in the establishment of EURATOM (the 
European Atomic Energy Community, see Chapter 111). Here .a technical 
vehicle (nuclear energy) was consciously chosen as a functional means of 
52 An elaborate discussion by one of the theory's chief proponents 
may be found in Ernst B. Haas, Beyond the Nation-State (Stanford, Calif: 
Stanford University Press, 1964). 
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fur ther ing  a primarily p o l i t i c a l  goal (un i f ica t ion  of the  Six) .53 
way of introducing a well-reasoned analysis of EURATOM, Lawrence 
Scheinman presents a b r i e f  summary of func t iona l i s t  arguments: 
By 
Current theory pos tu la tes  t h a t  under c e r t a i n  conditions 
(pr inc ipa l ly  ideological and socio-economic homogeneity) 
certain functions ( soc ia l  and economic welfare issues t h a t  
a r e  f a i r l y  s p e c i f i c  but no t  so l imited as t o  lack the  
qua l i t y  of po ten t i a l  ' sp i l l ove r '  i n t o  o ther  functional 
a c t i v i t y ) ,  performed under c e r t a i n  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  arrange- 
ments (primarily expert bodies vested with a degree of 
autonomy and power t o  acr di.rectly on the ' i n t e rna t iona l  
constituency) , are  conducive t o  a growing interdependence 
of t he  pa r t i c ipan t s  and t o  an increasing in tegra t ion  of 9- 
previously separate and aQtonomous e n t i t i e s .  Although not 
all par t i c ipan t s ,  such as government o f f i c i a l s ,  p o l i t i c a l  
leaders,  and i n t e r e s t  group spokesmen, share a common view 
of the  r e s u l t  of t h i s  increasing interdependence, the 
general expectation of most i s  t h a t  a new, curren t ly  
undefined, p o l i t i c a l  community w i l l  eventually emerge.S4 
Stanley Hoffmann captures t h e  essence of t h e  argument i n  noting that 
one of the  c ruc ia l  assumptions of the  func t iona l i s t  theory is: 
t h a t  t h e  dilemma of governments having t o  choose b_etween pur- 
suing an in tegra t ion  t h a t  t i e s  t h e i r  hands and stopping 
a movement t h a t  bene f i t s  t h e i r  people could be exploited 
i n  favor o f  in tegra t ion  by men representing the common 
good, endowed with the advantages of superior exper t i se ,  
i n i t i a t i n g  proposals, propped against  a set of deadlines, 
and using for t h e i r  cause the  techniques of package deals.55 
53 We are ,  admittedly, mingling s c i e n t i f i c  cooperation with techno- 
log ica l  cooperation. 
subjec t  matter i s  la rge ly  scient i f ic  (nuclear research),  t he  context is  
technological and economic (power production) and much of the  in te rna t ion-  
alism of the  s c i e n t i f i c  community is overshadowed by the  nationalism of 
t he  i n d u s t r i a l  sec tor .  Our confusion i n  t h i s  respect,  however, mirrors 
t h a t  of the  policy-makers e 
In  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  case of EURATOM, although the  
54 Lawrence Scheinman , "Euratom, Nuclear In tegra t ion  i n  Europe," 
In te rna t iona l  Conciliation, No. 563 (May 1967.), p .  6. 
55 Stanley Hoffmann, *'Obstinate or.Obsolete? ?'he Fate of t h e  Nation- 
S ta t e  and the  Case of Western Europe," Daedalus, XCV, 3 (Summer 1966), p .  883. 
53 
Putt ing matters even more concisely, i n  l a t  iqu  nn 
observes t h a t  
e ignty "could 
t h i s  metaphor 
it would seem 
functionalism involves t c ta t ion  t h a t  
be chewed up leaf by leaf l i k e  an artichoke 
a b i t  (through l i t e r a r y  though not  ag r i cu l tu ra l  l icense) , 
t h a t  the  t i o n a l i s t s  see scienc and technology a 
la rge  but  e a s i l y  d iges t ib l e  leaves whose digest ion i n  the  in te rna t iona l  
(European) stomach should be a major s t ep  toward the  development of i n t e r -  
dependence and the l imi ta t ion  of nat ional  sovereignty. 
There a re  four general means by which funct ional  in tegra t ion  i s  
supposed t o  operate.57 F i r s t ,  a s e t  of decisions i s  removed from the domain 
of in te rna t iona l  p o l i t i c s  and turned over t o  a special ized agency with 
c e r t a i n  supranational powers. 
means the  subs t i t u t ion  of welfare decision-making c r i t e r i a  f o r  power. 
large-scale in te rna t iona l  s c i e n t i f i c  cooperation such decision 
t h e  leve l  of a supranational executive, conceivably could involve the 
a l loca t ion  of s c i e n t i f i c  resources and the d i s t r ibu t ion  of e f f o r t  across 
To use the  func t iona l i s t  vocabulary, t h i s  
In  
member s t a t e s  i n  ce r t a in  f i e l d s .  Second, the  lessons learned i n  a given 
sec to r  may be applied t o  o ther  sec tors .  
of successful operation o r  by the st imulation of i t s  own requirements for 
say, materials, manpower, o r  lega l  authori ty ,  an in te rna t iona l  laboratory 
Thus e i t h e r  by providing an example 
57 See Haas, Beyond the  Nation-State, pp. 21-22, 47-50. 
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might encourage in tegra t ive  e f f o r t s  i n  other  sectors." [This is the  
widely-held n 
is favored through 
~b of "spil l-over . 
p o l i t i c a l  act s.  A t  t he  l e  of large-scale i 
cooperation, t h e  de fac to '  science policy-making 
a pos i t ive  contribution i n  the  func t iona l i s t  se 
tence of a supranational e n t i t y  provides the  bas i s  for the  development 
of a la rger  set of loya l t ies  which may be superimposed on national 
-7
al legiances.  This i s  of pa r t i cu la r  relevance t o  in te rna t iona l  labora- 
t o r i e s :  
o r ien ta t ion ,  the  evolution of a Europeanist technological e l i t e  through 
s ince it i s  widely assumed tha t  s c i e n t i s t s  are in te rna t iona l  i n  
s c i e n t i s t s '  par t ic ipa t ion  i n  such organizations could be ant ic ipated .as 
an outcome. 
3 .  Reality and Its Discontents 
It i s  probably f a i r  t o  say tha t  despite a l l  of i t s  func t iona l i s t  
po ten t ia l ,  in te rna t iona l  s c i e n t i f i c  cooperation i n  Europe--including 
large-scale organization--has not t o  date had any marked e f f ec t  on Euro- 
pean integrat ion.  
investment as well as p o l i t i c a l  potential--EURATOM--has been a great  
disappointment, f a l l i n g  victim, prac t ica lsy  s ince i t s  inception, t o  one 
crisis after another. 
CERN-cannot honestly claim much current impact on the  European p 
The mo3t ambitious project  i n  terms of f inanc ia l  
. 
The most successful pro jec t  i n  a s c i e n t i f i c  sense- 
scene. Nevertheless, the problem i s  not a t  a l l  r e s t r i c t e d  t o  s c i e n t i f i c  
58 An unsuccessful example, of course, might discourage such e f f o r t s .  
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cooperation. A large dose of economic integrat ion,  accomplished through 
the Common Market, has f a i l e d  t o  produce any percept ible  movement toward 
European p o l i t i c a l  un i ty  and even a casual look a t  the recent po l ic ies  of 
the major European governments suggests t h a t  nationalism--or a t  least 
the asser t ion  of nat ional  self- interest--has  grown ra ther  than declined 
over the pas t  decade. 
The tyranny of rea l i ty - - tha t  "the nat ion-state  is  s t i l l  here  and 
the new Jerusalem has been postponed"--is analyzed with considerable 
ins ight  i n  the above-quoted ar t ic le  by Hoffmann. 59 
Scheinman's analysis  of EURATOM, t h i s  paper provides the elements of an 
Read together with 
understanding of what has, i n  f a c t ,  occurred i n  Europe. Hoffmann speaks 
of a "logic of divers i ty"  i n  the nat ional  s i t ua t ions  of the various 
European countr ies ,  and describes the events of the  pas t  15 years as a 
race between the  logic  of in tegra t ion  ( in  the func t iona l i s t  model) and 
the log ic  of d ivers i ty .  
arena i n  Hoffmann's analysis :  (1) the temporary demise of nationalism 
following World War 11, (2)  the p o l i t i c a l  collapse of the old Europe, 
and (3) the  balance of t e r r o r  between the United S ta tes  and the Soviet 
Union. Under these conditions,  i n  the:late 40's and SO'S, countries with 
diverse  na t iona l  s i t ua t ions  were temporarily a l l i e d  i n  t h e i r  j o i n t  des i re  
Three main features  govern the European p o l i t i c a l  
(although f o r  divergent reasons) f o r  European in tegra t ion .  As the  s i t u -  
a t iona l  allowed, however, the d ive r s i ty  of motives which the countries 
brought t o  in tegra t ive  e f fo r t s  emerged, and the logic  of d ivers i ty  has 
apparently won the race.  
59 Hoffmann, "Obstinate or Obsolete? :'", p. 863. 
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In looking c r i t i c a l l y  a t  func t iona l i s t  theory, Hoffmann observes 
t h a t  the  log ic  of d ive r s i ty  "sets l i m i t s  t o  t h e  degree t o  which the  ' s p i l l -  
over' process can l i m i t  the  freedom of action of t he  governments.1160 
Furthermore, it restricts the  domain of functional in tegra t ion  t o  welfare 
a c t i v i t i e s .  In essence, the  log ic  argues i n  favor of  na t iona l  prefer- 
ence f o r  the r e l a t i v e  c e r t a i n t i e s  of na t iona l  control r a t h e r  than the  
ambiguities of supranational dominance. The two most important general 
lessons which may be drawn from the European experience with functional 
in tegra t ion ,  according t o  Hoffmann, a r e  tha t :  (1) '!its . . success 
i n  the  r e l a t i v e l y  painless area i n  which it works r e l a t i v e l y  well l i f ts  
the  pa r t i c ipan t s  t o  the  leve l  of issues t o  which it does not apply well 
any more," and (2) "by t ry ing  t o  be a force, the  [functional]  bureaucracy 
here, inevitably,  makes i t s e l f  even more of a s take  t h a t  t he  nations t r y  
t o  control or at least t o  affect."63 
Scheinman's analysis of EURATOM provides some ins ights  on techno- 
log ica l  aspects of in tegra t ion .  
Eunctional in tegra t ion  has not only f a i l e d  t o  f o s t e r  t he  desired po l i -  
t ical  i n i t i a t i v e s ,  but has a l s o  f a i l e d  t o  produce a v iab le  body i n  a 
technological sense. 
generali ty,  a number of h i s  po in ts  are applicable t o . a r e a s  of s c i e n t i f i c  
and technological cooperation outside of nuclear energy.62 
EURATOM is  an organization i n  which 
While much of Scheinman's argument is of l imited 
F i r s t  of a l l ,  
Ib id  p. 882. 
-a ' 
Ib id  pp. 887-888. - ' 
62 See Scheinman, llNuclear Integration ,I1 pp. 57 ' E € .  
t he  r e s t r i c t i o n  of EURATOM t o  a highly spec i f  
(nuclear energy), considered an advantage i n  the  func t iona l i s t  view, has 
a t  least one important drawback-the fact t h a t  it does not permit (as 
the  Common Market does) i n t e r s e c t o r a l  bargaining between nations.  Second, 
the assumption t h a t  technical experts can generally reach agreement on 
technical grounds where p o l i t i c i a n s  f a i l  i s  not always va l id .  
l a r l y  where the  subjec t  matter is hardware-oriented (technological) r a t h e r  
than knowledge-oriented ( s c i e n t i f i c )  and the economic cos ts  and payoffs 
are high, technica l  experts from d i f f e r e n t  nations have a tendency ( i l l u s -  
t r a t e d  by Scheinman f o r  s p e c i f i c  cases i n  EURATOM)63 t o  act very much 
l i k e  p o l i t i c i a n s .  Thi rd ,  the  rapid change which i s  so  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  
of modern technology may decrease the  will ingness of nations which see  
themselves as less advanced i n  ce r t a in  technological areas t o  make 
short-term concessions. Although trading such concessions is of ten  
necessary i n  the  functional process, f e a r  of f a l l i n g  f a r t h e r  behind i n  a 
Particu- 
v i t a l  technology might well prove an inh ib i t i on  f o r  a concerned na t ion .  
Perhaps Scheinman's most general point i s  t h a t  cooperative ventures 
i n  scientific/technological f i e l d s  cannot have r e a l  e f f e c t s  on p o l i t i c a l  
i n t eg ra t ion  without becoming p o l i t i c i z e d  themselves. 
sense the  beauty of employing s c i e n t i f i c  cooperation f o r  the  furtherance 
of p o l i t i c a l  in tegra t ion  hinges on the in t e rna t iona l ,  non-polit ical  
nature of science.  
the science is seen by national governments as being e s s e n t i a l l y  i r r e l evan t  
In  the  func t iona l i s t  
This non-pol i t ica l  condition can only obta in  when 
63 Ib id  pp. 63-64. -* ' 
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t o  v i t a l  policy goals. 
d i v e r s i t y  is’ l i k e l y  t o  p reva i l .  
Where it becomes relevant,  Hoffmann’s log ic  of 
t i o n a l  labora tor ies  i n  particular--appears then i n  
of an ambiguous s i t u a t i o n .  
ment for fos t e r ing  European (-and po ten t i a l ly  wider) in tegra t ion  through 
the func t iona l i s t  model. In  r e a l i t y ,  although some in te rna t iona l  labor- 
a t o r i e s  seem t o  work b e t t e r  than o thers ,  the  functional approach i t s e l f  
appears t o  be severely flawed. 
continue t o  exist and t h e  fu ture  w i l l  su re ly  bring demands f o r  more of 
thegi,’for as Sainmon pbints.olly, 
On paper such cooperation is an i d e a l  i n s t ru -  
Neiiertheless these  laboratories w i l l  
. . . intergovernmental co-operation i n  science and tech- 
nology i s  the  only way i n  which the  European countries can 
a t  t h e  same time concentrate “resources and avoid being 
eliminated from the  game.64 
And i n  t h e i r  operation, with or without the  benef i t  of functionalism 
these labora tor ies  w i l l ,  by de f in i t i on ,  play some p o l i t i c a l  ro l e .  
There a re  innumerable ways t o  a t tack  the  problem of studying t h i s  
This study has chosen t o  do so  through a d i r e c t  and empirical ro l e .  
examination of t he  a t t i t u d e s  and behavior of t he  s c i e n t i s t s  and engineers 
who comprise t h e  professional population of these labora tor ies .  Such an 
t o  leave unanswered many highly i n t e r e s t i n g  and even 
v i t a l  questions. As a poin t  of entry,  neverthel ss, it has a number of 
64 Jean- Jacques Sal omon, “Fe as i b i  lit y of Mu1 t i 1 a t  era1 Co- operat i on, 
Nature CCXVIII, 5144 (June 1, 1968), p. 819. -’ 
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s i g n i f i c a n t  merits. 
The p o l i t i c a l  r o l e  of the  in t e rna t iona l  labora tor ies  may be concep- 
tua l i zed  as depending upon two sets of fac tors :  
t o  the  performance of the  laboratory as a s c i e n t i f i c  o r  technical i n s t i -  
(1) those which r e l a t e  
tution, (2) those which relate t o  the  p o l i t i c a l  performance of t he  
laboratory i n  the  sense of the  functional model. 
set of f ac to r s ,  concerning the  performance of the  laboratory as a scien- 
t i f i c  i n s t i t u t i o n ,  is important from many points of view. 
Obviously, t he  first 
I t  i s  not 
unreasonable t o  suppose t h a t  the  laboratory's  in te rna t iona l  character 
may influence the behavior of i t s  s c i e n t i s t s .  In the words of Salomon, 
The working together o f  s c i e n t i s t s  from d i f f e r e n t  countries 
i n  one laboratory ce r t a in ly  poses d i f f i c u l t i e s  which should 
not be minimized: the d i v e r s i t y  of t h e i r  t r a in ing ,  languages 
and attitudes is not the  most favourable f a c t o r  f o r  communi- 
ca t ion  (even s c i e n t i f i c )  o r  for the  e f f ic iency  of an enter- 
p r i s e  . . . In t h i s  connexion, it is t o  be regre t ted  tha t  there 
has been no research ca r r i ed  out i n  Europe on the  behaviour 
of s c i e n t i s t s  i n  an in te rna t iona l  laboratory and the  organi- 
zational and 'ecological f ac to r s  a f f ec t ing  t h e i r  c r e a t i v i t y .  65 
Internationalism is  more than an abs t rac t  p r inc ip l e  i n  these labora tor ies ;  
it is  a f a c t  of da i ly  l i f e  whose consequences must continually be reck- 
oned with. 
environment, as they weigh i t s  a s se t s  and l i a b i l i t i e s ,  and as they r eac t  
By looking a t  t h e  s c i e n t i s t s  as they operate i n  t h i s  new 
t o  it as a professional but a l s o  personal experience, one may g e t  some 
f ee l ing  f o r  the  s c i e n t i f i c  po ten t i a l  and l imi t a t ions  of i n t e rna t iona l  
labora tor ies .  Through t h i s  same process, i n  learning who the  s c i e n t i s t s  
are, from where they have come, and where they are going (or hope t o  go), 
65 Ibid., p. 821. -
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the p o s s i b i l i t y  of r e l a t i n g  these  research establishments t o  the  broader 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l  s t ruc tu re  of science and technology i n  Europe presents 
i t s e l f .  
In  term of the  second set of f ac to r s ,  the s c i e n t i s t s  and engineers 
i n  in te rna t iona l  laborator ies  behave not only as t h e i r  professional  
ro les  d i c t a t e ,  but a l s q i n  varying degree; as p o l i t i c a l  animals. 
the more i n t e r e s t i n g  aspects  of the  func t iona l i s t  approach l i e s  i n  i t s  
project ion of  a developing e l i t e ,  committed t o  the  ul t imate  goal of 
p o l i t i c a l  i n t e g r a t i m .  
peanis t  o r ien ta t ions  do develop among many high leve l  o f f i c i a l s  [both 
i n  nat ional  and in te rna t iona l  pos i t ions)  who have par t ic ipa ted  i n  
One of 
There is evidence t o  suggest t h a t  s t rong Eura- 
funct ional ly  in t eg ra t ive  a c t i v i t i e s ,  Lindberg, i n  a study of policy- 
making on agr icu l ture  i n  the  Common Market, repor t s :  
Among the  38 high nat ional  agr icu l ture  o f f i c i a l s  interviewed, 
there  appeared t o  be a s t r i k i n g  s imi l a r i t y  of outlook . . . 
A re turn  t o  a s t r i c t l y  nat ional  approach was considered 
impossible by most, and unthinkabik or highly undesirable by 
a l l  .66 
He a t t r i b u t e s  such Europeanist a t t i t u d e s  t o  pa r t i c ipa t ion  i n  the system: 
Our analysis  has revealed the  extent  t o  which c i v i l  servants 
become soc ia l ized  i n t o  the  Community system b v i r t u e  of 
t h e i r  in tense  pa r t i c ipa t ion  i n  it. over time. 6); 
I t  is perhaps i n  this respect  t h a t  an inves t iga t ion  of the  behavior 
of the  scient is ts-and the a t t i t u d e  s t ruc tu re  which determines and 
character izes  t h i s  behavior--can be conceived of as a bridge between the  
66 Leon N .  Lindberg, "Decision Making and Integrat ion i n  the 
European Community," In te rna t iona l  Organization, X I X ,  1 (Winter 1965), 
p. 72. 
67 Ib id . ,  p. 76. -
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func t iona l i s t  i d e a l  and the  more mundane r e a l i t y .  To what extent does 
the  scientists '  behavior represent,  as one s c i e n t i s t  claimed, "all  t h e  
problems of Europe i n  a microcosm"? O r  is there ,  r a the r ,  within these 
international communities a broad consensus on t h e  major European issues? 
How, f i n a l l y ,  do the  scientists '  a t t i t u d e s  develop over the  time they 
spend i n  the  laboratory? 
theory, t h e  fu ture  p o l i t i c a l  r o l e  o f  such labora tor ies  and-their  i n t e r n a l  
p o l i t i c a l  climates a re  in t r igu ing  subjects f o r  study. 
In  any case, with o r  without func t iona l i s t  
In sum, then, both as s c i e n t i f i c  i n s t i t u t i o n s  qua s c i e n t i f i c  i n s t i t u -  
t ions  and as pa r t  of the  p o l i t i c a l  scene i n  Western Europe, in te rna t iona l  
labora tor ies  are worthy o f  inves t iga t ion .  
needs of science and f a c i l i t a t e d  by the in t e rna t iona l  character of  science 
i tself ,  c rea tes  opportunities f o r  science as well as f o r  broader segments 
of soc ie ty .  
depends i n  p a r t  on how much is  known about t h e i r  performance t o  date.  
it does not propose t o  provide any f i n a l  answers t o  the  questions a t  hand, 
t h i s  t hes i s  undertakes t o  begin the asking process. 
Their existence, based on the 
The degree t o  which they w i l l  l i v e  up to  these opportunities 
While 

THE STORY OF THIS STUDY 
The idea of studying in t e rna t iona l  labora tor ies  and the  s c i e n t i s t s  
who inhabi t  these laborator ies  began t o  t a k e  shape i n  the  Fall of 1965. 
A developing i n t e r e s t  i n  problems of science and in te rna t iona l  affairs 
was shaped by an opportunity t o  work with some of the data  from a large 
survey of the  p o l i t i c a l  a t t i t udes  of European e l i t e s .  This in te rsec t ion  
of ideas eventually came t o  focus on a study of in te rna t iona l  s c i e n t i f i c  
laborator ies  which employs the too ls  of survey research. 
A .  The Genesis of an Idea 
The study with which the  author had the good fortune t o  become 
1 acquainted i n  the Fal l  of 1965 was The European - E l i t e  - Panel - Survey (TEEPS). 
Within the  framework of t h i s  monumental decade-long pro jec t ,  a small army 
of interviewers,  f i e l d  d i r ec to r s ,  coders, and analysts  under the  d i rec t ion  
of  D r .  Daniel Lerner of M.I.T. amassed some g personal interviews 
and an addi t ional  was 
- -  
por t  on the TEEPS pro jec t  s ee  Daniel Lerner and 
Preceding page blank 63 
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gathered i n  the years 1955, 1956, 1959, 1961, and 1965 from panels i n  
Br i ta in ,  France, and Germany. The panels f o r  a l l  years were d r  
t he  most i n f l u e n t i a l  groups i n  publ i  rs: e l ec t ive  p o l i t i  
top c i v i l  servants ,  t r ade  union le  
cat ion e l i t e . "  These individuals  were asked t o  a r t i c u l a t e  t h e i r  views on 
a range of current--and of ten controversial--issues including such matters 
as East-West r e l a t ions ,  European in tegra t ion  e f f o r t s ,  the  At lan t ic  Commun- 
i t y ,  and the  arms race and disarmament. Although a great  deal of analysis  
on p a r t s  of t he  s u n e y  had been done over the  years,  the Fa l l  of 1965 
marked the  beginning of t he  f i n a l  ana ly t i ca l  s tage:  a l l  the  mater ia l  had 
been col lected and the time had come t o  take an overview of the complete 
da ta  set. 
, clergy,  and the  flcommuni- 
A t  various times during the  research on TEEPS, spec ia l  panels cover- 
ing pa r t i cu la r ly  in t e re s t ing  groups which did not f i t  i n t o  the  main panels 
were added t o  the study. One such s i d e  panel comprised, i n  1956, a mail 
questionnaire t o  the presidents  of France's l a rges t  corporations.  
t h i s  one i n  1965, included respondents from high leve ls  i n  the  bureaucracy 
of t h e  European Community i n  Brussels as well as members of the  European 
Another, 
Parliament i n  Strasbaurg. 
lar  i n t e r e s t  was a 1965 group composed of s c i e n t i s t s  and engineers a t  
CERN--the European Organization f o r  Nuclear Research a t  Geneva. 
The s i d e  panel which we found to be of par t icu-  
red questionnai 
a t  CERN by D r .  Vidya Joshi  (under the  d i r ec t ion  of D r .  Lerner) asked many 
he main e l i t e  panels i n  
n t  ervi ews 
with CERN personnel, i n  which the  respondents discussed t h e i r  personal 
65 
backgrounds, some general aspects of t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  views, and t h e i r  
experiences a t  and impressions of CERN. The author had the opportunity 
t o  do a number of small-scale analyses of t h i s  da t a  i n  the  form of term 
papers, research memos, etc. The r e s u l t s  of the most important of these 
analyses, i n  which the p o l i t i c a l  a t t i t u d e s  of CERN scientists were com- 
pared with t h e  a t t i t u d e s  of the  o ther  elite$, were summarized b r i e f l y  i n  
Chapter I .  
The da ta  from CERNpresented a t an ta l i z ing  p ic ture- - i t  ra i sed  quesr 
t i ons  which it was not capable of  answering. For one thing,  these scien- 
t ists  were c l ea r ly  highly i n t e l l i g e n t  individuals and many appeared (from 
sca t te red  voluntary comments wr i t ten  on the questionnaires and from h i n t s  
i n  the interviews) t o  have wel l -ar t iculated views &on t h e  p o l i t i c a l  scene. 
Yet, as ide  from these  comments and h in t s ,  the only expression of the scien- 
tists' views on spec i f i c  issues  which exis ted i n  the  data  were forced 
choices on the questionnaires.  Then, too,  questions on the s c i e n t i s t s  
backgrounds arose--questions whose i n t e r e s t  could not have been ant ic ipated 
i n  the  design of the  CERN study. 
t o  an in te rna t iona l  laboratory? 
l e f t ?  
l a r l y  with regard t o  p o l i t i c a l  or ientat ion? 
Why had these individuals chosen t o  come 
Where did they intend t o  go when they 
Had the  in te rna t iona l  experience changed them i n  any way, par t icu-  
The CERN panel had been added t o  the TEEPS program f o r  1965 i n  an 
e f f o r t  t o  include an important e l i t e  segment of European society whose 
a t t i t u d e s  had not previously been studied systematically.  In the present 
'The questionnaire,  i n  fact, was a less*-than-ideal instrument, s ince  
it had been designed f o r  use i n  a study of European Community c i v i l  
servants. 
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erest in this panel ed in scope and br 
in an international laboratory 
itself--independent of TEEPS. 
wanted to explore began to multiply until the central core--the political 
attitudes of the scientists--was enveloped in a whole matrix of p 
At the same time, the questions which we 
B. Hypotheses 
"he process through which this study developed was not a neat progres- 
sion from idea to hypothesis to experiment to conclusions. 
cally, there was a continual feedback and revision process through which 
the original ideas and hypotheses were modified as the experimentgro- . 
gressed. 
More realisti- 
Thus, although the process is described here in itraightforward 
fashion, it should be reco&zed that the novelty of the subject caused 
its conceptualization at the beginning to be less rigorous than we later 
would have liked. 
At the center of the conceptual scheme was the concept of "interns- 
tionalism.fl 
rather ill-defined. 
cept, at least as it applied to the political attitudes of scientists. 
was tentatively decided to search for the dimensions of internationalism 
ation and commitment to PO 
With regard to the present context, this notion is really 
Hence one object of the study was to refine the con- 
It 
varying geographical scope, as well as varying scopes of activities and 
authority. It was hypothesized that internationalism, to the extent that 
e could succe ould increase 
time a icientis onal laboratory--assuming that the 
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i n t e rna t iona l  aspect of t h e  
On the  bas i s  of t 
data) it proposed tha t  na t iona l i t y  should be one of t he  
ables.  
p o l i t i c a l  views should be determined i n  p a r t  by h i s  na t iona l i t y  ( the  po l i -  
cies, i n t e r e s t s ,  and t r a d i t i o n s  of h i s  country) and i n  t by the in f lu -  
ences of h i s  scient i f ic  background. 
The hypothesis germane t o  t h i s  po in t  is t h a t  t he  ind iv idua l ' s  
An i n t e r e s t i n g  coro l la ry  t o  t h i s  would 
be tha t ,  under the  influence of t he  in t e rna t iona l  s i t ua t ion ,  d i f fe rences  
i n  p o l i t i c a l  views among various n a t i o n a l i t i e s  should decrease with time. 
Some i n s t i t u t i o n a l  differences i n  the  p o l i t i c a l  views of s c i e n t i s t s  
a t  various in t e rna t iona l  centers were an t ic ipa ted .  This might be due t o  a 
process of prese lec t ion  as well as t o  the  influence of t h e  c e n t e r ' s  atmos- 
phere and or ien ta t ion .  In pa r t i cu la r ,  it w a s ,  f e l t  t h a t  s c i e n t i s t s  a t  or- 
ganizations aimed more d i r e c t l y  a t  p o l i t i c a l  goals (such =as EURATOM) would 
tend t o  display g rea t e r  involvement with these  goals (unity o f  the  Six, i n  
t he  case of EURATOM) than s c i e n t i s t s  a t  o ther  organizations. On the other 
hand, i t  was believed tha t  an overa l l  consensus among s c i e n t i s t s  should 
dominate s p e c i f i c  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  differences.  
We sought confirmation of some of t he  conclusions which came out of 
t he  CERN study: t h a t  the  average s c i e n t i s t  i n  these  centers displays a 
subs t an t i a l  interest i n  p o l i t i c a l  matters, but not a heavy emotional invest-  
ment i n  p o l i t i c s ;  and t h a t  views converge around a " l e f t i s t "  consensus. 
I t  w a s  a l s o  hypothesized t h a t  s c i e n t i s t s  and engineers would d i f f e r  i n  
t h e i r  general o r ien ta t ions ,  bu t  we sensed d i f f i c u l t y  i n  distinguishing 
S y conventional m 
f i  g i n  
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associates i n  their home countries,  t h e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  they 
l ies had i n  adjust ing t o  l i f e  as in te rna t iona l  c i v i l  servants  i n  a foreign 
country, the  degree t o  which the language b a r r i e r  in te r fe red  with technical  
work. 
but had never been asked of "real  l i v e  people." 
was a novel area of exploration; we would need t o  deal f lex ib ly  w i t h  our 
hypotheses, and while maintaining order and purpose, in ten t iona l ly  in t ro-  
duce some of t he  elements of a f i sh ing  expedition. 
problem of research design was attacked. 
t h e i r  fami- 
A l l  of these questions were not d i f f i c u l t  t o  answer i n  pr inc ip le ,  
Overall,  we f e l t  t h a t  t h i s  
On t h i s  basis ,  t h e  
C. Methodology: Experimental Design and Data Collection 
The r e s u l t s  of an experiment a re  determined by the  pa r t i cu la r  aspects 
of the  general problem at  which the experimenter chooses t o  look, by the  
instruments he employs, by t h e  s k i l l  with which he employs these ins t ru-  
ments, and by the  judgement which he uses i n  in te rpre t ing  h i s  data.  
survey research experiments are  not  usually rep l icable  i n  the  sense of 
physical or l i f e  science experiments (or even controlled laboratory-situa- 
As 
he benefi t  of 
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research t h a t  t he  experimenter repor t  f u l l y  on h i s  methods, so t h a t  the  
reader can properly evaluate the experimenter's concl 
sect ion as well as the  next, therefore ,  w e  s h a l l  ou t l ine  
i n  some d e t a i l .  
1. S i t e  Select ion 
Several a l t e rna t ive  routes appeared t o  be open fo r  dealing with the 
questions i n  which w e  were interested.  We had the  options of: (1) going 
as deeply as possible  i n t o  the CERN da ta  without gathering any more; 
(2) attempting t o  gather addi t ional  da ta  from CERN t o  supplement the orig- 
irial material;  (3) attempting t o  r ep l i ca t e  the  study a t  CERN with a ref ined 
instrument; (4) carrying aut  a similar study with a ref ined instrument (or 
the o r ig ina l  instrument) a t  another in te rna t iona l  laboratory; or  (S) per- 
forming a study of several laborator ies  (including CERN) with a new instru- 
ment, 
found i t  lacked some element of suspense--evidently we chose the last 
option. 
a la rger  sample of s c i e n t i s t s  of several  key na t iona l i t i e s ;  we hoped t o  be 
able  t o  assess i n s t i t u t i o n a l  differences between the various in te rna t iona l  
centers; and we hoped t o  obtain,  over the e n t i r e  sample, da ta  on per t inent  
i s sues  t h a t  were not covered in  the or ig ina l  study. 
The reader ,  recognizing the tone of such an enumeration, probably 
By performing a study of several  laborator ies  we hoped t o  obtain 
I t  was decided t o  r e s t r i c t  the  study t o  in te rna t iona l  s c i e n t i f i c  
organizations which ac tua l ly  perform in-house research. 
s c i e n t i f i c  organizations such as ELDO (European Launcher 
iza t ion)  and OECD (Organization f o r  Economic Cooperation 
were excluded ch ie f ly  because, while t h e i r  in te rna t i  
in te res t ing ,  they were administrative and not laboratory 
Internat ional  
Development Organ- 
and Development] 
secretariats were 
research bodies. 
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i n  t h e i r  employ were performing 
searchers.  The type of pe 
were expected t o  d i f f e r  s ign i f i can t ly  f 
organizations. 
centers were obvious selections-CERN, the EURATOM j o i n t  research center 
at Ispra,  and t h e  European Space Research Organization's (ESRO] technical 
center,  ESTEC. They were obvious because they a re  by far t h e  la rges t  of 
the in te rna t iona l  labora tor ies ,  and thus could provide the  most complete 
samples f o r  the  study. Then, too, each one of these centers represents 
This l e f t  a r e l a t i v e l y  small f i e l d  of choice. Three l a rge  
an important establishment i n  a major f i e l d  of "big science": high energy 
physics, nuclear power, and space technology. 
CERM, t h e  o ldes t ,  was founded i n  1954, while ESTEC came i n t o  being 10 years  
later. And, i n  addition, they a re  c red i ted  with varying degrees of suc- 
cess-&ERN has achieved world renown i n  its f i e l d ,  while ISPRA has been 
beset by a continuous p o l i t i c a l  crisis, and ESTEC has not ye t  emerged from 
its "breaking- in" period. 
They span a range of ages: 
4 
Beyond these  th ree  l a rge  centers,  under cons t ra in ts  of time and re- 
sources, 
establishments. 
one was north of t h e  Arctic Circle i n  Sweden (which was simply too far out 
of t he  way t o  v i s i t )  and two o thers  were qu i t e  t i ny ,  t h e  choice was 
narrowed t o  ESDAC, t h e  Space Data Center. 
decision was made t o  include j u s t  a few of t h e  many small 
ESRO presented several  poss ib le  candidates, bu t  s ince  
EURATOM a l s o  had th ree  j o i n t  
t e r s  i n  addition t o  ISPRA, and although none was more . 
l abora tor ies  i n  d e t a i l  here as a l l  of 
top ic .  
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desirable than any of the others, the PETTEN center came to be the most 
opportune. 
(see p. 135): in the French nuclear center in suburban Fontenay-aux-Roses 
was used for a small pretest. 
purely on the basis of accessibility and convenience of location.) 
As our field headquarters was in Paris, a EURATOM "association" 
(Selection of this establishment was made 
Two other small centers were chosen from a range of possibilities 
because of special characteristics.' 
tories of the International Atomic Energy Agency were chosen became of 
The Vienna and Seibersdorf labora- 
the highly international character of the organization--1AEA had 98 member 
states in 1967. Selection of the OECD Halden reactor project was made for 
a rather different reason--this project consists of an international con- 
tingent placed in the framework of a national atomic institute. The Inter- 
national Centre for Theoretical Physics in Trieste was also visited, but 
for a variety of reasons this very exciting establishment was not studied 
with the same methods used in the other centers and it is not included as 
part of this dissertatiofi. 
2 .  Design of the Instrument 
While selecting the laboratories from which the sample was to be drawn, 
it was necessary as well to design the instrument which would be used to 
collect the data. 
we introduced something of an innovation in the experimental technique. 
The ideal situation would have permitted us to gather all of our survey 
In an effort to conserve the best aspects of two methods, 
'see OECD, (Paris, 1965) for 
a fine enumerati ories. This book, 
indeed, proved invaluable in the selection process. 
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data  through interviews. The advantages of personal interviews o If- 
administered questionnaires a re  pa r t i cu la r ly  important i n  an exploratory 
study such as t h i s .  
t o  sample d ic ta ted  a subs tan t ia l  sample s i ze ,  w e  saw t h a t  it was going t o  
be necessary t o  use self-administered wri t ten questionnaires f o r  reasons 
However, as the various strata within which we wished 
of economy. 
of the sample and questionnaires f o r  t he  rest, while using as  nearly as 
possible  the  same instrument. 
The decision therefore  was made t o  employ interviews f o r  p a r t  
The in t en t  was t o  obtain t h e  necessary vol- -__. 
ume of respondents f o r  meaningful analysis ,  while preserving the richness 
which only interviews could supply. 
t o  each interview seemed appropriate and manageable. 
A r a t i o  of about th ree  questionnaires 
The se lec t ion  of questions proved t o  be one of the most d i f f i c u l t  
pa r t s  of t h e  pro jec t .  We expected t o  
encounter a certain amount of res i s tance  from the  subjects-on account of 
the tediousness of the  task  of f i l l i n g  out a form as  well as suspicion of 
t h e  motives of the experimenter.6 
Several cons t ra in ts  were apparent: 
This suggested keeping the  form as short 
as  possible  and avoiding highly controversial  matters. 
of t he  population, fur ther ,  made ce r t a in  types of questions seem inappro- 
p r i a t e .  
excluded on these  grounds. 
base on which the  study w a s  conceived and the  character of the  p o l i t i c a l  
a t t i t u d e s  i n  which we were in te res ted  d ic ta ted  t h a t  the  p o l i t i c a l  questions 
The e l i t e  nature 
Information tests and most types of psychological probes were 
The somewhat loosely s t ructured theore t ica l  
%he problem of being an American doing p o l i t i c a l  research abroad 
was compounded by the C I A  scandals which broke i n  the press  shor t ly  
before t h e  da ta  co l lec t ion  was t o  begin. 
tered was ra the r  less than ant ic ipated.  
I n  fact, the  res i s tance  encoun- 
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conform more t o  the  pa t te rn  used i n  the  TEEPS projec t  (more or less pol l -  
s t y l e  questions) r a the r  than t o  more sophis t icated soc ia l  science scales. 
Under these cons t ra in ts  a l ist  of questions was drawn up, ordered 
i n t o  an interview format, and pre tes ted  through a series of seven in t e r -  
views i n  the  Paris area.' 
a number modified as a result of t h i s  p re t e s t ,  but the basic  l i s t  of ques- 
t ions  remained r e l a t i v e l y  s tab le .  Subsequently, the  list of questions was 
rearranged and converted t o  a self-administered questionnaire format. 
form, pr inted i n  English, was pre tes ted  (with about 20 respondents) a t  
ESTEC, the  f irst  large laboratory v i s i t ed .  Several revis ions were made 
following the  p r e t e s t ,  and the f i n a l  questionnaire form, i n  French and 
German t rans la t ion  as well as English, w a s  p r in ted  and used f o r  t he  balance 
of the  survey. 
Several items were added, several  deleted,  and 
This 
The ac tua l  self-administered questionnaire which was employed (E% 
glish version) is reproduced i n  t h i s  volume as  Appendix 1. 
i n  Appendix 2,  by t h e  l i s t  of questions used i n  the interviews. 
covered on both included, generally:  nature of present work; professional 
background; personal background; react ions t o  internat ional  experience; 
t ies with home country; views on current topics  such as  (1) the "technolog- 
ical  gap," the  "brain drain," and the "space race," (2) European economic 
I t  i s  followed, 
The topics  
and p o l i t i c a l  integrat ion,  (3) mil i ta ry  problems, including nuclear 
weapons, and (4) East-West re la t ions .  
long, incorporating 63 amply-spaced questions. 
sections:  Professional Background, Current Experience, Current Issues,  
The questionnaire was 14 1 /2  pages 
I t  was organized i n t o  four  
' 
7The author, f o r  a period of four  months during which the preparations 
and preliminary s tages  of t h i s  pro jec t  were executed, resided i n  Par is .  
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and Personal Background. 
frankly explaining the  purpose of t he  
and e f f ec t s  of working i n  an in te rna t iona l  s c i e n t i f i c  organization"--and 
introducing the  experimenter was pr inted on the f ront .  
t i ons  were of the multiple-choice var ie ty;  of ten ''yesf1 and "nor1 we$e the  
choices prof€ered. The form was anonymous, and the  average time needed 
f o r  its completion was on the  order of twenty t o  t h i r t y  minutes. 
A covering letter (see App 1 f o r  tex t )  ' 
dy--"a study of t he  experie 
Most of the ques- 
The interview was designed t o  run about one hour. All questions were 
asked i n  an open-ended form, with the  respondent being free t o  in t e rp re t  
and answer them as he pleased. 
the  wr i te r  o r  h i s  wife (who served as  a research a s s i s t an t  on the pro jec t ) .  
Hence, because t h e  interviewers were not simply "hired-hands," it was pos- 
s i b l e  t o  allow more f l e x i b i l i t y  than i s  customary i n  s t ruc tured  interviews, 
and questions were sometimes added and sometimes omitted as t he  s i t ua t ion  
seemed t o  require ,  
All of the interviews were car r ied  out by 
The interviews were tape-recorded with the subjects  
knowledge and verbatim t r ansc r ip t s .o f  each interview were typed. Nearly 
a l l  of the  interviews were conducted i n  English--occasionally switching 
i n t o  another tongue f o r  clarification--with the  exception of three which 
were carr ied out i n  French. 
3. 
A sample s i z e  of about 400 was chosen. 
Operational Pro-cedure and Sample Selection 
This f igure  was arr ived at by 
taking a smallest cell size of 10 respondents and t i p ly ing  it first by 
80missions were caused ch ief ly  by t i m e  pressure o r  by the  fact t h a t  
the  respondent had already covered the  pa r t i cu la r  question 
a previous question. A number of questions were developed 
with as the  study progressed. 
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4 (for the number of laboratories: ESTEC, CERN, ISPRA, and "other"), then 
by 2 (far the time-spent-in-laboratory variable: high and low), and 
finally by 5 (for the nationalities: British, French, German, Italian, 
and "other") .' This meant about 300 questionnaires and 100 interviews 
according to our scheme. 
large laboratories, with the remainder to be divided up among these 
smaller centers. 
We estimated 100 respondents at each of the three 
During the preparatory stages of the project, arrangements were made 
to gain access to each of the selected centers. This was by no means a 
trivial task and it occupied a substantial amount of our time. We decided 
t o  abandon our Paris headquarters in the Spring and perform the entire 
data collection job in one manic sweep lasting from mid-April through the 
end of July (19671, and covering, geographically, most of the map of 
Western Europe. This plan allowed for a visit of approximately three weeks 
at each of the large centers, and about one week at each of the smaller 
ones. lo Travelling between the laboratories involved well over 3,500 miles 
of driving. 
the map of Western Europe in Figure 2.1. 
The relative positions of the various centers are shown on 
The numbers by which the labor- 
atories are designated indicate the sequence in which they were visited. 
Each visit was a period of frenzied activity--interviewing, distributing 
It should be noted that the data processing system employed in our 
analysis is an extremely flexible one, allowing great facility of division 
and recombination. 
larger than th is  basic figure. 
Hence most of the analysis deals with cells much 
lo ESTEC, where the questionnaire pretest was done, was revisited for 
an additional week in July, in order to augment the sample. 
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and co l l ec t ing  questionnaires,  as well as organizing t h e  data,  while a t  
t h e  same time t ry ing  t o  observe and absorb as much as possible of t he  
environment. 
Essent ia l ly ,  what was done after a r r iv ing  a t  a laboratory was t o  
arrange f o r  the  individual who was handling our v i a i t "  t o  introduce us 
t o  d iv is ion  and department heads. From here, personal introductions t o  
lower echelons were sought, and through these  introductions we scheduled 
interviews and personally d i s t r ibu ted  questionnaires.  
worthy with regard t o  t h i s  mode of  procedure: 
derived through conventional random se l ec t ion  operations, and (2) personal 
contact was u t i l i z e d  extensively a t  a l l  l eve ls .  
Two things are note- 
(1) the  sample was not 
That random se l ec t ion  methods were not used resu l ted  from the  f a c t  
We chose t o  set  t h a t  they were deemed ne i the r  necessary nor p r a c t i c a l .  
quotas f o r  the  four la rge  na t iona l i t y  groups and accept smaller numbers 
of t he  o ther  n a t i o n a l i t i e s ,  r a the r  than making the  sample correspond 
s t r i c t l y  t o  the percentage composition of the labs .  As the  population was 
limited t o  professional grade employees of  t he  several  cen ters  se lec ted ,  
i ts  magnitude was not large r e l a t i v e  t o  the projected sample s i z e .  We 
estimated the  t o t a l  number of po ten t i a l  respondents a t  s l i g h t l y  more than 
2,000.12 Discounting t h i s  f igure  somewhat t o  account f o r  the  fact t h a t  
11' The pos i t ion  of t h i s  individual var ied  from one establishment t o  
another, ranging from the  head of the  center  i n  one place t o  a representa- 
t i ve  of the public r e l a t ions  o f f i c e  i n  another. 
l2 Table 3.1 i n  the  next chapter gives the  f igures  from WUUI w e  
arrived at  t h i s  estimate. 
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some of the  po ten t i a l  respondents would be i n e l i g i b l e  on t h e  grounds of 
t h e i r  na t iona l i t y ,  we could conclude tha t  a sample of about 400 would rep- 
resent between 20% and 25% of t h e  t o t a l  population. 
centage, and the fact t h a t  t he  procedure, which consisted of sampling 
through a sequence of personal introductions,  contained no apparent b i a s ,  
we decided t h a t  the  gain from attempting t o  obtain complete l ists  of poten- 
t i a l  respondents and se l ec t ing  people from such l ists  by random methods 
I n  view of t h i s  per- 
would not be worth the  cost  of such a procedure. Our decision was re in-  
forced by the  fact t h a t  such l ists  (including names, n a t i o n a l i t i e s ,  and 
professional grades) were not readi ly  ava i lab le  i n  t he  centers,  and 
attempting t o  compile them would have i n f i n i t e l y  complicated our task. 
F ina l ly ,  the agreements which we made with t h e  administrations of t he  vari-  
ous centers--which were not i n e a l l  cases overly enthusiastic-about allowing 
us t o  poke about asking p o l i t i c a l  questions--stressed t h a t  each indivi-  
dua l ' s  pa r t i c ipa t ion  i n  the study would be purely voluntary, and we saw 
personal d i s t r ibu t ion  and co l lec t ion  as a means of optimizing responsive- 
ness under these circumstances. 
The personal contact upon which our method depended a l s o  provided 
several benefits. The sanction which was gained through being introduced 
by one f r i end  t o  another o r  by a d iv is ion  o r  group leader t o  a member of 
h i s  or her  staff proved invaluable i n  gaining the  confidence of subjec ts .  
The fact t h a t  we returned--several times i f  necessary--to c o l l e c t  a ques- 
t i onna i r e  from each subject t o  whom we had given one a l s o  gained us many 
responses which we would have otherwise l o s t  on account of t he  respondent's 
l az iness  or forgetfulness.  The fact t h a t  we ac tua l ly  took t h e  t rouble  t o  
meet and speak with each respondent a l s o  convinced them of our s i n c e r i t y ,  
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agreed t o  pa r t i c ipa t e  ( e i the r  by being interviewed or by 
returned a completed-form. 
(although a few were postponed fo r  a day o r  two) .I3 
j e c t s '  commitment was demonstrated by the fact t h a t  a large percentage of 
the questionnaire rec ip ien ts  took advantage of t he  space allowed f o r  
voluntary comments and wrote extensively,  and by the  fact t h a t  interviews 
designed t o  require  no more than one hour, averaged about one and a quarter  
hours (they ranged from 35 minutes t o  over 3 hours). 
Not one interview appointment was ever broken 
Furthermore, the  sub- 
D. Methodology: Data Reduction and Analysis 
The t o t a l  sample obtained, a f t e r  elimination of duplicates'' and the  
few people of non-professional grade who managed t o  creep in ,  came out t o  
384-slightly lower than the  projected 400. O f  these,  279 were 
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questionnaires and 105 were interviews. 
laboratory, and seniority is shown in Chapter fV, Table 4:l. 
certain unevenness in the distribution of nationality and seniority across 
the laboratories, the reasons for  which are discussed in Chapter IV. 
The distribution by nationality, 
There was a 
1. Coding 
The interviews were treated in two ways: First, they were analyzed 
qualitatively by thorough reading of the typescripts of the tapes. 
process yielded many ideas which were used in more quantitative analysis, 
as well as the numerous quotations used in Parts Two and Three of this 
thesis through which we hope to convey to the reader the flavor of the 
respondents' own feelings. Second, the free-€Towing responses were re- 
This 
duced to categories, coded along with the questionnaires, and analyzed 
numerically. 
to categories, an interview transcript was actually transposed into a blank 
This was a two-step process. In reducing the free responses 
questionnaire. A multiple-choice answer corresponding to the sense of the 
open-ended response was marked and a comment was written in when appropri- 
ate. 
the% "questionnaires" along with the others. 
The coding of the entire sample df 384 was then effected, treating 
In order to compile a codebook incorporating the comments as well as 
the closed responses, we took a sample of all the comments from 35 - 
randomly-selected questionnaires, typed these on index cards,:!and sorted 
the comments for each question into empirical categories. Comment codes 
were not always mutually exclusive, but they simply sought to reflect, as 
unambiguously as possible, the most frequently used comments. The code- 
book was. then written considering the closed response categories and the 
comment categories as separate items. Figure 2.2 illustrates a sample 
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codebook entry.  
da ta  e i t h e r  including o r  excluding write-in comments, for any p a r t i c u l a r  
piece of ana lys i s .  
assistant and double-checked; t h e  IBM cards which were punched from t h e  
code-sheets were v e r i f i e d  t o  eliminate punching errors. 
Using ADMINS (see below), t h i s  allowed us t o  treat the  
A l l  coding w a s  done by the  writer and h i s  wife/research 
2.  Analytic Techniques 
After having been punched on IBM cards, t h i s  s i zab le  da ta  s e t  (some 
1,500 cards) was ready f o r  computer ana lys i s .  
which were employed i n  the analysis were marginal d i s t r ibu t ions  of the  
frequency of responses t o  questions, and cross-tabulations,  as  well as 
some simple sca les  and indexes based on combinations of  questions. Rather 
than u t i l i z e  tlcannedtf programs on batch processing t o  carry out such oper- 
a t ions ,  it was decided t o  use a new on-line computer system for t he  treat- 
ment of soc ia l  science data,  which has been developed and implemented on 
The main quan t i t a t ive  too ls  
the M.I.T. time-shared computer system. Called ADMINS, t h i s  system is 
s u f f i c i e n t l y  novel t o  be worth a few words of  explanation. 16 
The philosophy of the ADMINS system is based on the  premise t h a t  the  
r e l a t ionsh ip  between the  soc ia l  s c i e n t i s t  and the computer should be i n t e r -  
active. This means t h a t  the  soc ia l  s c i e n t i s t  should be able t o  put a ques- 
t i on  about h i s  da t a  to the  computer as he  thinks of it; receive an answer 
l5 A "cross-tabulation" of two questions, one with poss ib le  responses 
A and B and the  o ther  with possible responses C and D ,  would show, i n  a 
2 K 2 t ab le ,  t he  number (or percentage) of respondents who answered A t o  
one question and C t o  the  o ther ,  as.well as A and D, B and C, B and D.  
l6 The next two paragraphs are adapted from Lerner and Gorden, 
Euratlantica, Annex 7, t o 'wh ich - th i s  author .contributed. 
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Figure 2 . 2  
Sample Codebook Entry 
CARD 3 
Column 
7 Q3-8a Would you approve the integration of a major part 
of your own country's armed forces into a perma- 
nent supranational force? 
Punch 
0 = Don't Know 
1 0 Yes 
2 = NO 
9 = Skipped in sequence of 4 o r  more skips 
8 Q3-8a (Comments on 3-8a) 
0 = No comments 
1 = Conditionally, under certain conditions 
2 = Necessary element of European unity 
3 = Would like to reduce size of forces 
4 = Anti-armed forces 
5 = Only after political integration 
6 = Other- 
83 
i n  seconds; choose h i s  neact question on the  bas i s  of the  answer he has just 
received; put h i s  next question t o  the  computer and receive a prompt 
answer; and so proceed s t e p  by s tep.  
Such an approach t o  da ta  analysis  conforms t o  the  bas ic  conceptual 
form of data-handling used by soc ia l  scientists, Until  recent ly ,  however, 
most large-scale soc ia l  science da ta  washandled by batch processing a t  a 
central computation f a c i l i t y ,  where it took hours and,often days t o  receive 
one's results. Under these conditions, the  analyst  tended t o  ask a great  
many questions simultaneously t o  avoid the long delays required by serial 
questioning. By circumventing t h i s  problem of "turn-around time," ADMINS 
is  designed t o  make the analysis  a more natural  and e f f i c i e n t  process. 
I t  enables a sequence of quesiions t o  grow d i r e c t l y  and immediately out of 
previous answers. 
S i t t i n g  i n  h i s  own o f f i c e  at a console--a.device qu i t e  s imi la r  t o  a 
te le type machine which is  connected t o  a cent ra l  computer by telephone 
l ines--the analyst  can deal with a d a t a  set containing hundreds of respon- 
dents with the  same f a c i l i t y  of  manipulation as  i f  they were only a hand- 
f u l .  
project ,  was done i n  t h i s  way on the  ADMINS system. l7 
A l l  of the quant i ta t ive  analysis ,  which is  the  backbone of t h i s  
I t  is not our object 
here  t o  spe&l out, i n  a step-by-step manner, the  process by which we 
l7 ADMINS was conceived qu i t e  broadly and has many uses beyond those 
t o  which w e  have put it. 
f o r  Internat ional  Studies:  S tuar t  D. McIntosh and David M. Griffel, ttThe 
ADMINS Primer" (November 1968); S.D. McIntosh and D.  Griffel, "ADMINS from 
Mark I11 t o  Mark V" (September 1968); I t h i e l  de Sola Pool, S. D. McIntosh, 
and D. Griffel, "On t he  Design of Computer-Based Information Systems" 
CSeptember 1968). 
See the  following monographs of the  M.I.T. Center 
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arr ived at the  various conclusions presented throughout the  balance of t h i s  
work. 
ment of Par t s  Two and Three. 
Most of t h i s  should become clear as the  reader follows the  develop- 
* * ** 
This study occupied, from t h e  beginning of i t s  da ta  col lect ion phase 
through the  end of i ts  analysis  phase, about two years,  not including the 
year during which the  ideas explored herein were developed and shaped i n t o  
a research program. Compared t o  the l i fe- t imes of the establishments 
included i n  the  study, two years i s  a non-tr ivial  period of time. 
Spring and Summer of 1967, during our wave of interviewing and question- 
na i re  d is t r ibu t ion ,  a great  deal  was happening i n  these centers .  
In the  
Our anal- 
ys i s  must take i n t o  account t he  reasons for  which these centers exist ,  the  
events which have gone in to  t h e i r  making, and t h e i r  s t a t e  at the  time of 
study. The next chapter, therefore ,  is devoted t o  these topics .  
CHAPTER I11 
EUROPE'S INTERNATIONAL LABORATORIES 
Although the laborator ies  included i n  t h i s  study share the impor- 
t a n t  aspect of being in te rna t iona l  i n  sponsorship, t h e i r  f i e l d s  of work, . 
aims, accomplishments, h i s t o r i c a l  contexts,  physical  appearances, and 
atmospheres vary enormously. To consider these laborator ies  as completely 
unrelated would be t o  m i s s  the  essential point  t h a t  i n  being in te rna t iona l  
they share a pecul ia r  qua l i t y  which sets them+apart from other  technologi- 
c a l  establishments--a qua l i ty  of which the staffs are highly conscious. 
Yet, i n  f a i l i n g  t o  take note of the  differences between these centers ,  one 
loses an important dimension along which the a t t i t u d i n a l  da ta  must be 
explored. 
This chapter,  therefore ,  ou t l ines  b r i e f l y  the  backgrounds of the 
several centers  dea l t  with i n  the study, t h e i r  h i s t o r i e s ,  and some of the 
bas ic  data  
study. I t  
needed f o r  understanding them as they were a t  the time of the 
attempts t o  convey the  ambiance of each center ,  using as source 
mater ia ls  not only published items but  a l so  mater ia l  from imiEorma1 conver- 
s a t ions  with individuals a t  the centers, as well as our own personal, 
highly subject ive,  observations based on s tays  a t  these centers  ranging 
from five days t o  four  weeks. As ESTEC, CERN, and ISPRA are the  most 
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important in te rna t iona l  labora tor ies  i n  Europe and as they provided t h e  
bulk of the survey data ,  t h e i r  descr ipt ions have been accorded proportion- 
a t e l y  more space and grea te r  d e t a i l  here. 
Table 3.1 summarizes some of the  quant i ta t ive  da ta  presented i n  t h i s  
chapter. 
For reference i n  l a t e r  chapters,  
A.  Space Technology 
Two establishments concerned w i t h  space research were incorporated i n  
the  survey. One, ESTEC ( the European Space Technology Centre), is the 
newest of t h e  large in te rna t iona l  laborator ies .  The s i t e  of most of the 
in-house research and engineering carried on by ESRO, it came i n t o  exis-  
tence i n  ear ly  1963. ESDAC, the European Space Data Centre, a smaller 
sister establishment t o  ESTEC, is charged with the  task  of processing the  
telemetry da ta  from ESRO's space a c t i v i t i e s .  Since an understanding of t h e  
character  of both of these centers  requires  a knowledge of the development 
of the parent organization, ESRO, we s h a l l  begin there .  
1. The Founding of the European Space Research Organization (ESRO) 
ESRO had i t s  or ig ins  i n  a series of informal discussions between a 
small number of i n f l u e n t i a l  Western European s c i e n t i s t s .  Concerned about 
t he  European r o l e  i n  the new and rap id ly  growing f i e l d  of space research, 
and encouraged by the success and pres t ige  of  CERN, t h i s  group (several  of 
whose members had been involved i n  t h e  ear ly  stages of CERN and a l so  i n  
EURATOM) developed the  bas ic  concept of a j o i n t  European space e f f o r t .  
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1 A t  a COSPAR 
became the  "promoter" of the ESRO idea,  and,wi 
ments of several nations, including notably B 
su f f i c i en t ly  in te res ted  t o  warrant the  holding of more formal 
and the  establishment of a study committee. 
conference i n  January 1960, Professor P ier re  Auger 
n a few months, 
i n  and France, had become 
On November 28, 1960,official  delegates from ten  nat ions (Belgium, 
Denmark, France, Germany, I t a l y ,  the  Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, 
and the United Kingdom) met a t  Meyrin, Switzerland ( s i t e  of CERN) t o  
develop the formal s t ruc ture  of the organization. 
wide range of bas ic  issues ,  including whether the organization should con- 
cern i tself  with j u s t  space craft or both space craft and launch vehicles,  
the delegates f i n a l l y  concluded a formal agreement t o  es tab l i sh  a prepara- 
to ry  body, known as COPERS (Commission preparatoire  europeen pour l a  
recherche spa t i a l e ) .  
which was opened for signature  i n  Paris on June 14, 1962. 
Unable t o  agree on a 
This body produced a Convention es tab l i sh ing  ESRO, 
The organization, through a long and somewhat painful  b i r t h ,  l o s t  
valuable time with respect t o  other  space a c t i v i t i e s .  
intended t o  last no more than a year, it was necessary t o  extend its agree- 
ment, i n  al l ,  four times because the  ESRO Convention did not  come i n t o  
Although COPERS was 
il ,  on March 20, 1964, it was f i n a l l y  r a t i f i e d  by the  required 
ommittee on Space Research of the 
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number of states .* 
Soviet  Union, and several  of t he  ESRO member- 
during the  1961-1964 period, while the  e 
marked time. COPERS, through i ts  small 
devoted i tself  t o  t h e  recruitment of a staff nucleus, the plann 
en t i f i e  and technical  activit ies,  and the  development of organizat ional  
po l i c i e s  during t h i s  .period. 
2. Development Since 1964 
The purpose of ESRO, according t o  Ar t i c l e  I1 of i t s  Convention, is  
"to provide fo r ,  and t o  promote, col laborat ion among European Sta tes  i n  
space research and technology, exclusively f o r  peaceful purposes. I f 3  To 
t h i s  end, t he  Convention provides t h a t  ESRO may: 
a. design and construct  sounding rocket payloads, s a t e l l i t e s  and 
space probes, carrying instruments provided by Member S ta tes  o r  
by the  Organization i tself;  
procure launching vehicles and arrange f o r  t h e i r  launching; b.  
c. provide means for the reception, co l lec t ion ,  reduction and 
analysis  of data;  
d. support research and development as required for i t s  programs; 
* The nat ions which r a t i f i e d  the Convention and are therefore  member 
states of ESRO include: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, I t a l y ,  the  
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the  United Kingdom, Austria 
and Norway, s igna tor ies  t o  the  o r ig ina l  agreement, f a i l e d  t o  r a t i f y  the 
Convention, but were granted observer s t a t u s  by the  ESRO Council. 
December 1967, the Spanish government no t i f i ed  t h e  Council of i t s  i n t e n t  
t g  withdraw from the organization, but  it la ter  agreed t o  remain i n  by 
means of a complex financial arrangement. 
In 
3 
90 
e. 
f .  
g. 
h ,  make contractual arrangements f o r  t he  use of 1 
f o r  rockets and satell i tes and o ther  f a c i l i t i e  
Member or other S ta tes  
ESRO is authorized i n  the Convention t o  es tab l i sh  severa l  f a c i l i t i e s  
including a research laboratory (ESLAB); sounding rocket launching f a c i l i -  
t i e s  (ESRANGE); a da t a  center  (ESDAC); a tracking, telemetry, and t e l e -  
command network (ESTRACK); and a technology center (ESTEC). The formal 
function of t h e  l a t te r  is *'to undertake or arrange f o r  t he  a c t i v i t i e s  
r e fe r r ed  t o  /gbove, sec t ion  a .7  and t o  promote and t a k e  p a r t  i n  advanced 
technological research and s p e c i f i c  s tud ie s  r e l a t e d  t o  space research. tv5 
- - 
Impl ic i t  i n  t he  foregoing sentence, through the  use of t h e  word 'lpromote,lt 
and ce r t a in ly  strong i n  the  minds of some of t h e  p o l i t i c a l  figures connec%: 
ed with ESRO, was the  hope tha t  ESTEC, by contracting out much of i t s  work, 
would contribute t o  the  development of a technologically advanced European 
space industry--more o r  less "spread the  wealth .lI6 
The a c t i v i t i e s  of t h e  organization have been confined t o  t h e  use of 
space craft and sounding rockets for s c i e n t i f i c  experiments i n  such f i e l d s  
Ib id . ,  p. ,110. ' -
nterna l  Struc- 
a1 Publi- 
e "Barmier 
Report. 
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as ionospheric and auroral  
launch vehicles from outs ide of t h e  
with such appl icat ions as weath 
The o r ig ina l  budget provided f o r  t he  expenditure of the  equivalent (at 1962 
prices)  of 1,509 mil l ion French francs ($300 mil l ion)  over an 8-year 
period. 
listed above (plus a small bas ic  research inst i tute ,  ESRIN, not spec i f i -  
c a l l y  mentioned i n  the  Convention), as  well as  an ambitious launching pro- 
This included funds fo r  the construction of the  establishments 
gram of 300 sounding rockets and 10 t o  1 2  satell i tes over the  8-year 
period. 
In general, ESRO has operated as a service organization, oriented t o  
the s c i e n t i f i c  needs of  nat ional  groups. 
from un ive r s i t i e s  or  government laborator ies  i n  the  member countries,  pro- 
pose experiments f o r  inclusion i n  sounding rocket o r  sa te l l i te  payloads. 
The proposals a re  evaluated by.ad hoc subject-oriented working groups each 
composed of about a dozen eminent European s c i e n t i s t s .  
These groups, which come as uni t s  
--
Often the  same 
individuals proposing experiments a re  members o f  t h e  -- ad hoc group evaluat- 
ing them. A Launching Programs Advisory Committee (LPAC) considers pro- 
posals forwarded f m m  the  ad hoc groups with respect  t o  t h e i r  s c i e n t i f i c  
merit and t h e i r  possible  inclusion i n  fu tu re  payloads, and makes recommen- 
--
dat ions t o  the  Directorate.  Experiments which a re  approved and 
’ The only departure from t h i s  policy t o  date  has been the performance 
of a f e a s i b i l i t y  study f o r  a European communications s a t e l l i t e ,  on a con- 
tract bas i s  f o r  another in te rna t iona l  organization. 
Until  recent ly ,  t he  LPAC made its recommendations t o  the  Sc ien t i f i c  
gested by the  Bannier Report discussed below. 
and Technical Committee, a subordinate of the  ESRO Council. The change 
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t h e  experimenter. Thus, although t h i s  s i t u a t i o n  may change i n  the  fu ture ,  
ESRO does not car ry  i ts  own experiments aboard i t s  space c r a f t - - i t s  scien- 
t i f i c  subjec ts  come from outside the  organization. 
Through the  end of 1967, ESRO had launched 56 sounding rockets rep- 
resenting 28 d i f f e r e n t  s c i e n t i f i c  payloads. 
ment Proposals submitted, 39 had been launched by t h a t  time and another 
33 were programmed gor launch i n  1968 and 1969. 
Out of a t o t a l  of 172 experi- 
A t  t he  time of our first v i s i t  t o  ESTEC (April 19671, t he  organi- 
zation had not ye t  attempted any s a t e l l i t e  launchings. 
launching attempt f a i l e d ,  a second copy of the  same sa te l l i t e  (ca l led  
i n i t i a l l y  ESRO-2, then renamed IRIS), which car r ied  seven experiments con- 
cerned with s o l a r  astronomy and cosmic rays,  was successfully launched by 
NASA i n  May 1968. 
simiaar small s c i e n t i f i c  s a t e l l i t e  ca l l ed  ESRO-1 ( l a t e r  AURORAE) i n  October 
1968, and a highly eccent r i  
Although.the .first 
This was followed by the  successful o rb i t i ng  of a 
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gotten beyond the  planning stage.'. The experiments on board these  satel- 
l i t e s  a l l  or ig ina ted  with na t iona l  s c i e n t i f i c  groups, and most of the  
actual construction work was (and is being) ca r r i ed  out by i n d u s t r i a l  
firms i n  the  member countries on a cont rac t  bas i s .  
3. Growing Pains 
Numerous problems have plagued ESRO during i ts  b r i e f  existence. Un- 
c e r t a i n t y  as t o  the  real purpose of t he  organization, compounded by impa- 
t i ence  and an unwillingness t o  compromise on the  p a r t  of member-states are 
a t  t he  root  of these problems. The symptoms have been f inanc ia l  and organi- 
za t iona l  c r i s e s .  
The major f inanc ia l  problems r e l a t e  t o  t h e  ESRO Council 's "no car ry  
Because of delays i n  s e t t i n g  up its faci l i t ies ,  ESRO forward" decision. 
underspent i ts  a l loca t ion  by 130 mill ion francs during i ts  first three-year 
budget period (1962-1966). lo The Council decided not to carry t h i s  money 
forward t o  the  second period; hence, money which the Directorate had f e l t  
would be ava i lab le  f o r  the  operational program had t o  be used during the  
second period f o r  buildings and equipment, and the  leve l  of operations 
was cu t  back. 
A lack of trust between member states was manifested c l ea r ly  i n  the  
organization's o r ig ina l  design. 
t i ons  the  supreme policy-making body is the  Council, a group composed of 
As i n  most intergovernmental organiza- 
TD-1 has s ince  been resur rec ted  as a "Special Project" financed by 
nine of the  me r-states, and is sch led f o r  a March 1972 launch. 
lo It  is perhaps c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  of ESRO t h a t  t h e  first 3-year budget 
period should be 4 years long. 
l i t e  t o  be launched was designated ESRO-2, and the  second was ca l l ed  ESRO-1. 
In a similar vein, t he  first ESRO satel- 
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two represent 
state,  i n  whic 
ests of each 
body is a Directorate,  headed by a Director-General. The 
supranational i n  character and i ts  members are supposed t o  represent not 
the  i n t e r e s t s  of t h e  country from which they come, but rat  
the  organization as a whole. 
Council was given d i r e c t  r e s  a wide range of  matters, and 
very few things were l e f t  t o  the  d iscre t ion  of the  Director-General. 
Rather than l imi t ing  i t s e l f  t o  broad i ssues  of policy, t h e  Council and 
i ts  subsidiary body, t he  Administrative and Finance Committee, were given 
r e spons ib i l i t y  f o r  decisions on r e l a t i v e l y  minor matters. 
General and h i s  staff were unable t o  function properly as executives and 
were overburdened with frequent presentations before the  Council and i t s  
committees. 
From the  time ESRO began operation, t he  
The Director- 
I t  became evident by mid-1966 t h a t  the organization was i n  deep 
trouble, and the  Council agreed t o  appoint a “Group of Experts t o  Study 
the  In te rna l  Structure,  Procedures and Methods of Work of ESRO.” Its 
repor t ,  completed i n  March 1967, and known as t h e  Bannier Report,l’char- 
irman, J. H. B 
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major recommendation for resolving t h i s  crisis w a s  a far-reaching reor- 
ganization, including subs tan t ia l  delegation of authori ty  t o  the  Director- 
General, and a l imi ta t ion  on the  powers of t he  Council. 
adopted the  f u l l  report  i n  pr inc ip le  and, i n  mid-l967--shortly a f t e r  our 
first v i s i t  t o  ESTEC--began t o  implement many of the  recommended changes. 
The Council 
4, 
For a number of reasons, one could bes t  describe the  condition of 
ESTEC i n  April-May 1967 as  tha t  of state of f lux.  
top management ( the Director, Head of  Administration, and Head of Per- 
The newness of the 
sonnel had a l l  been replaced within the past  several  months), the Ban- 
n i e r  Report, which was debated by the  Council and then released a t  the 
end of April ,  and t h e  physical moving of the organization from i ts  tem- 
porary quarters  i n  Delft t o  i t s  permanent si te i n  Noordwjjk a l l  contr i -  
buted t o  t h i s  impression. 
Although ESTEC was not o f f i c i a l l y  es tabl ished u n t i l  the  organiza- 
t ion  came in to  being i n  ear ly  1964, a s t a f f  nucleus had been working i n  
Delft s ince January 1963. Nevertheless, the establishment was ra ther  
slow i n  reaching f u l l  operation. 
near Delft, Holland, was found t o  be unsuitable because of the  nature of 
the  s o i l .  An a l t e rna t ive  s i te  of some 100 acres a t  Noordwijk, a town 
on the North Sea coast  about midway between Amsterdam and The Hague, 
was eventually agreed upon. 
ters, ESTEC was given temporary space i n  a bui lding belonging t o  the  
Technical University of Delft. 
dated ESLAC and p a r t  of ESTEC was a l so  erected on the permanent s i t e ,  f o r  
use pending completion of t he  new buildings.  
First of  a l l ,  the  s i t e  or ig ina l ly  chosen 
During construction of its permanent quar- 
A prefabricated building which accommo- 
In October 1966, t h i s  
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prefabricated building was totally destroyed by a fire. 
sary to find temporary working accomodations'for the 225 displaced - -  staff 
members in local hotels. 
It was neces- 
At the time of the study, ESTEC was organized into five depart- 
ments : l3 Applied Research (the largest), Sounding Rockets, Spacecraft 
Projects, Engineering, and Administration. About half of the establish- 
ment was located in Relft at the time of our first visit. The personnel 
office was located in a hotel on the beach in Noordwijk, and the remain- 
der of the establishment had already moved into the permanent buildings. 
At this time, ESTEC employed a staff of 464, of which 321 Were considered 
to be of professional grade. 14 
5 .  ESTEC's Atmosphere 
In Chapters V and VI we discuss the reactions of scientists and 
engineers to being placed in an international situation. In that con- 
text, quantitative data on the feelings of ESTEC's personnel toward 
their center are analyzed. 
fashion on the atmosphere and character of ESTEC as it appeared in mid- 
1967. 
Here we comment in a more impressionistic 
Several themes dominate the picture. In the first place, to the 
extent that a single nationality can be said to give a "flavor" to an 
l3 The Bannier Report recommended several changes in this structure. 
l4 Official figures as of June 1, 1967; does not include about 30 
persons working f o r  the ESTRACK Control Center, then at ESTEG, but since 
moved to Darmstadt. 
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EC has a dis 
sively in both technical 
Only in a few isolated pocket 
Rockets Department*-is French used as the working language. 
one-fourth of the entire sba 
civil servants on leave from government establishments. 
figures are not available, there seemsto be disproportionate number of 
Britons in administrative and technical managerial posts, and this prob- 
ably makes their presence even more strongly felt. 
hallmark of British life, is customary at ESTEC. 
While direct 
Afternoon tea, a 
The second dominant theme which strikes even the most casual observ- 
er. is the general lack of intellectual excitement in the air. 
visitor accustomed to a more or less academic atmosphere, where a deep 
commitment to one's work is the norm, this is especially striking. 
haps the comparison is unfair, since ESTEC is avowedly "technological" 
in nature rather than "scientific" and its work tends to be engineering 
and development (hardware-oriented) rather than research (knowledge- 
oriented). 
an old and undistinguished government establishment than t6, say, a uni- 
To a 
Per- 
In any case, one feels that the atmosphere is more akin to 
atory. To what extent this is due to the presence of many 
m aged British civil servants in administrative posts is a matter 
l5 In contrast, at ESRO Headquarters in Paris, French is the domin- 
ications difficulties 
t attributes to 
rs work; sever  
staff t-o work outside of 
the  standard o f f i ce  day, and those who did want t o  work a f t e r  
only motivated by overtime pay.16 
professional a c t i v i t y  a t  ESTEC which is  not d i r e c t l y  r e l a t ed  t o  one's 
job. A s c i e n t i s t  a t  B--the small more bas ic  research-oriented estab- 
lishment operated i n  con junc 
t o  set up continuing ESTEC 
There appears t o  be l i t t l e  in te rna l  
t 
TEC--noted t h a t  severa l  attempts 
inars about top ics  i n  space 
science had failed because of lack of  i n t e r e s t .  
A t h i r d  theme which pervades ESTEC r e f l e c t s  a general fee l ing  t h a t  
d a s ' a  locat ion was a mistake, and the  se lec t ion  of the  choice of Hol 
Noordwijk compounded t h i s  mistake. 
t ies i n  r ec ru i t i ng  staff from the  Latin countries 
The fact t h a t  ESTEC has had d i f f i cu l -  
o f ten  c i ted ,  and 
eetion, one may 
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concerned, it is rarely a positive one. 
tions and is n ded housing co 
an especially interesting country or 
Noordwijk in particular is a resort town of about 20,000 with virtually 
no cultural or intellectual life and a local population which i s  not es- 
pecially cosmopolitan. 
sand dunes, on the other side of which is the sea. Blowing sand and 
strong winds are constant sources of irritation. In sum, the location is 
far+ from ideal. 
The site on which ESTEC is located abuts a row of 
Of course, on the other side of the coin, one suspects that the 
exigencies of the location have contributed to the development of a com- 
munity spirit at ESTEG. 
ties , such as bridge clubs, sports car clubs and so on, which are popu- 
lar among the staff members. 
integration into the Dutch community around Noordwijk. With few excep- 
tions, the non-Dutch ESTEC personnel have only minimal contact with the 
indigenous population. 
Overall, however, there was a great deal of hopefulness evident in 
Everyone spoke of the mistakes of 
There are many organized extra-curricular activi- 
In a related line, there is very little 
the ESTEC atmosphere in Spring 1967. 
%he past several years, but most were willing to attribute the bulk of 
these mistakes t o  ESTEC's "running-in" period. Several persons who had 
held responsible executive posts were viewed as catastrophic failures- 
of the British o see Holland as the 
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p le t ion  of ESTEC's permanent buildings and t h e  moving out of Delft 
seen as important s t eps  towards "gett ing se t t l ed , "  
and Delft .  
f i r s t  tangib le  evidence of ESRO's accomplishments, was an t ic ipa ted  as  a 
morale booster.18 
the  most cynical--as giving o f f i c i a l  sanction t o  common gripes which "we 
The launching of the  first s a t e l l i t e ,  giving the  world the 
F ina l ly ,  t h e  Bannier Report was seen--though not by 
had known about a l l  along" and therefore  providing common-sense solutions 
t o  many of t h e  organization's troubles. 
6. The European Space Data Centre (ESDAC) 
The ESRO i n s t a l l a t i o n  i n  Darmstadt, Germany,is now known as ESOC-- 
the  European Space Operations Center-and cons i s t s  of ESDAC ( the  European 
Space Data Centre) and the  ESTRACK Control Center. 
v i s i t  (July 1967) t h e  Control Center was sti l l  i n  Noordwijk, and ESDAC, 
which is responsible f o r  %he reduction of telemetered d a t a  i n t o  a form 
usable by the  experimental groups and for the  performance of mathematical 
A t  the time of our 
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work such as o r b i t a l  calculat ions,  was qu i t e  well es tabl ished i n  its 
permaneht building. 
computer together with its associated hardware. 
staff of 53 persons. 
ESDAC’s chief  equipment cons is t s  of an I B M  360/50H 
The Center employs a 
19 
ESDAC was establ ished i n  ea r ly  1964, and f o r  i t s  first two and one- 
ha l f  years operated i n  rented quarters  i n  Darmstadt. 
t he  permanent bui lding proceeded rapidly,  and by late 1966 the  computer 
had been i n s t a l l e d  and much of the  establishment had already moved in .  
S t ruc tura l ly ,  the  Center is divided i n t o  an Administrative Division, a 
Data Processing Division which handles the  magnetic tapes received from 
the  Control Center and produces tab les ,  graphs, e t c .  f o r  the  experiment- 
e r s ,  and a Data Analysis Division which does o r b i t a l  calculat ions and 
programming f o r  the analysis  of observations as well as f o r  other  ESRO 
i n s t i t u t i o n s .  As the  l i nes  between the  jobs of these two s c i e n t i f i c  
divis ions a re  somewhat blurred,  it i s  not intended t o  maintain r i g i d  
d i s t inc t ions  within ESDAC. 
Construction of 
Darmstadt i s  a c i t y  of about 140,000 persons located i n  t h e  cent ra l  
pa r t  of the  Federal Republic of Germany, approximately 20 miles south of 
Frankfort/Nain. 
i n  the war and has been la rge ly  r e b u i l t .  
Capital of the - Land of Hesse, it was heavily damaged 
Although the  c i t y  is r a the r  
i ndus t r i a l  (several large chemical firms and engineering:works are 
located there)  and does not have the charm of Bavarian towns, it i s  
ce r t a in ly  not po’grim as some of the  indus t r i a l  axeas o f  northwestern 
l9 Figure f o r  end of 1967. 
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Germany. There are substa a1 recrea t iona l  and cu l tu  
as well as a prominent Technical University--in D 
rounding cities. 
of t he  c i t y ,  i n  a wooded area very near t o  t he  Hamburg-Base1 Autobahn. 
One ge ts  t h e  impression t h a t  ESRO's c r i s e s ,  fo r  some reason, have 
In p a r t ,  t h i s  may have been due 
The permanent s i te  of ESDAC i s  located a t  the  o u t s k i r t s  
not a f fec ted  ESDAC as deeply as ESTEC. 
t o  the  fact t h a t  ESDAC did  no$ f a l l  victim t o  such e x t r i n s i c  problems 
as the change of s i t e  and the f i re .  Then too.,,ESDAC's r e l a t i v e l y  small 
s i z e  and the well-defined character of i t s  mission may have helped t o  
keep d i f f i c u l t i e s  on a manageable sca l e .  
v i s i t  tr) ESDAC was two months l a t e r  than our v i s i t  t o  ESTEC and the  period 
of our s t a y  was only one week, so the  conditions f o r  forming impressions 
Of course, t he  time of our 
were not i den t i ca l .  
In any case, the  atmosphere i n  ESDAC i s  subs t an t i a l ly  d i f f e ren t  from 
t h a t  i n  ESTEC i n  a number of aspects. 
B r i t i s h  s t a f f  members here, the  German presence is a l s o  q u i t e  strong. 
Althokgh again there  a re  many 
While English i s  t h e  working language, t he  place does not  "feel" as 
Br i t i sh  as ESTEC. 
. 
Further, t he  q u a l i t i e s  of t he  location are such t h a t  
t h e  need f o r  developing a community s p i r i t  l i k e  t h a t  a t  ESTEC i s  g rea t ly  
reduced. While t h e  ESDAC s t a f f  does not seem t o  be genuinely in tegra ted  
the  German community, it--probably owing t o  i t s  r e l a t i v e l y  small 
size--does not appear as an a l i e n  presence i n  the  loca l  milieu t o  the  
extent t h a t  ESTEC does. 
t, and the main complaint about t h e  location, voiced by sev- 
The staff seems p r e t t y  much content with l i f e  
eral individuals,  was t h e  separation from Noordwij 
need t o  make frequent trips there .  This s i t u a t i o n  
d t h e  consequent 
ably changed with 
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the removal of the Control Center to Darmstadt. 
B. High Energy Physics - 
CERN, the European Organization for Nuclear Research, is generally 
It recognized as the major triumph of European scientific cooperation. 
is the standard to which all of the other international laboratories-- 
fairly or unfairly--are compared. There is no question that CERN has 
been an outstanding success. 
physics--one of the frontier fields of science--on a par with that of the 
It has maintained European high energy 
United States or the Soviet Union, a feat which very likely could not 
!\ave been accomplished by any one European nation acting alone. 
1. The Founding of the European Organization for Nuclear Research 
CfCERN) 
L;J.ng the oldest of the major international laboratories, CERN 
had the distinct advantage of having been conceived at a time when the 
European nations were ripe for this sort of venture. 
history of the events which surrounded the founding of CERN has been 
written by a scientist who was himself deeply involved in the process. 
Although, as in most such official accounts, the factors of personality 
whose interaction strongly influenced the course of the organization are 
not really treated, this paper, by the French physicist Lew Kowarski, 
gives us a valuable picture of the origins of CERN. 
An authoritative 
Kowarski describes 
the conditions which led to CERN's establishment: 
The early history of CERN' is that of an encounter between 
ives which became operative in 
r: the scientists' search for ays of acquiring 
e immediately after 
large-scale equipment, and the statesmen's search for domains 
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of common interest in 
produce tangible mani 
hardly surprising th 
encounter actually took place, turned out to be nuclear 
physics: 
promotion of its claims at the same time impera 
The feeling that "something" should be done in the way of European 
its newly demonstrated importance made the 
asy . 
cooperation was an essential component of the atmosphere in the intel- 
lectual- communities of the European countries as well as the United 
States after World War 11. Within this framework, members of the 
tightly-knit community of nuclear physicists ea? ' ::* cai I , c1 see that one 
of their most pressing needs was well-suited to this "something." 
scientists themselves took the initiative in developing the idea of CERN. 
Several influential members of the international physics community--Euro- 
peans, Americans, and European expatriates living in America--began to 
discuss possibilities for intergovernmental action in this sphere in 
private talks around 1948, Kowarski cites, in addition to'himself, 
H. Kramers (Mho later became head of EURATOM'S ISPRA laboratory), Pierre 
The 
Auger (who later was ESRO's first Director-General), and J. Robert 
Oppenheimer, as being involved in the first discussions. These men and 
other prominent scientists who soon became interested were acquainted 
with the academic and governmental individuals and offices; who were 
responsible.for scientific development in Europe. They were able without 
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great d i f f i c u l t y  t o  e n l i s t  the support of European-minded governmental 
o f f i c i a l s .  
The developing idea emerged from pr iva te  cussions t o  become a 
more publ ic  matter at  the  European Cultural  Conference held i n  Lausanne 
i n  December 1949. 
a proposal was made f o r  an in te rna t iona l  research i n s t i t u t i o n  i n  Europe. 
I. I ,  Rabi of the United S ta tes  repeated the call a t  a General Conference 
of UNESCO i n  Florence i n  June 1950, and the  Conference passed a - reso lu-  
Although physics was not spec i f i ca l ly  mentioned there ,  
2 1  
t i on  authorizing the  Director-General of UNESCO t o  "a s s i s t  and encourage 
the  formation and organization of regional research centres and labora- 
t o r i e s  . . . Auger, who was then Director of Natural Sciences a t  
UNESCO, obtained funds t o t a l l i n g  about $10,000 a t  a December meeting of 
the European Cultural  Centre's (founded a t  the  1949 conference c i t e d  
above) Commission f o r  S c i e n t i f i c  Cooperation. 
within UNESCO and'appointed a board of consultants,  which m e t  three times 
H e  es tabl ished an office 
i n  1951, and i n  turn was able t o  prepare a "complete and well reasoned 
agenda" f o r  a December 1951 intergovernmental conference t o  which UNESCO 
invi ted  formally empowered delegates of the European nations.  
delegates heard a plan, worked out by the consultants,  f o r  construction 
These 
of two accelerators :  a large one, second t o  none i n  the world, and a 
*' Kowarski, "Origin and Beginnings , I 1  p . 2. Jungk, Big Machine, 
p. 30, notes t h a t  such proposals were frequent i n  the  ear ly  post-war era. 
i, "Origin and Beginnings," Annex 11. UNESCO's r o l e  i n  
has been described. as t ha t  of a "fairy godmother." 
(Geneva) VIII, 3 (March 1968), p. 58. 
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smaller less powerful one which could be b u i l t  
would be used while t he  l a rge r  one was being b 
having t o  generate plans a t  t h i s  meeting, t h e  
with a concrete proposal. 
establishment of a provisional organizationwith a small budget which, i n  
a period of a year l o  a year and one h a l f ,  would car ry  out de t a i l ed  
planning and elaboration f o r  t h e  f i n a l  organization. 
j o in  such a provisional organizatPon was r e l a t i v e l y  small i n  f inanc ia l  
terms and a f t e r  a second meeting of t he  delegates i n  Geneva, an Agreement 
es tab l i sh ing  a provisional organization was opened f o r  signature i n  
Februar? 1952. 
The proposal a l so  recommended t h e  immediate 
The commitment- t o  
The Agreement was r a t i f i e d  by t k r e q u i r e d  number of states within 
th ree  months and t h e  Council of t he  provisional organization held i t s  
first meeting i n  May. 
General and four  study groups were created: 
machines, one f o r  t heo re t i ca l  physics, and one f o r  the  s t ruc tu ra l  frame- 
work of the  organization. 
Professor Edoardo Amaldi was appointed Secretary- 
two t o  handle the  proposed 
These groups, which by March of 1953 had 
acquired a staff of about 70 persons, were successful i n  carrying out 
t h e i r  tasks t o  t h e  extent t h a t  by June of t h a t  year a Convention estab- 
l i s h i n g  t h e  permanent organization was concluded and signed by twelve 
states. 23 
ce, I t a l y ,  Netherlands, 
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Although t he  necessary ratif ications of t h e  signatures were not 
completed f o r  f i f t e e n  months, CERN--in a manner which ESRO p a r t i a l l y  
copied some years later--acted as i f  it already had a lega l  existence. 
During t h i s  period the  Council established a provisional laboratory i n  
Geneva, began t o  prepare i t s  s i t e ,  made de ta i l ed  a rch i t ec tu ra l  drawings, 
and began t o  t r a i n  a s c i e n t i f i c  and technica l  staff--all of which, i f  
one takes the  view t h a t  r a t i f i c a t i o n  was not guaranteed, was a ra the r  
expensive gamble.24 
o f f i c i a l l y  came i n t o  existence i n  September 1954 it was already a going 
In any case, t he  gamble paid o f f ,  because when CERN 
concern. 
Looking back a t  t h i s  i n i t i a l  period, Kowarski c i t e s  th ree  fac tors  
which were important i n  i t s  successful outcome: 
1) Ambitious and sharply-defined objectives were aimed a t  from 
t h e  very beginning. . . . 
2) S c i e n t i f i c  and technical experts pa r t i c ipa t ed  at a l l  stages 
of organizational planning, and not merely were ca l l ed  i n  ' t o  
perform' i n  a framework not of  t h e i r  making. . . . 
3) I t  was recognized t h a t  the  inevi tab ly  modest i n i t i a l  pace of 
even a very b ig  p ro jec t  could be financed on a modest s ca l e  and 
i n  an unassuming lega l  framework; thus, an i n i t i a l  s tage  could be 
run concurrently with the  fu l l - s ca l e  lega l  building-up, instead 
of waiting f o r  its completion.25 
24 Kowarski, "Origin and Beginnings," pp. 10-11. In cont ras t ,  t he  
3-year delay i n  r a t i f i c a t i o n  of t he  t r e a t y  es tab l i sh ing  another European 
organization (ELDO) has been c i t e d  as one of t he  main reasons f o r  t he  
organiza t ion ts  lack of effectiveness. See Robert L. P fa l tzgraf f ,  Jr., 
and James L. Deghand, "European Technological Collaboration: 
ience of the  European Launcher Development Organization (ELDO)," 
Journal of Common Market Studies,  VII, 1 (September 1968), pp. 22-34. 
The Exper- 
25 Kowarski, ' lorigin and Beginnings," p. 14. 
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2.  "The Big Machine'' 
CERN's purposes are very clearly spelled out in its Convention. 
Article I1 states that: 
ne Organization shall provide for collaboration among European 
States in nuclear research of a puze scientific and fundamental 
character, and in research essentially related thereto. The 
Organization shall have m.c- wifh work f o r  military require- 
ments and the results of its experimental and theoretical work 
shall be published or otherwise m a d e  generally available.26 
The Convention further defines the basic purpose of the Organization as: 
(a) The construction of an International Laboratory . . . for 
research on high energy particles, including work in the 
field of cosmic rays. The Laboratory shall consist of: 
(i) a proton sychrotron for energies above ten 
(ii) a synchro-cyclotron capable of accelerating pro- 
tons up to, approximately, 600 million electron- 
volts (6X108eV) ; 
gigaelectronvolts (10 10 eV) ; 
(iii) the necessary ancillary apparatus . . . 
(iv) the necessary buildings . . . 
(b) The operation of the Laboratory specified above. 
(c) The organization and sponsoring of international cooperation 
in nuclear research, including co-operation outside the 
Laboratory . . . 27 
Provision is made for expansion of the program, providing two-thirds of 
the member states concur. 
CERN has operated for 14 years in accordance with the aims set out 
in the The %ew-born" organization had a total staff of 
26"'Convention for the Establishment of a European Organization for 
Nuclear Research?' (Geneva: CERN, 1953), p. 1. 
27 Ibid. ' 
L_ 
28 At the December 1967 meeting of the Council, a revised version 
of the Convention,incorporating provisions for the proposed 300 GeV 
accelerator, was presented to the governments of the member states. 
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cluding fellowship holders and occasional consul 
Construction of t h  cient funds t o  operate comfortably. 
began shor t ly  and a f u l l  beam was produ 
( the  smaller machine) f o r  the  first time i n  April 1957. Many experiments 
were performed on the  synchrocyclotron while construction of t he  l a rge r  
machine proceeded, and on November 24, 1959, the  28 GeV proton synchro- 
t ron  became operational.  
foremost high energy physics centers i n  the  world. 
study, t he  c a p a b i l i t i e s  of CERN's "big machine" were matched only by the  
machines a t  Brookhaven National Laboratory i n  the  United S ta tes  and Dubna 
From t h i s  time forward, CERN has been among t h e  
A t  the  time of t h i s  
J o i n t  I n s t i t u t e  f o r  Nuclear Research ( J I N R )  i n  the  Soviet Union. Since 
t h a t  t i m e  a 76 GeV proton synchrotron has become operational a t  Serpukhov, 
U. S. S.R. 
Professor Victor F.  Weisskopf, former Director-General of CERN, 
summed up the  accomplishments of h i s  laboratory: 
A number of discoveries of fundamental character were made, which 
had s ign i f i can t  influence on the  development of physics . , . 
the establishment of  t he  electron-neutrino decay of the pion 
was done qu i t e  ear ly  with the  small machine; t he  exact determin- 
a t ion  of the magnetic moment of the  muon; t h e  radioactive decay 
of t he  charged pion i n t o  the  uncharged pion; t he  discovery of 
a number of boson and baryon resonances and t h e i r  p roper t ies  . . . 
t he  first observation of t he  so-called shrinking of the  d i f f r ac -  
t i o n  peak i n  proton-proton sca t t e r ing  of  high energy; t he  
de t a i l ed  inves t iga t ion  of neutrino-induced reac t ions .  Thus 
CERN has es tab l i shed  itself quickly as a center of research 
le  i n  importance t o  the  U.S. centers a t  Brookhaven and 
29 
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f 
during the first f i v e  y 
v i s i t ,  i n  May 1967, the 
CERN and about 400 visi  
ge t  estimates ca l led  f o  
seven-year period. Costs, of course, went beyond t h a t ,  and it is  
reported t h a t  t o t a l  expenditures between 1952 and 1960 (mostly f o r  con- 
s t ruc t ion  of the two accelerators)  were approximately $56 mill ion.  
The 1955 budget was about $5.8 million.31 By 1967, the annual budget 
had grown t o  $40 mil l ion (not including supplemental programs). Each 
member nation contributes t o  t h i s  budget according t o  a formula based 
an the  national incomes of the members. 
30 
CERN has s t r iven  t o  keep i ts  research f ac i l i t  up t o  date.  A 
large 2-meter hydrogen bubble chamber was b u i l t  and i s  used i n  conjunc- 
t i o n  with the proton synchrotron. Although it encountered some problems 
i n  ear ly  operation, it has provided several  mill ion photographs of t rack  
chamber events f o r  researchers t o  analyze. The Accelerator Research 
Division, working with a study group concerned with fu tu re  projects ,  
developed plans for a set of in te rsec t ing  s torage rings, which w i l l  
g r ea t ly  increase the e f f ec t ive  power of the  proton synchrotron. The 
(Syracuse, N.Y.: Th a- 
cuse University, 1967), p. 25. 
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rings are presently under construction. This is a proj 
required a formidab le investment and 
current improvements on the proton synchrotron include systems for in 
ing- the intensity of the proton beam and increasing the repetition rate 
of the machine. 
pean Committee on Future Accelerators which is concerned with establishing 
a YERN IIql--a giant -300 GeV accelerator more powerful than the American 
CERN's leaders have also been very active in the Euro- 
device being constructed at Batavia, Illinois. 
3. 
Like ESRO, CERN is governed by a Council on'which each member state 
has two delegates (one scientist and one diplomat/administrator) and one 
CERN's Structure and Mode of Operation 
vote. The Council is responsible for determination of the Organization's 
policy in scientific as well as technical and administrative matters, 
controls the budget and expenditures, and staff appointments and dismis- 
sals. Most decisions are taken by a simple majority vote, except for 
staff appointments and dismissals and changes in the scale and amount of 
financial contributions of the member.. states, which require a two-thirds 
majority . 
Subordinate to the Council are the Committee of Council--the 
"steering" committee of the organization between Council meetings--whose 
chairman is the President of the Council, as well as the Finance Committee 
and the Scientific Policy Committee. 
cally mentioned in the Convention, but were created by the Council 
through its authority to "establish' such subordinate bodies as may be 
These committees are not specifi- 
necessary for the purposes of the Organization. ,I3' 
Dire 
tive of CERN. 
directorate consisting of four members (one each 
physics, technical management, and administration), and supervised the 
-,)eration of eleven divisions. In June 1966 however, the Council 
approved the Director-General's plan for internal reorganization, and 
as a result of this, the Directorate was eliminated and the divisions 
were placed under seven administrative departments. 33 Table 3 . 2  (see 
following page) lists the departments and the subordinate divisions 
within t h i s  structure, which was in operation at the time of our visit 
to CERN. 
According to the 1966 Annual Report, The Director-General and the 
Directors 6fJDepartments now form a Board of Directors. 
deals with all important problems connected with the running of CERN 
The Board 
ar,d assists the Director-General in taking the necessary decisions. t'34 
Although this reorganization seems to be aimed towards reducing the 
direct power of the Director-General, and increasing the coordination 
between divisions, most CERN people do not seem to feel that it will make 
a great deal of difference in the operation of the organizaZion. 
32 "CERN Convention," p. 24. 
Geneva, 1967), p. 16. 
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Table 3.2 
Structure of CERN 
Physics I Department 
Nuclear Physics Division (NP) 
SC Machine Division (MSC) 
Physics 11 Department 
Theoretical Physics Department 
Track Chambers Division (TC) 
Theoretical Studies Division (TH) 
Proton Synchrotron Department 
PS Machine Division (MPS) 
Nuclear Physkcs Division (NPA) 
Applied Physics Department 
Data Handling Division (DD) 
ISR Construction Department 
Intersecting Storage Rings Division (ISR) 
Accelerator Research Division (AR) 
Administration Department 
Finance Division (FIN) 
Personnel Division (PE) 
Technical Services and Buildings Division (SB) 
It is worth noting that, in comparison to ESRO and EURATOM, CERN is 
People are not overly concerned with the a very loosely organized body. 
formal organization chart, and informal channels of comunication seem 
to have greater importance than in the other centers. 
do not seem to be aware of their own titles or the titles of their 
Individuals also 
colleagues. The divisions seem to operate quite autnnomously, although 
the Dir -General, when he chooses to, c tually absolute 
authority. 
% 
The autonomy of the divisions is the subject of some internal 
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cr i t ic i sm,  but i n  general it appears t o  work r a t h e r  well. 
have remained a t  CERN through the  t en  
r epor t  t h a t  t h e  power of the Director-General's o f f i c e  has varied sub- 
s t a n t i a l l y  depending on t h e  person holding it.35 The degree of au thor i ty  
concentrated i n  the  hands of t he  Director-General is  even more s t r i k i n g  
t o  Europeans than it is  t o  Americans. 
usually found a t  t he  head of American research establishments and aca- 
Persons who 
A dtrong executive such as is 
demic i n s t i t u t i o n s  i s  r a r e l y  seen i n  Europe. 
t h i s  pa t t e rn  t o  CERN's s i t u a t i o n  i s  an important element i n  the organi- 
za t ion ' s  achievements. 
Successful adaptation of 
CERN operates both as a serv ice  organization f o r  s c i e n t i f i c  groups 
belonging t o  i ts  member s t a t e s ,  and as a s c i e n t i f i c  establishment with 
an in-house capab i l i t y  f o r  doing important physics. 
may be contrasted t o  t h a t  i n  ESRO, which we recall operates so l e ly  as a 
This s i t u a t i o n  
serv ice  t o  national. groups, and t o  t h a t  i n  EURATOM, which as we s h a l l  
see l a t e r ,  operates i t s  j o i n t  research centers as almost 100% in-house 
operations. 
any given time. 
s i t ies  and o ther  physics centers,  l a rge ly  but by far not e n t i r e l y ,  i n  
CERN plays host t o  an average of 400 v i s i t i n g  s c i e n t i s t s  a t  
These s c i e n t i s t s  come s ingly  o r  i n  groups from univer- 
t h e  member countries.  I t  is  common, i n  fact ,  f o r  a European high energy 
phys ic i s t  who is  on the staff of a univers i ty  t o  spend anywhere from one 
t o  t h r e e  months of h i s  year a t  CERN. And, as CEW makes it a policy t o  
the  number of i n d e f i n i t e  contracts it gives, t he re  i s  qu i t e  a 
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b i t  of personneliinterchange between the  CERN staff and academic and 
government i n s t i t u t e s  i n  the  member countries.  
Often groups w i l l  design and bui ld  a piece of equipment f o r  a par- 
t i c u l a r  experiment, t ransport  it and themselves t o  Geneva, and carry out 
the  experiment u t i l i z i n g  the  p a r t i c l e  beam from one of CERN's acce 
to r s .  
p ro jec t ,  bu t  CEREI, i n  addi t ion to supplying the  beam, provides support 
personnel and equipment as needed by the group. 
service,  CERN provides a g rea t  deal  of  raw da ta  t o  various research ten- 
ters i n  the member countr ies .  Such data  generally takes the form of 
bubble chamber photographs--which portray the  paths of co l l id ing  and 
decaying subatDmic particles--and the analysis  of these photographs 
cons t i tu tes  a subs tan t ia l  p a r t  of the  research program of a number of 
European i n s t i t u t e s .  
In such cases the nat ional  group pays most of the  cost of t he  
Besides t h i s  form of 
CERN has a l so  had, from the beginning, a s t rong in t e rna l  s c i e n t i f i c  
These highly-regarded s c i e n t i s t s  perform experiments e i t h e r  complement. 
i n  t h e i r  own groups or, more frequently,  i n  conjunction with v i s i t i n g  
groups. 
s c i e n t i f i c a l l y  strong from the beginning, t he  organization has probably 
moved towards more pa r t i c ipa t ion  of nat ional  groups. 
In terms of evolutionary trends,  while CERN's own team has been 
The presence of 
such f r o n t i e r  facil i t ies i n  Western Europe has undoubtedly st imulated 
the  growth of high-energy physics i n  Europe and encouraged young scien- 
tists t o  en ter  the  f i e l d .  As a consequence there  has been more demand 
f o r  CERN's facilities and the  prac t ice  of admitting v i s i t i n g  teams has 
expanded. 
I t  should be apparent by t h i s  time t h a t  CERN's s c i e n t i f i c  l i f e  is 
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focused a the  accelerated beam of 
proton synchrotron machine (PS). 
making structure i s  the  a l loca t ion  
and space on t h e  f l o o r  of t he  expe 
decision-making with regard t o  t i m e  and space on the  CERN PS would be a 
valuable contribution t o  the  sociology of science. Unfortunately, our 
purpose and the  duration of our v i s i t  did not allow f o r  such a study. 
What we d id  learn is  t h a t  t h e  procedure f o r  s e l ec t ion  of experimen 
something l i k e  t h i s  (and t h i s  'is not a t  a l l  apparent from CERN's organi- 
zation char t s  or any of 
or  groups e i t h e r  ins ide  
ments. These proposals 
i t s  published material): Individual phys ic i s t s  
or  outside of CERN develop proposals for  experi- 
are then sen t  t o  one of t he  th ree  experimental 
committees-Track Chamber'Experiments, Physics 111, o r  Electronics 
Experiments--groups composed of established European phys ic i s t s  i n  these 
areas and chaired (usually) by a phys ic i s t  who i s  not a CERN s t a f f  mem- 
ber.  
t o  s c i e n t i f i c  merit ,  po ten t i a l  f o r  achievement of r e s u l t s ,  contribution 
t o  the  f i e l d ,  and cos t  ( i n  space, time, and money). The recommendations 
The committees evaluate the proposals competitively w i t h  regard 
36 The PS is  shaped l i k e  a huge r ing .  It produces a beam of high 
energy p a r t i c l e s  by taking these  p a r t i c l e s ,  which have been in jec ted  at 
low energy at a poin t  along the  r ing ,  and spinning them faster and 
large but f i n e l y  tuned pieces of 
t he  p a r t i c l e  
vided, a .few--e ments may use 
e t i t i o n  f o r  t i m  '' t he  machine 
here they may i n t e  
(use of the  beam) and space on the  floor of t h e  experimental h a l l  
(where b 
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are then coordinated by a Nuclear Physics Research Committee (NPRC) which 
is  chaired by the Director-General and includes the chairmen of the  exper- 
imental committees as well as  t he  CERN d iv is ion  leaders.  Most of t he  
decisions are ac tua l ly  taken here,  although v i a  discussions leading t o  
consensus and not by vote. 
say i n  the  decision of whether o r  not t o  include a pa r t i cu la r  experiment 
i n  the  program, but i n  prac t ice  h i s  authori ty  is ra re ly  exercised i n  a 
formal manner. A phys ic i s t  can, i f  he wishes, submit a proposal d i r e c t l y  
t o  the  Director-General, but t h i s  again i s  usual ly  not done. 
The Director-General has the  absolute f i n a l  
Overall ,  the  e n t i r e  decision process i s  characterized by a great 
deal of  informal communication a t  a l l  s tages ,  and most of the  r e a l  issues  
are worked out i n  t h i s  way. 
there  a re  ce r t a in  experiments which a re  e a s i l y  recognized by the  physi- 
c i s t s  as hav ingc ruc ia l  bearing on some aspect of a current theory--there 
is an unwritten CERN policy of assembling teams composed of both CERN 
people and outs iders ,  r a the r  than j u s t  one o r  the other .  
In a l l  r e a l l y  important experiments--and 
There is  some t a l k  among the CERN s t a f f  of an " I t a l i an  mafia"--a 
group of prominent I t a l i a n  phys ic i s t s  who tend t o  support each o the r ' s  
proposals and run roughshod over the  des i res  of others .  There is a l so  
some t a l k  of an "in-group" and an Itout-groupt1 among the  phys ic i s t s ,  
implying t h a t  those i n  the in-group f ind  it much eas i e r  t o  get t h e i r  
experiments approved than those i n  the out-group. 
t h i s  up, however, admitged t h a t  the  groups were defined more on the bas i s  
of pas t  s c i e n t i f i c  performance than personal i ty . )  
is discontent with the a l loca t ion  system o r  i t s  r e s u l t s ,  it was not wide- 
spread a t  the time of our v i s i t  t o  CERN, and one can safe ly  conclude t h a t  
(Those who brought 
In any case, i f  ' there  
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as a mechanism f o r  making " s c i e n t i f i c  choices" the  s 
well .  
4. 
CERN is located i n  Meyrin, a suburb about 10-15 minutes dr ive  from 
t h e  center of Geneva. 
near ly  equally divided between Switzerland and France. 
comprised only the Swiss por t ion  of t h i s  t e r r i t o r y ,  but i n  order t o  
bui ld  the in t e r sec t ing  storage r ings ,  i t  was necessary t o  expand across 
the  Franco-Swiss f r o n t i e r .  
complication. A t  the  time of our v i s i t ,  i n  May 1967, t he  only work t h a t  
I t  occupies an area of approximat 
The o r ig ina l  s i te  
This has been accomplished w i t h  only minor 
was taking place on the  French s ide  was construction work, and so the  
substance of t h i s  sec t ion  w i l l  be confined t o  the  o r ig ina l  portion of 
t h e  s i te ,  as was our v i s i t .  Within t h i s  101 acre tract were'aocated 
some 57 buildings,  ranging from small nondescript p refabr ica ted  barracks 
t o  q u i t e  large,  modern and aes the t i ca l ly  pleasing laboratory and o f f i c e  
buildings.  
650 feet i n  diameter, mostly buried i n  the  ground. 
l a r l y  obvious fea ture  of t h e  CERN landscape--its form and s i z e  are such 
t h a t  it is  b e s t  recognized from the  air. (Important guests are i n  fact 
given a short a i r  tour.)  
The proton synchrotron is  a wheel shaped s t ruc tu re  more than 
I t  i s  not a particu4 
GERN i s  blessed with an extremely beau t i fu l  location, but t h i s  is  
more it t cape than the  s i t e  i 
the s i t e  i tself  is  q u i t e  f la t ,  as it m u s t  be f o r  t h e  i n s t  
Mountain Range rises 
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buildings whose occupants a re  for tunate  enough t o  have windows facing 
the  proper d i rec t ion ,  one can on a good day admire Mont Blanc, a good 
s i x t y  miles away. 
years, do not f ind  time during t h e i r  working day t o  enjoy the  scenery. 
In addition, the locatim provides both the pleasanter  aspects of  pastoral  
l ife-quiet ,  clean a i r ,  and a generally relaxed fee l ing ,  - and since 
Geneva is so readi ly  accessible,  much of the  var ie ty  and excitement of 
an in te rna t iona l  c i t y .  
v i s i t :  where else i n  Europe could one f ind  a location with such beau- 
t i f u l  surroundings, ten minutes from a cosmopolitan c i t y ,  f i ve  minutes 
from an in te rna t iona l  a i rpo r t ,  f i f t e e n  or twenty minutes from several  
beaches,, and an hour or so  from some of the world's f i n e s t  sk i ing  areas? 
There are few CERN personnel who,even after many 
CERN people of ten rhe to r i ca l ly  asked during our 
The r a the r  relaxed and informal fee l ing  is p a r t  of what might be 
ca l l ed  the  dominant impression of CERN--that is, an atmosphere of academia. 
In a number of respects CERN is very strongly reminiscent of  an educational 
i n s t i t u t i o n .  
s i t e  and a college campus, and i n  addition the v i s i t o r  i s  a l so  ce r t a in  
t o  not ice  the r e l a t ive ly  large number of youthful faces .  Some of the  
or ig ina l  s t a f f  members a re  reaching or have reached middle age, but a 
large percentage of t he  s t a f f  is qu i t e  young and many fellows and v i s i -  
t o r s  a re  e i t h e r  students or recent univers i ty  graduates. 
indefinable i n t e l l e c t u a l  excitement pervades the atmosphere. 
is a highly subject ive mode of description, a number of more objective 
indicators  might a l so  be mentioned. 
centers  we visited--operates on a 24-hour-a-day bas is .  
an economic necessity,  s ince  anything less would be t e r r i b l y  wasteful of 
There is some physical s imi l a r i t y  between pa r t s  of CERN's  
A ce r t a in  
While t h i s  
For example, CERN--alone among the  
The product of 
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the  vas t  investment represented by the  accelerators,  t h i s  schedule adds 
t o  the  infornhality of t he  CERN scene. 
v i s i t i n g  scient is ts ,  especial ly  those concerned with experiments i n  pro- 
Professional s t a f f  members and 
cess o r  operation of t h e  machines, a re  almost as l i ke ly  t o  be found i n  
t h e i r  laborator ies  a t  midnight as they are  a t  noon. 
thing as a nine-to-five day fo r  these individuals--technicians as well 
as Ph.D.'s--and although most a re  qui te  conscious of t h e i r  l e i su re  time, 
they wil l ingly put i n  long hours when t h e i r  work demands i t .  The admin- 
There is no such 
i s t r a t i o n  has shown i t s e l f  t o  be qui te  adaptable t o  such s i tua t ions  and 
one f inds,  f o r  example, t ha t  there  i s  no problem ge t t ing  i n  o r  out of 
the  gates a f t e r  hours, t h a t  the canteen i s  open almost always (although 
the  excellent se lec t ion  of food i s  r a the r  r e s t r i c t e d  outside of normal 
mealtimes), and t h a t  there  is no pressure t o  constrain professional people 
t o  regular hours--most a re  given v i r tua l ly  Eull respons ib i l i ty  f o r  them- 
selves .  
CERN is the  large number of seminars, colloquia,  conferences, and lec- 
tu res  that a re  always on the calendar. 
I 
Another indicat ion of the i n t e l l e c u t a l  excitement present at: 
In addition t o  t h i s  type of 
activity--generally concerned with p a r t i c l e  physics o r  closely a l l i e d  
f ie lds-- there  a re  a l so  t r a in ing  classes  i n  technical areas ,  lectures  on 
other  areas of cul ture  o r  publ ic  a f f a i r s ,  concerts, and the l i ke .  
Perhaps the  most important among these indicators  of t h e  in t e l l ec -  
t u a l  atmosphere is  the presence of numerous %ame" physicis ts  a t  the  
laboratory. 
physics is i n  some way associated with CERN. 
ical - and experimental physics. 
as well as most of the top s c i e n t i f i c  management, are respected and well- 
Vir tual ly  anyone who is anyone i n  European high-energy 
This is  t rue  both f o r  theorst-  
Many of t he  permanent staff members, 
12 1 
known men i n  t h e i r  f i e l d s .  Further, other important high-energy physi- 
cists i n  European i n s t i t u t e s  and univers i t ies  a re  associated i n  some way 
with CERN, and occasionally spend time there .  Any non-European high- 
energy phys ic i s t  passing through Europe is  c e r t a i n  art least t o  s top i n  
f o r  a shor t  v i s i t  a t  CERN t o  see h i s  f r iends and learn how t h e i r  l a t e s t  
experiments a re  progressing. The presence of men with such "intellec- 
t u a l  sex appealff3' is a great  a t t r a c t a n t  f o r  young s c i e n t i s t s  and many 
come not only t o  pa r t i c ipa t e  i n  use of the  machines, but t o  work under 
and learn from these men. 
In the  foregoing, w e  have spoken of the various aspects o f  C E W ' s  
i n t e l l e c t u a l  atmosphere as  i f  they were i n  some way separable. 
not.  
They are  
The informality,  the odd hours, the f l e x i b i l i t y  of the' organization, 
t h e  intense (formal and informal) communication of ideas,  and the  excel- 
lence of the  s c i e n t i f i c  s t a f f  a r e  a l l  interwoven, and, taking account of 
the  spec ia l  nature of CERN's task,  none could e x i s t  without the  others.  
On the  other  hand, t h i s  type of atmosphere i s  not unique t o  CERN. I t  i s  
a necessary p a r t  of being i n  the m a i n s t r e a  of  fundamental research and 
other  centers of physics excellence,such as Brookhaven and Berkeley i n  
t h e  United S ta tes ,  and other  laborator ies  of diverse  types possess 
similar i n t e l l e c t u a l  ambiances. 
There are other  aspects of CERN worth taking note o f ,  which a re  
unique t o  t h i s  establishment and not necessar i ly  r e l a t ed  t o  the  in t e l l ec -  
tual ambiance. In comparison with ESTEC, where we noted a dominant 
37 An epi the t  once applied t o  J. Robert Oppenheimer. See R. Jungk, 
(New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1958), 
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Br i t i sh  "flavor," there  is  no spec ia l  
t h e  l a rges t  contingents among the  pro 
France, Germany, and I t a l y ,  and the  bulk of t h e  lower grade personnel are 
French and Swiss (with some I t a l i a n s ) ,  there  i s  no mination by any . 
s i n g l e  one of these  groups. 
English, and one of the  requirements f o r  employment i s  fluency i n  one of 
these languages and a t  l e a s t  a working knowledge of t h e  other.  
languages seem t o  be  used i n  about equal proportions--with perhaps a 
s l i g h t  edge f o r  English i n  professional discussions and a s imi l a r ly  ~ 
s l i g h t  edge for French i n  o ther  types of conversations--and there  do not 
appear t o  be any areas .wi th in  the  organization where one of t he  languages 
CERN's o f f i c i a l  languages are French and 
The two 
t o t a l l y  excludes the  other.38 
taneous t r ans l a t ion  through earphones a t  each seat; smaller conferences, 
such as group meetings, generally arrive at  a consensus about which lan- 
For la rge  meetings there  i s  usually simul- 
guage t o  use, not necessar i ly  one of the  o f f i c i a l  languages. This lack 
of a s ing le  dominating f lavor  i s  a l so  r e f l ec t ed  i n  administrative prac- 
tices. A member of t he  personnel sec t ion  described t h e  s i t u a t i o n  well: 
Newcomers must then be helped t o  adapt themselves t o  the  
Organization, where d i f f e r e n t  national trends and t r a d i t i o n s  
are merged i n t o  p rac t i ces  which are pecul ia r  t o  CERN and 
which are unique i n  the  f i e l d  of personnel management.39 
The ~ c t  t h a t  CERN is located i n  as in te rna t iona l  a c i t y  as Geneva, 
while not d i r e c t l y  a f f ec t ing  the  in t e rna l  atmosphere Qf t h e  organization, 
38 This occasionally leads t o  minor problems, as i n  deciding which 
language t o  use i n  answering the  telephone. 
), pp. 142-143. 
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is q u i t e  important with respec t  t o  t h e  CERN community. 
many years been the  seat of numerous in t e rna t iona l  org 
s ides  CERN, t he  l a rge r  ones include the  World Health Organization (WHO), 
t h e  World Meteorological Organization (WMO)., the  In te rna t iona l  Labor 
Organization (ILO), and the  European Headquarters of t h e  United Nations. 
The staffs of these  and the  o ther  i n t e rna t iona l  organizations c o n s t i t u t e  
a subs t an t i a l  in te rna t iona l  community, which e x i s t s  on i t s  own within the  
g rea t e r  Geneva area. 
presence is  t h e  s ta t is t ic  t h a t  nearly one-third of t h e  pupi l s  i n  the  
Geneva public schools (Canton of Geneva) are non-Swi~si!~' 
g rea t ly  f a c i l i t a t e s  adaptation t o  the Geneva area f o r  CERN personnel. 
Such seemingly minor matters as the  a v a i l a b i l i t y  of foreign newspapers 
Geneva has f o r  
One ind ica t ion  of t h e  magnitude of t h i s  foreign 
This presence 
41 
and goods, the fact t h a t  l oca l  Genevois are accustomed t o  dealing with 
foreigners,  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of taking p a r t  i n  c u l t u r a l  and recrea t iona l  
act ivi t ies  of the  o ther  in te rna t iona l  organizations are q u i t e  important. 
A t  most i n t e rna t iona l  labora tor ies  outside of Geneva, one e i t h e r  remains 
within a circle of acquaintances r e s t r i c t e d  t o  t h e  organization o r  
attempts t o  in t eg ra t e  with t h e  indigenous population (usually qu i t e  d i f -  
f i c u l t ) .  In  Geneva there  is a t h i r d  a l t e rna t ive ,  t h a t  of pa r t i c ipa t ing  
i n  an in t e rna t iona l  soc ie ty  which incorporates a much broader spectrum of 
people than one would f i n d  i n  h i s  own organization. 
40 Pierre Zumbach, Head of CERN Social Affairs Section, "L'Integra- 
t i o n  des Fonctionnaires Internationaux a l a  Communaute de Geneve," Speech 
Before the  Junior Chamber of Commerce of Geneva, March 3, 1966. 
41 I t  a l so  creates o ther  problems as Zumbach (Ibid.) - pointed 
out 
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C. Nuclear ~ Power 
The two EURATOM J o i n t  R 
and PETTEN, belong t o  an org 
lems which have beset  it. 
have been wr i t ten  about EURATOM--and much more has been wr i t ten  
Many of the  numer 
OM than about of  t he  other  organizations tudy--are con- 
cerned with "what went wrong1'. o r  "why did EURATOM fa i l  * ' '  
although EURATOM cannot t r u t h f u l l y  be considered a success at t h i s  point ,  
In f a c t ,  
the  organization has managed t o  survive and i ts  ul t imate  fate has yet  
t o  be determined. EURATOM'S problems, i ts  wide publ ic i ty ,  and i ts  bas i c  
differences from the  other  organizations i n  the study can be traced t o  
one very clear and over-riding cause--the fact t h a t  EURATOM is a p o l i t i c a l  
organization r a the r  than a s c i e n t i f i c  one and i t s  goals a re  p o l i t i c a l  
r a t h e r  than s c i e n t i f i c .  
1. 
A real understanding of t he  or ig ins  of EURATOM would require  a f u l l  
review of post-World War I1 European h i s to ry  with p a r t i c u l a r  emphasis on 
e f f o r t s  at European p o l i t i c a l  in tegra t ion .  EURATOM ( i t s  f u l l  t i t l e  is  ' 
t h e  European 
'the trSix." 
and the  EEC (European Economic Community--the Common Market), it is part 
ok the  European Community, a body of nat ions which, on the road t o  a 
i c  Energy Commhfty), i t  w i l l  be reca l led ,  belongs t o  
Together with the  ECSC (European Coal and Stek l  Community) 
ing 
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within it a s ing le  integrated economy under common rules 
and i n s t i t u t i o n s ;  and of adopting a c n policy-as w e l l  
as a common external  t a r i f f - - i n  t h e i r  
with the r e s t  of t he  world.42 
The idea of an atomic energy community i n  Europe f irst  came t o  the 
nomic dealings 
fore upon the f a i l u r e  of the  plan f o r  a European Defense Community (EDC) 
i n  1954. 
for the  EDC, hopes f o r  t he  rapid p o l i t i c a l  in tegra t ion  of Europe were 
dashed. But, immediately the  resourceful "Europeanists" began t o  seek 
When the  French National Assembly f a i l e d  t o  r a t i f y  the t r e a t y  
new paths towards t h e i r  long-range goal. In December 1954 the Common 
Assembly of the ECSC asked f o r  the  establishment of a working group which 
was t o  study p o s s i b i l i t i e s  f o r  expanding the scope of the community. 
This group, i n  tu rn ,  proposed the convening of a high-level intergovern- 
mental conference on fu ture  s teps  toward European integrat ion.  The con- 
ference of Foreign Ministers of t he  ECSC, which was held a t  Messina, 
I ta ly ,on June 1 and 2, 1955, served t h i s  purpose. 
The Messina conference approved a resolut ion which incorporated 
pa r t s  of act ion proposals from Germany, I t a l y ,  and the Benelux countr ies ,  
and i n  keeping with the pa t te rn  of p ro l i f e ra t ing  committees, it appointed 
a committee of nat ional  representat ives  and professional experts t o  work 
towards the  aims of the resolut ion.  This committee which came t o  be 
known by the name of i ts  chairman, Paul-Henri Spaak, worked through the 
second h a l f  of 1955 and the  ea r ly  part of 1956 a t  a chateau outs ide of 
42 Richard Mayne, The Community of Europe (London: Victor Gollancz, 
1962), pp. 12-13. 
excel lent  summary which Mayne presents  i n  Chapter V I .  
This sectkon: on EURAT0M"s h i s to ry  owes much t o  the  
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Brussels. In  April 1956 it presented t c i l  of Ministers i t s  
repor t ,  commonly known as the  Spa& Rep The repor t  wa bY 
the  Ministers a month la ter  and at the same time the  Spaak Commi 
transformed i n t o  Ita conference w i t h  Treaty-making powers. 
which es tab l i shed  both EURATOM and the  Common Market emerged from t h i s  
conference i n  l e s s  than a year ' s  time and were signed i n  Rome, i n  a 
t o r i c  moment f o r  European unity,  on March 25, 1957. Rat i f ica t ion  was 
rap id ly  forthcoming and t h e  treaties camel i n t o  'force on January 1 , 1958. 
Soon the rea f t e r ,  the  headquarters of both new ani zations were es tab- 
l ished a t  Brussels. 
was 
The Treaties 
While a l l  of t h i s  o f f i c i a l  governmental a c t i v i t y  was taking place,  
the  l tfatherlr  of t h e  European uni ty  movement, Jean Monnet, was exerting 
h i s  profound influence from outside of o f f i c i a l  c i r c l e s .  I n  October 
1955 he had formed a pressure group which wag composed of th i r ty - th ree  
important p o l i t i c a l  leaders representing a broad range on the  p o l i t i c a l  
spectrum of  t h e  Six countries,  and which was ca l led  the  "Action Committee 
f o r  the  United S ta t e s  of Europe." Many of the  reso lu t ions  which t h i s  
committee adopted at its semi-annual meetings were binding not only on 
t h e  members of the  committee, but a l so  on the  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  and 
t r ade  unions which they represented. Hence, as Mayne concludes, 
a 
By prodding governments and wiming over parliamentary and 
t rade  union opinion, there  can be no doubt a t  a l l  t h a t  
e t  and the Action Committee played a decisive p a r t  i n  
i ng  the  adoption and r a t i f i c a t i o n  of t h e  Euratom and 
Common Market Trea t i e  
43 Ib id . ,  p. 109. -
Ib id . ,  p. 110. -
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An 
t h a t  of 
important cont ras t  between the  h i s t o r i e s  of CE 
EURATOM should be qu i t e  apparent from t h i s  b r i  
and 
Scien- 
tists themselves were not key f igures  i n  the  b i r t h  of EURATOM as they were 
i n  the other  two organizations. This was the r e s u l t  of the  f a c t  t h a t  
while CERN arid ESRO came i n t o  being largely as  p o l i t i c a l  responses t o  
scientific/technological needs, EURATOM arose as a technological response 
t o  a p o l i t i c a l  problem. 
cynical over h i s  organization's d i f f i c u l t i e s ,  suggested t o  us tha t  
EURATOM'S concern with atomic energy is only accidental .  
he claimed, passed around a ha t  f o r  ideas as t o  what t h e i r  new European 
organization should do and atomic energy seemed t o  be the bes t  thing 
t h a t  came out! 
A high-level EURATOM s c i e n t i s t ,  who had grown 
The po l i t i c i ans ,  
There is, i n  fact, a kernel of t ru th  i n  t h i s  wise-crack. The prob- 
l e m  which beset  t he  Europeanists upon the  f a i l u r e  of the  EDC w a s  how t o  
put the  machinery of European unity i n  motion again, how t o  regain 
momentum. 
o f  course, the  Common Market), was the r e s u l t  of several  factors :  (1) In- 
tegrat ion of atomic energy resources appeared t o  complement e f f o r t s  of 
the  Coal and Stee l  Community t o  in tegra te  European energy production. 
(2) Atomic energy w a s ,  t o  a large extent ,  t he  "vogue" during the ear ly  
1950's. 
t i on  i n  a r e l a t i v e l y  shor t  time--the vast  po ten t ia l  f o r  destruct ion as 
well as progress pointed towards in te rna t iona l  e f f o r t .  (3) I t  was 
believed, as  Scheinman points out, t ha t  s ince atomic energy was a new 
f i e l d ,  "there were few vested i n t e r e s t s  t o  be overcome, and l i t t l e  
That atomic energy w a s  perceived as  the solut ion (along with, 
I 
Great progress was expected t o  come out of i ts  peaceful applica- 
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ructuring of impacted attitudes was involved."45 (4) It was evident 
lopment of the 
sition, which was beyond the c 
dual nations except the super-powers. 
as it did in the cases of CERN and ESRO, pooling Europe's efforts to 
keep up with the United States. ( 5 )  The concept of EURATOM also extended 
the principle of sector (functional) integration established by ECSC. 
In this regard, Scheinman notes, 
In 
Euratom's virtue was to sustain the European movement while 
the supposedly 
agreement on a era1 economic union was pursued. In the 
end, the Eurat d EEC treaties, were ratified at the same 
time, though in separate instruments. From the moment of 
ratification, Euratom's utility as a vehicle f o r  European 
integration was spent, and the organization was left to 
justify its existence by its own action.46 
Beyond these five reasons there is, of course, the major argument 
ch more delicate task of working out an 
which dominated all disc omof EURATOM and which still fills most of 
EURATOM'S public relations material--that is, the matter of Europe's 
energy requirements. 
that, as a function of increasing industrialization, Europe's energy 
requirements would grow very rapidly.47 Questions were raised as to %he 
A number of studies were performed which predicted 
45 Lawrence Scheinman, "Euratom: Nuclear Integration in Europe, '' 
No. 563 (May 1967), p. 9. Scheinman is also 
e fallacy of this belief--in light of France's 
trial interests. 
rtant of these was Orga or European Economic 
cts of the European Energy lem" (Paris, 1955). 
Louis Armand who ame one-of the 
"Three Wise Menc1 discussed below. 
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costs of different forms of energy production, the effect on Eu 
balance of payments of ever-increasing imports of fossil fuels, and the 
national security problems caused by the need to rely so heavily on 
imported fuels (especially from the Middle East). Optimistic assumptions 
about the economics of atomic energy showed it to be the best solution 
to these problems. 
Foremost among these studies was the report of the "Three Wise Men," 
which originated in a 1956 resolution of Monnet's Action Committee. 
Armand (former head of the French national railways), Franz Etzel (Vice- 
President of the ECSC High Authority), and Francesco Giordani (an Italian 
nuclear expert) were appointed to study the problem. Their report, which 
was presented in May 1957, and which acted as a spur'towards ratification, 
was entitled "A Target for EURATOM." In response to the energy require- 
ment forecasts, it set forth for the EURATOM countries a 1967 production 
goal of 15 million kilowatts. The "Wise Men'stt report was considered 
authoritative throughout EURATOM'S early period, and its numbers have 
been widely quoted. 
of EURATOM'S Commission in January 1958. 
Louis 
Armand, in fact, was chosen as the first President 
2.  Structure and Development 
Compared with ESRO and CERN, EURATOM is a rather complex organization. 
Research and development comprise but one part of its functions, and its 
nature is essentially "promotional. As an indication of its relative 
48 Pierre Mathijsen, quoted in'scheinman, "Nuclear Integration," p. 11. 
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y, we note t h  i l e  Convention est 
repr in ted  i n  i ts  
pages, and CERN's Convention i s  of about equal length, t 
the  EURATOM Treaty is bound as a book c o n s i s t i  
(Of t h i s ,  112 pages represent the  Treaty i t se l f ,  and t 
sists of annexes, de f in i t i ons ,  protocols,  declarations 
f o r t h . )  The s e n s i t i v i t y  of technological areas with which EURATOM was 
intended t o  cope and the  po ten t i a l  domain of i t s  p o l i t i c a l  e f f e c t s  a r e  
of course responsible f o r  t h i s  complexity. 
zations discussed here, EURATOM was designed with many more i n t r i n s i c  
Compared t o  the  other organi- 
strains, but a l so  a much wider range of  p o l i t i c a l  opportunities.  
Ar t i c l e  1 of the  Treaty spec i f i e s  EURATOM'S aims: 
I t  s h a l l  be the  aim of the  Community t o  contribute t o  the  
r a i s i n g  of t he  standard of l i v ing  i n  Member S ta tes  and . to  
the development of commercial exchanges with other countries 
by the creation of conditions necessary f o r  the speedy 
establishment and growth of nuclear i ndus t r i e s  .49 
In  Ar t i c l e  2, the  Community is  directed t o  take ce r t a in  actions 
toward the  attainment of i t s  aims. Spec i f ica l ly ,  it s h a l l :  
(a) develop research and ensure the  dissemination of technical 
knowledge, 
(b) e s t ab l i sh ,  and ensure the  application o f ,  uniform s a f e t y  
standards t o  p ro tec t  t he  hea l th  of workers and of the  general 
i c u l a r l y  by encouraging 
e bas i c  f a c i l i t i e s  
tab l i sh ing  t h e  European Atomic Energy 49 
(Brussels: EURATOM, '1957), p. 17. 
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(d) ensure a regular and equitable supply of ores and nuclear 
f u e l s  t o  a l l  users  i n  the  Community, 
(e) guarantee, by appropriate measures of control,  t h a t  nuclear 
materials a r e  not d iver ted  f o r  purposes o ther  than those for 
which they are intended, 
( f )  exercise the property r i g h t s  conferred upon it i n  respect 
of spec ia l  f i s s ionab le  materials, 
(g) ensure extensive markets and access t o  the  b e s t  technical 
means by t h e  c rea t ion  of a common market f o r  spec ia l ized  
materials and equipment, by the  free movement of capital for  
nuclear investment, and by freedom of employment f o r  s p e c i a l i s t s  
within the  Community, 
(h) es t ab l i sh  with o the r  countries and with in t e rna t iona l  
organizations any contacts l i k e l y  t o  romote progress i n  
the  peaceful uses of nuclear energy. 5E 
Although t h i s  discussion i s  ch ie f ly  concerned with EURATOM'S research 
functions,  i t  should be noted t h a t  the  organization's other functions were 
intended t o  be of considerably wider scope than i ts  own in-house 
research. 51 
under a s i n g l e  r u b r i c ) ,  EURATOM is empowered t o  facil i tate dissemination 
Within the  realm of research and t r a i n i n g  (which are t r ea t ed  
of information, supply nuclear materials and personnel t o  en terpr i ses  i n  
the  member s t a t e s ,  p lace  research cont rac ts ,  and e s t ab l i sh  its own "Joint 
Nuclear Research Centre." This Centre, which i s  discussed i n  Ar t i c l e  8 of 
t h e  Treaty, cons i s t s  i n  fact  of four  establishments: ISPRA ( I t a l y ) ,  
Ibid. ,  pp. 17-18. -
'' The in t e re s t ed  reader is  r e fe r r ed  t o  t h e  writ ings of Scheinman, 
Mayne, and W. Walsh, as well as Jaros lav  Polach, Euratom (Dobbs Ferry, 
N.Y. : -@ceana Publications, 1964) f o r  more comple-ussions of EURATOM. 
Polach's de t a i l ed  bibliography and h i s t o r i a n  Walsh's extensive list of 
footnotes are a l s o  very helpful.  . 
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PETTEN (Holland), KARLSHRUE (Germany), and GEEL (Belgium). 52 
t i a l  program is spel led out i n  an annex t o  the  Treaty, where pluovisions 
Its i n i -  
are made f o r  "general chemical, physical ,  e lec t ronic  and metal lurgical  
laboratories; ' t  several  spec ia l  laborator ies  i n  areas inc lu  
fusion, isotope separation and radiobiology; a bureau 6f nuclear standards;  
a documentation center;  several  reactor  prototypes; and spec ia l  high- 
f lux  reac tors .  53 
9 
Before going on t o  see how EURATOM'S research a c t i v i t i e s  have 
developed from t h i s  i n i t i a l  statement i n  the Treaty, it is  worth spending 
a few moments examining the organizational s t ruc tu re  of EURATOM, f o r  t h i s  
aspect is  cer ta in ly  unique among technological organizations.  The execu- 
t i v e  body of t he  organization i s  an Executive Commission, r a t h e r  than a 
s ing le  Secretary-General. Until  Ju ly  6 ,  1967, the  EURATOM Commissian 
consisted of f i v e  memb , each from a d i f fe ren t  member state. On t h a t  
date,  however, t h e  "fusion of the executives" took place; a 14-man 
Commission took executive control  over the e n t i r e  European Community 
(EURATOM, ECSC, EEC) and t h i s  act ion was viewed by the  Six as a major 
s t ep  towards integrat ion.  The fusion ac tua l ly  occurred between t h e  time 
of our v i s i t  t o  ISPRA and our v i s i t  t o  PETTEN, but no d i r e c t  consequences 
were v i s i b l e  a t  the laborator ies .  Let us consider, therefore ,  the  Commis- 
s ion  as  it exis ted p r i o r  t o  fusion. The f i v e  members (Luxembourg, having 
52 In a b i t  of double-talk, separation Itfor geographical [!I  or 
operational reasons" was foreseen i n  Article 8 .  
53 "Euratom Treaty," Annex V, p. 153. 
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no nat ional  atomic program was not represented on the  Cornmi 
supposed t o  represent are 
a l l y ,  but  in  fact it has been widely re 
operated as representat ives  of p o l i t i c a l  (national)  i n t e r e s t s .  54 The 
Commission had a President and a Vice-president (the Presidents were a l l  
Frenchmen), and below the  Commission there  ex is ted  the 
t r a t i v a  s t ruc tu re  of EURATOM. 
t o  renewable four-year terms by the governments of  the niember d ta tes ,  
Members of t h e  Commission were appointed - 
"acting in common agreement. T1  
Besides the Commission, t he  only other  Community i n s t i t u t i o n  w i t h  
any r e a l  power is  the Council of Ministers.  
s i x  representat ive of cabinet rank, one from each member s t a t e .  Unlike 
ESW and CERN, there  is no clear-cut  conceptual divis ion of responsibil-  
ity'between the  Council (charged with policy-making a t  CERN and ESRO) 
This Council consis ts  of  
and the  Executive (charged with administration).  The EURATOM Council is 
empowered t o  "take a l l  measures within its competence i n  order t o  co- 
ordinate  the act ions of  Member S ta tes  and of the  Community."'' Here the  
representatives a re  supposed t o  ac t  as  representatives of t h e i r  nations.  
Council decisions a r e  taken by vote according t o  a ra ther  complex scheme. 
Certain decisions,  such as es tab l i sh ing  or rev is ing  a bas ic  five-year 
research program, require  a unanimous vote, but annual budget a l locat ions 
54 See Scheinman, "Nuclear Integration," p. 22; W. Walsh, Science 
, p. 81; and Polach, Euratom, p .  105. 
55 PEura432m Treaty," A r t .  115, p. 79. 
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crucial to the fun Scheinman suggests, 
The superstructure of EURATOM also includes the European Parlia- 
ment, which serves chiefly as a forum for discussion, although theoreti- 
cally it has the power to dismiss the Commission on a two-thirds vote; 
the Court of Justice, which has enforceable powers to ensure the obser- 
vance of law and justice in the application of the Treaty; and three 
large but impotent "consultative bodies," the Scientific and Technical 
Committee, the Economic and ial Committee, and the Consultative Com- 
mittee for Nuclear Research. The Parliament, the Court, and the Economic 
and Social Committee are shared by all three parts of the Community, 
With regard to the administrative structure of EURATOM beneath the 
Commission, detailed information is not generally available. Several 
divisions exist, including the Information and Documentation Center, the 
Eurisotop Bureau, the Security Inspectors, and a number of others. 
Joint Research Centre 
The 
the division of Research and Training 
Besides its own research estab- ded by a Director-General. 
on also administers EURATOMiCs resear 
uclear Integration," p. 23. also p .  24 for a 
cil's Committee of Permanent esentatives. 
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and contracts of association. 
with industrial firms and groups, universities, and public and private 
Such contracts--of which 450 were signed 
research organizations between 1958 and 196357--accounted for about 50% 
of EURATOM'S research expenditures. s8 In general, research contracts 
are let for performance of specific tasks by an outside organization, 
while contracts of association involve EURATOM participation (with money 
as well as personnel) in projects at outside organizations. 
In order to put the Joint Research Centre into operation quickly, 
EURATOM, instead of beginning to construct its own facilities, decided 
that it would take over and expand existing facilities in the member 
states. The first of its laboratories, the Central Nuclear Measurements 
Bureau, began operation in 1960, in buildings provided by the Belgian 
government at Geel, near the Belgian nuclear center at Mol. In March of 
the following year, the Italian Comitato Nazionale per 1'Energia Nucleare 
(CNEN) transferred its large general-purpose nuclear center at Ispra 
entirely to EURATOM. In 1962, the Dutch reactor center at Petten trans- 
ferred part of its facilities to the Community, and finally, on the site 
of a German nuclear research center at Karlsruhe, EURATOM constructed its 
fourth establishment--the European Transuranium Institute. 
Despite the fact that the organization decided to use mainly existing 
facilities, EURAT0M:'s research program got off to a rather slow start. 
'' OECD, International Scientific Organizations (Paris, 1965), p.  141. 
58 Jules Gueron, "The Lessons 'to be Learned from Euratom," Bulletin 
of the Atomic Scientists, XXIII, 3 (March 1967), p.  40. 
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Polach observes t h a t  a change of a t t i t u d e  on the p a r t  of the  Commission 
was later responsible f o r  speeding up research ac t iv i ty .  
although research was expressly provided f o r  i n  the or ig ina l  plan, the  
Commission did not deal se r ious ly  with it u n t i l  it was apparent t h a t  
EURATOM'S r o l e  i n  actual  power production was not  going t o  proceed accord- 
ifig , t o  plan:' s' In  addi t ion he  ascr ibes  some of the  d i f f i c u l t i e s  i n  
s t a r t i n g  up research t o  a lack of large-scale f a c i l i t i e s  and problems 
i n  recru i t ing  high-level s c i e n t i f i c  personnel. Whatever the  cause, out 
of i t s  i n i t i a l  f ive-year $215 mil l ion research program, EURATOM expended 
l e s s  than $4 mill ion i n  i t s  f irst  two years,  of which $2 mill ion went t o  
H e  implies t h a t  
EURATOM par t ic ipa t ion  i n  OECD reac tor  projects.60 
pace of a c t i v i t y  increased markedly, especial ly  i n  the  area of contract  
research. 
research, by l a t e  1960 it had spent more than $34 million.61 
funds, incidental ly ,  l i k e  those of CERN and ESRO, a r e  derived from con- 
t r ibu t ions  of  the member s t a t e s ,  although EURATOM does theore t ica l ly  have 
In  1960 and beyond, the 
While during 1959 EURATOM spent only about $3& mill ion o n .  
(EURATOM'S 
the  power, through Ar t i c l e  173 of i t s  Treaty, of levying taxes upon i ts  
members.) By the end of the five-year period [end of 1962), a l l  but  $20 
mill ion of the  $215 mil l ion research budget had been earmarked. In  June 
1962, t he  Council of Ministers approved a second five-year program 
1963-1967), t h i s  one f o r  a t o t a l  of $425 mil l ion.  This amount w a s  
( fo r  
reduced 
59 Polach, Euratom, p. 139. 
6o Ibid.  
61 W. Walsh, Science . . . Affairs, p. 83.  
-
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from the $480 mill ion proposed by the  Commisson, and la t  
adjusted s l i g h t l y  upwards over t he  objections of t he  French 
.(19.64) it was 
62 
As the  adjustments which were f i n a l l y  approved ($5.5 million against  a 
request f o r  $48 million) were not su f f i c i en t  t o  cover the  r i s i n g  costs  of 
EURATOM'S research, the organization, i n  1965, began cu t t ing  back dn some 
of i ts  areas of research. 
t h e  need t o  approve a new five-year plan for t h e  period beginning with 
1968, has severely impaired EURATOM'S functioning as  a research body; it 
w i l l  be  discussed i n  more d e t a i l  below. 
The continuing program crisis, compounded by 
O f  t he  $425 million budget, $127 million was al located t o  building 
up and operating the  four Jo in t  Research Centre establishments, and about 
ha l f  of t he  t o t a l  was t o  be spent on work car r ied  out a t  the  Centres. 
Approximately $57 mil l ion was al located t o  EURATOM'S "star" project-  
ORGEL. 
um 
as a moderator. 
EURATOM establishments: 
used both as t e s t s  of reactor  design and fo r  materials and system tes t ing ;  
a large information processing center (CETIS) is providing computer f a c i l i  
t ies f o r  t he  Organization and is doing important work on mechanical t rans-  
l a t i o n  as well; van de GraBf and l i nea r  accelerators  are  i n  use f o r  prepa- 
63 
This program, housed a t  ISPRA, involves research on na tura l  urani- 
fueled reactors  using an organic l iqu id  as  a coolant and heavy water 
Other i n t e re s t ing  work has been going on a t  a l l  of the  
several  reactors were completed and are  being 
r a t ion  of primary standards for nuclear measurements. 
62 See Scheinman, "Nuclear Integration," pp. 43-51, f o r  a discussion 
of the  crisis t h i s  provoked. 
63 Wornunity Topics," (Brussels : European Community Informat 
Service,  n.d.), No. 7,  p. 4. 
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i t y  par tners  t o  agree on a program, and t h e i r  unwillingness t o  a l loca t e  
la rge  sums of money f o r  which they are not assured immediate d i r  
1) re turns .  Its r o  s go much deeper. Two 6f t h e  fundamental 
premises upon which EURATOM w a s  founded have proved t o  be inconsistent 
with r e a l i t y :  (1) t ha t  atomic power would be required by Europe and 
economical t o  produce by the  mid-to-late 1960’s and (2) t h a t  the nuclear 
f i e l d  was well-suited t o  cooperative e f f o r t s  because of t h e  lack of 
vested i n t e r e s t s .  
The “great nuclear development crisis” (as J u l e s  Gueron calls it in- 
h i s  ar t ic le  c i t e d  above) resu l ted  when technologists and policy-makers 
i n  Europe began t o  r e a l i z e - t h a t  f o s s i l  fuels--especially petroleum products 
and na tura l  gas (whose use had been growing a t  the expense of coal)--were 
not going t o  be i n  such s h o r t  supply, that reac tor  e f f ic iency  was not 
increasing as fast as predicted,  and tha t  atomic power was not going t o  
be more economical t o  produce than conventional power i n  t h e  immediate 
fu tu re  As d i s p a r i t i e s  between ea r ly  opt imis t ic  r epor t s  and t h e  current 
64 This b r i e f  summary of t he  s i t u a t i o n  i s  not intended as an author- 
i t a t i v e  evaluation , 
w i t h  the  problems o anization. 
as a means f o r  t h e  reader t o  become 
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atomic power p i c tu re  grew, the  S ix  countries began t o  question EURATOM'S 
ro le .  
A t  the  same time, nat ional  nuclear establishments, which i n  the  mid- 
1950's were qu i t e  small, began t o  grow rapidly and r a the r  than being cor 
ordinated by EURATOM, began t o  compete with it. The member states, esper 
hially t h e  la rger  ones, discovered t h a t  they could i n  fact do more alone 
than they had first thought. France's des i r e  f o r  a force de frappe, i n  
pa r t i cu la r ,  soon impelled t h a t  country t o  embark on a nat ional  nuclear 
energy program of  the same order of magnitude as EURATOM'S. 
pany of such competition, EURATOM had tended t o  come o f f  second-best. 
A s  one jou rna l i s t  observed recent ly ,  
In the  com- 
Euratom has lacked a constituency; industry has i t s  own 
i n t e r e s t s  t o  consider, and Euratom appears as a r iva l  t o  the 
nat ional  programs of the most ac t ive  governments. 66 
These root  problems have been compounded by the nature of t he  organi- 
zation i tself .  S t ruc tura l ly ,  it has been incapable of taking the decis ive 
measures needed. In pa r t i cu la r ,  the Commission, unable t o  withstand the 
pressures of nat ional  i n t e r e s t s  i n  i t s  operations as the top executive 
body, has been a t  f a u l t .  Several confrontations have occurred between 
the Commission and member governments, one r e su l t i ng  i n  the departure of 
Etienne Hirsch, second President of the  Commission, who was, i n  Schein- 
man's words, "the Commuriity['s] f i r s t  and only dynamic leader."67 What 
66 John Walsh, "Euratom: After 10 Years, S t i l l  Seeking the Way," 
Science, C L V I I I  (October 6 ,  1967), p.  95. 
67 Scheinman, "Nuclear Integration," p. 36. 
excel lent  summary of EURATOM'S troubles on pp. 35-51. 
Scheinman gives an 
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the Six  partners  did,  i n  e f f ec t ,  when they cons 
e s t ab l i sh  an organization with l imited scope and powers, 
control  over nat ional  a c t i v i t i e s  i n  i t s  
ambitious program. Had it been p rac t i ca l  t o  carry out 
was not - - i t  would have required combining the  members' 
r a the r  than running them i n  competition. 
A t  t he  time of our v i s i t s  t o  the EURATOM laborator ies  (mid-1967), 
the organization had been working on montb-by-month inter im allocations-- 
without an approved budget f o r  the current year--since January. Although 
the budget was f i n a l l y  approved by the Council i n  July,  the  dispute,  
which concerned support of an I ta l ian fas t - reac tor  program and an assess- 
ment of $ 2 , 8  mill ion f o r  plutonium supplied by t h e  United S ta t e s  which 
France refused t o  pay, prevented the approval of a new five-year research 
program. Rather than waiting f o r  approval of the  f u l l  five-year program, 
the Council then took up debate of the  1968 budget i t s e l f  and slashed 
the f igure the Commission had proposed i n  ha l f  from $82 mill ion t o  $40.7 
mil l ion.  As reported it, "The act ion was the  culmination of a 
long period of bickering over budgets, which r e f l ec t ed  the  member nations! 
d i f f e r ing  conceptions of Euratom's proper scope. !I6* This cu t ,  while it 
l e f t  the J o i n t  Research Centres i n  r e l a t ive ly  good shape, suspended a l l  
associat ion contracts ,  under which nearly a l l  of EURATOM'S nuclear fusion 
and biological  research was financed. A t  the time of our v i s i t s ,  as at 
the time of t h i s  wri t ing,  EURATOM personnel had no notion as t o  t he  long- 
uratom: A Cut f o r  Cooperation," , c L v m  
29, 1967), p. 1657. 
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term plans of t he  organization, and ac tua l ly  were operating without even 
knowing whether t h e i r  organization would continue t o  exis t .  
4.. 
From the  time of its founding i n  1957, u n t i l  March 1961 the nuclear 
research centre  a t  Ispra ,  I t a l y  was a p a r t  of t h e  I t a l i a n  nuclear pro- 
gram. When, i n  1961, the I t a l i a n  o f f e r  t o  t r a n s f e r  the  center  t o  EURATOM 
was accepted and pue i n t o  e f f ec t ,  t h e  laboratory began work with about 
350 employees (including loca l ly  recru i ted  labor) .  Although a number of 
buildings already exis ted on the  site, EURATOM began expanding the faci l i -  
t i e s  i n ' o rde r  t o  accommodate2 i t s  rapid growth. By the end of 1961 the 
number of  employees a t  ISPRA had near ly  t r i p l e d ,  and by mid-1967 it had 
r i s e n  t o  more than 1,600. 
EURATOM centers--its personnel number more than the  combined t o t a l  of 
ISPRA is by far the  la rges t  of the  four 
the  o ther  three.  I ts  importance is  fu r the r  magnified by t h e  fact t h a t  it 
houses the ORGEL projec t ,  i n  which EURATOM has invested heavily.  Within 
the f irst  five-year plan, ISPRA's budget accounted for $45 million, and 
within the  second $87 million, plus  a separate  $45,5 mill ion a l loca t ion  
for ORGEL experiments car r ied  out a t  ISPRA. 69 
The ISPRA s i t e  comprises some 400 acres a t  a dis tance o f  s l i g h t l y  
more than one mile: from the Western shore of Lago Maggiore and about 45 
miles northwest of Milan. 
3 reactors  (ISPRA-1, ECO, and ESSOR), a large computation center ,  and some 
Scat tered about t h i s  heavily-wooded s i t e  a r e  
69 EURATOM'S budget f igures  vary from one source t o  another, and these 
figures represent the author 's  bes t  estimates based on a var ie ty  of sources. 
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40 laborator ies ,  experimental ha1 r 
i s  divided i n t o  11 n "services ,?' so 
i n t o  sect ions and experimental groups: 
service,  with over 200 s t a f f ) ,  Engineering, Metallurgy and Ceramics, Phy- 
sical  Chemistry, Chemistry, CETLS (the European S c i e n t i f i c  InfoTmation 
Processing Centre), Direct Conversion, Protection, Medical, Library and 
Documentation, and General Seyvices. 
establishment, and subordinate t o  him are  the heads of the various ser -  
vices .  The ORGEL pro jec t ,  which has been mentioned earlier i n  t h i s  chap- 
t e r  as being "housed" a t  ISPRA, is  exactly i n  t h a t  s i t ua t ion .  
administratively,  ORGEL fa l l s  under the control of the  ISPRA adminis- 
t r a t i o n ,  i t s  top management is  independent and, while it must work i n  
cooperation with ISPRA departments, it repor t s  d i r e c t l y  t o  Brussels. 
Reactor Physi 
A Director is i n  charge of the 
Although 
5 .  ISPRA's Atmosphere 
EURATOM'S d i f f i c u l t i e s ,  combined with some spec ia l  cha rac t e r i s t i c s  
of the ISPRA s i tua t ion ,  have created a very unusual atmosphere i n  the  
center .  
establishment i s  of ten c i t e d  as an example of how not t o  run an in t e r -  
nat ional  s c i e n t i f i c  laboratory.  
it has weathered a number of crises which were not general t o  EURATOM, 
but  it has not emerged the  
The personnel a t  ISPRA a re  a l l  well aware of t he  f a c t  t h a t  t h e i r  
-
ISPRA has survived EURATOM'S c r i s e s  and 
t e r i s t i c  of t he  atmosphere i s  a ge signation. I n  
other  words, the staff has been subjected t o  the  center ' s  d i f f i c u l t i e s  
Rather t h e  t it no longer care gh t o  be m i l i t a n t .  
e t h a t  matters outs ide of t h e i r  
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control  determine the  fate of t h e i r  organization and t h e i r  work. 
hold some mild hope f o r  t he  future, but  not much enthusiasm. 
al l ,  they feel t h a t  t h e i r  work and the real s c i e n t i f i c  capab i l i t i e s  of 
t h e i r  center  are unrecognized because of i r r a t i o n a l  p o l i t i c a l  disputes.  
They 
Most of 
Coexisting i n  t h i s  atmosphere of res ignat ion are several  o ther  dimen- 
sions of ISPRA's character--some of which are separable from the  resig- 
nat ion and some of which are not. 
that despi te  its t r ans fe r  from CNEN t o  the Community i n  1961, ISPRA i n  
First of a l l ,  one must acknowledge 
1967 is s t i l l  very much an I t a l i a n  establishment a t  hear t .  O f  the  ISPRA 
staff ,  excluding loca l ly  recru i ted  labor, nearly ha l f  a r e  I t a l i a n s .  I f  
one includes these agents locaux, who a re  v i r t u a l l y  a l l  I t a l i a n ,  one 
begins t o  see t h a t  through the weight of numbers alone, the I t a l i ans  
exer t  a profound influence.  (Many of these  people were employed by CNEN 
a t  ISPRA and simply stayed on when EURATOM took over.)  
the  fact t h a t  the  center  is placed i n  a highly parochial  r u r a l  environ- 
Add t o  t h i s  
ment, so  t h a t  i f  a foreign individual wishes t o  have any contacts outside 
of the  EURATOM community, he must adapt go I t a l i a n  ways, and the I t a l i a n  
f lavor  becomes even more comprehensible. 
The I t a l i a n  language, too,  is a fea ture  of ISPRA. Off ic ia l ly ,  ISPRA 
( l i k e  the  whole European Community) has four languages--French, German, 
I t a l i a n ,  and Dutch. 
plus,  often,  English. 
I t a l i a n  e s sen t i a l  f o r  survival  i n  the locale ,  I t a l i a n  is  most of ten 
Community documents are issued i n  a l l  four languages 
A t  ISPRA, s ince  most people f ind  a knowledge of 
chosen as a common tongue and much of the center ' s  business (formally and 
informally) is car r ied  out i n  it. 
a language which while not o f f i c i a l l y  recognized by the EC, i s  widely 
Probably second i n  currency is English, 
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spoken especial ly  among Germans and Dutch a t  ISPRA. 
in t e rna l  technical  reports  are circulated i n  English. 
In  addi t ion,  many 
French i s  used 
widely, 
highest  
I n  
of course, pa r t i cu la r ly  i n  the  pa r t s  of the  center  with the  
concentrations of French and Belgians. 
paint ing t h i s  p o r t r a i t  of ISPRA, one cannot ignore t h a t  aspect 
which i s  perhaps most attractive--1SPRA's se t t i ng .  I t  i s  hard t o  describe 
t h i s  s e t t i n g  without the use of adject ives  more su i t ab le  f o r  travelogues 
than f o r  the present context,  
see the snow-capped Alps r i s i n g  majest ical ly  behind the azure waters of 
From.the grounds of  the  laboratory one can 
Lago Maggiore. Tiny orange-tile-roofed v i l lages  l i t e r a l l y  dot the country- 
side--from a height each one i s  dis t inguishable  amidst the green f o r e s t s  
j u s t  as on a map. 
even distracted--by the beauty of the  surroundings, and as a t  CERN, he 
f ee l s  tha t  even those employees of long standing have not become oblivious 
t o  it. 
The v i s i t o r  t o  ISPRA cannot fa i l  but t o  be impressed- 
Unlike t h a t  of  CERN, however, ISPRA's location also exhibi ts  a number 
of profound disadvantages. The i d y l l i c  view of l i f e  i n  I t a l y ' s  lake 
country, i s  so i led  a bit 'when one learns  t h a t  ISPRA's climate is not 
qu i t e  s o  idea l ,  t h a t  th ree  months of winter submerge t h e  area i n  di luvian 
r a ins  and continual fog." 
or even Noordwijk. I t  i s  a hamlet of some few hundred res idents ,  and 
s ince  the  only la rge  c i t y  i n  the  region, Milan, is su f f i c i en t ly  d i s t a n t  
Further, the  v i l l age  of I spra  is  not  Geneva, 
(45 miles) t o  preclude commuting or even casual t r i p s  f o r  a l l  but a 
'' See Claude Deplanche, ' 'Ispra," EURA'EDM Bullet in  d' Information 
Interne,  No. 8 (1966), p. 3, for a "Euratomian's" view of the  ISPRA 
weather. 
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venturesome few, one lives primarily i n  a r a t h e r  rural area, where the 
va r i e ty  and diversions of urban l i fe ,  and t h e  prerequis i tes  f o r  a cosmo- 
po l i t an  way of l i f e  are almost t o t a l l y  lacking. 
EURATOM, aware of t he  defec ts  of the  ISPRPL aocale and highly con- 
scious of the  s o c i a l  welfare of its staff has moved t o  take care  of i t s  
own. As a r e s u l t ,  t h e  organization has c rea ted  a more o r  less self- 
s u f f i c i e n t  community which is dargely independent of the  indigenous 
population. In  t h e  words of a member of  t h i s  community, 
La concentration de plus de 4,500 personnes y compris l e s  
fami l les  en p le ine  campagne cons t i tue  un fa i t  unique non 
seulement dans l e s  Communaut6s mais dans tou tes  fes 
organisations europgennes ou in te rna t iona les  .71  
For the  v i s i t o r  o r  newly-arrived employee, ISPRA has its own motel-type 
accommodations. EURATOM par t i c ipa t e s  i n  various ways i n  providing perrna- 
nent housing f o r  i ts  s ta f f - - there  are even some permanent apartments 
on t h e  s i te . "  
cen ter  f o r  after-hours a c t i v i t y ,  and clubs of every va r i e ty  ( t enn i s ,  
An a t t r a c t i v e l y  designed club-house serves as a soc ia l  
ping-pong, judo, horseback r id ing ,  and bridge, f o r  example) abound. 
There is  a EURATOM beach a t  the lake; concerts, movies, and lec tures  a r e  
ava i lab le  f o r  i n t e re s t ed  individuals.  ISPRA is perhaps the  only in t e r -  
na t iona l  laboratory (or national laboratory f o r  t h a t  matter) which has 
its own "miniature golf" course. 
IL Ib id . ,  p. 5. 
-.leLc 
'' Only a few people are ac tua l ly  accomddated on the  S i t e  o r  i n  the  
v i l l a g e  of Ispra-most of the s t a f f a l i v e  i n  the  many small v i l l ages  
around Ispra  and i n  Varese--a town of about 65,000 located about 15 miles 
from t h e  center. 
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One problem whnch EURATOM has solved qu i t e  successful ly  is  t h a t  of 
education. 
Schools," several  of which are sca t te red  about Europe. 
any of the Six countries may study from kindergarten up t o  univers i ty  L 
level without fear of being excluded from the  mainstream of education i n  
h i s  own country. 
In  Varese, the  Community has provided one of i t s  "Euro 
Here, a ch i ld  from 
Despite t h i s  t i g h t l y  organized environment, ISPRA has had some ra the r  
severe morale problems. 
t i e s  of the Community, the f a c t  t h a t  funds have been i n  short  supply, t he  
These stem i n  pa r t  from the p o l i t i c a l  d i f f i c u l -  
f a c t  t h a t  no one i s  r e a l l y  qui te  sure  what t he  ult imate aim of a l l  t h i s  
reactor  research is  ( t h i s  would not be s o  bad i f  the laboratory had not 
been constructed with such an applied or ien ta t ion) ,  and the  f a c t  t h a t  the 
fu ture  course of the  organization is  completely unknown. 
about the fu ture  i s  compounded by the f a c t  t h a t  most of t he  EURATOM staff 
have what the Europeans c a l l  "fonctionnaire" s t a tus .  
equivalent t o  a c i v i l  service appointment i n  the U.S., and implies a high 
degree of job tenure. 
very existence is i n  doubt is  not conducive t o  high morale.73 
Community salaries are probably the  highest  among European organizations 
and it is the only such organization t o  provide pension r i g h t s  f o r  i t s  
employees. Complaints among the  ISPRA s t a f f ,  however, include the  grading 
and promotion system, which, it i s  f e l t ,  do not r e f l e c t  one's professional  
performance, 
Uncertainty 
This i s  roughly 
Naturally, a secure job i n  an organization whose 
European 
0 
73 See below, Chapter V I .  
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Some of t h e  consequences of t h i s  mor 
l m  of s c i e n t i f i c  o 
es. The phenomenon of the  locke 
ences. 
some s o r t  of gate t o  
passage of these  gates is nothing more than a formality.  
Nearly a l l  of t h e  labora tor ies  included i n  t h i s  study have 
t r ic t  access t o  t h e i r  sites. For employees, 
A t  ISPRA, how- 
ever, t he  gates are kept locked day and n ight  except f o r  a shor t  period 
i n  t h e  morning, lunch time, and a similar s h o r t  period i n  t h e  evening. 
Employees (from the  leading s c i e n t i s t s  on down) who a r r i v e  more than 15 
minutes after t h e  s t a r t i n g  time i n  t h e  morning are no t  allowed t o  en te r  
unless they give t h e i r  names t o  the  guard and f i l l  out a "tardy s l i p , "  
which eventually is forwarded t o  the i r=superv isor .  In  t h e  evening, no one 
is allowed t o  leave u n t i l  the o f f i c i a l  q u i t t i n g  time, and the  long l i n e  
of automobiles i n  a w e  behind the  gate with t h e i r  engines running ten  
minutes before q u i t t i n g  t i m e  i s  a most amusing s igh t  t o  the v i s i t o r .  
This ac t ion ,  i t  i s  said, was occasioned by the  fact t h a t  employees were 
taking advantage of the  normal professional freedom. 
Also connected t o  the  morale problem are the  r e l a t ions  between the  
Local Committee of Personnel (Staff Association) and the  administration. 
These have been a t  times very s t ra ined ,  and the re  w a s  once even a shor t  
s t r i k e  i n  which professionals stopped work along with non-professionals. 
The Personnel Committee has gone so far as t o  car ry  out i ts  own survey 
of employee s a t i s f a c t i o n ,  and has o f t en  demanded a grea te r  (even exclu- 
s ive )  voice i n  
e f ind  r e l a t i v e l y  
high morale--those areas which are more per iphera l  t o  the  c e n t e r ' s  main 
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f o c i  there  ss dep 
such act ivi t ies  as biology and 
quie t ly  going along and doing very good wor 
f o r  these areas,  the type of i n t e l l e c t u a l  excitement t h a t  was apparent 
a t  CERN does not e x i s t  a t  ISPRA. 
"none of t he  member states granted too  much 
way of p ersonne 1" 74- -I SPRA ha accumulated some excellent people. 
pa r t i cu la r ly  i n  ORGEL, might po ten t ia l ly  have "star" q u a l i t i e s .  But 
organizational problems have prevented the center  from becoming i n  any 
sense a place where br ight  young s c i e n t i s t s  and engineers might wish t o  
COi:le 2nd learn from top people i n  t h e i r  f i e l d s .  
l e  
Despite i ts  recruitme i f f icu l t ies - -  
the  new Comglunity i n  the 
A fey,  - 
ISPRA's ys ica l  i so la -  
t ion ,  the h o s t i l i t y  of "competing" nat ional  programs, t he  f a c t  t h a t  t h e r e  
is very l i t t l e  turn-over among the  personnel, and the fact t h a t  ISPRA 
a r t r a c t s  few short-term v i s i t o r s ,  have combined, f i n a l l y ,  t 
people the impression t h a t  they a re  ra ther  i so la ted  and outside the 
mainstream of a c t i v i t y  i n  t h e i r  f i e l d s .  75 
6 .  The J o i n t  Research Centre a t  PETTEN 
The physical contrast  between ISPRA and PETTEN i s  most s t r ik ing .  
One f inds PETTEN i n  perhaps the  most barren p a r t  of northern Holland. 
74 Scheinman, "Nuclear Integ 
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The land around it is f la t  and la rge ly  devoid of trees. 
PETTEN is s i t u a t e d  on one s ide  of a row of sand dunes, on the  o ther  s ide  
of which is the  sea. 
q u i t e  empty--PETTEN itself  is a v i l l a g e  so small it does not even have a 
hote l .  To the  tastes of most Europeans, t h e  climate is not p a r t i c u l a r l y  
appealing. Distance t o  the  nearest large c i t y  (Amsterdam--35 miles) is 
Like ESTEC, 
Unlike.ESTEC, however,-the land around PETTEN is 
such t h a t  employees are generally confined t o  l i v i n g  i n  e i t h e r  Petten, 
o r  t h e  neighboring towns of Bergen and Alkmaart (which are much more 
a t t r a c t i v e ) .  
Like ISPRA, PETTEN is a general-purpose nuclear research center.  
I t  stands on the  grounds of  the  Reactor Centrum Nederland and i t s  orig- 
i n a l -  buildings were acquired by t r ans fe r  from t h a t  agency. The Center 
ac tua l ly  began operation i n  ea r ly  1963, and it has s ince  grown t o  the  
s i z e  of about 200 employees.76 (The Dutch cen te r  surrounding i t  has 
about 600 employees.) A handful of buildings house i t s  labs,  and a 
high-flux mater ia l s - tes t ing  reac tor ,  which is presently operated by the  
Dutch center  (although it is  owned by EURATOM) is i t s  chief piece of 
equipment. 
A t  t h e  time of our v i s i t  (August 1967) PETTEN was i n  a s t a t e  of 
t r a n s i t i o n .  Having begun as a b a s i c a l l y  technica l  i n s t i t u t i o n ,  it was 
gradually changing over t o  a more s c i e n t i f i c  or ien ta t ion .  
o r ig ina l  program, PETTEN was intended to  be subs t an t i a l ly  l a rge r  than it 
present ly  is, and it was t o  b e  concerned with technical coordination i n  the 
In EURATOM'S 
" As of mid-1967. 
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domain of high temperature gas reactors .  
much abandoned, PETTEN has come t o  focus more on the study on non-f i ss i le  
reac tor  materials. 
Calorimetry, Applied Research on Graphites, Structure  of Materials, Hy- 
draul ics ,  and Electrochemistry Xa group which was a t  ISPRA i n  August 
1967, but which shor t ly  the rea f t e r  moved t o  PETTEN), 
is an I r rad iz t ion  Service and a Post- i r radiat ion Service, plus a General 
Services Division 
A s  t h i s  r o l e  has been p r e t t y  
PETTEN i s  organized i n t o  f i v e  s c i e n t i f i c  branches: 
In addition there  
A number of fac tors  have combined t o  c rea te  a much hea l th i e r  s p i r i t  
In the  f i rs t  place, at PETTEN than tha t  which was t o  be found a t  ISPRA. 
the  center is subs t sn t i a l ly  newer and the  change-over t o  a more s c i e n t i f i c  
or ien ta t ion  has helped t o  keep t h i s  freshness a l ive .  Also, as PETTEN was 
- or ig ina l ly  intended t o  bg much la rger ,  i t s  budget, which was cut ,  s t i l l  
i s  su f f i c i en t  t o  give it an atmosphere of some affluence--the s t a f f  does 
not f e e l  hemmed-in by budgetary cons t ra in ts .  Furthermore, the  EURATOM 
program h2s given PETTEN :some l ibe r ty  t o  take on outside work on a con- 
t r a c t  bas i s  f o r  i ndus t r i a l  c l i en t s .  This work has provided the  cknter 
with valuable indus t r i a l  contacts,  and has minimized the  sense of profes- 
s iona l  i so l a t ion  which the environment might otherwise induce. 
PETTEN's staff has a much higher professional or ien ta t ion  and few of the 
morale problems which e x i s t  a t  .ISERA. 
In a l l ,  
PETTEN works primarily i n  English, although,as a t  ISPRA, it is not 
an o f f i c i a l  language. French and Butch a r e  next most, popular, i n  t h a t  
order.  
as something of a f i l t e r ,  and t h a t  those people who have ac tua l ly  come to' 
work at PETTEN have been prepared f o r  t he  s i t ua t ion .  
One suspects t h a t  the  unat t ract iveness  of t h e  locat ion has acted 
I n  any case, one 
15 1 
finds ( ra ther  t o  t h e  su rp r i se  of t he  author) t h a t  there are not nearly 
as many complaints about loca l  conditions as a t  ESTEC. 
vided, as a t  ISPRA, such th ings  as housing (severa l  apartment blocks i n  
Bergen and Alkmaar), and a European School ( a t  Bergen). Although a g rea t  
va r i e ty  of clubs, c u l t u r a l ,  and soc ia l  act ivi t ies  e x i s t ,  t h e  sense of a 
closed community is not nearly as pervasive as at ISPRA--probably as  a 
result of PETTEN's smaller s i z e .  
EURATOM has pro- 
D .  Atoms f o r  Peace 
The f i n a l  portion of t h i s  chapter is devoted t o  two organizations 
which a re  t r ea t ed  i n  the  same sec t ion  only on account of  t h e i r  r e l a t i v e l y  
minor rode i n  t h i s  study. Their shor t  treatment here, however, does not 
reflect t h e i r  real importance relative t o  the o ther  organizations 
described above. 
1. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
The In te rna t iona l  Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) i s  t h e  only t r u l y  world- 
wide organization included i n  t h i s  study. I n  s t r i c t  usage, t he  other organ- 
iza t ions  should a l l  be considered regional.  I n  cont ras t ,  IAEA, an arm of 
the  United Nations, i s  world-wide and included ( i n  Ju ly  1967) 98 member- 
states--most of t h e  countries i n  the  world. 
be t raced  back t o  the  fear-hope ambivalence with which s c i e n t i s t s  and 
p o l i t i c i a n s  viewed atomic energy i n  the  late 1940's and ea r ly  1950as. 
President Eisenhower's suggestion of a United Nations atomic energy agency 
i n  h i s  famous "Atoms-for-Peace" speech i n  1953 was followed by approval 
of an Atoms-for-Peace Plan by the  General Assembly and a United Nations 
-
The or ig in  of t he  Agency can 
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conference a t  Geneva on the  peaceful uses o f  atomic energy. 
conference came, i n  August 1955, a Draft S ta tu te ,  which was revised and 
Out of t h i s  
eventually signed by some 70 nat ions i n  October 1956." After ratifica- 
t i on  by the  required number of states, the  Agency began i t s  formal exis- 
tence s l i g h t l y  more than a year later.  
According t o  i t s  s t a t u t e ,  the  object ive of the  Agency is  t o  "accel- 
erate and enlarge the  contr ibut ion of atomic energy t o  peace, healeh 
prosperi ty  throughout the  In p rac t i ca l  terms, the  main func- 
t ions  of  the Agency are twofold: 
and 
F i r s t ,  t o  promote peaceful uses through 
(a) exchange of pr in ted  information, convening of conferences and sympo- 
s ia ;  (b) provision of technical  ass is tance t o  those countr ies  which 
require  it (IAEA is the  only one of the  in te rna t iona l  bodies discussed 
here  t o  which most of the developing nat ions belong); and (c) sponsoring 
and/or carrying out research i n  se lec ted  f i e l d s .  
in te rna t iona l  inspector  and apply safeguards against  divers ion of f i s s ion -  
able materials i n t o  m i l i t a r y  p ro jec ts .  
IAEA i s  probably more known t o  the general publ ic  i n  the  United S ta t e s  
and Europe, and t h i s  r o l e  has grown i n  importance with the  conclusion of 
Second, t o  act as an 
I t  is  t h i s  second r o l e  f o r  which 
0 
t he  Non-Proliferation Treaty. 
While the  agency is  l inked t o  the  United Nations l i k e  t h e  special-  
i zed  UN agencies through a "relat ionship agreement,'' it re t a ins  ' 
77 See W e  Walsh, Science 
78 Sta tu t e  of the  Internat ional  Atomic Energy Agency (Vienna: 
e Affairs, pp. 47-69, f o r  more d e t a i l s .  
IAEA, 
1965), Article 11, p a  5. 
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independence i n  pol icy,  program, and budgetary matters. 
repor t s  to  the  General Assembly and the Economic and Social  Council. A t  
the  top of the  agency's s t ruc tu re  is the  General Conference, which meets 
once a year,  and i n  which each member nation has one vote.  
board of governors (13 of t he  seats are fixed; others  are e lec ted  by the 
I t  submits annual 
A 25-member 
General Conference within ce r t a in  geographical c r i t e r i a )  handles policy 
matters, more o r  less as a committee of the  conference, and a Secretar ia t - -  
headed by a Director-General--performs executive functions.  
Director-General are f i v e  departments: 
n i ca l  Assistance, Administration, Research and Isotopes, and Technical 
Operations. 
Beneath the  
Safeguards and Inspection, Tech- 
In mid-1967, the headquarters of  the  Agency were located i n  a large 
o f f i c e  building--actually converted from two adjacent hotels--in the center  
of  Vienna. 
ha l f  were of professional  grade. 
those individuals who were ac tua l ly  involved i n  research within the agency, 
but the ac tua l  research which IAEA performs is qu i t e  small i n  proportion 
t o  the organization's s i ze .  The f a c t  t ha t  any in-house research is car- 
r i e d  out a t  a l l  is mainly due t o  the  i n i t i a t i v e  of the  head of the Research 
and Isotopes Department. 
basement of the Vienna headquarters i n  1959 when IAEA became involved i n  
the  provision of ca l ibra ted  radio-isotope samples t o  laborator ies  i n  the  
member states. 
makeshift faci l i t ies .  
S ta t e s  government, the  Agency was able  t o  e rec t  more spacious quarters  on 
the grounds of the  Austrian National Atomic Laboratories, some 25 miles 
A t  t h a t  time IAEA's paid staff numbered more than 600; near ly  
1 n . t h i s  study we dea l t  mainly with 
Small laborator ies  were first set up i n  the  
Work on environmental contamination a l so  began i n  these 
In 1961, thanks t o  a $600,000 grant from the  United 
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away i n  the v i l l age  of Seibersdorf. 
s c i e n t i s t s ,  engineers, and technicians were working i n  Seibersdorf, while 
a handful of others  continued t o  work i n  the basement of headquarters. 
A t  the  time of our v i s i t ,  about 40 
The laborator ies  were divided i n t o  three sect ions:  Chemistry, 
Agriculture, and Technical Support. Much of t he  laborator ies '  work is 
done i n  support of IAEA f i e l d  pro jec ts  i n  developing countries.  
t i s ts  come e i t h e r  on a temporary bas is  from jobs i n  t h e i r  own countries,  
o r  as permanent employees, A disproportionate number are Austrian. The 
s c i e n t i s t s  a l l  seem t o  be aware t h a t  theirs  i s  a r e l a t i v e l y  minor r o l e  
i n  IAEA, and even tha t  the existence of t h e i r  laboratory is not par t icu-  
l a r l y  well-known, but they also seem t o  be aware of the f a c t  t h a t  t h i s  
makes l i f e  i n  such a broadly in te rna t iona l  body t h a t  much eas ie r .  
Scien- 
The atmosphere a t  Seibersdorf (and even i n  the Vienna basement) 
gives a d i f f e ren t  impression than most of t h e  organization. The grea te r  
p a r t  of IAEA is administratively-oriented and appears r a the r  slow-moving 
and bureaucrat ic ,  
supported by nearly 100 governments, ru les  and regulat ions abound, posts  
are f i l l e d  on a geographic quota bas i s ,  and the wide p o l i t i c a l  scope of 
A s  one might expect i n  the  case of an organization 
the  organization (including both East and West) necess i ta tes  a ce r t a in  
amount of delicacy i n  interpersonal  re la t ions .  
i n  IAEA's  laborator ies ,  on the  other  hand, seems t o  draw the  type of 
individual who l i k e s  t o  subvert  (o r  a t  l e a s t  bend) pe t ty  regulat ions,  and 
who is much more informal i n  h i s  manner, Consequently, the  atmosphere i n  
the  labs  gave the  impression of being considerably more relaxed than t h a t  
which e x i s t s  elsewhere i n  the  Agency. 
The research or ien ta t ion  
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The l imited length of our stay made it hard t o  judge t h e  s t rength 
of community fee l ing  throughout t he  agency, but it was evident t ha t  the 
laborator ies  a t  l e a s t  did not possess much of t h i s  kind of s p i r i t .  
a t  least one way, however, t he  Seibersdorf arrangement was a b i t  unusual: 
The establishment is so completely i so la ted  (some of the staff r e f e r  t o  
it as lrSiberias-dorflt) t h a t  the  Agency has found it necessary t o  provide 
t ransportat ion f o r  t he  staff. 
In 
Hence, v i r t u a l l y  the whole staff r ides  
back and fo r th  t o  work on chartered buses, and the  laboratory work is 
generally confined t o  the standard 9-to-5 day. 
2.  The OECD HALDEN Reactor Project 
Whereas IAEA was c i t e d  as being the most in te rna t iona l  of t h e  various 
organizations discussed here,  the HALDEN reac tor  project  is  probably c loses t  
t o  a nat ional  center.  In fact, the  pro jec t  does not even have a legal  
status separate from the  Norwegian I n s t i t u t e  f o r  Atomic Energy, within 
whose walls it is  located. HALDEN is one of th ree  jo in t  p ro jec ts  of OECD's 
nuclear energy agency, ENEA (European Nuclear Energy Agency), and consis ts  
simply of  an agreement t o  operate j o i n t l y  a reac tor  owned by the Norwe- 
gian I n s t i t u t e .  
Before dealing spec i f ica l ly  with HALDEN, a few words about ENEA are 
i n  order.  
t he  foundation of EURATOM, and looking f o r  ways f o r  dealing with atomic 
energy, t he  Organization f o r  European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) began 
thinking, i n  the  mid-19501s, of j o i n t  act ion i n  the nuclear f i e l d .  In  
large measure, t he  h is tory  and f i n a l  shape of ENEA a re  inextr icably in t e r -  
twined with those of EURATOM. 
Concerned over the same s o r t  of energy forecasts  as led t o  
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EURATOM was begun as an e f f o r t  t o  c rea te  an independent capa- 
b i l i t y  both f o r  e l e c t r i c  power and for the  production of 
weapons material. 
s p l i t  the  Continental Six and t o  i s o l a t e  the French weapons 
in t e re s t .  The U,S. -BritiSh maneuver was b r i l l i a n t l y  success- 
f u l  and brought about an interpenetrat ion of both ENEA and 
EURATOM e T9 
ENEA was designed as a countereffor t  t o  
ENEA was establ ished i n  December 1957, following the  actions and 
proposals of a sequence of consultants,  commissions of experts,  working 
groups, and spec ia l  committees within OEEC. The seventeen member coun- 
t r i e s  of OEEC signed the or ig ina l  s t a t u t e ,  (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, I t a l y ,  Luxembourg, the Nether- 
lands, Norway, Portugal,  Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the  United 
Kingdom, Spain acceded l a t e r , )  The agency is  ra the r  loosely organized, 
and i ts  powers are even more circumscribed than EURATOM'S. Its state- 
ment of purposes gives evidence t o  this fac t :  
The Agency s h a l l ,  as far as possible ,  promote the confron- 
t a t i o n  and harmonization of programs and pro jec ts  of par t ic ipa-  
t i n g  countries.  . 
t o  communicate per iodical ly  t o  the Agency t h e i r  nat ional  o r  
j o i n t  programs of estimates t o  no t i fy  the  Agency of t h e i r  
publicly or pr iva te ly  sponsored pro jec ts .  
form of recommendation t o  the countries concerned, go 
---
To t h i s  end, par t ic ipa t ing  countries s h a l l  be inv i ted  . . . -- -
The Steering Committee may e i t s  advice a . i n  the 
__c I
The organization has been qui te  ac t ive  i n  a research and development 
role--in the  HALDEN pro jec t  as well as EUROCHEMIC (a  nuclear chemical 
79 H. L. Nieburg, "EURATOM: 
P o l i t i c s ,  XV, 4 (July 1963), p a  597. The reader i s  r e fe r r ed  t o  this 
a r t i c l e  for a s t r a t e g i c  analysis  of the behind-the-scenes maneuvering 
which took place i n  the ear ly  s tages  of both EURATOM and ENEA, with par- 
t i c u l a r  emphasis on the  U.S, ro l e .  
A Study i n  Coalit ion Po l i t i c s , "  World 
ENEA S ta tu te ,  quoted i n  W, Walsh, Science a . Affairs, p. 39. 
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processing p lan t  i n  Mol, Belgium) and DRAGON [a j o i n t l y  constructed and 
operated power reac tor  i n  Winfrith, U . K . ) .  
ro le ,  both as a control  agency and as sponsor of the European Nuclear 
Energy Tribunal; and it has served as a communications center  f o r  nuclear 
data.  
I t  has a l so  played a legal  
81 
Member governments i n  ENEA are not required t o  pa r t i c ipa t e  i n  each 
j o i n t  undertaking (a  mode of operation which, incidental ly ,  is present ly  
under consideration by o ther  European s c i e n t i f i c  organizations) and so 
HALDEN was o r ig ina l ly  sponsored by seven s ignator ies :  
of Austria and Switzerland, the  nat ional  atomic energy au tho r i t i e s  of 
the governments 
Denmark, Norway, Sweden and the  U . K . ,  and the EURATOM Commission. This 
agreement, which was signed i n  June 1958, was extended twice and las ted  
through the  end of 1963. 
j o i n t  operation of the  HALDEN reac tor  belonging t o  the  Norwegian I n s t i -  
A s  an object ive,  it simply provided f o r  the  
t u t e  fo r  Atomic Energy, "with a view t o  studying the  physics and technol- 
ogy of reactors  cooled and moderated with boi l ing  heavy water and 
evaluating the indus t r i a l  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  of t h i s  type of reactor .  t182 The 
reac tor  went c r i t i c a l  i n  1959 and s ince  t h a t  time has been the source of 
some in t e re s t ing  technological developments. A new agreement was signed 
i n  late 1963, covering the period through 1966, and a t  t h i s  time EURATOM 
81 ENEA maintains a small computer program l ib ra ry  within ISPRA, by 
agreement with EURATOM, from which it disseminates programs f o r  nuclear 
calculat ions.  
Saclay, France. 
I t  a l s o  operates a Neutron Data Compilation Center a t  
82 OECD, Internat ional  S c i e n t i f i c  Organizations, p. 107. 
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withdrew and several  of i t s  member states signed as individual nations.  
In i t s  current three-year program, HALDEN i s  exploring a new field--on- 
l i n e  d i g i t a l  computation, with an eye towards continuous aptimization of 
reactor  operation. 
HALDEN's program is designed by a program board on which each signa- 
to ry  i s  represented by a s c i e n t i s t  or engineer, and approved by a Board 
of Management. 
f o r  the Norwegian I n s t i t u t e  which has two,) 
the 1964-1966 program it t o t a l l e d  $3.6 mil l ion,  
(August 1967) some 160 persons were employed on the  p ro jec t ,  of which 
only about 40 were considered professional grade s c i e n t i s t s  and engineers. 
O f  these 40, roughity -half were non-Norwegian. 
personnel, the pro jec t  was divided i n t o  two groups--Statics and Dynamics, 
(Each member has one vota on the Management Board, except 
The budget i s  not large--for 
A t  the time of our v i s i t  
In addi t ion t o  operations 
but  i n  mid-1967, Dynamics was being phased out and a new group concerned 
with computation was being formed, 
Halden is  a r e l a t i v e l y  small town (population 10,000), located 
about 40 miles south of Oslo on the Eastern s ide  of t he  Oslo Fjord. I t  
is an a t t r a c t i v e  area, although Norwegians claim t h i s  is not  a par t icu-  
l a r l y  nice p a r t  of Norway, but winters a r e  long, and f o r  a non-native 
t o  enjoy l i v ing  i n  Halden f o r  an extended period probably requires  t h a t  
he be something of a "Norwegiophile." Outdoor spor t s  a r e  very popular; 
as ide from t h i s ,  the  town o f fe r s  few opportunities f o r  cu l tu ra l  enrich- 
ment. The Norwegian working day, which the  pro jec t  follows, i s  unusual: 
I t  lasts from about 8:OO a,m. through 3:30 or 4 : O O  p.m., with only a 
coffee break a t  noon, Dinner i s  eaten after work, a t  about 4:30 p.m. 
The Norwegian "flavort1 completely dominates the HALDEN project; 
even the universal use of English in work and informal conversation does 
not diminish this impression. 
a reasonable English as their second or third language.) 
provides housing for foreign as well as Norwegian staff. 
(Virtually all educated Norwegians speak 
The Institute 
Foreign staff 
members generally are seconded from organizations in their own countries 
for periods of two years or more. 
some of the international staff have be& at HALDEN since the project 
Often these contracts are extended and 
began. 
own countries are employed directly by the Institute. 
housing, as well as the smallness of the town have made the project's 
In addition some non-Norwegians who are not seconded from their 
The Institute 
professional staff--Norwegian and non-Norwegian--a rather tight-knit 
community. 
members and their families. 
and esprit dl&ole are evident, with many individuals working extra hours 
strictly on their own initiative. This is reinforced by a general belief 
that the results coming out of the project will be of considerable 
significance in nuclear technology. 
There appear to be many close friendships among the staff 
A high degree of professional commitment 
* * *  
This discussion of the various centers included in the study has 
emphasized differences rather than similarities. 
as possessing its special personality, deriving from the history and 
nature of its parent organization, as well as the peculiarities of its 
locale. Amidst this mass of diverse information about the laboratories 
Each center was seen 
there is, however, a certain symmetry. 
when we begin to examine the data supplied by the respondents. 
Such symmetry emerges more clearly 
Part Two 
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deals with the personal and professional cha rac t e r i s t i c s  of the  skien-  
t ists .  We begin i n  the  next chapter with t h e i r  backgrounds and the  
reasons f o r  which they sought work i n  an in te rna t iona l  environment. 
PART TWO 

CHAPTER I V  
PORTRAIT OF THE RESPONDENTS 
The a b i l i t y  t o  make reasonable prognostications about t he  s c i e n t i f i c  
fu tures  of these laborator ies ,  as w e l l  as about t he  p o l i t i c a l  ro l e s  which 
they a re  capable of playing, requires  a r a the r  intimate knowledge o f  the  
types of people who are  involved i n  t h e i r  operation. 
i n  the  atmospheres of ISPRA, CERN, and ESTEC suggest t h a t  the  staffs of 
these  laborator ies  are r a t h e r  d i f f e r e n t  from each other--at  least i n  
The broad constrasts  
terms of professionalism and a t t i t u d e s  toward the  laboratory. 
t i on ,  t he  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  s t ruc tu re  of education and s t i e n t i f i c  research 
In addi- 
varys widely *among the several  countries represented i n  the  sample. 
One might expect, on t h i s  account, nat ional  differences i n  the profes- 
s iona l  and academic backgrounds of these s c i e n t i s t s .  
Despite a l l  of t h i s ,  perhaps the  most s t r i k i n g  s ingle  aspect of the  
sample which was drawn i n  t h i s  study is its homogeneity. 
t h e i r  soc io logica l  cha rac t e r i s t i c s ,  as well as  i n  a wide range of t h e i r  
a t t i t u d i n a l  choices on p o l i t i c a l  issues, the  respondents were a l l  qu i t e  
similar t o  one another. This overa l l  homogeneity is most i n t e re s t ing  i n  
t h a t  it emphasizes first the  r a t iona le  fo r  t r e a t i n g  s c i e n t i s t s  as a dis-  
t i n c t  e l i t e  segment of t h e  population, and second t h e  e s s e n t i a l  s imi l a r i t y  
In many of 
- __ -_- 
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between the various in te rna t iona l  laborator ies  which were studied. 
Bearing i n  mind t h i s  homogeneity as w e l l  as the  ul t imate  policy i n t e r e s t  
of such a "por t ra i t  of the  respondents," it i s  worth taking a careful  
look a t  those differences among respondents which do appear, as they 
of ten  point  t o  s ign i f icant  cha rac t e r i s t i c s .  
A. Basic Variables 
1. Laboratory, Nationali ty,  and Senior i ty  
As outlined i n  Chapter 11, the  sample was drawn within three basic  
parameters: laboratory (4 categories) ,  na t iona l i ty  (5 categories) ,  and 
time spent i n  the  labordeory (2 categories,  henceforth termed "senior- 
i ty" ) .  
combinations of these parameters. 
s e l ec t - a s  many high sen io r i ty  I t a l i a n s  from ESTEC as low sen io r i ty  Britons 
from ISPRA, and s o  for th .  
Ideal ly ,  we sought a sample d is t r ibu ted  evenly across a l l  possible  
In other words, w e  would have l iked t o  
Table 4 . 1 ,  which presents the  d i s t r ibu t ion  of 
respondents across a l l  th ree  parameters, reveals  t h a t  t h i s  goal was not 
achieved. 
Reflecting t h e i r  large s i z e  as well as the  sampling plan,  t he  CERN, 
ISPRA, and ESTEC laborator ies  dominate the sample. For some purposes, 
as the discussion develops .we may choose t o  deal  with the  other  labora- 
t o r i e s  (IAEA, ESDAC, PETTEN, HALDEN, and FONTENAY) i n  an aggregated form 
(designated "OTHLAB" as i n  Table 4.1). Otherwise the discussion is based 
en t i r e ly  on the  three  large centers ,  with occasional individual reference 
t o  the  smaller centers.  The r e l a t i v e  s t rengths  of the organizational 
h ie rarch ies  a r e  r e f l ec t ed  i n  the  sample s i zes  yielded by our sampling 
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Table 4.1 
Respondents by Laboratory, Nationali ty,  and Senior i ty  
ESTEC -
TOTAL 
7 
It  Othnat -Ge - Fr - B r a  - 
LOW Senior i  tyc 24 14 15 4 15 72 
11 5 5 3 11 35 High Senior i ty  
TOTAL 35 19 20 7 26 107 
d 
CERN -
Low Senior i ty  11 7 10 10 7 45 
TOTAL 25 13 1 7  19 23 97 
High Senior i ty  14 6 7 9 16 52 
Low Senior i ty  
High Senior i ty  
TOTAL 
0 2 9 8 1 20 
2 23 26 31 14 96 
2 25 35 39 15 116 
Low Sen io r i ty  2 3 9 0 15 29 
High Senior i ty  5 1 8 6 1s 35 
TOTAL 7 4 17 6 30 64 
GRAND TOTAL 69 61 89 71 94 384 
Notes: a Abbreviations B r ,  F r ,  Ge, I t  are used i n  tab les  through- 
out t o  represent Br i t a in ,  France, Germany and I t a l y  
Includes: Holland (24), Belgium (21), Switzerland (13), 
Austria (12), Sweden (4),  Denmark ( 3 ) ,  Norway ( 8 ) ,  Finland 
(2) , and Spain (7) . 
Less than 2% years i n  lab (166). C 
More than 24 years i n  lab (218). 
Includes: IAEA ( l l ) ,  ESDAC (l8), PETTEN ( lo ) ,  HALDEN e 
(201, and FONTENAY (5). 
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technique a t  CERN, ESTEC, and SSPRA. CERN, because of  i t s  ra ther  loose 
s t ruc tu re ,  was the  most d i f f i c u l t  place i n  which t o  make the  personal 
contacts needed f o r  da ta  co l lec t ion  and therefore  yielded the smallest  
sample. ISPRA, i n  cont ras t ,  provided the easiest connections and the  
l a rges t  sample. 
Examining the  na t iona l i t y  d is t r ibu t ion ,  large groups of Br i t i sh ,  
French, German, and I t a l i a n  respondents may be seen, with smaller num- 
bers  drawn from the  Benelux countries,  Scandinavia, Austria,  Switzerland, 
and Spain. Para l le l ing  treatment of the laborator ies ,  most of the analy- 
sis  is  based on the four la rges t  na t iona l i t i e s ,  while the smaller groups 
are  brought i n  occasionally where appropriate. Unevenness i n  the nation- 
a l i t y  d i s t r ibu t ion  is  explained by two main f ac to r s .  In the first place,  
s u f f i c i e n t  numbers of the  four large na t iona l i ty  groups were not avai lable  
i n  a l l  the  centers .  
European Community, very few Bri t i sh  s c i e n t i s t s  a re  t o  be found a t  ISPRA. 
The climate and s t y l e  of l iv ing  i n  ESTEC’s location (Noordwijk, Holland) 
a re  not a t t r a c t i v e  t o  many Europeans, pa r t i cu la r ly  I talians,  and the seven 
I t a l i a n s  included i n  the  ESTEC sample represent the bulk of the  I t a l i a n  
population there .  Secondly, d i f f e ren t i a l  response rates were displayed 
by the  various na t iona l i t i e s .  There was, f o r  example, a s ign i f icant ly  
For example, s ince  Bri ta in  is not a member of the 
higher re fusa l  and non-respondent rate -among the  French than among any 
other  group. The Br i t i sh ,  on the other  hand, acted i n  qui te  the  opposite 
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1 fashion and t h e i r  quota w a s  of ten overf5lled.  
The sen io r i ty  d i s t r ibu t ion  is even more unbalanced. We chose, 
somewhat a r b i t r a r i l y ,  a c r i t e r i o n  of 235 years i n  the  laboratory t o  divide 
our sample between high and low sen io r i ty .  
divided i n  two r a the r  neat ly  by t h i s  c r i t e r ion ,  a t  ESTEC the sample is  
weighted heavily towards low senior i ty ,  while a t  ISPRA it is  weighted 
heavily towards high sen ior i ty .  Two simple facts explain t h i s  imbalance: 
ESTEC is a new laboratory and did a great  deal  of h i r ing  i n  t h e  1965-1967 
period. 
build-up immediately thereaf te r ,  and has done very l i t t l e  h i r ing  s ince 
i t s  ear ly  years. CERN, because of its age and in ten t iona l  high r a t e  of 
personnel turnover, is the only one of t he  major laborator ies  with a 
While the gross sample i s  
ISPRA, on t h e  other  hand, was set up i n  1961, sustained a rapid 
balanced sen io r i ty .  d i s t r ibu t ion .  
2 .  Demography of t he  Sample 
Within i t s  bas ic  parameters, the sample is demographically r a the r  
homogeneous. Aside from t h b i r  s t r a t i f i c a t i o n s  by na t iona l i ty ,  there  is 
Such differences,  r e su l t i ng  from d i f f e r i n g  nat ional  s ty l e s  of 
self-expression, have been reported by other  researchers.  For example, 
see comments i n  Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune, "Equivalence i n  Cross- 
National Research," Public Opinion Quarterly, XXX, 4 (Winter 1966-67), 
pp. 551-568; Henry A ,  Landsberger and AntonioiSaavedra, "Response Set  i n  
Developing Countries," Public Opinion Quarterly, XXXI ,  2 (Summer 19671, 
pp. 214-229; Karl W .  Deutsch, Lewis J. Edinger, Roy C. Macridis, and 
Richard L. Merritt, France, Germany and the  Western Alliance (New York: 
Charles Scr ibner ' s  Sons, 1967), pp. 20-23; as well  as  the extensive 
discussion i n  Daniel Lerner and Morton Gorden, Euratlantica: Changing 
Perspectives of t h e  European Elites (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1969 i n  
press ) ,  Chapter 3. 
* This problem l imited our a b i l i t y  t o  make one of the  bas ic  tests 
of funct ional  theory. See Chapter VIII. 
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no reason t o  be l ieve  t h a t  each sub-sample i s  not representa t ive  of i t s  
laboratory p ~ p u l a t i o n . ~  
of in te rna t iona l  labora tor ies  w i t h  that of other types of European scien- 
t i f i c  establishments, so  we are  constrained here t o  presenting mainly a 
descr ip t ive  account of what was found, re ly ing  on our judgement for 
However, we have no way of comparing the  makeup 
external comparisons. 
More than 95% of the  sample i s  male (370 male, 14  female) and t h i s  
d i s t r ibu t ion  r e f l e c t s  the composition of t he  professional s t a f f s  of the 
centers ,  Science and engineering i n  Western Europe--like the United 
S ta tes  and unlike the  Soviet Union--are mainly men's professions. The 
normal f ac to r s  which tend t o  l i m i t  the number of women entering these 
professions4 a re  compounded at the  
s i t u a t i o n a l  fac tor :  
in te rna t iona l  centers by an important 
married female s c i e n t i s t s  and engineers a re  not 
l i k e l y  t o  come t o  these centers unless t h e i r  husbands a l s o  work there ,  
as joining one of the centers generally requires a subs t an t i a l  move. For 
most married couples, the  primary f ac to r  i n  a relocation decision i s  
generally the  husband's career and not t he  wife ' s .  As a r e s u l t ,  nearly 
a l l  of the  women at  the  labora tor ies  are e i t h e r  unmarried or spouses of 
an employee of t he  center.  While among the  men, only 16% were s ing le ,  
In fact, desp i te  our attempt t o  draw equal numbers of t h e  four  
major n a t i o n a l i t i e s ,  t h e i r  proportions i n  t h e  samples from each lab are 
roughly equal t o  t h e i r  proportions i n  the respective lab populations. 
An excellent discussion of these f ac to r s  may be found i n  Alice S. 
Rossi, "Barriers t o  the Career Choice of Engineering, Medicine or Science 
Among American Women," i n  Jacquelyn Mattfield and Carol G .  Van Aken, 
Women and the S c i e n t i f i c  Professions,(Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1965), 
pp. 51-127. 
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more than ha l f  of t he  women (56%) were unmarried--at least a t  the time 
of t he  study. 
The respondents were i n  general a r a the r  youthful group, t h e i r  
average age being 35 years.  
major n a t i o n a l i t i e s  and laborator ies ,  
from 19 through 61 years,  nearly 60% of  the respondents were i n  t h e i r  
t h i r t i e s .  I t  is worfh noting, with regard t o  po ten t i a l  influences on 
p o l i t i c a l  a t t i t u d e s ,  t h a t  respondents i n  t h i s  age bracker were enter ing 
o r  passing through adolescence w h i l e  World War I1 w a s  raging around them. 
This average was nearly constant across the 
Although the  range of ages extended 
Intersect ing the mode of each of these demographic charac te r i s t ics ,  
one may describe a hypothetical  "modal" respondent i n  the sample: 
person would be a male i n  hi& t h i r t i e s ,  married, with two o r  fewer 
children. 
This 
5 In fact, so homogeneous i s  the  sample, t h a t  40% of the  respon- 
dents f a l l  prec ise ly  i n t o  t h a t  category! 
B. Professional Background 
1. Education 
Because of the differences between European academic systems,cross- 
nat ional  analysis  of educational da ta  rapidly becomes a complex matter. 
useful  s t a r t i n g  point  i s  simply the  number of higher degrees reported by 
respondents. 
some higher education but  no degree (3%), those who reported receiving no 
A 
Leaving aside those who indicated t h a t  they had received 
The average number of children among married respondents was 1.7. 
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selves-including, inc identa l ly ,  t he  personnel o f f i ce r s  i n  the  several  
in te rna t iona l  laborator ies .  Not only a re  the t i t l e s  f a r  from standard- 
ized ,  but i n  a number of countries (Germany and I t a l y ,  f o r  example) 
higher academic c redent ia l s  are of ten obtained through research programs 
which do not necessar i ly  lead t o  a degree.6 
have attempted t o  reduce t h e  various nat ional  systems t o  one approximate 
common standard,  and for  convenience the  e n t i r e  matter is discussed i n  
terms of "equivalent" American degrees. 
some adjustments, on the  number of years of study required f o r  a t t a in ing  
the  degree. Using t h i s  system, Table 4 . 2  (see following page) presents 
In coping with t h i s  data ,  we 
The equivalents a r e  based, with 
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t he  breakdown of respondents' higher degrees.8 Most of those holding a 
Table 4.2 
T i t l e  o f  Highest Degree 
(n=384) 
Ph.D. 6% 
Mas.-Ph.D. 8 
- M.S. 19 
B . S . - M e  S 41 
B.S. 8 
Below B.S. 9 
Other, DK 9 
Ph.D. o r  M.S.-Ph.D. equivalent had obtained only one lower degree pre- 
vious t o  it. For most of those holding a B.S. o r  B.S.-M.S., t h i s  w a s  
t h e i r  only degree. 
have more than one degree. 
The French a t  a l l  labora tor ies  were most l i ke ly  t o  
ISPRA had the  g rea t e s t  proportion of respon- 
!ents with more than one degree (47%), but CERN had a s ign i f i can t ly  
g rea t e r  proportion of Ph.D.'s than the  o ther  labora tor ies .  
More than h a l f  of the  respondents had received t h e i r  highest  degrees 
i n  e i t h e r  physics (34%) o r  electrical engineering (29%). The next most 
popular f i e l d s  were mechanical engineering, chemistry (in which we have 
included metallurgy), and mathematics, i n  t h a t  order. The d i s t r ibu t ion  
of  f i e l d s  corresponded, as one might expect, t o  t h e  nature of t he  
of Ph.D. and M.S..-Ph.D. equivalents i s  probably under- 
l e  who had worked beyond t h e  highest  degree i n  t h e i r  
, f o r  example--GEten d i d  not r epor t  t 
172 
laborator ies :  CERN had mostly phys 
y s i c i s t s ,  chemists 
ca l ,  mechanical, 
A majority of the  respondents from every large nat ion except Germany 
had received t h e i r  highest  degree from one of t h e i r  country's major univer- 
s i t i e s .  Germany's system of Technische provided the educations 
of nearly ha l f  of the  German s c i e n t i s t s  and engineers i n  the sample. 
a l l  the  nat ional  contingents 
i n  tha t  a s ign i f icant  proportion of them (11%) had worked t h e i r  way up 
through the Br i t i sh  system of extension courses and loca l  technical colleges 
r a the r  than going s t r a i g h t  through a university-type program. 
were a r a the r  d i f fe ren t  breed than most of t he  engineers of other  nation- 
a l i t ies ,  as the following excerpt from one interview suggests: 
Of 
n the sample, the Br i t i sh  were perhaps unique 
These men 
My higher education was hardly gained. I l e f t  scho 
I went t o  sea and was six years at  sea . . . I then 
got married and only then did I r ea l i ze  tha t  v i r t u a l l y  the 
only difference between me and the people who were ge t t ing  
2,000 pounds a year, was tha t  they had l e t t e r s  behind t h e i r  
name and I hadn't .  It  took m e  over t e n  years of night school 
t o  acquire my qual i f ica t ions  . . . I had t o  do the  f i n a l  year 
by correspondence and home study . . . 
Apart from these 'lself-madefl engineers, most of Che respondents completed 
ir educations i n  a normal 
d. 
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Among those 283 fo r  whom there  w a s  complete data,  only 26--about 9%-- 
reported having s tudied at a higher educational i n s t i t u t i o n  outside of . 
t h e i r  own country.9 
gone elsewhere outs ide of Europe, leaving a t o t a l  of only 14 respondents 
who had s tudied i n  a European country other than t h e i r  own! 
O f  these,  9 had gone t o  the United S ta t e s ,  and 3 had 
Here, among perhaps the  most internationally-oriented group of 
scientists i n  Europe, one f inds s t rong evidence of a lack of s c i e n t i f i c  
interchange among European univers i t ies .  lo Various reasons may be sug- 
gested t o  account for t h i s  apparently low r a t e  of interchange. Looking 
back a t  the vast  differences between European educational systems, one 
susgects t h a t  var ia t ions  i n  admission requirements and concern about the 
s u i t a b i l i t y  o f  f b e i g n  degrees f o r  domestic employment ( a t  least i n  the 
engineering professions) probably account f o r  t h e  reluctance of many 
individuals t o  study abroad, Perhaps even more important is t h e  fact t h a t  
f inanc ia l  support i n  the form of grants and fellowships i s  much more 
l i ke ly  t o  be avai lable  f o r  students who choose t o  pursue a degree a t  home 
than f o r  those who go t o  a foreign country. 
t ists  and engineers i n  $his sample, few had ventured outside of t h e i r  own 
In any case, among the  scien- 
countr ies  t o  study. 
The proportion was s l i g h t l y  higher f o r  t h e  smaller countries.  
lo P. M. S .  Blackett, i n  h i s  Pres ident ia l  Address before the  Br i t i sh  
Royal Society (November 30, 1966) deplored t h i s  s i t ua t ion ,  c i t i n g  a Royal 
Society survey which showed t h a t  "the number of post-doctorate [science] 
s tudents  from Europe working i n  Bri ta in  was less than a f i f t h  of those 
from the  U.S.A." He announced i n  t h i s  address t h a t  t he  Royal Society w a s  
undertaking a program aimed a t  making a "notable increase i n  the  scientific 
interchanges within Europe. f1 
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2.  
From what s o r t s  of jobs do the in te rna t iona l  scientists 
what extent are they fresh out of s 
away from careers i n  government, industry,  and the academic world? The 
answers t o  these  questions are essent ia l  t o  an understanding of t he  
001, and t o  what extent a r e  they drawn 
re la t ionships  between in te rna t iona l  laborator ies  and nat ional  s c i e n t i f i c  
establishments. Additionally, they may determine the po ten t i a l  a b i l i t y  
of these s c i e n t i s t s  t o  play the ro l e  of a functional e l i t e  i n  European 
in tegra t ion .  
dents '  previous employment does not comprise t h e i r  complete work histo---  
The information which was gathered concerning the  respon- 
Ties. A des i re  t o  keep the questionnaire reasonably shor t  made i t  
necessary t o  restrict questioning t o  the respondents' a c t i v i t i e s  imme- 
dirrtelyprevious t o  t h e i r  a r r i v a l  a t  the in te rna t iona l  laboratory.  
i n  i t s e l f ,  however, reveals  a great  deal .  
This 
Within the gross sample, some 15% of the  respondents had come t o  
t h e i r  present posi t ions d i r ec t ly  from t h e i r  s tud ies .  
( 8 5 % ) ,  however, had been previously employed. 
"flavor" was discussed i n  Chapter 111, shows the most respondents coming 
s t r a i g h t  from t h e i r  s tud ies  (25%), while ESTEC shows the  least (7%) .  O f  
The vas t  majority 
CERN, whose academic 
course, CERN's  intended r o l e  i s  c loser  t o  t h a t  of an educ8t iona l ' ins t i tu -  
t i on  and i t s  work is  more closely linked t o  t h a t  which goes on a t  a univer- 
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(51%, 42%), a t h i r d  from government laborator ies  (32%, 38 
few from the  un ive r s i t i e s  (8%, 14%). 11 
The respondents' previous employment a l so  appears t o  be a function 
of t h e i r  na t iona l i t y .  Table 4.3 presents  t h i s  p ic ture .  The s t rengths  of 
Table 4.3 
Previous Employment by Nat ional i ty  
Government Lab 
University 
Industry 
Other and DKa 
B r i t i sh  French 
(59) Tm- 
54% 45% 
17 4 
26 39 
3 11 
29 % 
17 
53 
-- 
I t a l i a n  
(71) 
16% 
21 
52 
11 
a . "DK'I is useL throughout as an abbrev-ation f o r  "Don't Know," 
equivalent i n  most of our usage t o  "no response." 
governmental science bureaucracies i n  Great Br i ta in  and France are r e f l ec t ed  
i n  t h i s  t ab le .  S c i e n t i s t s  and engineers with permanent posts  i n  government 
agencies a r e  of ten able  t o  take temporary leave t o  work i n  the  i n t e r -  
nat ional  brganizations,  and for the Br i t i sh  a t  least, the  pay is generally 
a good deal above what they earn at home. 
maintains Br i ta in ' s  relations-l;ri;th in te rna t iona l  s c i e n t i f i c  organizations 
The Science Research Council 
I t  i s  worth noting parenthe t ica l ly  t h a t  a t o t a l  of 10 respondents 
had come t o  t h e i r  present  jobs d i r e c t l y  from another in te rna t iona l  labor- 
a tory and several  o thers  had at some previous time worked i n  another 
in te rna t iona l  baboratory. The f inanc ia l ,  i n t e l l e c t u a l  and/or psychological 
rw-ards of working i n  such centers  are apparently hard f o r  some indiv i -  
duals t o  forego. 
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and it seems t o  have encouraged t h i s  secondment process. A number of 
Commissariat 2 1'Energie Atomique, A 
during the  greater part  of t h e i r  p r  
percentage of Frenchmen coming from univers i t ies  i s  
and one may speculate t h a  erhaps because univers i  
s o  d i f f i c u l t  t o  get i n  France, Frenchmen who receive such appointments 
a re  l e s s  l i ke ly  than academics of other na t iona l i t i e s  t o  e i t h e r  give them 
up or go on leave t o  work i n  an in te rna t iona l  center.  
Those respondents coming from governmental employment tended t o  have 
sionaf l i ves .  
1 2  
spent a longer time i n  t h e i r  previous positons.  
f ive years or more i n  t h a t  posi t ion,  while only a t h i r d  of those coming 
from the  univers i t ies  or industry had been employed t h a t  long. 
Nearly ha l f  had been 
Indepen- 
dent of the sec tor  from which they came, t he  Br i t i sh  tended t o  have spent 
t h e '  longest time i n  t h e i r  previous job ,  while the I t a l i a n s  had spent the 
l e a s t .  
Although most respondents came from posi t ions i n  t h e i r  own countries,  
it is  s ign i f i can t  t h a t  a non-negligible f r ac t ion  or iginated a t  jobs which 
were already outside of t h e i r  country. 
ers i n  the country where the in te rna t iona l  center was establ ished and 
A few had been working as foreign- 
maining i n  t h a t  country 
an a l i e n  t o  t h a t  of an 
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in t e rna t iona l  c i v i l  servant.  Others--a t o t a l  of 11 i n  t h e  sample-came 
back t o  Euuope from jobs i n  the United S ta t e s .  This "reverse bra in  drain," 
while small, corresponds t o  one of the aims of these  organizations. 
s p i r i t  i s  epitomized i n  the  i n t e r e s t i n g  but a typica l  experience of one 
Its 
ESTEC space s c i e n t i s t  who, i n  an interview, explained how he happened 
t o  come t o  the  organization: 
I was s tudying- in  [a un ive r s i ty ]  i n  Cal i forn ia ,  and I was 
going t o  make a Ph.D. I n  Aeronautical Engineering there.  
One day I was dr iv ing  i n  my car and I heard over t h e  news 
t h a t  Europe had created its own space agency; t h i s  surprised 
me g rea t ly  because I thought they would take a t  least t en  
years t o  make such a th ing  . . . I thought i f  t h i s  is going 
t o  be a CERN f o r  space research, i t ' s  exactly what I ' m  
looking f o r b a i t ' s  European and i t ' s  space. 
s tud ies  with only an engineer's.degree, came t o  Paris and 
immediatply went there  and sa id ,  'Look, can I work f o r  you?' 
So I q u i t  my 
Examination of t he  respondents' educations as well as t h e i r  previous 
pos i t ions  reveals some pa t t e rns  which w i l l  help us  later i n  understanding 
d i f fe rences  in : types  of s c i e n t i s t s  and engineers drawn t o  the  various 
centers.  I t  was noted t h a t  ESTEC, where the laboratory as well as the  
sample was weighted with a large proportion o f  Britons, had more engi- 
neers,  few academic types and many individuals recru i ted  d i r e c t l y  from 
government and industry.  ESTEC was a l s o  t h e  only one of the  large centers 
i n  which a s i g n i f i c a n t  percentage (15%) of the  respondents had spent 
more than 10 years i n  t h e i r  previous job. CERN was the  most academic i n  
or ien ta t ion ,  with the  l a rges t  percentage of respondents coming d i r e c t l y  
from t h e i r  s tud ie s  and the  l a rges t  percentage coming from previous employ- 
ment i n  a univers i ty .  The g rea t e r  p a r t  of t h e  ISPRA respondents were 
s c i e n t i s t s  and most came from the government and i n d u s t r i a l  sec tors .  
proportion drawn t o  ISPRA frorn t h e  academic world was less than t h a t  a t  
The 
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CEW but grea te r  than t h a t  a t  ESTEC. 
C.  Joining an Internat ional  Laboratory 
The decision t o  j o i n  the staff of one of these in te rna t iona l  centers 
For c l ea r ly  represented a major decision i n  the  l i f e  of each respondent. 
most i t  meant giving up a job a t  home and moving t o  a foreign country, 
of ten uprooting one's family -in the process and rupturing personal and 
professional t i e s .  
down i n t o  two pa r t s :  
and (2)  the  decision t o  jo in  the in te rna t iona l  center.  Using the T 
responses obtained, we attempt here t o  describe the various ways i n  which 
This analysis attempts t o  break the decision process 
(1) the decision t o  leave one's former posi t ion,  
the process operated among the  respondents. 
1. 
In an open-ended fashion, the questionnaire and interview both asked 
Decision t o  Leave Former Job 
the repondents t o  s t a t e  the reasons f o r  which they had l e f t  t h e i r  previous 
pos i t ions .  
categories:  (1) Lack of work; (2) In t e l l ec tua l  d i s sa t i s f ac t ion  (e.g., 
"uninteresting work," "lack of challenge") ; (3) Career d i s sa t i s f ac t ion  
In the coding process, t he  responses were sor ted i n t o  several  
(e.g., "low salary,"  "no prospects f o r  advancement") ; (4) Desire f o r  
broader experience (no d i s sa t i s f ac t ion ) ;  (5) Better  opportunity (no 
d i s sa t i s f ac t ion ) ;  (6) Personal reasons; and (7) Other reasons. Overall, 
the  responses were well d i s t r ibu ted  across a l l  of these reasons with t h e  
most frequent choice being career d i s sa t i s f ac t ion  (20%) and the  least 
frequent being p onal reasons ( 6 % ) .  
Cross-tabulation by laboratory,  however, uncov some significant 
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d i f fe rences .  
f i e d  with t h e i r  previous posit ions--either i n  an i n t e l l e c t u a l  o r  career 
A t  CERN one finds t h a t  few of the  resp  n t s  were d i s s a t i s -  
sense--only 23% so state. 
former jobs--accounting together f o r  42%--are "be t te r  opportunity" and 
%broader experience." Compared t o  scientists from other  labora tor ies ,  
the  CERN respondents were not p a r t i c u l a r l y  unhappy a t  t h e i r  former' jobs, 
The two most frequent reasons given f o r  leaving 
but  they found the  a t t r a c t i o n  of CERN i r r e s i s t i b l e  f o r  reasons we s h a l l  
examine shor t ly .  A t  ISPRA, on the other hand, a p l u r a l i t y  (41%) l e f t  
t h e i r  former jobs because of career (20%) o r  i n t e l l e c t u a l  (21%) d i s s a t i s -  
fac t ion .  Apparently they sought t o  improve t h e i r  s i t ua t ions  by changing 
jobs.  F ina l ly ,  a t  ESTEC, one f inds  the  l a r g e s t  s ing le  choice among any 
of t he  major laboratories--career dissatisfaction--which drew an even 
30%. 
type they des i red  i n  t h e i r  former jobs (16%). 
This was followed by those who complained of a "lack of work" of t h e  
ESTEC a l s o  had the  highest  
proportion of responses c l a s s i f i e d  as "other reasons" (19%) among t h e  
large centers,  and t h e  ranks of t h i s  group were swelled by a number of 
Britons who s t a t e d  t h a t  they l e f t  ch ie f ly  out of a des i r e  t o  g e t  away 
from t h e i r  country f o r  a time. 13 
2 .  Att rac t ions  of t h e  In te rna t iona l  Centers 
What, then, made these centers a t t r a c t i v e  t o  the  zespondents? The 
l3 C f .  James A. Wilson, "The Emigration of Br i t i sh  Sc ien t i s t s , "  
Minerva, V ,  1 (Autumn 1966), pp. 20-29. 
t ies ,  t he  scientific c i v i l  service", o r  Br i t i sh  industry and commerce" 
among t h e i r  reasons f o r  leaving. (p. 25;) 
Many Br i t i sh  s c i e n t i s t s  who had 
Americarreferred t o  " i r r i t a t i n g  conditions i n  Br i t i sh  universi-  
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questionnaire en ts  were pres  d with a number of p 
f o r  coming t o  
important ,'I Ira factor ,"  "not import y were a l s o  asked e 
one reason which they f e l t  was rtmost important" i n  t h e i r  decision. 
interviewees were simply asked t o  describe how and why they came t o  the  
The 
organization and t h e i r  free-flowing responses were coded onto t h e  question- 
na i re  forms. 
While a l l  of the respondents answered a t  l e a s t  p a r t  o f  t h i s  question, 
se lec t ion  of - one most important reason was re jec ted  by nearly a t h i r d  of 
the respondents. 
t h i s  category, o r  gave multiple answers. 
t i on  of the f ac t  t h a t  f o r  many respondents the  a t t r ac t ion  of the interna-  
t i ona l  center was based on a conbination of factors, none of which was 
sufficient.individually, but which together provided the impetus f o r  the 
decision. 
for the three large centers are  presented i n  Table 4.4 (see following page). 
Considering only those respondents who did ind ica te  one most important 
reason ( i . e . ,  excluding those c l a s s i f i e d  as "other, multiple,  and no 
answer"), it appears t h a t ,  i n  the  t o t a l  sample, "opportunity t o  pursue a 
pa r t i cu la r  type of work" accounted f o r  more than ha l f  (51%) of the  deci- 
s ions king a somewhat d i s t an t  second as a most important reason was 
These individuals e i t h e r  did not s e l e c t  any response f o r  
This i s  taken a5 a strong indica- 
The marginal f o r  t h i s  e s sen t i a l  question, plus t he  tabulat ions 
-
"the des i re  t o  work with people of other  nat iona1i t ies ." l5  Among those 
'Other,1t but  which w 
e, "desire t o  work f 
were coded together with t h i s  response. 
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Tabae 4 .4  
Most Important Reason f o r  Coming t o  the  Organization, By Laboratory 
Total  Sample ESTEC CERN ISPRA 
(384) (107) (97) (116) 
---
Opportunity t o  pursue a p a r t i c u l a r  type 
Desire t o  work with a p a r t i c u l a r  ind i -  
o f  work 35% 32% 40% 34%. 
vidual or group 2 2 0 3 
Quality of equipment 3 2 3 4 
Higher sa l a ry  8 I1 6 9 
Desire t o  work with people o f  o ther  
n a t  i ona li ti e s 11 12 8 12 
Location 2 0 2 3 
Job secu r i ty ,  tenure 1 0 2 1 
Lack of 'opportunities i n  own spec ia l ty  
i n  own country 6 7 4 6 
Other, Multiple, and No Answer 33 34 33 29 
who did give one most important rezson, t h i s  category drew 17% of  these 
responses. 
I t  i s  c l e a r  from t h i s  t ab l e  t h a t  when asked t o  s e l e c t  the -- one most
important reason which brought them t o  t h e i r  present jobs, a p l u r a l i t y  of 
respondents a t  a l l  th ree  major labora tor ies  (as well as a t  t he  smaller 
ones not shown here) gave the  professional answer: 
sue a p a r t i c u l a r  type of work." 
of the  respondents' decisions were codetermined by a number of f ac to r s ,  
and because d i f fe rences  between the  labora tor ies  are r a t h e r  hard t o  d i s -  
"opportunity t o  pur- 
Because it appeared, however, t h a t  many 
t inguish  from t h i s  rabulation, w e  'looked a b i t  frrrther i n t o  those reasons 
which t h e  respondents f e l t  were not "the one most important," but were 
nevertheless "very important" or a t  least Ira factor" i n  t h e i r  decisions. 
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The d i s t r ibu t ion  of importance f o r  e 
by laboratory. 
able  form, each proffered choice was ra ted  as having e i t h e r  h i  
or low importance for t he  s c i e n t i s t s  of each center.16 
ra ted  high i n  importance f o r  a pa r t i cu la r  laboratory i f  40% or more of the  
respondents ranked it as "most important" or "very important." 
was ranked low i f  40% specif ied it as "not important" o r  did not r a t e  i t s  
importance a t  
ne i ther  the high nor the low c r i t e r i a .  
following page). 
reason was thus cr ted  
I n  order t o  reduce the  r e su l t i ng  mass of data  i n t o  man 
A choice was 
A choice 
Choices of medium importance were those tha t  f i t  
Table 4.5 displays the r e su l t  (see 
The strengjth of professional  or ien ta t ion  a t  CERN is evident from t h i s  
tab le :  CERN!s staff ha.- come t o  Geneva t o  do high energy physics at the 
bes t  machine i n  Europe --or f o r  those who were not high energy phys ic i s t s ,  
a t  l e a s t  t o  follow a l i n e  of work which i n t e r e s t s  them. For most CERN 
respondents, other  considerations were secondary. Of pa r t i cu la r  note i s  
the f a c t  t ha t  CERN's in te rna t iona l  makeup, while (as w i l l  be seen l a t e r )  
enjoyed by nearly everyone, was not ra ted as an important reason f o r  coming 
t o  CERN i n  the f irst  place. 
In cont ras t ,  ESTEC's personnel were a t t r ac t ed  not only by the nature 
of i t s  work, bu t  a l so  by the  higher s a l a r i e s  it of fers  (par t icu lar ly  re la -  
t i v e  t o  those i n  Br i ta in) ,  and by the f ac t  t h a t  it i s  an in te rna t iona l  
ade use o f  those multiple responses i n  the 
ch were not u t i l i z e d  i n  the  above discussion. "most important" catego 
pendix 1, the reader may 
i l i t i e s  as more or less 
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Table 4.5 
Relative Importance of Reasons f o r  Coming t o  the Organization, 
by Laboratory 
Pa r t i cu la r  type of work 
ISPRA -CERN ESTEC 
high high high 
--
Particular individual/group low l O W  low 
Quality of equipment 1 ow mediuma low 
Higher s a l a r y  high low medium 
People of o ther  n a t i o n a l i t i e s  high low medium 
Locat ion low 1 ow 1 ow 
Job s e c u r i t y  1 ow 1 ow 1 ow 
Lack of opportunities 1 ow 1 ow 1 ow 
While 43% of those a t  CERN considered qua l i t y  of equipment not a 
important, t he  number of respondents who considered it most important 
or very important (33%) was so much g rea t e r  a t  ESTEC o r  ISPRA, t h a t  we 
do not feel j u s t i f i e d  i n  r a t i n g  t h i s  choice as 'low. 
t h e  uni ueness of  CERN's acce lera tor  which is re levant  here r a t h e r  than, 
Evidently it is 
s t r i c  -+-E fj? spea ing, its "quality." 
center." 
minds of ESTEC staff members imply a lower degree of professionalism, and 
g rea t e r  degree of commitment t o  non-technical (career and soc io-pol i t ica l )  
One might speculate t h a t  such i n i t i a l  expectations i n  the  
goals. 
The r e l a t i v e  importance of t h e  various reasons a t  ISPRA is similar 
t o  t h a t  a t  ESTEC, but with less emphasis on sa l a ry  and internationalism. 
Given t h e  over t ly  p o l i t i c a l  nature of EURATOM, t h i s  f inding is somewhat 
unanticipated. We may hypothesize t h a t  s c f e n t i s t s  are l i ke ly  t o  have a 
l8 See Footnote 13, p.  228. 
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more professional or ien ta t ion  (and thus be more concerned with the  par- 
t i c u l a r  type of work) than engineers, and as the ISPRA sample has a 
r e l a t i v e l y  l a rge r  proportion of s c i e n t i s t s  than ESTEC, t h i s  would account 
f o r  the differences i n  Table 4.5. Table 4.6, i n  which s c i e n t i s t s  and 
engineers have been distinguished on the  bas i s  of academic degrees, sup- 
por t s  t h i s  a s se r t ion  . 19 
Table 4.6 
Percentage of Sc ien t i s t s  and Engineers Choosing "Type of Work" 
as Most Important Reason, by Laboratory 
ISPRA -CERN _L ESTEC -
S c i e n t i s t s  36% (n = 36)  41% (n = 49) 39% (n = 69) 
Engineers 27% (n = 60) 42% (n = 43) 23% (n = 39) 
To summarize t h i s  discussion, one may model two types of processes opera+ 
ing 
processes probably not  much d i f f e r e n t  from most other job change processes. 
The f irst  model seems t o  divide i n t o  two subprocesses: 
i s  a decision t o  leave the former job. This decision, based on e i t h e r  
t o  br ing  s c i e n t i s t s  and engineers t o  these in t e rna t iona l  laboratories--  
its i n i t i a l  s tage  
career  o r  i n t e l l e c t u a l  d i s sa t i s f ac t ion ,  is followed by the  se l ec t ion  of 
another job from a range of alternatives--choice being based on such extra- 
professional considerations as the  in te rna t iona l  atmosphere of t he  organiza- 
t i o n  and leve l  of s a l a ry ,  i n  addition t o  the  type of work ava i lab le .  This 
l9 We may a l s o  observe i n  t h i s  t ab le  t h a t  a t  least when distinguished 
according t o  education, CERN s c i e n t i s t s  and engineers are much more a l i k e  
than s c i e n t i s t s  and engineers i n  the  other labora tor ies .  
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model seems t o  predominate a t  ESTEC and ISPRA. The second type of pro- 
cess does not separa te  nea t ly  i n t o  two p a r t s  but f inds  t h e  individual 
r e l a t i v e l y  s a t i s f i e d  with h i s  former pos i t ion .  
experience o r  simply t h e  appearance of a b e t t e r  opportunity i n  the i n t e r -  
A vague des i r e  f o r  broader 
na t iona l  center motivates the  job change, and o f t en  the  decision t o  leave 
the  former job is a product of t h e  decision t o  take the  new one, r a t h e r  
than its predecessor. This latter process seems t o  occur more o f t en  a t  
CERN . 
D .  Organizational Status 
Before concluding t h i s  p o a t r a i t  of the  respondents it i s  worth 
looking b r i e f l y  a t  t he  places they hold within t h e i r  organizations. 
e f f o r t  w a s  made t o  select p a r t i c u l a r  strata among the  professional staffs 
of these  labora tor ies ,  and i n  t h i s  respect,  t h e  samples seem t o  be ade- 
quate representations of t he  ac tua l  organizations. The grea te r  p a r t  of  
t he  respondents might be described as young "bench s c i e n t i s t s "  and engi- 
neers--more or less t h e  rank and f i l e  of these  labora tor ies .  Some, of 
course, are destined t o  become important f igures  i n  t h e i r  f i e l d s ;  others 
w i l l  f i n i s h  out t h e i r  professional careers a t  more o r  l e s s  the  same leve l .  
S c i e n t i s t s  with high leve l  posts i n  the  organizations are represented i n  
the  sample i n  rough proportion t o  t h e i r  numbers i n  the  labs.  
No 
Table 4.6 i n  t h e  previous sec t ion  showed the  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of scien- 
tists and engineers (according t o  academic degree) a t  the  three  la rge  
labora tor ies .  
organizational job t i t l e - -wi th  ISPRA having more s c i e n t i s t s  than engineers, 
This same p a t t e r n  is mirrored i n  the  d i s t r i b u t i o n  by 
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CERN having about equal numbers, and ESTEC having more engineers than 
s c i e n t i s t s .  2o A ce r t a in  number of programmers and enginelaring techni- 
cians (with appropriate degrees) a r e  included i n  the  sample, comprising 
about a f i f t h  of the  ESTEC and CERN samples, but less than 10% of the  
ISPRA sample, 
group leaders is d i s t r ibu ted  f a i r l y  evenly across the  major centers.  
The 15% of the sample which i s  comprised of d iv is ion  and 
The d i s t r ibu t ion  by f i e l d  of educational spec ia l i za t ion  is r e f l ec t ed  
i n  the  d i s t r ibu t ion  of a c t u a l - f i e l d s  of  work. In other words, most 
respondents were working i n  the f i e l d s  i n  which they were educated. 
Respondents were a l s o  asked t o  c l a s s i f$  t h e i r  work as t o  whether it was 
bas ic  research, applied research, development, engineering, technical 
se rv ice ,  or administration. The tabulation of t h i s  question by labora- 
t o r y  is presented i n  Table 4.7.. Given the .na ture  of t h e  various 
Table 4 . 7  
Type of Work, by Laboratory 
Basic Research 2% 18% 10% 
Applied Research 20 20 36 
Development 8 24 16 
Enginaering and Design 22 20 19 
Technical Service 17 5 8 
Administration 16 2 4 
DK, Other, Multiple Answer 
cludes some s c i e n t i s t s  (13) were not ac tua l ly  
by t i t l e  bu t  as 'lfellowslt o 
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organizations, t h i s  t a b l e  o f f e r s  few surpr i ses .  
a t i on  r e a l l y  required relate t o  t h e  la rge  proportion of ffadministrators't  
a t  ESTEC, and the  unexpectedly small proportion of Ifbasic r.esearchers" a t  
CERN. With respect t o  the  former, t h i s  is not out of proportion f o r  
ESTEC--a number of the  respondents were contract  supervisors i n  the  Space- 
craft Projects Department whose work consisted of overseeing t h e  construc- 
t i o n  of ESRO's satellites i n  industry.  
users" a t  CERN are probably under-represented with respect t o  "machine 
builders" and flservice" s c i e n t i s t s  and engineers. 
appear reasonably representa t ive  of t h e  organizations. 
the  smaller labora tor ies  (ESDAC, PETTEN, HALDEN, IAEA) seem t o  be concen- 
t r a t e d  strongly among applied research types, as a re  the  labora tor ies .  
The only words of explan- 
With respec t  t o  the  latter, "machine 
Otherwise the  samples 
The samples from 
* * *  
The material i n  t h i s  chapter was presented primarily i n  order t o  
acquaint t he  reader w i t h  the bas i c  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of those individuals 
who, as inhabitants of t he  in t e rna t iona l  labora tor ies  of Europe, became 
p a r t  of  t h i s  study. I t  should be evident from t h i s  b r i e f  p o r t r a i t  t ha t  
desp i te  a broad demographic homgeneity, the cha rac t e r i s t i c s  of these: 
scientists and engineers vary s ign i f i can t ly  i n  response t o  q u a l i t i e s  of 
t he  d i f f e r e n t  labora tor ies  and under cons t r a in t s  of d i f f e r e n t  na t iona l  
s c i e n t i f i c  systems. 
t u t i o n a l  background, which r e f l e c t  d i f f e r e n t i a l  re la t ionships  of the  
labora tor ies  t o  industry,  government, and academia. Furthermore, the  
con t r a s t s  i n  degree of professional motivation i n  decisions t o  come t o  the  
Of p a r t i c u l a r  importance a re  the  var ia t ions  i n  i n s t i -  
i n t e rna t iona l  laboratory as well as i n  reasons f o r  leaving previous jobs,  
point t o  important: implications f o r  t h e  achievement po ten t i a l s  of t h e  
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lives and at 
situation in the laboratory. 
CHAPTER V 
THE INTERNATIONAL LIVING EXPERIENCE 
Most of the  s c i e n t i s t s  and engineers who come t o  the in te rna t iona l  
laborator ies  a re ,  f o r  longer o r  shor te r  periods of time, leaving t h e i r  
homes and going t o  l i v e  i n  foreign countries.  To some extent ,  the fu ture  
pa t te rns  of t h e i r  l i ves  w i l l  be shaped by t h i s  experience. For many 
individuals ,  however, e a r l i e r  exposure t o  more than one nat ional  cul ture  
has created the  preconditions f o r  successful adjustment t o  in te rna t iona l  
l i f e .  In  exploring the operating cha rac t e r i s t i c s  o f  in te rna t iona l  labor- 
a to r i e s ,  t h i s  chapter deals with l i f e  ins ide  and outside of the labora- 
to ry  as an in te rna t iona l  l i v ing  experience. I t  begins by examining multi- 
nat ional  influences i n  the respondents' l ives--those aspects of t h e i r  
family backgrounds which extend beyond the  confines of a s ing le  nation, 
t he  extent  to  which they have previously l ived  abroad, t h e i r  t r ave l s ,  and 
t h e i r  language competence. I t  looks fur ther  a t  the ways i n  which they 
have adjusted t o  l i f e  i n  a foreign country. 
respondents' re la t ionships  with t h e i r  own countries:  the  personal and 
professional  ties they maintain a t  home, t h e i r  pa r t i c ipa t ion  i n  the  nat ional  
Final ly ,  it examines the  
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l i f e  of t h e i r  country, and t h e i r  future  plans f o r  returning--or not 
re turning.  
A. Foreign Exposure 
1. Family Influences 
The vast majority of the respondents came from conventional mono- 
nat ional  famil ies ,  i n  which both parents were of one na t iona l i ty  and they 
were of the same na t iona l i ty .  
from families i n  which one or both parents possessed a d i f f e ren t  
na t iona l i ty  than they themselves. 
e r a l l y  take the f a the r ' s  na t iona l i ty ,  most of ten among these cases it was 
the  mother whose na t iona l i ty  d i f fe red  from the  respondent's.' A t  l e a s t  
i n  t h i s  respect ,  then, the respondents were probably not very d i f fe renr  
Only a small number--26 i n  a l l  (7%)--came 
As Europeans of mixed parentage gen- 
from most of t h e i r  countrymen--they were Frenchmen born of French parents,  
Germans born of German parents ,  and so  for th .  
While a man of course cannot choose h i s  parents ,  he is  normally f r e e  
i n  modern society t o  choose h i s  wife; and it i s  s ign i f i can t  t h a t  a s izable  
proportion of the respondents chose wives whose n a t i o n a l i t i e s  d i f fe red  
from t h e i r  own. The data ,  unfortunately,  does not reveal how many of the 
respondents were married before coming t o  t h e i r  present  jobs,  and how many 
met t h e i r  wives while a t  the in te rna t iona l  laboratory. I t  does ind ica te ,  
The number of cases i n  which the respondent's parents had i m m i -  
'grated t o  the country of the respondent's na t iona l i ty  may have been 
s l i g h t l y  underestimated as the question asked for parents '  nat ional i ty--  
not country of t h e i r  b i r t h .  
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however, t h a t  some 18% of  t h e  respondents have fore ign  spouses.' Although 
it is d i f f i c u l t  t o  t e l l  because the  numbers become q u i t e  small, there  
does not seem t o  be any p a t t e r n  among the  intermarriages--Frenchmen seem 
about as l i k e l y  t o  have married German g i r l s  as Belgians; Dutchmen seem 
about as l i k e l y  t o  have married I ta l ian as Swedish g i r l s .  
however, are married t o  o the r  Western Europeans. 
Nearly a l l ,  
2 .  Travelling and Living Abroad 
Chapter IV reported t h a t  a r e l a t i v e l y  small proportion of the  respon- 
dents had received t h e i r  educations outside of t h e i r  own countries,  but 
t h a t  a somewhat larger proportion had come t o  the in t e rna t iona l  cen ter  
d i r e c t l y  from employment outside of  t h e i r  own country. This l a t t e r  pro- 
portion--varying from 11% t o  14% across the  major na t iona l i t i e s - -g rea t ly  
understates t h e  number who have l ived  and worked abroad a t  some previous 
t i m e  i n  t h e i r  l ives  because it includes only t h a t  period immediately 
previous t o  t he  present job. The number of respondents who reported 
having l ived  abroad a t  %t ime  previous t o  coming t o  the laboratory was 
very nearly one-half of t h e  sample (48%).  
There is some ind ica t ion  tha t  a s i g n i f i c a n t  proportion o f  t he  respon- 
2 
dents were exposed t o  l i f e  i n  a fore ign  country during t h e i r  childhood. 
Adding those respondents who were born abroad, and those who were born 
ins ide  t h e i r  own countries but l ived  i n  another country before beginning 
t h e i r  higher education y ie lds  a t o t a l  of 57 individuals.  This is nearly 
one-third of the  t o t a l  number who have l ived  abroad, and ind ica tes  t h a t  
Living abroad was defined in  the  question as "3 months or longer." 
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f o r  many of t he  respondents, an in te rna t iona l  influence has deep roots  
i n  t h e i r  background. 
Among those 185 respondents who had l ived outs ide of t h e i r  own 
country before coming t o  the  in te rna t iona l  center ,  more than a fourth 
had l ived i n  more than one country. Most had spent s ign i f i can t  periods 
of time abroad, nearly ha l f  spending grea te r  than 2 years,  and nearly a 
quar te r  spending grea te r  than 5 years .  
consideration seemed t o  play some ro l e  i n  the choice of countries within 
Europe, but  more respondents had l ived i n  the United S ta t e s  (53) than any 
other  s ing le  country. Br i ta in  (22) ranked second behind the U.S., 
followed by Switzerland (21), and France (19). Signif icant  numbers of 
Br i t i sh  had l ived i n  Canada o r  other  Commonwealth countr ies ,  and a 
number of Frenchmen had l ived  i n  French colonies o r  ex-colonies. 
Geographic proximity and language 
The proportion of respondents with foreign l iv ing  experience varied 
markedly with laboratory and na t iona l i ty ,  as Table 5.1 i l l u s t r a t e s .  This 
Table 5.1 
Previous Living Abroad, by Laboratory and Nationali ty 
ESTEC CERN ISPRA 
Yes 
No 
DK 
37% 68% 65% 57% 36% 23% 6% 32% 52% 43% 62% 
63 32 35 43 64 77 88 68 48 54 36 
0 0 0 0  0 0 6 0  0 3 2  
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t ab le  reveals  important differences between the  types of individuals 
drawn t o  the  three  major laborator ies .  
t r i e s  had the l e a s t  foreign l i v ing  experience. 
CERN respondents from a l l  coun- 
Overall,  only one-third 
of these individuals  had l ived  abroad before coming t o  CERN. A t  ISPRA, 
approximately ha l f  o f  the respondents of  each major na t iona l i t y  had pre- 
viously l ived  abro&--the average including smaller na t iona l i t i e s  was 
53%. 
n a t i o n a l i t i e s  were f a i r l y  similar t o  one another; 
I t  is important t o  note t h a t  a t  both ISPRA and CERN, the  various 
ESTEC is s t r ik ing ly  
d i f f e r e n t  from e i t h e r  of these cases. 
I t a l i a n s  a t  ESTEC, nearly two-thirds had previously l ived  abroad, gener- 
Among the French, Germans, and 
a l l y  a higher proportion than a t  the other laborator ies .  In  cont ras t ,  
only about one-third of the  ESTEC Br i t i sh  seem t o  have done so. This i s  
t h e  only case of such a s t rong reversa l  i n  the  tab le .  
The reasons behind t h i s  t a b l e  r e l a t e  t o  the  respondents' motivations 
for&' joining the in te rna t iona l  organizations.  ESTEC'S attractive power, 
it w i l l  be reca l led ,  was based nearly as much on the extra-professional 
fac tors  of  s a l a ry  leve l  and in te rna t iona l  atmosphere as  on the type of 
work it was doing. 
dents coming d i r e c t l y  from t h e i r  s tud ie s ,  
from industry o r  government. In  Britain,  ESRO's main means of r ec ru i t -  
ment is the  c i r cu la t ion  of vacancy not ices  i n  government establishments 
(where a grea t  proportion of the persons with the  needed s k i l l s  ex is t )  
and i n  Br i ta in  a l so ,  the  sa l a ry  d i f f e ren t i a l  is greatest. Many career  
c i v i l  servants come t o  ESTEC on secondment from Bri ta in  f o r  a l imited 
period of time. 
nat ional  exposure i n  t h e i r  careers .  
Further,  ESTEC had the  smallest  percentage of respon- 
Most respondents were drawn 
These individuals  are l ike ly  t o  have had l imited in t e r -  
ESRO recruitment i n  France, Germany, 
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and I t a l y ,  on the  other hand, i s  less concentrated i n  the  government sec- 
t o r ,  fewer individuals a r e  seconded from career  government 
salary leve ls  are not t h a t  d i f f e r e n t .  Among these n a t i o n a l i t i e s ,  then, 
one would not expect in te rna t iona l  experience t o  be qu i t e  as limited as 
among t h e  Br i t i sh  and i n  f a c t  one might expect t o  f ind  more individuals 
f o r  whom pas t  foreign experience has created the  des i r e  t o  work i n  an 
in te rna t iona l  atmosphere. Indeed t h i s  i s  what i s  found. 
A t  CERN, where the  main a t t r ac t ions  a re  the  type of work and the  
f a c i l i t i e s ,  considerations such as salary and des i r e  t o  work i n  an i n t e r -  
national atmosphere a re  l e s s  re levant .  Although the CERN respondents a re  
a cosmopolitan group, most come t o  CERN f o r  professional reasons unrelated 
t o  previous in te rna t iona l  experience. Furthermore, it should be r eca l l ed  
t h a t  25% of the  CERN sample came d i r e c t l y  from t h e i r  s tud ie s  and thus had 
less opportunity for previous foreign experience. 
ISPRA was intermediate t o  ESTEC and CERN w i t h  regard t o  the f ac to r s  
which served t o  a t t r a c t  s c i e n t i s t s  and engineers. Extraeprofessional 
fac tors  were more important than a t  CERN, but l e s s  important than a t  
ESTEC. 
l eve l  f o r  ISPRA. 
highest  percentage of foreign l i v ing  experience a t  ISPRA was the  I t a l i a n s .  
These s c i e n t i s t s  may well have enjoyed the in te rna t iona l  atmosphere, 
f inding what one ca l i ed  "best of two worlds"--a non-Italian organization 
Similarly,  previous foreign exposure fa l ls  a t  an intermediate 
I t . i s  perhaps s ign i f i can t  t h a t  t he  group with the  
i n  I t a l y .  
I t  might be expected t h a t  (1) being s c i e n t i s t s  and 
(2) working i n  a foreign country, and (3) having done a 
oad, t h e  respondents would, i n  gen 
engineers, 
subs t an t i a l  amount 
a wel l - t rave l led  
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group. This, i n  fact, is the  case, as t he  da ta  shows. Table 5 . 2  presents 
the  percentage of respondents who reported having t rave l led  t o  various 
areas of the  world. 
Table 5 . 2  
Percentage of Respondents Reporting Travel 
To Selected Regions of the  World 
Western Europe 
Eastern Europe 
Soviet Union 
United States/Canada 
Middle East 
Asia 
Africa 
Latin America 
Other Areas 
100% 
16% 
4% 
40 % 
12% 
7% 
15% 
5% 
3% 
The character  o f  t r a v e l  var ied subs t an t i a l ly  between d i f f e ren t  pa r t s  
of the world. Very few (8) respondents, f o r  example, reported v i s i t i n g  
the  United S ta tes  purely f o r  t o u r i s t i c  purposes. 
e i t h e r  for professional  reasons, or combined professional  t r i p s  and 
tourism. Travel i n  the  Middle East and Eastern Europe was, on the other  
hand, predominantly t o u r i s t i c ,  while travel i n  the  remaining areas (out- 
s i d e  Western Europe) was largely professional  (including mi l i ta ry  serv ice) .  
A trichotomized index of  amount of travel compiled from the da ta  showed 
Most (146) went there  
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3 l i t t l e  var ia t ion  e i t h e r  across laborator ies  o r  na t iona l i t i e s .  
3. Language Competence 
The language b a r r i e r  i s  sometimes mentioned as an impediment t o  effec- 
t i v e  work i n  an in te rna t iona l  s c i e n t i f i c  en terpr i se .  
the degree t o  which the respondents were able t o  communicate i n  more than 
one tongue might be taken as a p a r t i a l  indication o f  t h e i r  exposure t o  
a l i en  cul tures  as well as o f - t h e i r  a b i l i t y  t o  cope with and p r o f i t  from 
the in te rna t iona l  s i t ua t ion  of the laboratory.  Each respondent was 
asked t o  enumerate the languages he spoke.. The t o t a l  number of languages 
f o r  each respondent was coded, and a respondent was a l s o  coded as e i t h e r  
In t h i s  analysis ,  
speaking o r  not speaking each of the  seven most popular languages. 
Vir tual ly  a l l  educated Europeans speak a second language, and many, 
especial ly  those coming from smaller countries,  speak a t h i r d .  Thus the  
average number of languages spoken by the respondents i n  t h i s  study--3.3-- 
was remarkable only by American standards. Only 17 persons i n  the  en r i r e  
sample were monolingual. In te res t ing ly  enough, a l l  1 7  were Bri t ish (14 
from ESTEC)--comprising one-fourth of the t o t a l  number of Bri t ish respon- 
dents.  Fifty-two respondents spoke f ive  o r  more languages. The average 
number of languages spoken by the various na t iona l i t i e s  as well as the 
The index was constructed i n  the following manner: Those who 
reported having only t r ave l l ed  through "some" of Western Europe ( for  
t o u r i s t i c  o r  professional reasons o r  both) were assigned the value "low 
travel" (n =, 91). Those who had t rave l led  through most of Western 
Europe, o r  some o r  most of Western Europe plus  one area outs ide of 
Europe, were c l a s s i f i e d  "medium travel"  (n F 2 1 8 ) .  
led more than t h a t  was considered "high t ravel"  (n = 75).  
Anyone who had t rave l -  
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frequency of speaking severa l  of t h e  most popular languages is given i n  
Table 5.2. Most impressive here is  t h e  enormous power of t h e  English 
Table 5.3 
Language Competence by Nationali ty 
Br Fr Ge I t  Hol Bel Swi Aus Scand Spain 
(69) (61) ($9) (71) (24) (21) (13) (12) (17) (7) 
Avg. No. 
of Langs. 2.17 3.15 3.40 3.35 4.67 4.14 3.69 3.17 3.53 4.00 
Percent 
Speaking: ' 
Eng 1 i s h  100% 97% 100% 90% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 86% 
French 71 100 73 94 79 100 100 58 50 100 
German 1 2  39 100 27 100 76 54 100 100 43 
I t a 1 i ana 7 48 36 100 21 52 23 25 0 8 
Vir tua l ly  a l l  non-Italians who speak It'a3ian a r e  from ISPRA. a 
language. 
seven of these ten  were I t a l i a n s  a t  ISPRA.' 
Only t en  persons i n  the  e n t i r e  sample did not speak English-- 
English is  c l ea r ly  the  
lingua franca of t h i s  in te rna t iona l  s c i e n t i f i c  community. 
is  a r e l a t i v e l y  close second t o  English i n  currency. 
Overall,  French 
(One must remember 
t h a t  a l l  of these  labora tor ies  have e i t h e r  French o r  English o r  both as 
Although questionnaire subjec ts  were given t h e i r  choice of English, 
French, and German forms, and 21% took French, while 14% took German, the  
French and German forms were more a matter of convenience than necessity 
f o r  t he  respondents. I t  is evident from Table 5.3 t h a t  t he  study could 
have proceeded subs t an t i a l ly  unhindered i f  it had been done e n t i r e l y  i n  
English. 
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5 o f f i c i a l  languages.) German follows as a d i s t an t  t h i r d .  
Despite differences i n  language requirements, t he  s c i e n t i s t s  a t  the 
various laborator ies  do not d i f f e r  markedly i n  l i n g u i s t i c  capabi l i t i es .  
Although German is an o f f i c i a l  language a t  ISPRA and not  a t  CERN and 
ESTEC, roughly the same proportion of non-Germans speak the  language a t  
a l l  three laborator ies  (25-30%). English i s  nearly as widely spoken a t  
ISPRA as a t  CERN and ESTEC, and French is  only s l i g h t l y  more popular 
among non-native speakers i n  CEW than elsewhere. Among the  major lan- 
guages, the only deviant case is  I t a l i an .  
of ISPRA, only 19 non-Italian respondents spoke tha t  language. 
knowledge of I t a l i a n  i s  s o  e s sen t i a l  f o r  l iv ing  i n  the area tha t  only 4 
non-Italians i n  the  sample have not managed t o  pick it up. 
In the e n t i r e  sample outside 
A t  ISPRA, 
Amount of t r ave l ,  number of languages spoken, and foreign l i v ing  
experience are a l l  highly in te rcor re la ted .  A high score of in te rna t iona l  
exposure on one var iable  generally suggested a high score on the others .  
An index of  " internat ional  exposure" was constructed using a l l  three of 
these indicators ;  its construction i s  shown i n  Table 5 . 4  (see following 
page). 
the  national groups a t  the  major laborator ies  and thus summarize the 
This index serves t o  emphasize the important differences between 
0 
r e s u l t s  of t h i s  sect ion.  Table 5.5 (see following page) shows the d i s t r i -  
bution of the index f o r  each major na t iona l i ty  at the three  major 
Our resul t  here brings t o  mind the words of one respondent, an 
eminent French phys ic i s t ,  who was asked if  he had found language t o  be 
much of a problem i n  h i s  laboratory': "No, I spoke French from b i r th ,  
English from Physics, and German from prisoner-of-war. It was no 
problem f o r  me!" 
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Table 5.4 
Index of Internat ional  Exposure 
Index 
__1_ Trave 1 Languagea -Living Abroad 
Yes h i  h i  1 
Yes h i  l o  1 
Yes med h i  2 
Yes med l o  2 
Yes - l o  h i  2 
Yes lo  l o  3 
no h i  h i  3 
no h i  l o  3 
no med h i  3 
no 
no 
med l o  4 
l o  h i  4 
no l o  l o  5 
a H i  language = more than 3 
Lo language = 3 o r  less 
n Group n - 
29 
24 53 
52' 
58 
12 122 
9 
9 
10 
36 64 
72 
15 87 
55 55 
Index 
1 (h i )  
2 
-
3 
4 
Table 5.5 
Index of Internat ional  Exposure, 
by Laboratory and Nat ional i ty  
ESTEC CERN ISPRA 
B r  F r  G e  I t  B r  F r  G e  I t  F r  Ge I t  
(35) (19) (20) ( 7) (25) (13) (17) (19) (25) (35) (39) 
4% 32% 10% 29% 16% 0% 6% 5% 12% 3% 13% 
23 32 50 29 16 23 0 26 40 40 41 
11 11 15 14 8 15 24 5 32 29 13 
37 21  20 29 52 31 53 32 8 20 13 
5 (law) 1 7 5 5 0  8 31 18 32 8 6 21 
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laborator ies .  
r e s u l t s  p a r a l l e l  and r e f ine  those of Table 5.1. 
except f o r  the Br i t i sh ,  the ESTEC respondents have a l l  been ra ther  highly 
exposed t o  aspects of in te rna t iona l  l i fe .  
showing a much lower level  of exposure. 
A s  l iv ing  abroad i s  a major component of t h i s  index, the 
I t  may be seen t h a t ,  
The Br i t i sh  d i f f e r  sharply-- 
A t  CERN, a l l  four major nation- 
a l i t i e s  show a uniformly low level  of p r i o r  exposure. The level  of expo- 
sure of the four na t iona l i t i e s  a t  ISPRA is a l so  f a i r l y  uniform; it i s  
intermediate between ESTEC (apart  from the Br i t i sh)  and CERh. 
B . Adjustment 
Varying degrees of p r i o r  in te rna t iona l  exposure suggest varying 
react ions t o  l i f e  i n  a foreign country. 
they had had any d i f f i c u l t i e s  i n  adjusting t o  l i f e  i n  the  country and 
community i n  which the laboratory was located. Overall,  only 25% respond- 
cd 
na i re  comments one gets  a b e t t e r  fee l ing  f o r  the r e a l  meaning of t h i s  
response. 
The respondents were asked i f  
tha t  they had, but  i n  looking a t  the  cross-tabulations and question- 
The Br i t i sh ,  both a t  ESTEC and CERN, were most l i ke ly  t o  say t h a t  
they had encountered problems i n  adjusting. 
former group and 40% of the  la t te r  so  indicated.  
notably the Germans--report a similar level  of d i f f i c u l t y ,  giving ESTEC 
the d i s t inc t ion  of having the  most d i f f i c u l t  location t o  which t o  adjust .  
Forty-three percent of the 
Other groups a t  ESTEC-- 
6 
A number of Frenchmen and Belgians at'ESTEC solved t h e i r  adjust-  
ment problems by leaving t h e i r  families a t  home, l iv ing  i n  small f la t s  or  
rented rooms near ESTEC, and commuting home each weekend. 
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If one excludes Italians--who were ac tua l ly  l iv ing  i n  t h e i r  own country-- 
from the ISPRA tabulat ions,  then ISPRA displays a s l i g h t l y  greater r a t e  
of adjustment d i f f i c u l t y  than CERN, and a s l i g h t l y  lower r a t e  than ESTEC. 
Among a l l  n a t i o n a l i t i e s ,  problems of adjustment seemed fewest a t  CERN. 
What s o r t s  of d i f f i c u l t i e s  appeared? In large p a r t  they were similar 
t o  problems which might arise among any ordinary persons who went t o  l ive 
i n  a foreign country. 
and "mentality11 were the  most prevalent. '  The ESTEC Br i t i sh ,  most problem- 
Complaints about " local  conditions , I 1  "customs," 
prone i n  t h e  sample, o f ten  c i t e d  such things as weather, housing condi- 
t ions ,  and cost  of  l iv ing  as  sources of i r r i t a t i o n .  More than one-third 
of t h i s  group volunteered such complaints, A handful of  respondents a t  
CERN and ISPRA mentioned t h a t  they found the  l i f e - s t y l e  of the local popu- 
l a t ion  d i f f i c u l t  t o  adjust  to .  Language problems were only r a re ly  mentioned 
at the  major laborator ies .  
One suspects t h a t  the r e l a t i v e  paucity of adjustment problems 
reported by the  ISPRA respondents is t o  be credi ted not so  much t o  the 
favorable q u a l i t i e s  of the location, s ince ISPRA's location, i n  f a c t ,  
might be expected t o  prove d i f f i c u l t  t o  adjust  t o .  
t o  the  e f f o r t s  which EURATOM has made t o  f a c i l i t a t e  adjustment of new staff 
Rather, it is  a c red i t  
members (see Chapter 111). These procedures have na tura l ly  been ref ined 
' Although nearly 30% of the respondents wrote i n  comments i n  
response t o  t h i s  question, too grea t  a stress on numbers here might be 
somewhat misleading. 
important i n  developing some of these ideas.  
Qual i ta t ive examination of the  interviews was a l so  
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as the organization has grown and t h e i r  effect iveness  i s  brought out by 
the fact tha t  those ISPRA respondents who reported t h a t  they had had 
adjustment problems a r e  a l l  i n  the  high sen io r i ty  group. Not a s ing le  
individual (out of a t o t a l  of 20)  who arr ived a t  ISPRA during the pas t  
2& years reported problems i n  adjusting. 
The staffs of a l l  of these in te rna t iona l  laborator ies  a re  given a 
special  s t a tus  by the host governments. As in te rna t iona l  c i v i l  servants 
they have r igh t s  and pr iv i leges  similar t o ,  but  na tura l ly  not as broad- 
ranging as, diplomatic personnel: exemption from customs duty f o r  cars  
and personal possessions, exemption from income tax  f o r  the s a l a r i e s  
earned ins ide  the organization, and s o  for th .  The spec ia l  s t a t u s  of 
in te rna t iona l  c i v i l  servant operates i n  two divergent ways, however. 
the  one hand, many of the normal problems which foreigners might encounter 
On 
upon s e t t l i n g  i n  an a l i en  country a re  a l lev ia ted .  
deal too frequently with the unfamiliar-bureaucracy of the  country. One 
One does not have t o  
has many compatriots i n  a s imi lz r  posi t ion,  and one ' s  pas i t ion ,  due t o  i t s  
attendant pr iv i leges ,  i s  somewhat above other  foreigners i n  perceived 
s t a tus .8  On the other hand, the  in te rna t iona l  c i v i l  servant status 
serves t o  i s o l a t e  the  individuals from t h e  community i n  which they are 
placed. In the concise words of one questionnaire respDndent, commenting 
I n  f a c t ,  these considerations apply t o  a lesser degree a t  ESTEC, 
where conf l i c t s  between the  organization and the Dutch government over 
many of these very matters a re  a frequent source of complaint among the 
s taff .  I t  is assumed t h a t  these disagreements w i l l  be--or already have 
been--worked out.  
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on t h e  question of adjustment: 
Natural pa r t i c ipa t ion  i n  loca l  community excluded by l ega l  
status of ' in te rna t iona l  organization staff. '  
To the  extent t h a t  t he  s c i e n t i s t s  des i r e  t o  in t eg ra t e ,  t h e i r  status 
i n h i b i t s  t h i s  process and f o r  many t h i s  lends something of an ar t i f ic ia l  
qua l i t y  t o  t h e i r  stay.  
This effect may be seen i n  the  manner i n  which respondents evaluated 
the  mentalities o f  people i n  t h e i r  host  country--a manner which seemed 
almost independent of the  country i tself .  A t  CERN, nearly everyone except 
the Swiss khemselves mpressed  the  opinion that' the Swiss we*&-rather 
cold and aloof i n  t h e i r  dealings w i t h  foreigners and t h a t  it was very d i f -  
f i c u l t  t o  make f r iends  among them. A t  ESTEC one could hear v i r t u a l l y  
the  same evaluation, replacing "Swiss" with Dutch. The reac t ion  was 
similar with respect t o  the  Italians at  ISPRA. Three sho r t  quotes 
serve  t o  demonstrate t h i s  point: 
From the  Swiss community i t ' s  very, very hard t o  meet people. 
We meet them on the  staircase o r  i n  the  l i f t - - ' H e l l o ,  f i n e  
weather today, '  and t h a t  was the end of the  contact w i t h  t h e  
Swiss. . . I think even the  Swiss among themselves don't 
have very c lose  contact.  J u s t  everyone by himself, t h a t ' s  
t h e  most important pa r r  of the  world. 
--German a t  CERN 
This i n  my opinion i s  a bad aspect of ISPRA. I t ' s  l i k e  a 
colony. . . I t a l y  is a country i n  which you do not have a 
middle class, you have only r i ch  people and poor people. 
Varese is  a town of r i ch  people. . . and t o  contact t h i s  kind 
of  soc i e ty  is extremely d i f f i c u l t .  
--Frenchman a t  ISPRA 
. . I don't  f e e l  myself very much a t  home i n  Holland. I 
think t h i s  is  due t o  the  Dutch character.  You see, f o r  
instance,  they leave t h e i r  jobs i n  t h e  evening, go home and 
set t le  a t  home. 
mon l i fe .  . . They are q u i t e  n ice ,  but they don't e a s i l y  
make f r i ends .  
They don't h.ave very much of soc ie ty  o r  com- 
--Frenchman a t  ESTEC 
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Some of the  respondents did i n  fact recognize t h a t  the  spec ia l  
status of t he  in te rna t iona l  c i v i l  servant and t 
a large group of foreigners  accounted f o r  t h i s  phenomenon. In  any case, 
t h e  phenomenon was less pronounced a t  the smaller centers ,  such as ESDAC 
and PETTEN, probably because of the centers '  s i ze .  Since they were r e l a -  
t i ve ly  few i n  number, the  s c i e n t i s t s  were forced t o  look outside of t h e i r  
organization f o r  a t  l e a s t  some of t h e i r  soc i a l  contacts,  and, simultaneously, 
the local res idents  were l e s s  prone to ident i fy  them as par t  o f  a c l a s s  
fact of being one of 
of 'Ioutsiders . I '  
The range of adjustment problems discussed here,  it must be remem- 
bered, per ta ins  t o  a minority of the respondents. The grea te r  port ion 
of the respondents i n  a l l  nat ional  groups a t  a l l  major laborator ies  
responded negatively t o  the  question of adjustment problems. 
question, however, dealing with sa t i s f ac t ion  with l i f e  i n  the  laboratory 's  
location, provided more broadly-based data .  Table 5.6 shows its tabulat ion 
A d i f f e ren t  
Table 5.6 
Sa t i s fac t ion  with Life i n  the Location, 
by Laboratory and Nationali ty 
ESTEC CERN ISPRA 
B r  F r  Ge I t  Br.  F r  G e  I t  F r  Ge I t  
(353 .(I91 (20) '. (7)  (25) (13) j ( 1 ~ ) - ~ ~ 1 9 )  125) (35) (39) 
Comp 1 e t  e 1 y 
Very s a t i s f i e d  14 16 5 0 36 62 65 32 36 51 28 
Sa t i s f i ed  26 47 45 29 36 23 18 42 24 37 46 
Somewhat 
s a t i s f i e d  49 2 1  35 29 8 0 . 0  26 32 6 18 
Very 
unsa t i s f ied  9 11 15 14 0 0 0 0  4 3 3  
sat i s  f ied  3%' 5% 0% 14% 20% 15% 18% 0% 4% 3% 5% 
Here, as well as i n  Tables 6.3, 7.4, 8.4, 8 . 5 ,  and 10.2, below, DK is  a 
omitted f o r  the sake of s implici ty .  
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by na t iona l i ty  and lab. 
foregoing discussion. 
(CERN), lower i n  Ispra ,  and lowest a t  Noord~ i jk  (ESTEC) . The ESTEC 
The r e s u l t s ,  c l ea r ly ,  p a r a l l e l  those of the  
The leve l  of s a t i s f ac t ion  is  highest  i n  Geneva 
Br i t i sh ,  who reported the  highest  frequency of adjustment problems, were 
a l so  the l e a s t  s a t i s f i e d  with l i fe ,  but otherwise the  level  of satisfac- 
t ion  w a s  more a function of location than na t iona l i ty .  
t iona l  point  worth noting is the v i r t u a l  absence of d i s sa t i s f ac t ion  with 
l ife i n  Geneva.' For most of  the  respondents, s a t i s f ac t ion  w&th l i f e  i n  
the  host country appears t o  be associated with p r i o r  foreign exposure. 
Excluding I t a l i ans  from ISPRA (who are  l iv ing  i n  t h e i r  own country), those 
respondents who showed a higher degree of p r i o r  foreign experience 
(measured by the sca le  hi the  previous sect ion)  were l ike ly  t o  show 
greater sa t i s f ac t ion  with l i f e  i n  the  laboratory location. 
The only addi- 
10 
C. Domestic Ties 
In l i gh t  of t h e i r  p r i o r  in te rna t iona l  exposure and t h e i r  l iv ing  
experience i n  the  host country, one should expect t h e  degree of  commit- 
ment which the  respondents s t i l l  show toward t h e i r  own country t o  be an 
The 5 I t a l i a n  respondents from CERN (26%) who rep l ied  "somewhat 
unsat isf ied" t o  t h i s  question appear as something of an anomaly as no 
col laborat ion o r  explanation appears e i t h e r  i n  the  interview texts,  
questionnaire comments, o r  r e l a t ed  questions. 
lo A s ign i f i can t  exception t o  t h i s  re la t ionship  appears a t  ESTEC. 
Here a number of individuals with very high indices  of p r i o r  exposure 
are very d i s s a t i s f i e d  with the location--giving fu r the r  support t o  those 
who claim t h a t  ESTEC's location was a poor choice. 
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important dimension. 
t he  s c i e n t i f i c  performance of the laborator ies  ( i n  maintaining important 
t a l en t  as p a r t  of the European s c i e n t i f i c  community) and second t o  t h e  
The commitment dimension--since i t  r e l a t e s  first t o  
d i r ec t  p o l i t i c a l  r o l e  (since i f  the s c i e n t i s t s  a re  t o  assist i n  European 
integrat ion they must remain i n  Europe)--is of pa r t i cu la r  concern from a 
policy standpoint.  The extent t o  which the  s c i e n t i s t s  follow current 
events i n  t h e i r  countr ies ,  the types of contacts they maintain there ,  and 
t h e i r  expressed desires  to re turn o r  not a r e  a l l  aspects oi this key 
question, 
1. Keeping Up with Events 
In  response t o  the  query "DO you t r y  t o  keep up with nat ional  l i f e  i n  
your country through newspapers, radio or other means?" 
the  respondents rep l ied  tha t  they did.  Those sca t te red  
d i d  not were more l ike ly  t o  come from smaller countries 
v i r tua l ly  a l l  of 
few who sa id  they 
For these people 
from smaller countries,  it seemed tha t  the unavai lab i l i ty  o f  newspapers as 
well as a fee l ing  t h a t  events i n  these countries were not s o  in te res t ing ,  
reduced the incentives t o  keep up t o  date.  
information from home were newspapers and radio broadcasts. 
papers--weekly as well as  daily--seemed t o  be t h e  most important primary 
Respondents' main sources of 
News- 
source, while radio was c l ea r ly  used as a supplement. Nearly half  of 
those who responded gave newspapers as  t h e i r  so l e  source and about an 
l1 Although the  questionnaire encouraged these two responses f o r  the  
sake of c l a r i t y ,  t he  interview format did not suggest them and obtained 
the  same response pa t te rn .  
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both newspapers and rad 
r t ance  of the  press 
country is f u r t h e r  emph 
which asked the  respondents t o  
read, fewer than 10% f a i l e d  
1 2  
ry. 
Beyond simply following events i n  t h e i r  own countries,  t he  scien 
t i s t s - - t o  a g rea t e r  o r  lesser extent--maintain t i e s  by re turn ing  home f o r  
v i s i t s .  In addition t o  regular vacations, t h e  major organizations allow 
professional staff members an annual or biennia l  "home leave," i n  which 
the  organization pays the  cos t  of a t r i p  home f o r  the  s t a f f  members and 
h i s  family. 
may, na tu ra l ly ,  a l s o  go home on t h e i r  own expense during vacations o r  on 
holiday weekends and most gave "every few months" as the  frequency of 
t h e i r  t r i p s  home. The Br i t i sh  a t  CERN and ESTEC deviated somewhat, with 
most returning home only once a year and some even l e s s  often than t h a t .  
A few respondents [French and Germans a t  ESTEC, I t a l i a n s  a t  CERN) s a i d  
they managed t o  get home about once a month. 
Nearly h a l f ,  i n  fact, read papers only from t h e i r  own country. 
Depending on how far they are from home , t h e  respondents 
2. Professional Contacts 
O f  course, as scient is ts  and engineers, t hese  individuals l i v e  i n  a 
professional reputa t ion  and p 
cked up one of t h e  loca l  
h 
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grea t  deal.  
t h e i r  home country then, one is  tapping an element of t h e  respondents' 
a b i l i t y  t o  re turn  home and resume a career there.  
I n  asking whether they maintained professional ties i n  
I t  was somewhat sur- 
p r i s ing ,  therefore ,  t h a t  nearly h a l f  (excluding those who were c i t i z e n s  
of t h e  host country) s t a t e d  t h a t  they did not maintain such t i e s .  
on leave from t h e i r  former pos ts  automatically had t i e s  a t  these i n s t i -  
Those 
tutions;  t h i s  was t h e  most popular form of re la t ionship .  
t a c t s  w i t h  colleagues and membership in professional soc ie t i e s  were n e x t ,  
in importance. ISPRA s c i e n t i s t s ,  s ince  they were engaged in career 
pos i t ions  a t  EURATOM, tended to have t h e  fewest professional t i e s  a t  
home. 
and 53% a t  ESTEC.) As the  engineering profession i n  Br i t a in  is  s t ruc -  
tu red  around its professional soc ie t i e s ,  and as the B r i t i s h  contingent 
i n  the sample a l s o  included a high percentage of persons on leave from 
government labs,  t h i s  group had the  l a rges t  proportion of respondents 
with domestic professional contacts.  As one might expect, such t i e s  
tended t o  decrease with time spent abroad. 
mentioned having contact with professional groups i n  t h e i r  own countries,  
but f e l t  they were regarded by these groups as foreign colleagues working 
i n  the  same f i e l d  of research! 
Personal con- 
(Only 44% maintained such t i e s  a t  ISPRA, compared t o  57% a t  CERN, 
A few respondents, i n  f a c t ,  
3. Living Preferences 
Those severa l  respondents who f e l t  t h a t  they were viewed as foreign- 
ers i n  t h e i r  own countries d id  not express a p a r t i c u l a r  des i r e  t o  r e t u r n  
home. 
t h e i r  current contracts expired or at some unspecified time i n  the fu tu re .  
A good many others,  however, f u l l y  intended t o  do s o  e i t h e r  when 
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Y 
t o  work i n  i f  they 
indicated t h a t  they 
"research," o r  t h a t  they would be very happy remaining where they w& 
or  t h a t  they would 
dual merits.13 
preferences. 
The remaining 74% indicated t h a t  they d id  have d e f i n i t e  
Among those who indicated a choice of country, 55% ranked t h e i r  own 
country as f i r s t  choice, while 45% preferred a d i f f e ren t  one. 
respondents had the  highest  percentage not ind ica t ing  a preferred 
The CERN 
country, bu t  a t  the  same time, those CERN s c i e n t i s t s  who d id  choose a 
country were most l i k e l y  t o  pick t h e i r  own. 
and German respondents chose t h e i r  country, while more of the  I talians 
Overall, fewer of the  Dutch 
did so.  
foreign country seemed t o  be most strongly r e l a t e d  t o  one's previous 
foreign experience. 
Rather than na t iona l i t y  o r  laboratory,  however, choosing a 
Among those respondents with the highest  index of 
i n t e rna t iona l  exposure (groups 1 and 2) 55% indicated a foreign country 
as t h e i r  f i rs t  choice, while among the  remainder of the  sample, only 39% 
d id  so. 
The United S ta t e s ,  not unexpectedly, arose most frequently as a 
s on t h i s  item 
ce" on the  i n t e r -  
i ng  preferences-- 
regard t o  
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desired place t o  work. I t  was mentioned (counting both f i rs t  and second 
choices) a t o t a l  of 57 times--far more than any other foreign (European 
or non-European)-country. Among the  first choices alone, it accounted 
for more than a t h i r d  of those who chose a country o ther  than t h e i r  own. 
Germans, pa r t i cu la r ly ,  indicated a des i re  t o  go t o  America. Few respon- 
dents from the  la rge  European powers wanted t o  go t o  any other large 
European power. 
most of the responses, while not a s ing le  non-British chose Br i ta in  and 
Among those few who did, France and I t a l y  accounted f o r  
only one non-German chose Germany. 
4 .  Commitment Index 
The various ind ica tors  discussed i n  t h i s  sec t ion  a r e  a l l  measures of 
a l a t e n t  dimension we have ca l l ed  ttcommitmentrt t o  one's om country. We 
may combine them t o  form an index of t h i s  dimension i n  a manner similar 
t o  that used i n  the  index of in te rna t iona l  exposure. (See Table 5.7,  
next page.) 
In order t o  understand the  impact of t he  prime var iab les  on t h i s  
index of commitment, it is  necessary t o  divide the  sample by a l l  t h ree  
(laboratory, na t iona l i t y ,  and sen io r i ty )  simultaneously and compare the  
d i s t r ibu t ions  of commitment scores within each c e l l .  The numbers be- 
come qu i t e  small i n  t h i s  process, but our conclusions a re  reinforced by 
impressions from the  interviews. 
dents who have spent t he  longest periods of time i n  t he  in te rna t iona l  
environments of xhe labora tor ies  a re  the l e a s t  committed t o  t h e i r  own 
countries.  Although the re  are many var ia t ions ,  no regular  pa t te rns  can 
be found i n  comparing t h e  commitment scores of respondents broken down by 
The main conclusion i s  t h a t  those respon- 
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I 
Keep up 
own Yes 
own no Yes 2 32 36 
own no no 3 1 
nons Yes Yes 3 44 
none Yes no 3 2 47 
none no 
none no 
d i  E f e ren t  yes 
d i f f e r e n t  yes 
d i f f e r e n t  no 
d i f f e r e n t  no 
4 51 
4 4 
4 36 
4 1 92 
Yes 5 51 
no 5 6 57 
na t iona l i t y  and laboratory, even when s e n i o r i t y  is held constant. Within 
v i r t u a l l y  all.’ laboratory-nationali ty groups, however, those respondents 
with higher s e n i o r i t y  show lower commitment scores.  The e f f e c t  was most 
c lear -cu t  a t  CERN where the d 
uniform, but it could a l s o  be seen a t  ISPRA and ESTEC where the  samples 
were weighted with high s e n i o r i t y  and low s e n i o r i t y  respondents, respec- 
ribution by s e n i o r i t y  was r e l a t i v e l y  
not be p a r t i c u l a r l y  surpr i sed  a t  t h i s  r e s u l t - - i t  
s t h a t  a set 
ve high senior- 
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of decreased commitment with time, and (2) t h a t  it is not a highly pro- 
nounced one. 
-
Among the many var ia t ions  tha t  were found across nat ional i ty-  
laboratory groups, one of the most surpr i s ing  was t h a t  low senior i ty  
Br i t i sh  a t  ESTEC displayed a lower commitment than any other  low sen io r i ty  
group. (Commitment was equally low among high senkority Br i t i sh  a t  
ESTEC.) 
experience, i t  might be expected tha t  these pa r t i cu la r  Br i t i sh  comprised 
the minority o f  t h e i r  group with high foreign experience. 
s i t ua t ion  is  qui te  the opposite. 
of p r i o r  foreign experience. One is led t o  the conclusion t h a t  desp i te  
the f a c t  t h a t  a number of these men a r e  on secondment from career posi- 
t i ons ,  t h i s  group might represent something of an inc ip ien t  "brain drain" 
f o r  Bri ta in .  Rather than going t o  America o r  a Commonwealth country, 
however, they have chosen t o  "immigrate" t o  an in te rna t iona l  organization. 
Since commitment was lower among those w i t h  high p r io r  foreign 
In f a c t ,  the  
Most of these men show very low levels  
* * *  
Overall, the personal experience a sc5ent i s t  gains i n  going t o  work 
at  a large in te rna t iona l  laboratory appears t o  d i f f e r  substantial1y:'from 
the experience which he might reasonably expect t o  f ind  i n  a non- 
in te rna t iona l  establishment abroad. 
appear prepared (one might even say predisposed) f o r  the  experience i n  
l i g h t  of t h e i r  previous foreign exposure and language a b i l i t i e s ,  there  
a re  a number of s ign i f icant  areas i n  which the individuals drawn t o  the 
three major centers  from the  four  main na t iona l i t i e s  seem t o  diverge. 
Although i n  general the s c i e n t i s t s  
The fact t h a t  CERN personnel report  t h a t  they had had the  least foreign 
txposure-previous t o  coming t o  the lab appears t o  fit  with the high degree 
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of professionalism expressed i n  t h e i r  motivations f o r  coming: 
coming for the  s c i e n t i f i c  experience, i n t e rna t iona l  influences i n  one's 
background should not be e spec ia l ly  re levant .  Furthermore, desp i te  the  
fact t h a t  low foreign exposure otherwise presaged lower s a t i s f a c t i o n  with 
l i fe  i n  t h e  host country, CERN respondents c l e a r l y  showed the  highest  
l eve l  of s a t i s f a c t i o n  with t h e i r  ex t ra=curr icu lar  l ives.  
If one is  
Variations i n  t h e  dimension which was l abe l l ed  here "commitmenttt 
(measuring the  s t r eng th  of t ies  with one's own country) suggested t h a t  its 
major determinant was the  length of time respondents had worked i n  t he  
in t e rna t iona l  laboratory. (The chief exception t o  t h i s  was found among 
t h e  low s e n i o r i t y  Br i t i sh  a t  ESTEC--a group which gave indications of 
being p a r t  of t h e  famous "brain drain.") 
of these laboratories--which appears t o  requi re  maintaining re la t ionships  
between the in te rna t iona l  s c i e n t i s t s  and the  s c i e n t i f i c  communities of 
the  member count r ies - - th i s  f inding underlines the  wisdom of CERN's r e l a -  
t i v e l y  high rate of personnel turnover. 
In  viewing the  p o l i t i c a l  r o l e  
Chapters IV and V have drawn the out l ines  of personal s t y l e  and 
a t t i t u d e  within which the s c i e n t i s t s  operate i n  t h e i r  l abora tor ies .  
number of fea tures  which characterize t h e i r  backgrounds and t h e i r  ambi- 
t i ons  have been uncovered. 
xea l ly  d e a l t  with the  c e n t r a l  i s sue  i n  t h i s  i n t e rna t iona l  adventure--the 
process of doing research i n  the  multi-national environment. Chapter V I  
is devoted t o  the  many f ace t s  of t h i s  theme. 
A 
To t h i s  point,  however, t he  study has not 

CHAPTER V I  
SCIENCE NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL 
American s c i e n t i s t s  who have studied i n  any of t h i s  na t ion ' s  major 
un ive r s i t i e s  o r  worked i n  l a rge r  i n d u s t r i a l  o r  government labora tor ies  are 
qu i t e  accustomed t o  seeing s c i e n t i s t s  from diverse n a t i o n a l i t i e s  casually 
working together.  A team incorporating graduate students from, say, 
Japan, Belgium, Egypt, and Israel as w e l l  as a couple of Americans is 
ne i the r  an uncommon s i g h t  i n  the  engineering labs of M.I.T. nor one worthy 
of  p a r t i c u l a r  note i n  i t s  context.  The cur ren t  s i t u a t i o n  i n  most Euro- 
pean science centers,  however, does not present i tself  i n  qu i t e  the same 
l i g h t .  In Chapter I V  w e  took note of t he  weakness of educational exchange 
among European un ive r s i t i e s  and some of  t h e  reasons f o r  it.' Further, 
while it was found t h a t  a la rge  proportion of t h e  respondents had had 
experience l i v i n g  and working abroad, it might have been added t h a t  those 
who worked i n  un ive r s i t i e s ,  government, or i n d u s t r i a l  cen ters  i n  European 
nations o ther  than t h e i r  own often found themselves e i t h e r  alone o r  p a r t  of 
a very small minority of foreigners.  
As s c i e n t i f i c  working environments, the  in t e rna t iona l  laboratories are 
i n  t h i s  regard unique i n  Europe. They are f u r t h e r  d i f f e ren t i a t ed  from 
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other  research centers  because of t h e i r  administrations,  These bodies, 
although f r e e  from the l imitat ions of nat ional  administrative prac t ice ,  
are of ten subject  t o  the p o l i t i c a l  whims and cross-pressures of a multi- 
p l i c i t y  of  member s t a t e s .  This chapter examines several  charac te r i s t ics  
of  the in te rna t iona l  environment: how it d i f f e r s  from other  research 
environments, the implications of these differences f o r  t he  performance 
of s c i e n t i f i c  work, and how our respondents reac t  t o  the environment i n  
a personal sense. 
we are  not dealing w i t h  an in te rna t iona l  environment per se ,  but with 
several  d i f f e ren t  laborator ies  each displaying a host of unique charac- 
t e r i s t i c s  and sharing only the aspect of being in te rna t iona l  i n  sponsor- 
ship.  
cha rac t e r i s t i c s  of the environment which do appear t o  be shared by the 
several  centers can be a t t r i bu ted  with greater  confidence t o  the in t e r -  
nationalism o f  the centers.  
Our t a s k  i s  i n  one sense complicated by the f a c t  t h a t  
- - 
I t  i s  i n  another sense f a c i l i t a t e d  by t h i s  same fac tor ,  s ince those 
A. National Style  and Internat ional  Science 
Foreign s c i e n t i s t s  coming t o  work o r  study i n  the United S ta tes  gen- 
e r a l l y  tend t o  adapt themselves t o  a vague s e t  of operational habi t s ,  
customs, and values which cons t i t u t e  the American s t y l e  of l i f e .  They 
speak continually i n  English, they eat sandwiches f o r  lunch, they deal 
informally with t h e i r  superiors ,  and so fo r th .  While some a l t e r a t ions  
i n  the behavior pa t te rns  of the res ident  Americans might be expected 
(e.g., speaking more slowly and d i s t i n c t l y  i n  order t o  be understood) it 
is the  foreigners who do most of the adapting. In ISPRA, CERN, and 
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ESTEC as well as the  smaller centers ,  t h  
behavior represents  t h e  norm and a c t s  as a 
need f o r  adaptation i s  co t o  a l l ,  and a cent 
be found which, while drawing on t h e  charac te r i s  
various components, is d i s t i n c t  from them a l l .  
Finding t h i s  cen t r a l  meeting ground is of co 
by the subjec t  matter of science. 
common methods of work are the  forces which tend t o  place the  act ivi t ies  
Common problems on which t o  work and 
of s c i e n t i s t s  i n  a context perceived as la rge ly  independent of c u l t u r a l  
and s o c i e t a l  differences.  I t  i s  naive t o  th ink ,  though, t h a t  na t iona l i t y  
plays no r o l e  i n  t h e  research process o r  t h a t  it can be ignored as a 
f a c t o r  i n  operation of these  labora tor ies .  
respondents, 
To quote one of our - 
The research, t he  methods of research are qu i t e  t he  same. There 
is no national physics; the  physics I s tud ied  i n  Germany, I 
continued t o  study i n  the U.S.A., and I p rac t i ce  here [ i n  ISPRAI 
a r e  a l l  qu i t e  the same. The thing t h a t  i s  d i f f e r e n t  is the  way 
d i f f e r e n t  people a t tack  a problem . , . I mean a so lu t ion  is  a 
solution--but how you get t o  the so lu t ion ,  t h i s  depends on your 
background, your cu l tu ra l  and national background. 
1. Language 
The perception of differences between colleagues and t h e  process of 
adaptation begins with language. We described e a r l i e r  t he  remarkable 
l i n g u i s t i c  a b i l i t i e s  of t he  respondents, noting t h a t  they spoke, on the  
average, more than th ree  languages. i t e  t h i s  leve l  of fluency, though, 
very few were genuinely b i -  or t r i - l i n g u a l ,  and the  need t o  communicate 
constantly i n  one or severa l  foreign tongues was the  most obvious and 
important d i f fe rence  between working i n  an in t e rna t iona l  establishment 
218 
Some comparison 
laboratory is of co 
estimate t h e  di 
environments; the  
e na t ive  tongues t o  a large majority of t he  staff. The in t e r -  
national centers a r e  de jure and de f ac to  polylingual communities; t h e i r  
o f f i c i a l  languages are determined by treaty--each organization having a t  
l e a s t  two and as many as four considered "official"--while the unoff ic id l  
- -- 
use of a language i s  generally a product of mutual convenience. 
of the staffs--not a minority as i n  other labs--do a major pa r t  of t h e i r  
communicating i n  a language which is not native t o  them. 
many technical terms are the same or nearly so i n  most European languages 
i s  a s ign i f i can t  asset.' On the  other hand, language use pa t te rns  (as 
observed i n  Chapter 111) tend t o  vary throughout d i f f e ren t  pa r t s  of t h e  
organizations and seem sometimes t o  ac t  as communications b a r r i e r s .  
A majority 
The fact t h a t  
2 
3 Most of t he  s c i e n t i s t s  did not consider language t o  be a problem i n  da i ly  
Non-technical words a l s o  a re  adapted from one language i n t o  another, 
sometimes r e su l t i ng  %n jargon hardly i n t e l l i g i b l e  t o  an outsider.  
Our instrument and our sampaing 
prec ise  data gathering on t h i s  subjec t ,  
e pa t te rns  i n  in te rna t iona l  or 
r o j e c t  i n  i tself .  
nique were not su i t ab le  for 
a sociometric study of lan- 
a t ions  would be a most i n t e r -  
uding, surpr i s ing ly ,  those whose language a b i l i t i e s  were most 
2 19 
work. 
responded negatively. Among the  laborator ies ,  the  percentage who d id  
encounter a language problem was highest a t  ESTEC (26%) and lowest a t  
In  answer t o  a question on t h i s  matter, four - f i f ths  of the sample 
ISPRA (11%). Within each laboratory , the  d i f f e ren t  na t iona l i t y  groups 
did not vary great ly ,  leading one t o  the in t e re s t ing  conclusion t h a t  
t he  s c i e n t i s t s '  language d i f f i c u l t i e s  were determined more by the lab- 
oratory i n  which they worked than t h e i r  na t iona l i t y .  
are thought t o  account f o r  the  r e l a t ive ly  l a rge r  d i f f i c u l t y  reported a t  
Three bas ic  reasons 
ESTEC. 
non-scient i f ic  persons ( in  contract  administration) and language prob- 
lems a re  l i ke ly  t o  a r i s e  here more of ten than i n  intra- laboratory com- 
munication, Second, although the Br i t i sh ,  many of whom were monolingual, 
F i r s t ,  there  is a grea te r  need a t  ESTEC t o  dea l  with outside,  
d id  not report  more language problems than the other  na t iona l i t i e s  a t  
ESTEC, t h e i r  presence i n  large numbers may well have caused language 
problems for the  others .  
recent ly-arr ived personnel, who, as explained below, might be expected t o  
report  more language problems. 
Final ly ,  ESTEC had a large contingent of 
Viewing the marginal for t h i s  question i n  l i g h t  of the open-ended 
responses of the interviews suggests t h a t  the numbers understate  the 
range of fhe  problem while probably overstat ing i ts  gravi ty .  On the 
interviews, very few respondents s t a t e d  t h a t  l i n g u i s t i c  d i f f i c u l t i e s  
subs t an t i a l ly  a f fec ted  t h e i r  work or t h a t  of t he  laboraotry.  Except f o r  
these sca t te red  few, the  language b a r r i e r  was more a minor annoyance than 
anything else. On the other hand, few of those who asser ted  t h a t  lan- 
guage was not a problem did so i n  an unqualified fashion--suggesting t h a t  
a small degree of in te r fe rence  was almost universal. Such interference,  
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many respondents pointed out,  decreased with time. The first few months, 
were the most d i f f i c u l t ,  but beyond t h a t ,  most of the respondents claimed 
t h a t  they had adapted qu i t e  rapidly t o  the  multi l ingual environment. 
The quant i ta t ive  data,  showing a decreasing frequency of language prob- 
lems with increasing sen ior i ty ,  tends t o  support t h i s  f inding. 
4 
2 .  National Character is t ics  
Beyond language, a more complex f ac to r  which might po ten t ia l ly  in t e r -  
f e r e  with the  communication process i n  an in te rna t iona l  laboratory i s  the  
var ia t ion  of national s t y l e s  of l i f e .  The f a c t  of being born and ra i sed  
a "Briton" r a the r  than a "German" implies a whole s e t  of cu l tu ra l  and 
h i s t o r i c a l  assumptions which a re  constantly manifest i n  behavim pa t te rns .  
The operation of an in te rna t iona l  laboratory requires  the continuous 
juxtaposi t ion of these  patterns. 
A fundamental lack of prejudice i s  e s sen t i a l  t o  t he  s c i e n t i f i c  
ethos,  The be l i e f  t h a t  na t iona l i ty ,  race,  and r e l ig ion  a re  i r re levant  
and the qua l i ty  of h i s  work is  the only basis  on which t o  judge a fellow 
s c i e n t i s t  pervades and helps t o  maintain the in te rna t iona l  s c i e n t i f i c  
community. The func t iona l i ty  of t h i s  be l i e f  has been demonstrated by 
the  experiences of science i n  those soc ie t i e s ,  such as Nazi Germany, 
In most cases, adaptation implied a psychological adjustment and/or 
re fami l ia r iza t ion  with previously learned languages rather than learning 
an en t i r e ly  new tongue. 
s c i e n t i s t s  arr ived with a knowledge of I t a l i a n ,  but most acquired i t .  
The only exception was a t  ISPRA, where few 
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. Sometames, 
t o  t h i s  unbiased outlook lea 
na t iona l i ty  does not a f f e c t  
to ry  provides an environment where such an i l l u s i o n  may not long survive. 
Our object We do not aim here t o  do a study of nat ional  charactere6 
is only t o  describe i n  approximate terms how our respondents view t h e i r  
colleagues of o the r -na t iona l i t i e s .  
part of the in te rna t iona l  laboratory experience and, as w i l l  be seen 
This mutual perception is an important 
l a t e r  i n  t h i s  chapter,  is responsible f o r  a major p a r t  of i t s  reward. 
The questionnaire asked whether the respondents had "found any d i f -  
ferences i n  t ra in ing  among s c i e n t i s t s  and engineers from d i f f e ren t  coun- 
t r i e s  which a f f ec t  the way they approach problems." While a bare majority 
of the  respondents (52%) rep l ied  t h a t  they had found such differences,  
the nature of the interview responses indicates  t h a t  the wording and 
closed-ended nature of  thas  self-administered question rendered i t  
incapable of e l i c i t i n g  the most important da ta .  
interviews tha t  v i r t u a l l y  everyone observed nat ional  differences i n  the 
I t  was found from the 
s t y l e s  of  work o f  h i s  coldeagues, but most a t t r i bu ted  t h e i r  roots t o  
rovers ia l  area 
(Reading, Mass.: 
20. This a r t i c l e , -  
e new Handbook, 
also provides a subs tan t ia l  bibliography. 
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en, especial ly  
l i e  i n  cu l tu ra l  and h i s t o r  
a l t e r ed  our interview 
ences i n  "tra 
s ta ted ,  i n  what seems t o  be almost an ideologically motivated response, 
t ha t  no national differences exis ted,  t ha t  s c i e n t i s t s  d i f fe red  only as 
individuals,  we found i n  many cases descriptions of nat ional  differences 
emerged i n  response t o  other  questions. 
Most of ten the s c i e n t i s t s  reported t h a t  the widely recognized 
nat ional  stereotypes,  although rather too general, had some v a l i d i t y  
a f t e r  all: For example, t o  quote one CERN Frenchman, 
I mean you might sometimes f ind  a well organized I t a l i a n  and 
a very f a s t  Dutchman, but the reciprocal  is  more of ten  t rue .  
, li I mean a l l  these categories a r e  a l i t t l e  absurd, there  
might be exceptions, but these so-called national characters 
ex is t .  
A s  d id  t h i s  respondent, most of the subjects  c i t e d  the contrast between 
the Latin and Anglo-Saxon/Germanic temperaments. 
informative and sometimes amusing, and it i s  worth c i t i n g  a number of them 
Their descr ipt ions were 
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boards and when we go from one person t o  the  next,  it r e a l l y  
takes an e f f o r t  t o  realize we a r e  t a lk ing  t o  a t o t a l l y  d i f f e r -  
ent person . . ., and t r y  t o  assess both people cor rec t ly ,  
A Br i t i sh  phys ic i s t  saw comparable differences from a more operational 
po in t  of view: 
You f ind  the English s t i l l  want t o  do everything on war surplus 
mater ia l  and they approach everything i n  a small-minded way. 
The French, on the  other  hand, refuse t o  do anything unless they 
have the  best  qua l i t y  apparatus, the bes t  qua l i t y  material and 
enough of i t  . . . The Germans are  typ ica l ly  very thorough, 
serious-minded-about it and s tar t  i n  a very methodkcal 
fashion. . . . You f i n d  j u s t  the  nat ional  temperaments; the  
Latin countr ies  tend t o  be suddenly en thus ias t ic  and then fade 
of f  and come again. 
But I think t h i s  is jus t  a nat ional  cha rac t e r i s t i c  more than 
anything. 
The Northerners tend t o  be more dour. 
Generally, the t ra i ts  associated with d i f f e r e n t  na t iona l i t i e s  were 
viewed pos i t ive ly  and without overt evaluation. They were seen as 
becoming p a r t  of the  nat ional  s c i e n t i f i c  t r ad i t i ons .  Latins were cred i ted  
w i t h  being more theo re t i ca l ly  or iented,  abs t r ac t ,  mathematical, and 
imaginative. Northerners, on the other  hand, were considered more 
p rac t i ca l ,  persevering, physically or iented,  and thorough. A high- 
ranking German phys ic i s t  from EURATOM gave a graphic descr ipt ion 
contrast ing h i s  own countrymen with the French: 
There is a conf l i c t  pa r t i cu la r ly  between the Germans and the 
French. The Germans a re  t ra ined  t o  take a very experimental 
approach, a physical approach t o  physics, while the French 
always look a t  things mathematically. Do you understand me? 
The Germans make physics from a model. 
example, of an electron, of a p a r t i c l e ,  is seen as spinning. 
[Respondent made hand motions t o  demonstrate.] 
a mathematical symbol o r  an equation. 
Angular momentum, f o r  
I t ’ s  not  j u s t  
These traits seem t o  be d i s t i l l e d  from the  more common general 
s tereotypes,  such as those of Frenchmen and Germans systematized by 
Erich Reigrotski and Nels Anderson, “National Stereotypes and Foreign 
Contacts,” Public Opinion Quarterly, XXIII (Winter 1959-60), pp. 515-528. 
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A Belgian engineer was s l i g h t l y  more guarded: 
I wouldn't exaggerate the importance [of these differences]  
but t o  take an example, German people tend t o  go i n t o  every 
d e t a i l  and on the  other hand, French or  Latin people tend 
t o  be more quick and sometimes super f ic ia l .  But these of 
course a re  very general considerations, they might not be 
t rue  f o r  individual cases. 
F ina l ly ,  a French mathematician provided perhaps the  Simplest way of 
dist inguishing between European mental i t ies  : 
Of course, the differences i n  mentality e x i s t  . . . For 
example, you can r e a l l y  draw a l i ne  cu t t ing  Europe i n  two 
par t s :  the p a r t  where the shops a re  closed a f t e r  s i x ,  and 
the p a r t  where the  shops s tay open a f t e r  s ix .  
one you have Great Bri ta in ,  Holland, Germany, Switzerland, 
and a l l  the Northern countries.  
Belgium, France, I t a ly ,  Spain, and so  on. 
In the  f irst  
In the  other p a r t  you have 
Although the  quant i ta t ive  data is not s t rong enough t o  support them, 
on the  basis of the  interviews we may propose two ra the r  general asser- 
t ions  with regard t o  these  stereotypes.  F i r s t ,  while it seems tha t  the 
images of other na t iona l i t i e s  a re  nearly always given with pos i t ive  o r  
neut ra l  a f f e c t ,  there  is  l i t t l e  tendency f o r  them t o  disappear with 
increasing experience a t  the centers.  In other words, the stereotypes do 
not seem t o  be false images based on a lack of knowledge, but,  as has 
been proposed by others ,  functional aspects of human perception. In 
fact, there  is some evidence t o  suggest t ha t  those individuals with l i t t l e  
p r i o r  foreign contact who re jec ted  stereotypes as "ant i -scient i f ic"  seemed 
t o  discover, with experience, t ha t  they r e a l l y  do e x i s t .  A young Briton 
a r t i cu la t ed  t h i s  process from h i s  own experience: 
A t  t he  time I came here I had no nat ional  bias whatsoever i n  
the sense t h a t  I regarded a l l  people as  being equal i r respec t ive  
of t h e i r  na t iona l i ty ,  language, r e l ig ion  or  anything. . . . 
Ibid. ,  p. - 518. 
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Since being here f o r  about 18 months, 
and I think now t h a t  whi l s t  peo 
with, the na t iona l  joke l eve l ,  
But I think t h e r e ' s  su rp r i s ing  t r u t h  i n  them--something I 
d idn ' t  believe before I'came here. Now I tend t o  be l ieve  t h a t  
t he re ' s  a l o t  of t r u t h  i n  it. 
The second general a s se r t ion  is t h a t  t he  sa l iency  of na t iona l i t y ,  
and hence of these images,tends t o  decrease with the  professionalism of 
t h e  scientist. ' 
did not maintain na t iona l  images; sume of t he  most a r t i c u l a t e  descrip- 
This i s  not t o  say t h a t  highly professional individuals 
tions--including severa l  c i t e d  above--came from the mouths of eminent 
s c i e n t i f i c  pe r sona l i t i e s .  lo Rather, with increasing professionalism, 
the  respondents tended t o  perceive the  spec ia l  f i e l d ,  school, o r  place 
of previous work as stereotyping features of equal or grea te r  importance 
than na t iona l i t y .  For example, a p a r t i c u l a r  s c i e n t i s t  might be viewed 
as a former co-worker of Professor Amaldi a t  F rasca t i  (which implies a 
set of spec ia l  professional a t t r i b u t e s )  rather than as a demonstrative 
o r  emotional I t a l i a n .  
By professionalism w e  a r e  r e fe r r ing  t o  a q u a l i t a t i v e  judgement of 
the  ind iv idua l ' s  commitment t o  h i s  subjec t ,  something discussed e a r l i e r  
i n  regard t o  reasons f o r  coming t o  the  laboratory. 
i s i n g  theo re t i ca l  physi- 
t he  ed i to r s  of Inter-  
mon and Schuster, 1966), p. 
tongue-in-cheek, on whether, through t h e i r  
Negro phys ic i s t s  w i l l  "introduce the  
concept of ?rhythm' and 'harmony' , i n  elementary pa r t i c l e s . "  
226 
sic areas of pote 
and national styles present--one may procee 
internationalism actually had at the oper 
tions, apart from creating the political and administrative messes which 
were discussed in Chapter 111. 
effects of having so many countries at the top, but more in the effects 
One is interested here partly in the 
of having people of many nationalities at the bottom. Concern focuses 
on two areas which arose frequently in formal and informal discussions 
with scientists and administrators in the labs. On one side there is the 
question of the effect of nationality on recruitment and formation of 
technical departments and teams. On the other there are the matters of 
actual operation, scientific productivity, and conflict management in a 
multi-national situation. 
1, Aspects of Recruitment 
The main advantage of working in an international laboratory 
is certainly the choice, the wider choice of staff. So you 
at least, to try to pic 
not just the best in y 
highly developed--countries. 
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one of t h e  m i n t e rna t iona l  S 
t o  f i l l  a staff p o s i t i  
papers, professional and t rade  i n  
government labs) i n  a l l  of i ts  member 
with regard t o  higher level pos i t ions ,  
Councils nominate p a r t i c u l a r  individuals from t h e i r  own co 
s iona l ly ,  h i r i n g  of these  types i s  s a i d  t o  be ca r r i ed  out through p o l i t i -  
c a l  "horse-trading" between dele'gations and the  detrimental e f f e c t s  on the  
organization's morale and l eve l  of staff competence are evident.  CERN 
appears t o  have been qu i t e  f r e e  from t h i s  problem, while ESRO appears t o  
have suffered from it i n  i t s  ea r ly  stages.  
Normally, when r ec ru i t i ng  is done on the  bas i s  of open advertise- 
ments or unso l i c i t ed  applications,  considerations of na t iona l i t y  do not 
play a major r o l e .  
a ted  by o the r  f ac to r s  as i n  any o ther  s c i e n t i f i c  organization. 
Technical qua l i f i ca t ion  is the  cen t r a l  matter, moder- 
As a 
ru l e ,  however, the  organizations t r y  t o  maintain the  levels of s t a f f  from 
d i f f e ren t  countries i n  rough proportion t o  t h e i r  f i nanc ia l  shares i n  the  
body, whether or not t h i s  is  s t a t e d  as o f f i c i a l  policy.  l1 
limit the a b i l i t y  of t he  organizations t o  do t h i s  a t  a l l  l eve ls :  
f a c t  t h a t  location and climate of a place tend.. t o  at tract  c e r t a i n  
Several f ac to r s  
(1) the  
n a t i o n a l i t i e s  and repe l  others (as p out e a r l i e r  with respect t o  
; {Z) pro jec t  d department h en na t iona l i t y ,  although 
l i e s  only t o  professional semi-professional 
r e c r u i t .  j a n i t o r s  from iioll 
surplus of French computer operators i n  one d iv is ion  it was decided t o  
r e c r u i t  a number of operators from non-Latin countries.  "So," i n  the 
words of  our informant, "we advertised i n  these Northern climes and we 
got 175 applicants from England, 8 from Germany, and about 3 from 
Scandinavia and Holland." 
industry combined with Britain 's  lower s a l a r y  leve l  made balanced r ec ru i t -  
The more advanced s t a t e  of Br i t a in ' s  computer 
13 ment impossible. 
l2 In the words of 
I t a l i a n .  So 90% of the  
an Italian group leader from ISPRA: "1 am 
I t a l i a n s  I chose, I may say, are very good 
people, because I was able  t o  evaluate them before I took them i n t o  my 
d iv is ion .  
deeply." 
People of other countries,  I wasn't able t o  judge them so 
l3 Comparative da ta  on average s c i e n t i f i c  and engineering salaries 
i n  t he  various s is very scarce.  In G r  
Committee on M s f o r  Science and Techno 
2 29 
often as team w 
duals mentioned e attempts t o  balance 
colleagues so le ly  on t he  bas i s  of  h i s  na t iona l i ty .  
operate i n  reasonable 'fashion, v i r t u a l l y  a l l  o f  t he  organizations allow 
team t o  recruit and select members without introducing na t iona l i ty  
questions. 
So i n  order t o  
The matter of na t iona l i ty  in  s t a f f ing  is a more important issue a t  
aggregate leveis  of the organization than a t  the individual o r  team 
levels .  In  other  words, na t iona l i ty  need not be overt ly  considered 
[although as we have said it has def in i t e  effects) a t  the lower levels, 
as long as no s igni f icant  displacements occur overal l .  Only when indi- 
vidual matters threaten t o  upset a cer ta in  unspoken balance aver the 
whole organization might there be an interact ion.  
of the organizations the promotion of a German scier?t is t  t o  divis ion 
leader might be delayed or foreclosed even though he merits the posit ion 
on professional grounds, if there  are already, say,  three other  German 
divis ion leaders i n  the laboratory. 
For example, i n  most 
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leaders might be no more rapid at CERM, simply because the  iarportance of 
being a division leader (s ta tus)  is much greater  i n  a career-oriented 
body. Achievement i s  measured on technical productivity i n  the doninant 
par t s  of CERN, whereas t h i s  is t rue  of only i so la ted  parts.of ISPRA. 
(The pattern had ye t  t o  be determined i n  ESTEC a t  the  time of our v i s i t ,  
although there  were many complaints about the  grading and promation 
system. ) 
2. Aspects of Operation 
In  actual  operation the charac te r i s t ics  inherent i n  the international-  
ism of a laboratory are  not strongly evident. 
tures  common t o  a l l  of the laboratories included-in t h i s  study was the 
v i r tua l ly  t o t a l  absence of any conf l ic t s  among the  staffs drawn on 
One of  the s t r ik ing  fea- 
f 
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ne national 
group against  moth  i n  l i g h t  
of the fact t h a t  i n t e re s t s  i n  such disputes were l ike ly  
according t o  posi t ion and not nat ional i ty .  
t r ibu ted  
Further, simply because fric- 
t i on  between national groups was an 
inflammable--problem area, people t o  
becone involved where it poten t ia l1  
between the  pol ic ies  of member governments toward the orgahization have 
been prac t ica l ly  continuous-often finding France opposed t o  the other 
f ive  members--the personnel, whose own se l f - in te res t  regularly differs 
from t h e i r  governments’ po l ic ies ,  have not ref lected these disputes.  
Beyond the  question of Rational conf l ic t s ,  one might expect the 
laboratories t o  show some ef fec ts  of t h e i r  internationalism i n  other 
aspects of  operation such as technical productivity.  
spec i f ica l ly  concerned with t h i s  problem it would cer ta in ly  be worthwhile 
t o  generate objective measures of cer ta in  operational and productivity 
In a study more 
variables as well as t o  attempt the exercisz of controls on t h e  measure- 
ments. Here we report  somewhat subjectively,  basing our conclusions on 
personal observations combined with the responses of the interviewees 
(using them as informants instead of respondents here). 
Several aspects are  worth noting: In the  f i r s t  place, the  broad 
range of nat ional  s ty l e s  provides st imulation from divers i ty  i n  problem 
solving. 
res e 
fe ren t  ta len ts  t o  each mentality:. 
A divis ion leader a t  GERN des bed the  experience of doing 
i n  mixed na t iona l i ty  teams i n  humorow terms, a t t r i bu t ing  d i f -  
t l e  l i k e  the famous joke.  the man who sa id  t h a t  
American orchestras were the best  i n  the  world, because the 
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t he  woodwinds w e  . Provided you h 
of the organizations are important i n  obtaining d ivers i ty .  
of the  European countries have only a very limited number of "schoolsir 
(establishments as well as schools of thought) i n  a pa r t i cu la r  segment 
of a f i e l d  such as nuclear o r  space research; t he  smaller nations may 
have no more than one. 
as only the in te rna t iona l  labs have done, can benefit  from the cross- 
The la rges t  
A large establishment drawing on various nations, 
f e r t i l i z a t i o n  of d i f fe ren t  schools. 
On the  other hand, there is no question but t ha t  t h i s  same diver- 
s i t y  of national s t y l e s  combined with the range of languages spoken 
does reduce the efficiency of communication i n  the  in te rna t iona l  labora- 
tory. 
creates d i f f i c u l t i e s ,  whiQe noting tha t  respondents f e l t  it was not a 
major problem. We s h a l l  deal l a t e r  i n  t h i s  chapter wi th  individual 
response t o  the national s t y l e  differences. 
t ha t  po ten t ia l  areas of f r i c t i o n  do e x i s t  because of language and s t y l e  
d ivers i ty ,  and although i n  the long run the  amount of information l o s t  
because of communication inefficiency may not be s ign i f icant ,  there is 
cer ta in ly  a need f o r  greater e f f o r t  i n  communication than i n  a national 
We have already mentioned the circumstances under which language 
Let us simply note here 
% 
a e i r d  point, t he  r nternational laboratory from 
chy of any s ingle  nation permits a ce r t a in  l a t i t ude  
i n  administrative prac t ice  t h a t  would 
fr i t u t i  , if it were the  
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aUSpiCeS of a s ingle  nation would cer ta in ly ,  as a of our inter- 
viewees pointed out,  f a l l  within the purview of a long-established and 
probably qu i t e  r i g i d  government agency o r  ministry. 
its personnel regulations,  its budgetary practices,and so fo r th  would 
automatically be defined i n - t h i s  case. As an internat ional  laboratory, 
there i s  at least the opportunity t o  circumvent ?&is problem and develop 
procedures spec i f i ca l ly  suited to  the establishment. In t h i s  regard the 
Such matters as 
(often obstructive) influence of powerful individuals (hoe s c i e n t i f i c  
and administrative) who may have developed an "empire*1 with t i g h t  per- 
sonal control i n  a par t icu lar  s c i e n t i f i c  area i n  one nation can a l so  be 
circumvented. 
Finally, on t h e  opposite s ide  of t h i s  coin,  while reducing t h e  
r i g i d i t i e s  of national s t ruc ture ,  the internat ional  character of these 
centers necessar i ly  subjects  them t o  a wider scope of p o l i t i c a l  pres- 
sure. 
inevitably complicate a l l  a c t i v i t i e s  for which responsibi l i ty  is not 
designated to supranational l eve l s  of t h e  x g a n i - a t i o n .  Ir, cperation, 
one would expect pressures t o  be greater  i n  an organization i n  which 
results were more tangible and more d i r ec t ly  re la ted  t o  economic and 
secur i ty  considerations than i n  an organization more abs t rac t ly  oriented. 
As we have seen,. t h i s  has been the case. 
The mere fact t h a t  more than one country is involved must 
C. Individual Response 
1. Special Character is t ics  of Each Center 
Asked t o  discuss the outstanding features which d i f f e ren t i a t e  hi 
present environment from other  environments with which he is familiar, the 
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s c i e n t i s t  is first and €oremost conscious of many a t t r i b u t e s  which do not 
relate d i r e c t l y  t o  its internationalism. 
appear i n  comparing, by laboratory, the responses t o  questions such as: 
"Are there any charac te r i s t ics  of t h i s  laboratory which might make it 
Strong contrasts therefore 
eas ie r  t o  perform research or  other technical a c t i v i t i e s  than i n  a 
nat iona l  or university laboratory?." o r  the  follow-up ' I A r e  there any 
-
charac te r i s t ics  which might make it more d i f f i cu l t ? "  
It becomes clear t h a t  what is being measured is largely a function 
of the spec ia l  state of affairs within each center,  and r e f l e c t q i n  each 
case, much of  the atmosphere described i n  Chapter 111. Table 6 . 1  
presents the data  for the above two questions. 
Table 6.1 
Ease and Difficulty of Performing Research, by Laboratory 
ESTEC CERN ISPRA 
(107) -m -
Easier: 
Yes 
No 
DK 
More d i f f i c u l t :  
Yes 
No 
DK 
44% 73% 48% 
43 12 44 
13 15 8 
64% 37% 6.5% 
21 45 25 
15 18 10 
The contrast  between CERN on one s ide  and ISPRA and ESTEC on the  
other is  evident, 
questionnaires than any others. 
(an extremely high proportion f o r  a voluntary comment) c i t ed  %ore money" 
These two questions drew more write-in comments on the 
Nearly h a l f '  of a l l  the CERN respondents 
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or %better facilitiesgt by way of explaining whac mads things easier; 15% 
c i t ed  famore freedom.tf A t  ISPRA and ESTEC only about one-quarter of the  
respondents nade the first type of coment,  while a scat tered few made 
the second. In commenting on the added d i f f i c u l t y  of t h e i r  present 
organization, ESTEC and ISPRA respondents most frequently mentioned the 
problem of '*bureaucracy"--more than 25% doing so i n  each case, compared 
t o  7% at CERN.14 
unexpectedly, by 15% of the  ISPRA resiondents, while problems of "mixing 
nationality',' accounted f o r  a l i k e  proportion of comments a t  ESTEC. 
most frequent write-ins of  d i f f i c u l t y  a t  CERN were "language" and "mixing .  
'*Political problems at the top" were mentioned, not 
The 
nationa1ity; 'but each drew only 10% of t h e  t o t a l  number or' CERN respondents. 
There was some var ia t ion by nat ional i ty  within each laboratory, but 
t h i s  was minor compared t o  the  strengfh of trends between the laboratories.  
The interviewees a l so  expressed i n  words what the numbers above present. 
The answers t o  the "easier-more d i f f i cu l t "  questions a t  CERN were almost 
stereotyped: 
Well, CERN i s  unique for a s t a r t .  It's t h e  only piace i n  
Europe where you can do t h i s  h igh  energy physics work. 
--Brizish physicist  
First of a l l ,  CERN is a much bigger organization. I t  has 
got a budget of some 170 million Swiss Francs, while my 
i n s t i t u t e  i n  I t a l y  had perhaps half  a million. This is a 
h e l l  of  a difference! 
--Italian physicist  
The feeling-at least among the physicists--is  one of expansiveness, of  
freedom. 
on experiments and a lack of bureaucratic r e s t r i c t ions  were often mentioned. 
A greater  willingness of the administration t o  take "long-shots" 
. . .  
l4 This is a corn& gripe among scientists i n  government and industry. 
a1 o f  bureaucratic obstacles t o  innovation see Victor A. 
Thompson, 't5ursaucracy and Innovation,tf Administrative Science Quarterly,-  
X, 1 [June 19651, pp. 1-20. 
236 
Among t h e  CERN engineers, the fee l ing  is somewhat more restrained; the  
differences between CERN and the domestic establishmen 
have experience tend t o  be discussed more i n  terms of 
co l leg ia l  re la t ions ,  and communication problems are more often cited.  
i t h  which they 
Except i n  a few cases, however, they r e f l e c t  a t  least p a r t  of t h i s  same 
s p i r i t  . 
ISPRA presents a r a the r  d i f fe ren t  picture.  Bureaucratic restric- 
t ions and p o l i t i c a l  complications render the  performance of research o r  
other  s c i e n t i f i c  ac t iv i ty  a much more t ry ing  process than the respondents 
would like.'' Some interview excerpts will serve t o  develop the  ideas 
which emerged from the questionnaires: 
I think tha t  i f  one comes from a university i n s t i t u t e  the  
first thing t h a t  s t r i k e s  one i n  such an i n s t i t u t i o n  as 
EURATOM is a highly developed bureaucracy. 
cracy poses a certain handicap in the  work because one' 
wastes a l o t  of, time i n  writ ing p-rtlgress reports,  predic- 
t ions on the  wcrrk one i s  doing, monthly newsletters and,. 
similar things. This i s  the thing shich is evaluated by 
higher management here--but i t  i s  completely useless for 
onel5 work. 
This bureau- 
--German s c i e n t i s t  
We are  complaining here of the lack of management. 
i t ' s  t rue  probably because now the European Community has 
come t o  a d i f f i c u l t  point and there is no p o l i t i c a l  w i l l  
t o  continue, t o  ga deeper. This lack of p o l i t i c a l  strength 
at the top leve l  of the  Communities reflects down t o  t h i s  
lack of management. There is no well-defined purpose t o  go 
I think 
to.  . . You may be working with 
i n t e r e s t  but,  w e l l ,  you are not 
which i s  building up. 
some colleagues who share your 
fee l ing  as pa r t  of some project 
- - I ta l ian  phys ic i s t  
Even the Commission has taken of f ic ia l - - i f  belated- note of t h i s  
s i tua t ion ,  pointing out i n  its 1967 annual repor t  t h a t  p o l i t i c a l  problem 
have created an atmosphere i n  the  Joint Research Centers "which is unpro- 
pursu i t  of the  work and which must not be allowed t o  
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Basically [ISPRA] is motivated f o r  pol i t ical  reasons and 
so w e  sometimes have the feel ing tha t  the essent 
is that ISPRA is there--= a demonstration of so 
t ical  framework--and what we are actual ly  doing here is not 
i n t e re s t ing  f o r  anybody . , e We could as well be  making 
ice cream, but p o l i t i c a l l y  o f  course i t  m u s t  be sa id  tha t  
we a re  doing technical work. 
--Italian physicis t  
Perhaps the most s ign i f icant  pa r t  of the ISPRA s i tua t ion  is t h i s  
feeling, expressed well by the last of these respondents, tha t  what the 
scientists do does-not matter very m u c h ,  t h a t  s c i e n t i f i c  performance is 
not the r ea l  c r i t e r ion  by which they w i l l  be judged, What does matter, 
Community p o l i t i c s ,  is t o t a l l y  beyond t h e i r  control.  This feel ing goes 
through several  levels :  On :he i Z d i - < i h d  I s ;e l  a nilaber o f  Tersons 
pointed out that  Trcmotlons seemed r o  be granted 09 a random basis--a 
cer ta in  percentage of those with a given sen ior i ty  were selected €or pro- 
motion each year--rather than on the basis  of actual merit.I6 Similarly, 
research and development projects  were seen as more o r  l e s s  p o l i t i c a l  
footbal ls ,  t h e i r  fortunes subject t o  the whims of one o r  another member 
country rather  than being determlned by t h e i r  technological performance. 
Finally,  the f a t e  of the e n t i r e  organization (and of more immediate 
concern, the ISPRA Center) was f e l t  r,a hinge not on how well i t  worked 
sc i en t i f i ca l ly ,  but on the p o l i t i c a l  s i t ua t ion  or' the  Europe of the Six. 
Being on the one hand s c i e n t i s t s  committed t o  t h e i r  work, and on the 
other  hand "Europeans" (as w i l l  be seen l a t e r )  committed t o  European 
integrat ion,  they cannot avoid a sense of impotence, In the  revealing 
l6 We were not able t o  determine how true this al legat ion w a s ,  but 
the fact t h a t  the feel ing is extant is s igni f icant  i n  i tsel f .  
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words of one ISPRA Frenchman, 
This mazter of [EURATOM] p o l i t i c s  is not made at our 
leve l  a t  a l l .  In f a c t  it is made a t  such a level that 
nobody can do anything about, it. 
ESTEC, f i n a l l y ,  shows neither t he  expansiveness of CERN nor the 
- 
f rus t r a t ion  of ISPRA. 
nearly as serious as those at: ISPRA. 
The respondents here  see problem but they are not 
Mainly, they stem from organiza- 
t iona l  p o l i t i c s  : 
This is bn organization tha t  i n  principle is supposed t o  
return same.. o f  the money invested by the members i n  t h e  
form of contracts.  The e f fec ts  of t h i s ,  a t  l e a s t  f o r  the 
moment, are qui te  bad because it  makes, at high leve ls ,  
p o l i t i c a l  can f l i c t s  t h a t  are sometimes far from techno- 
logical and s c i e n t i f i c  i n t e r e s t s .  
--Spanish s c i e n t i s t  
Bureaucracy is a l so  a pa r t  of t he  ESTEC scene and the reaction t o  it is 
similar t o  t h a t  a t  EURATOM: 
[The main d i f f i cu l ty1  is ce r t a in ly  t h e  fantastic mess you 
have from the-administrative point of view. 
algebraic addition o f  a l l  the defects of national adminis- 
t r a t ions  and i t  is  r e a l l y  something t o  see. 
This is an 
--French s c i e n t i s t  
A t  ESTEC, t o  a larger extent than a t  CERN or ISPRA, respondents tended 
t o  describe the differences between t h e  experience of doing s c i e n t i f i c  
work (its pros and cons i n  an international environment) i n  terms of t h e i r  
own spec i f ic  job and immediate set of colleagues ra ther  than i n  terms of 
the organization as a whole. 
in te rpre ta t ion  of t h e  question r e l a t ed  t o  the less professionally- 
s c i e n t i f i c  character of the  ESTEC sample (and the ESTEX population, f o r  
I t  is suspected t h a t  t h i s  somewhat narrower 
t h a t  matter). Being more concerned. with immediate surroundings, these 
less professionaLly-oriented respondents were a lso  more prone t o  f ind  
d i f f i c u l t i e s  i n  the  cross-cultural situation. (It w i l l  be reca l led  tha t  
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ESTEC had by far the  highest  proportion of write-in comments of t h i s  
nature.) We heard, f o r  example, tha t :  
When you have foreigners from a l l  countries speaking only 
basic  English t o  each other,  you have a l o t  more m i s -  
understandings than you have i n  a uniform society.  . , 
Further, they have d i f fe ren t  backgrounds and methods of 
doing things and when they have t o  work together on one 
project  each guy is convinced t h a t  h i s  method is  the only 
cor rec t  one and they have a hard time agpeeing on one way 
of doing it. 
--Swiss engineer 
The net result of the  interview analysis w a s  t o  suggest that although 
the  percentages of  respondents who found advantages and disadvantages 
t o  the internat ional  environment were qui te  similar a t  ESTEC and ISPRA, 
the r e a l  feelings were ra ther  different .  
i n  the organization was much more severe a t  ISPRA than a t  ESTEC. 
Individual response t o  defects 
2. Rewards of the  Internat ional  Life 
Beyond the special  charac te r i s t ics  of each center,  there  is a t  least 
one area of  widely shared attitudes throughout the sample--reactions t o  
the internationalism o f  the environment. In one sense the feelings are 
ambiguous: Many f e l t ,  as did the Swiss engineer quoted above, that  the 
mixing of  d i f fe r?n t  languages and d i f fe ren t  national st;rles decreased the 
eff ic iency of communication i n  the laboratory. 
claiming tha t  t h i s  was no problem at  a l l .  
about ease of communication, however, v i r tua l ly  a l l  o f  the respondents 
remarked on the personal and professional 
environment. 
respondents fe l t  t ha t  the  p o l i t i c a l  and administrative disadvantages 
Others disagreed, 
Regardless of  t h e i r  opinions 
of the internat ional  
Although in evaluating research a t  ISPRA and ESTEC, most 
resu l t ing  from the internat ional  s t ruc ture  far outweighed the advantages 
of the cross-cultural  st imulation, an appreciation o$ the importance of 
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t h i s  stimulation w a s  s t i l l  present throughout. 
orchestra with Russian s t r ings ,  French woodwinds, and German brass, cited i n  
the previous section, was but one pa r t i cu la r ly  w e l l  phrased sample of many 
The analogy of the  American 
similar responses. 
recognized and appreciated. 
The value of d ivers i ty  i n  a s c i e n t i f i c  team is widely 
17 
In terms of its personal value, the mode of description which respon- 
dents used i n  discussing t h e  stimulation which they received from the  
in te rna t iona l  environment was reminiscent of  the vague ways i n  which 
people often speak of the value of t rave l :  
From a personal point of view I prefer t o  l i ve  i n  such 
an atmosphere because t o  a cer ta in  degree it gives me 
new viewpoints. . . So I think the  individual p r o f i t s  
from it whether o r  not the laboratory as a whole does. 
--German physicist  a t  ISPRA 
Meeting people of different outlooks is always stim- 
lazing. . 
--British engineer at ESTEC 
I believe there a re  be t t e r  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  t o  g e t  new ideas 
in  such a center because people are coming from many 
d i f fe ren t  countries and maybe t h e  information i s  not d i f -  
fe ren t ,  but . 
--French physicist  a t  ISPRA 
I think coming here and working with other na t iona l i t i e s  
has been qui te  a good experience; it broadens one's experi- 
ence.. You can ' t  put your f inger  on it exactly and say 'now 
t h i s  i s  very good,' but I f e e l  it broadens one's experience. 
--British engineer at CERN 
l7 There is some danger, of course, t ha t  responses on t h i s  subject 
were se l f - jus t i fy ing ,  representing canscious or unconscious attempts on 
the pa r t  of resp 
independent che 
s i s t e n t  with other response patterns.  
dents t o  r a t iona l i ze  t h e i r  present s i tua t ions .  Without 
it is impossible t o  ascer ta in  the  f u l l  extent of t h i s  
t. 
r widespread across the  various laboratories, and second, not incon- 
We should note, however, t ha t  t h e  responses here are first 
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The reward is i n  p a r t  t h a t  of experiencing d i r ec t ly  tha t  which one 
has been accustorned to  learning only from 
d i r e c t  experience a person feels more capable of separating evaluative 
material from objective material than he does i n  secondary reports.  
condary sources. In such 
We 
might surmise tha t  the a b i l i t y  t o  be  objective would be of par t icu lar  
value i n  the  mind of  a s c i e n t i f i c a l l y  t ra ined  individual.  Further, i n  
the  internat ional  experience there  is the simple joy of discovery-finding 
known facts or ideas placed i n  new contexts or viewed i n  different ways. 
In  the words of two of our respondents: 
YOU have heard t h a t  having a Chinese f a the r  and an I t a l i a n  
mother makes a very nice g i r l  T?.e same Li trile o f  t h c  
brain,  I think. Making your brain work with brains 
t ra ined i n  d i f fe ren t  ways with a d i f f e ren t  language gives 
you cer ta in ly  new opportunities f o r  discovery. This is 
rea l ly ,  I think the main pos i t ive  aspect of my experience 
i n  in te rna t iona l  bodies, 
--French scientist  from ESTEC 
If we had the  same CERN i n  I t a l y  s t a f f ed  wholly with 
I t a l i ans  I 'd  perhaps do the same physics o r  the same 
mathematics and I ' d  enjoy these things professionally.  
But I would miss t h i s  contact with ocher people who have 
other kinds of educition, other ideas in t h e i r  heads, 
other prejudices than mine a 
-- .I talian pnysicis t  a t  CEXS 
Finally the reward of the internat ionai  experience appears to j e  tha t  
of making one's own self-image more cosmopolitan, 
system of science, being cosmopolitan is a highly valued t ra i t .  
parison with t h e i r  reference groups at home, these respondents feel 
themselves far more experienced and sophisticated.  
from ISPRA (leaving himself open t o  being called a snob) put it t h i s  way: 
Vitllin the value 
By com- 
A French physicis t  
I bel ieve t h a t  my fellow countrymen who have stayed i n  
t h e i r  own country f o r  a l l  t h e i r  l ives  cannot have a very 
object ive way of judging many problems, They are biased 
and this is unconscious, I would say. It  i s  a very amusing 
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experience when you go back t o  your own country and dis -  
c u s ~  some problems t o  see  how people a re  biased. 
never lived outside t h e i r  awn country and were never 
exposed t o  d i f fe ren t  points of view. 
They 
The fee l ing  tha t  one has been "broadened" seems t o  mean a good deal t o  
the respondents and the way i n  which they view themselves. I t  is common 
t o  t h e  several  na t iona l i t i e s  i n  a l l  of t h e  laboratories included i n  the 
study . 
In order t o  explore f u r d e r  t h i s  notion of "broadening'," the  respon- 
dents were asked, "DO you f e e l  t h a t  the  experience of working i n  an 
international atmosphere has changed your perspective on your home 
country?'' 
the above-quoted Frenchman. 
The pos i t ive  response--56%--indicates general agreement with 
The cross-tabulation by laboratory and 
nat iona l i ty  i s  given i n  Table 6.2 below. The only s izable  departure from 
Changed Perspective on Home Country, 
by Laboratory and Nationality 
ESTEC CERN ISPRA 
Br F r  Ge I t  Br F r  Ge I t  F r  Ge I t  
(351 (191 (20) 171 (251 (131 (173 (19) (251 (351 (39) 
Yes 66% 63% 60% 57% 64% 54% 53% 63% 68% 51% 44% 
No 34 26 35 43 32 38 4 1  26 32 46 44 
DK 0 1 1  5 0 4 8 6 1 1  0 3 12 
overall  f igures is among the  I t a l i ans  a t  ISPRA. 
l iv ing  i n  t h e i r  own country as well as the broadly Italian flavor of t he  
ISPRA establishment might acccaunt fo r  t h e  somewhat weaker effect on 
these nationals. 
The f a c t  t ha t  they a re  
Otherwise, a r a the r  consistent proportion around 60% 
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t h a t  t h e i r  perspective had change 
exposure. In commenting on t h e i r  responses, of those who 
that t h e i r  perspective had not changed wrote t h a t  before coming t o  the  
laboratory their views of their own country were already d i f f e ren t  from 
(re& "broadertf) most of t h e i r  compatriots. 
necessary t o  change, I had already changed" were typical.  
Remarks s as "it w a s  not 
Aniong those who claimed tha t  t h e i r  perspectives had changed, the  
most frequent comment re f lec ted  a be l i e f  t ha t  the  individual 's  views had 
become "more objective." A fair number of respondents (28) volunteered 
the information t h a t  they had become more c r i t i c a l  of t h e i r  own country, 
while a few more (32) f e l t  t ha t  they had becomeiless critical, t ha t  they 
now appreciated t h e i r  country more. The d is t r ibu t ions  of  these two 
groups according t o  amount of t i m e  spent i n  the organization showed 
marked differences.  
i n  the organization less than 18 months, while seven o f  the "less c r i t i c a l "  
respondents f i t  t h i s  description, 
c r i t i c a l "  respondents had been i n  the organization more tnan four years, 
while seventeen of the "more critical'' had this high degree of sen ior i ty .  
There were too few respondents with very low sen io r i ty  t o  be able t o  
Oniy two of the "more c r i t i c a l "  respondents had been 
Conversely, only seven of the "less 
emant of  the individual 's  fee l ings  towards h i s  country 
few months of h i s  s t ay  in the  in te rna t iona l  laboratory, 
but beyond t h i s  ear ly  period there  seem to be a process i n  which the 
individual 's  aff inity 2or h i s  country and iden t i f i ca t ion  with it is a t  
f i r s t  tensd and then slowly de ed over an exte 
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from home. 
research on t h e  a t t i t udes  of foreign students toward: t h e i r  own 
In  t h i s  respect our data roughly pa ra l l e l s  t h e  findings of 
18 countries. 
The change i n  respondents' perspective w a s  documented not only i n  
these numerical: da ta  but a l so ,  even more graphically, i n  the interview 
data. While one could quote at  great length here, the  words of  but two 
individuals serve t o  convey t h e  s p i r i t  o f  many of the  responses: 
an Italian physicist  from CERN: 
F i r s t ,  
I am a b i t  a f r a id  t h a t  when I w i l l  have t o  go back and 
l i v e  there [ i n  I t a l y ]  I w i l l  f ind some d i f f i c u l t i e s ,  I 
w i l l  not be able t o  accept certain things which are 
taken f o r  granted there and I w i l l  t r y  t o  add on some th ings  
which I learned here, which I consider b e t t e r  . a . Well, 
I find i t  i n  my holidays already, when I discuss anything 
with my parents o r  old friends. . . They accuse me o f  having 
changed my fee l ings  os they t e l l  me 'Oh, you are a foreigner 
n o w . . .  F 
Then, at ISPRA, a Frenchman: 
Yes. [Interviewer: In  which way has it changed?] 
Well, i n  such a way tha t  I r ea l i ze  t h a t  France is not the 
center of the world! 
I t  is important t o  remember here t h a t  we are not measuring actual 
changes i n  respondents' feelings toward t h e i r  countries, but only t h e i r  
introspective evaluations of such changes. The subject of a changed 
perspective often arose within discussions of the  rewards which t h e  scien- 
tists received from the in te rna t iona l  atmosphere of their laboratories,  and 
it should be apparent t h a t  possession of a more realistic perspective on 
t h e i r  own countries is par t  of t h e i r  cosmopolitan self-image. 
l8 Amar K. Singh, "The Impact of Foreign Study: The Indian 
Experience," Minerva, I,  1 (Autumn 1962), p. 43. 
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3. Job Satisfact ion 
The f i n a l  segment of t h i s  discussion of work i n  an internat ional  
laboratory concerns the degree t o  which the  s c i e n t i s t s  report  they are 
pleased with t h i s  experience. In r e a l i t y ,  job sa t i s f ac t ion  is not 
en t i r e ly  separable from reactions t o  l i f e  i n  the area where the labora- 
t o r y  is located-that is, disaf fec t ion  i n  one sphere no doubt encourages 
it i n  the  other.  
one spec i f i ca l ly  aimed at  sa t i s f ac t ion  with l i fe  in t he  area (discussed 
By asking two separate but  adjacent questions, however -- 
i n  Chapter V) and one concerned with job satisfactitan-we hoped tha t  
respondents would be able t o  dis t inguish a t  l ea s t  p a r t i a l l y  between t h e i r  
reactions t o  t h e i r  professional posit ions and in s t i t u t ions  and t h e i r  reac- 
t ions t o  outside l i f e .  
Comparing Table 6.3 below, which shows job sa t i s f ac t ion  by laboratory 
Table 6.3 
Job  Sat isfact ion,  by Laboratory and Nationali ty 
ESTEC C E E J  ISPR.4 
Br F r  Ge I t  Br Fr Ge I t  F r  Ge I t  
(35) (19) (20)  ( 7 )  (25)  (13) (17)  (19 )  ( 2 5 )  ( 3 5 )  (39) 
Compietely 
Very 
Sa t i s f i ed  40 21 5 14 48 46 59 37 32 20 18 
Sa t i s f i ed  23 53 50 14 20 38 18 47 20 46 44 
Somewhat 
Unsatisfied 34 21 35 43 12 8 12 11 36 26 28 
L w a t i s f i e d  3 0 5 0 4 0 0 0 1 2 6 8  
Sat i s f ied  0% 0% 5% 0% 16% 8% 12% 5% 0% 0% 0% 
‘:-Y. 
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and nat ional i ty ,  with Table 5.6,  which presents an analogous breakdown 
f o r  sa t i s fac t ion  w i t h  l i fe  i n  the laboratory's  location, it appears t ha t  
the two dis t r ibut ions run i n  paraLle2. The lab showing the  highest 
proportion of respondents completely s a t i s f i e d  and very s a t i s f i e d  with 
l ife i n  the area, CERN, a l so  shows by far the highest degree of job satis- 
faction. 
within each laboratory, a strong degree of association w a s  found. 
who w a s  highly s a t i s f i e d  with h i s  posit ion was generally highly s a t i s f i e d  
with the l i f e  he found outside of the laboratory, and vice-versa, The 
In cross-tabulating one type of sa t i s fac t ion  with t h e  other, 
A person. . 
converse may be s t a t ed  even more strongly: no one who showed extreme 
high o r  low sz t i s fac t lon  on one scale  showed the opposite on the other.  
In  l i g h t  of  the reactions shown t o  the par t icu lar  character is t ics  of 
each center, there are na great surprises t o  be found i n  the  levels  of 
satisfactian which the respondents report. As noted above, t h e  CERN 
sample, independent of nat ional i ty ,  shows the  greatest  proportion with a 
high level of job sa t i s fac t ion .  Both ISPRA and ESTEC show smaller percent- 
ages a t  the upper par t  of the scale--only one respondent from e i ther  
laboratory said he was completely s a t i s f i e d  with h i s  position--while 
substant ia l  numbers appear at the lower part of the scale. ISPRA, i n  
par t icular ,  shows a s igni f icant  few at  the extreme of dissat isfact ion.  
Differences between laboratories dominate the var ia t ion of na t iona l i t i es  
within each laboratory, but one figure which does s tand out i n  Table 6.3 
is the  high percentage (40%) of Bri t ish respondents a t  ESTEC who repl ied 
that they were very s a t i s f i e d  with t h e i r  posit ions.  
pa ra l l e l  i n  Table 5 .6 ;  i n  fact, the ESTEC Bri t ish are the  l e a s t  s a t i s f i e d  
This figure has no 
w i t h  outside l i f e  of any national contingent a t  any laboratory. We propose 
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t h a t  t he  question o f  job sa t i s f ac t ion  is viewed in  relative tenus by the 
individual; it seems t o  measure h i s  comparison of h i s  present career 
s i t ua t ion  with t h a t  which he might have otherwise expected t o  have fo l -  
lowed a t  home. On t h i s  bas i s ,  it appears t h a t ,  a r r iv ing  with a somewhat 
d i f f e ren t  set of expectations, t he  Brit ish a re  compensated by t h e i r  
r e l a t ive ly  higher sa la ry  l e v e l  for the organizational and 
problems which affect the morale of other ESTEC personnel. 
is trative 
This hypothesis is supported by examination o f  a related question, 
which asked whether t h e  respondent f e l t  t ha t  "the organization is pro- 
viding [him] wi th  a reasonable amount of  i n t e l l e c t u a l  stimulation." Cross- 
tabulating t h i s  question w i t h  job sa t i s f ac t ion ,  one f inds ,  as might  w e l l  
be expected among a group of s c i e n t i s t s ,  t h a t  the two variables are 
highly correlated.  Table 6.4 presents t h i s  cross-tabulation, with c e l l s  
Job Sa t i s fac t ion  versus in t e l l ec tua l  Stimulation 
Conpletely Very Somewhat Very 
Sa t i s f i ed  Sa t i s f i ed  Sati'sfied Unsatisfied Unsatisfied 
In t e l l ec tua l  
Stimulation: 
Suff ic ien t  
Not suffi- 
c i en t  (82 )  1 9 21 43 8 
(2333 14 93 93 30 3 
showing r a w  numbers (instead of percentages as most of the other tables 
show) . Throughout the various laboratory/nationali ty groups, those 
showing a low degree of job sa t i s f ac t ion  a l so  express a lack of 
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i n t e l l ec tua l  stimulation. 
were e i t h e r v e r y  s a t i s f i e d  o r  s a t i s f i e d  with t h e i r  posit ions,  58% f e l t  t ha t  
they were not receiving su f f i c i en t  i n t e l l ec tua l  stimulation. 
Among the ESTEC Bri t i sh ,  however, where 63% 
One added point,  which concerns not only fhe ESTEC Bri t i sh  but al l  
other respondents as well, is  the  matter of career patterning. 
t i on  suggests t h a t  t h i s  is an aspect of some importance, and the main 
reason f o r  our rather s l i g h t  .emphasis on it is t h e  fact t h a t  w e  are lacking 
any hard data and a re  constrained t o  suggesting ra ther  than demonstrating 
our notions. 
extent the  degree o f  s a t i s f ac t ion  which an individual receives from hi5 
s tay  i n  an international laboratory and which consequently, i n  aggregate, 
strongly affects the morale of a center, is the  degree t o  which the 
scientist sees h i s  s t ay  as permanent, 
In essence it seem that the more strongly--and more long-term--one 
commits himself t o  one o f  these organizations, the more sens i t ive  he is 
t o  defects i n  t h e  environment and t o  i n s t a b i l i t i e s .  This is perhaps more 
a fac tor  of the s c i e n t i s t ' s  s t a t e  of mind than the r ea l  length of h i s  
s tay .  Many of the s c i e n t i s t s  a t  ISPRA have been there r e l a t ive ly  shor t  
periods--on the  order of 5 years--while many of  the CERN staff members 
have held t h e i r  posit ions much longer--say about 10 years. 
however, the s c i e n t i s t s  are d i n g  more o r  less career decisions i n  
coming t o  the  organization--they receive tenure a f t e r  about two years 
and many, when they began, expected t o  be able t o  remain i n  the  organiza- 
t i on  e f fec t ive ly  f o r  the duration of t h e i r  careers.  
Observa- 
I t  appears t h a t  one fac tor  which determines t o  a large 
This is a r a t h e r  complex fac tor .  
In EURATOM, 
A t  CEREI the  organi- 
zation's i n t en t  is t o  give as many qual i f ied  s c i e n t i s t s  as possible an 
opportunity ta be a par t  of the  organization. Hence an individual 
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not see h i s  
choices as long-term--rather they are made step-wise. One 
contracts)  is that they never feel quite permanent i n  Geneva. In the  
words of me Bri t i sh  scientist: 
I don't think we ever r e a l l y  feel permanent here, t ha t  
we are going t o  s t ay  permanently. . . , One has the 
feel ing,  okay, one's been here f ive  years,  perhaps I ' l l  
stay a few nore years, I don'; knohi, perhaps f iat .  Qa: 
i t ' s  s t i l l  the feel ing,  t h i s  i s n ' t  our permanent home. 
Although $he fee l ing  vaguely dis turbs  many of the  CERN respondents-- 
the above individual  mentions elsewhere that he believes some of the  
value of the experience is l o s t  by it--it seems t o  be largely functional,  
i n  t ha t  it allows t he  s c i e n t i s t s  t o  put up with many minor problems--both 
i n  and out 05' the organization--which might be considered more serious if 
they were seen i n  a permanent fzaneworb. 19 
While CERN and ISPRA represent r e l a t ive ly  pure cases, ESTEC is rather 
too  new t o  f i t  e i t h e r  pa t te rn ,  Contracts there  are of limited duration 
and many of the staff members {part icular ly  the Bri t ish)  are on second- 
ment from government establishments. * The ne t  result  is cer ta in ly  far from 
a PS the  staff, and i n  fact t 
extrema-that of too temporary a nature-may have been approached. 
noted earlier t h a t  some respondents--Frenchmen and Belgians-leave t h e i r  
families a t  home and commute back and for th  on weekends. "his s i tua t ion  
o f  .transience--leading one respondent t o  reply, when asked about l i f e  
i n  Noordwijk, "I must say qu i t e  frankly, I don't  l i ve  there,  I j u s t  work 
there," appears t o  y i e ld  a l e v e l  of comnitment t o  the  organization which 
is less than optimal. 
level of career commitment appears t o  be close t o  t h a t  o f  CERN r a the r  than 
ISPRA. Even at PETTEN,-whi& is an organ of EURATOM i n  the  same sense 
as ISPRA, the  career orientation does not seem t o  b e  on the same order 
as t h a t  a t  ISPRA. This may be a t t r ibu ted  t o  the  r e l a t ive  youth o f  the  
We 
Outside of the three major establishments, t he  
establishment, as well as,perhaps, t o  the recent reorientation of its 
function. 
* * *  
This concludes P a r t  Two and its discussion of the personal and profes- 
s iona l  experience o f  working i n  an international laboratory. The discus- 
sion has attempted t o  portray t h e  backgrounds of the individuals who are 
drawn t o  such centers as well as the cikcumstances under which they came. 
I t  has  explored those aspects of the  in te rna t iona l  experience which 
appear to be significant i n  the pr iva t e  lives of these  individuals, and it 
has looked a t  the  s c i e n t i s t s  as they function professionally i n  t h i s  
r a the r  unique environment. A l l  of  these matters derive t h e i r  importance 
from our des i re  t o  understand t h e  s c i e n t i f i c  po ten t ia l  of in te rna t iona l  
laboratories through t h e i r  in te rna l  accomplishments as well as t h e i r  
relationship -to national s c i e n t i f i c  structurk.  
t i f i c  poten t ia l  is only ha l f  of the  story, hawever. 
The laboratory's scien- 
Bearing i n  mind 
that-the important pol i t ica l  context of technological collaboration in  
Western Europe w a s  the aspect which originally brought us to  the study 
of these sc ient i s ts ,  w e  turn now to look at  their pol i t ical  nature and 
the ways in which they view the social issue areas which surround them. 
Part Three undertakes this t a s k .  

a53 
Preceding page blank 

m E R  VI1 
THE PLACE OF POLITICS 
In the €0-1 s t ruc ture  of  internat ional  scientific laboratories 
there is no place f o r  p o l i t i c s  among the professional s t a f f s .  Employed 
on a supranational basis--in which they are  not i n  any sense considered 
representatives o f  the countries from which they come--the sc i en t i s t s  and 
engineers are constrained by regulations from par t ic ipa t ing  i n  par t i san  
o r  nat ional  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i v i t i e s .  
the p r o f e s s i q a l  functions which they p e r f o m  are c lear ly  (and quite  
intent ional ly)  a fac tor  i n  the p o l i t i c a l  re la t ionships  between the member 
countries. Furthermore, viewed individually,  the s c i e n t i s t s  and e q i n e e r s  
possess p o l i t i c a l  a t t i tudes  which are of  considerable in t e re s t  t o  us ,  
f i r s t  as these a t t i tudes  in t e r sec t  with the  internat ional  s c i e n t i f i c  
environment, and second in regard to the scientists' e l i t e  ro le  and poten- 
t i a l  influence i n  policy determination i n  Europe. 
Cmsidezed.in the aggregate-, however, 
Part Three of t h i s  study is devoted t o  the examination of some of 
the  p o l i t i c a l  a t t i tudes  o f  these internat ional  s c i e n t i s t s  and engineers, 
as revealed by t h e i r  responses on the interviews and questionnaires. The 
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task is begun i n  this chapter by an attempt t o  place the  a t t i t udes  i n  a 
framework of general p o l i t i c a l  orientation. 
are then devoted t o  examination of the  s c i e n t i s t s '  responses t o  questions 
on specific issue-areas; ascertainment of response patterns;  and analysis 
of the faceors which d i f f e ren t i a t e  the  respondents' patcerns of  views on 
these issue-areas . 
Three succeeding chapters 
By way of defining the  general p o l i t i c a l  orientation of  the in t e r -  
national s c i e n t i s t s  and engineers w e  look i n  turn a t  t h e  place which 
p o l i t i c s  occupies i n  the l ives of these men, the degree t o  which they 
are concerned with i t ,  the  focus of t h e i r  i n t e re s t ,  t h e i r  d i s t r ibu t ion  
on the  l e f t - r igh t  continuum, and t h e  various aspects of  t h e i r  participa- 
t ion.  I t  is unfortunate t h a t  comparable empirical data is not available 
on the  p o l i t i c a l  a t t i t udes  o€ a group of s c i e n t i s t s  outside of an inter-  
national laboratory-either i n  Europe o r  i n  the United States-&so t h a t  we 
might speak more generally. Thus, i n  this par t  of  t he  discussion, as i n  
preceding- chapters, we are constrained mainly t o  describing the s i tua t ion  
as we found it i n  the international laboratories.' The degree t o  which 
the  p ic ture  we s h a l l  pains conforms to generally recognized impressions 
We r e l y  here a l so  on some of the da ta  which w a s  gathered at  CERN 
i n  an e a r l i e r  study 
present study. 
bed i n  Chapter 11 and not replicated i n  the  
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2 of scientists' p o l i t i c a l  thinking. as well as its correspondence t o  the 
author's personal knowledge of s c i e n t i s t s  i n  o ther  environments 
however, a ra ther  wider degree o f  appl icabi l i ty  f o r  many o f  the 
suggests, 
conclusions. 
A. The Depth of P o l i t i c a l  Involvement 
1. Manifest concern 
There are many aspects of l ife which i n t e r e s t  t he  average s c i e n t i s t  aS 
much as o r  more than p o l i t i c a l  affairs. In the words of one ESTEC Briton,  
Sc ien t i s t s  a re  t e r r ib ly  busy and very in te res ted  in  what  
they're doilig;. They're in te res ted  next i n  t h e i r  families,  
i n  a change of scene, and i n  t h e i r  recreat ion.  Anyway, 
i t ' s  only the  few who fee l  very strongly po l i t i ca l ly  among 
scientists and engineers. 
To say  that p o l i t i c s  is not the central interest o f  these men i s  far  
d i f fe ren t ,  though, from saying t h a t  they are not concerned or committed t o  
cer ta in  basic  pr inciples  and inodes of approach. Po l i t i c s  i s  very def in i te ly  
a s ign i f icant  element i n  the Weltanschauungen of  these individuals.  There 
is no contradiction between the words of the Briton c i ted  above and those 
o f  a German engineer at  CERN who, when asked i f  s c i e n t i s t s  were not 
For some non-empirical but provocative thoughts on t h i s  subject see 
Albert Wohlstetter, "Scient is ts ,  Seers and Strategy,' ' Fore im Affairs, 
XLI, 3 (April 1963); and Warner R. Schi l l ing,  "Scient is ts ,  Foreign Policy, 
and Poli t ics ,"  i n  Robert Gilpin and Christopher Wright (eds.), Sc ien t i s t s  
and National Policy-Makinq (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), 
pp.' 144-173. More empirical work has been done by, among others ,  David 
Nichols, "The Polit ical  Attitudes of a Sc ien t i f i c  Elite" (unpublished 
P h . D .  disser ta t ion ,  Dept. of Po l i t i ca l  Science, M.I.T., 1968). 
in te res ted  i n  p o l i t i c s ,  replied: "Not interested? O f  course they are! 
They are fill of o p i n i o n d  
Throughout a l l  of the  laboratories included i n  t h i s  study, it was 
found t h a t  the vas t  majority of s c i e n t i s t s  and engineers maintained a 
def in i te  i n t e r e s t  i n  public affairs. To the  extent t h a t  the "ivory tower" 
image sometimes a t t r ibu ted  t o  s c i e n t i s t s  still  survives--and a t  least i n  
the United S ta tes  it is rapidly fading--this study gave evidence of its 
inadequacy. 
voked resistance i n  the subjects.  
perhaps the most avowedly apo l i t i ca l  of the organizations, but i t  a l so  
In some cases, however, t h e  pa r t i cu la r  word "polit ics" pro- 
This w a s  t rue  especially a t  CERN, 
happened elsewhere. Experience suggested the  use (on both questionnaires 
and interviews) of  "international developments ,'I "public affairs ) I 1  
r*current public issues" o r  any o ther  such terms which describe %he 
larger p o l i t i c a l  domain, and these seemed t o  be generally accepted. 
explanation for t h i s  phenomenon appears t o  be a semantic one, i n  t ha t  the 
word "po1itics"alone ca r r i e s ,  f o r  some s c i e n t i s t s ,  connotations of local 
The 
party a c t i v i t i e s ,  campaigning, banner-waving, and personal bargaining-- 
a c t i v i t i e s  which a re  n o t  appealing t o  men whose basic operational mode 
is  analytical  .? Such t e r n  as Itcurrent public issues ,I1 "international 
This quote, together with pa r t s  of the  remainder ' of t h i s  chapter, 
e World Pol i t ics :  A Survey a t  CER1J" (M.I.T. Center f o r  Inter-  
Studies Dcmment No. C/68-2, January- 1968). 
is taken from Daniel Lerner and Albert H. Teich, "International Scien- 
Our finding here confirms t h a t  of Donald A. Strickland, who writes 
tha t  scientists "often man by ' p o l i t i c a l '  t h a t  an a c t i v i t y  is controver- 
sial, or that it has a high emotional content (is ' i r r a t i o n a l '  behavior) . . .** Scient i s t s  i n  Po l i t i c s  (Lafayette, Ind.: Purdue University Press, 
19681, p. 94, In addition, the senses of the  words 
and 
lea e confusion. 
i n  German are s l i g h t l y  d i f fe ren t  from 
affairs" o r  even "current p o l i t i c a l  issues" represent, on the  other hand, 
aspects of l i fe  with which a sc ien t i s t , '  as an i n t e l l i g e n t  person, 
cannot help being concerned. 
Just how concerned the respondents were with p o l i t i c a l  affairs was 
measured through the use of two self-report  questions, one which asked 
t h e  subjec t  to estimateshow of ten  ha discussed current p o l i t i c a l  issues 
with h i s  cokleagues, and a second which asked hila t o  compare h i s  own 
degree of interest i n  public affairs with t h a t  of h i s  colleagues, i n  
terms of a hypothetical average. 
As anticipated,  the responses to these two questions displayed a 
pronounced relationship: 
value on the other and vice versa. 
quency of discussion, however, seemed to evoke the most in t e re s t ing  
responses on the  interviews and we tend t o  favor giving it the  most 
weight. Two findings of i n t e r e s t  emerged from its examination. F i r s t ,  
among t h e  major laboratories,  p o l i t i c a l  discussions were reported most 
frequently a t  ISPRA. 
a h igh  value on one generally implied a high 
The question which asked about f r e -  
-..-z- 
Given t h e  p o l i t i c a l  nature of EURATOM and the 
#e speak mainly of "sc ien t i s t s"  in t h i s  chapter although it is 
generally supposed that s c i e n t i s t s  and engineers d i f f 5 r  s ign i f i can t ly  
i n  personality traits, soc ia l iza t ion  experiences, and p o l i t i c a l  outlooks. 
Seymour M. Lipset reports,  i n  fact, i n  P o l i t i c a l  Man (Garden City, N.Y. :  
Doubleday and Go., 19601, pp. 315-314, t h a t  an American p o l l  i n  1944 
uncovered a heavy Democratic majority among s c i e n t i s t s  and a heavy Repub- 
l ican  majority among engineers. Nevertheless, OUT experience i n  th i s  
study indicates t h a t  in  most (but not a l l )  of the  areas i n  which we a re  
in te res ted ,  the conventional labels do not d i f f e ren t i a t e  su f f i c i en t ly  
within our sample and perhaps the  or ien ta t ion  towards research (or a t  
least the  absence of a routinized production orientation) i n  these organ- 
iza t ions  blurs t he  d i s t i n c t i o n . .  We are, however, aware tha t  the gener- 
a l i t y  of our conclusions outside the sample with respect t o  engineers is 
probably lower than with respect to s c i e n t i s t s .  
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highly p o l i t i c a l  roots of its current crisis, t h i s  f inding should come 
as no great surprise. 
discussion and ESTEC the  lowest. Table 7.1 presents t h i s  r a the r  clear-cut 
CERN reported the next greatest frequency of 
Table 7.1 
Frequency of Po l i t i ca l  Discussion by Laboratory 
Very Often 7% 6% 15% 
Often 12 23 34 
Occasionally 56 48 35 
Rare 1 y 24 20 15 
Never 0 3 0 
DK 0 0 1 
dist r ibut ion,  and Table 7.2 presents the para l le l  distribution by type of 
Table 7.2 
Frequency of  Po l i t i ca l  Discussion by Type of Work 
Bas i c 
Research 
-0 
Very Often 18% 
Oft en 32 
Occasiona1ly 39 
Rarely 11 
Never 
DK 
0 
0 
Applied 
Research 
C126) 
13% 
24 
44 
17 
2 
0 
Engineering 
(69) 
7% 8% 
25 22 
49 52 
19 16 
0 1 
0 1 
26 1 
frequent among bas i  
ough applied research, develop 
in te rac t ion  between type of work and laboraeory 
ef€ect on the frequency of discussion. 
Reinforcini an i n t u i t i v e  f a i t h  in t he  finding that basic s c i e n t i s t s  
seem t o  have a higher p o l i t i c a l  i n t e r e s t  than those involved in develop- 
ment or engineering work were statements on the interviews such as t h a t  
of a French mathematician who remarked: 
When you go from t h e  s c i e n t i s t  t o  the engineer and techni- 
cian, you lose a ce r t a in  percentage of what I would call 
i n t e l l e c t u a l  a c t i v i t y ,  so t h i s  means a l so  p o l i t i c a l  
i n t e r e s t .  
i n t e re s t ed  i n  p o l i t i c a l  issues;  t hey ' r e  just working i n  
t h e i r  own l i t t l e  job. 
A lot of engineers and technicians are not 
Or of  a Belgian engineer: 
The good ones are in te res ted .  The others--they a re  j u s t  
making money. 
The r e s u l t s  of  the question which asked for a se l f - r a t ing  on degree 
More of i n t e r e s t  i n  p o l i t i c s ,  as noted above, para l le led  this question. 
ISPRA respondents judged themselves t o  be above average i n  p o l i t i c a l  
i n t e r e s t  compared with t h e i r  colleagues and more ESTEC respr, 
themselves average or  below. I t  is l ike ly ,  ever,  thac this response 
t i on ,  s c i e n t i s t s  showed a igh t ly  higher leve 
iscussion also i nc  cussion than engineers, and frequency o 
mildly with educational attainment. 
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ce fl> persons with low p o l i t i c a  
om as a standard o 
extent t h a t  one's o m  level of i n t e r e s t  acts as an "internal anchor" 
percsption of interest  leve ls  of other s c i e n t i s t s  to whom one has posi- 
t i v e  
seem 
t would be assi ated toward!. one's aun level, making one 
"average .11' 
The questions on frequency of p o l i t i c a l  discussion and se l f - r a t ing  
of p o l i t i c a l  i n t e re s t ,  however, y i e ld  no r e a l  absolute indication o f  the 
strength of p o l i t i c a l  involvement among the respondents. 
one may come t o  such a measure is an index of  exposure t o  printed media, 
The closest  
which varies with p o l i t i c a l  i n t e re s t .  
this index was examined once before i n  Chapter V. I t  simply asked 
respondents t~ a s 1  the newspapers and weekly magazines they read. 
The question used t o  construct 
From 
t h i s  lis% t h e  number of  da i l i e s  and the number of weeklies were tabulated 
separately, then cross-tabulated t o  form a four-valued scale,  The degree 
' See on t h i s  topic, Muzafer Sherif and Carl Hovland, Social Jud 
ment (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), especially 7I----Jr' hapter 4 
m a s s i c  example of t h i s  l a t t e r  tendency w a s  displayed by a Br i t i sh  
engineer at ESTEC who, i n  regard t o  his own p o l i t i c a l  i n t e r e s t  proclaimed, 
I am a completely p o l i t i c a l l y  uneducateg person. . . . I don't 
ow nothing about it and I ' m  
e never heard of anybod 
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of d i f fe ren t ia t ion  on this b out 
er l i s t e d  one weekly. Appro 
case l i s t e d  two papers, a small proportion (8%) 1 
and the reminder  f a i l ed  t o  list any. 
at they did not read any 
[Only a h 
exposure index roughly p a r a l l e l s  t he  d is t r ibu t ions  of the measures of 
p o l i t i c a l  i n t e re s t .  I t  contributes some sense of  scale by revealing 
t h a t  most of our respondents do read a t  least one da i ly  paper and one 
weekly. In doing 50 i t  also reveals the r a r i t y  of extremely h igh  i n t e re s t  
o r  extremely low in t e re s t .  
2. Emotional Investment 
The l eve l  of the s c i e n t i s t s '  emotional Envestment i n  p o l i t i c a l  
affairs is  somewhat lower than might be expected on the basis  of t h e i r  
i n t e re s t .  While maintaining a generally high information level on 
matters pertaining t o  p o l i t i c a l  a f f a i r s  (manifested i n  the a r t i cu la t e  
range o f  responses which was received on the interviews and question- 
naires), the s c i e n t i s t s  i n  internat ional  laborator ies  display a tendency 
t o  remain ra ther  detached from everyday p o l i t i c a l  trends and developments. 
Several factors  are associated with this tendency, which was f i rs t  
observed i n  the e a r l i e r  study of CERNa8 First, opportunities €or d i r ec t  
par t ic ipa t ion  i n  p o l i t i c a l  airs are qu i t e  res 
See Lerner and Teich, "International Sc ien t i s t s , "  pp. 10-12, 
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amomt of emotional energy 
involve themselves i n  outside a c t i v i t i e s ,  especially 
ne i ther  remat 
national siruat 
ent t h a t  the s c i e n t i s t s  nay 
maintain i n t e l l e c t u a l  i n t e r e s t  i n  p o l i t i c a l  matters without developing 
strong emotional t ies t o  a given h u e  o r  posit ion,  t h e  everyday cross- 
national contact w i l l  ce r ta in ly  be f a c i l i t a t e d .  Finally--and t h i s  is a 
theme which w i l l  be returned t o  l a t e r - - i t  appears t h a t  i n  t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  
thinking, these s c i e n t i s t s  tend t o  extrapolate t h e  methods and viewpoint 
of science i tself .  Where things do not qu i te  f i t ,  most are unwilling t o  
make 8 deep personal commitment. 
A sharrt: digression on t h i s  latter point is i n  order. The words of 
the  Br i t i sh  engineer from ESTEC c i t e d  above (p. 257) are again 
suggestive: 
I think s c i e n t i s t s  i n  general f e e l  t ha t  p o l i t i c s  are a 
s t a t e  t ha t  go on anyway. You cannot c l a s s i fy  p o l i t i c s  
i n  the same way, f o r  example, t h a t  you can c lass i fy  the 
elements, and whilst  one w i l l  have opinions, one could 
only influence things i n  a minor way. . . . So they have 
feelings,  but perhaps they don't i n f l i c t  them very widely 
on other people. 
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P o l i t i c s  consists of phenomena which o f t e  
whose prac t ice  is not 
scfence and technology. A s  a young Ce t a t  ed , "Pol i t ics  
are too much af fec ted  by 
P o l i t i c a l  decision-making is an uncomfortable entry in to  a world s t ruc-  
tmed by the extrapalatian of science. 
the noms of t h e  scientific method, unable t o  impose razional solutions 
an p o l i t i c a l  problems, and sharing what they admit t o  be rather idea l i s -  
t i c  notions about world affairs, many of the respondents seemed t u  
temper t h e i r  very r ea l  i n t e r e s t  i n  p o l i t i c a l  and soc ia l  a f f a i r s  with a 
sense of  detachment. 
cialized t o  thinking within 
10 
Under these circumstances one finds t h a t  p o l i t i c a l  discussions among 
t h e  s c i e n t i s t s  normally take the  form of exchanges of information ra ther  
than emotional disputes. The respondents' own words again t e l l  the  story: 
If w e  i n v i t e  a couple of  English people t o  our home, t he  
discussion is often about differences between I t a l y  and 
England. . . . So if  we t a l k  about p o l i t i c s ,  you keep on 
saying ' i n  I t a l y  one does l i k e  t h a t , '  and they say, 'no, 
i n  England one does like this.' This i s  the kind of  
discussion one often has, 
- - I t a l i an  s c i e n t i s t  a t  CEXi 
One s c i e n t i s t  who has made a deep emotional commitment, the  Russian 
academician Andrei Sakharov, s t i l l  demonstrates t h e  desire t o  extrapolate 
science i n  h i s  widely publicized manuscript "Thoughts on Progress, Peaceful 
Coexistence and In t e l l ec tua l  Freedom," [ uly 22, f9681. A 
-
od is " ' ~ C f e n t i f i c ' ~ ~  he s t a t e s ,  i f  i 
8s and views, presupposing 
onclus ions. I t  H i s  proposal 
t ha t  "international affairs must be completely permeated with s c i e n t i f i c  
methodology ,Ii and fur ther  t h a t  " sc i en t i f i c  methods and principles of  in te r -  
national policy w i l l  have t o  be worked out." 
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--German sc ien t  is t at ESTEC 
Well we have 
the disclussi 
i t t l e  b i t  of argument, yes 
concern what peoples' poi 
--Italian engineer at ISPRA 
Extreme views are seldom fiund, and--as w i l l  be seen shortly-there is a 
broad sharing of political orientation and views among these internat ional  
s c i en t i s t s .  This consensus, together with the respondents' sense of 
detachment, generally serves t o  maintain p o l i t i c a l  discussions a t  a low 
emotional level. 
Another byproduct the respondents' low emotional investment i n  
poki t ica l  a€fa i r s  is a general fee l ing  among them t h a t  t f ie i r  informational 
level is lower than it should be. Although we have no objective measure 
of  t h i s  variable ,  w e  have already noted tha t  our impression, through t h e  
interview and questionnaire responses, indicates tha t  the level compares 
reasonably t o  other. highly educated e l i t e  segments of society.  However, 
since they are t ra ined as sc i en t i s t s ,  the respondents hes i t a t e  t o  draw 
inferences and propose f inn  conclusions on cer ta in  p o l i t i c a l  questions, 
i n  par t icu lar  those whicfr seem t o  require expertise outside of t h e i r  own 
" w served on e r  
CERN study, where 4uestion s, for examrple, 
'I The notion of incorpor the interviews 
and questionnaires was rejected as being 
subjects . t o  antagonize the  
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were rejected off-handedly by many respondents w i  
'1 ' m not an economist . 'I Accus tome 
own f i e l d s ,  the respondents were unwilling t o  giv 
i n  areas where they f e l t  less knowledgeable. 
coHuPents such as 
o speaking with authority i n  t h e i r  
'amateurish" opinions 
In t h i s  study, an e f f o r t  
w a s  made t o  assure the  subjects t h a t  they were being asked f o r  
rather than opinions and s technique met with a good- 
deal of  success. 
B. Direction and Scope of In t e re s t  
1, Po i i t i ca l  Spectrum 
Tne extrapolation QE the s c i e n t i f i c  viewpoint as a theme on which t o  
s t ruc tu re  one's p o l i t i c a l  thought leads t o  some readi ly  iden t i f i ab le  
trends among the  scientisM' attitudes. Within the conventionally recog- 
nized spectrum of p o l i t i c a l  thought ranging from extreme left  t o  extreme 
r i g h t ,  the largest part of the  respondents found themselves i n  a moderate 
l e f t  t o  center posit ion,  The s c i e n t i s t s  were asked t o  define t h e i r  own 
places on t h i s  spectrum; among t he  237 respondents for whom there is data 
( the  question was omitted i n  t h e  interviews), 1% r a t e  themselves a s  
extreme left ,  41% as moderate left ,  36% as center,  21% a5 moderate r igh t ,  
and less than 1% as extreme r igh t ,  
The raw d i s t r ibu t ion  of t h i s  variable (not percentages) f o r  t he  
various laboratory/nationali ty groups &- . resented i n  Table 7.3 (see 
following page). Aggregate figures f o r  the major laboratorkes are 
The one "extrsme right" and two "extreme left" respondents have 
been added i n t o  the  moderare factions in this table.  
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Table 7.3 
P o l i t i c a l  Spectrum by 
ESTEC 
Br Fr G e  It TOTALa 
Left 7 6 4 1  25 
Center 7 3 6 1 20 
Right 7 1 4 2  23 
DK 3 5 3 1 -12 
Laboratory and Nationality 
CERN ISPRA 
Br F r  Ge It  TOTAL F r  Ge , It TOTAL 
6 5 7 7  29 8 11 13 34 
3 2 4 1  19 4 13 7 27 
2 0 0 2  8 1 1  6 1 1 .  
4 0 2 3  11 2 3 5  13 
a Including smaller na t iona l i t i es .  
also shown. Despite the l imitations of i ts  small numbers, t h i s  tab le  
reveals a number of trends. 
dents showing up on the r igh t ,  and the bulk of these are Brit ish (as well 
as s o n y h t c h  and Belgians not shown on the table]. 
left-oriented of the  major centers, followed by ISPRA. 
ESTEC has the highest proportion of respan- 
CERN is the most 
The Germans seem 
t o  have a tendency t o  c lus t e r  about the center, while the  French and the 
Italians lean more t o  the l e f t .  13 
Divided e i t h e r  by t i t l e  of degree or  by present function, the scien- 
tists i n  the  sample tend t o  be s l i g h t l y  more t o  the  left  than the 
engineers. The extent of t h i s  tendency, however, is not nearly as large 
as one would have expected a p r i o r i  and it does not account f o r  the- d i f -  
ferences between the various laboratories or  na t iona l i t i e s .  While 
- 
l3 A s igni f icant  number PRA Italians do, however, appear on the  
r igh t .  Varying assumptions what consti tutes l'leftl' and what con- 
stimtes "right" i n  differen ean nations c lear ly  have some e f f ec t  
here, although the general images of 9eft!' and fk ight"  widely shared 
by these s c i e n t i s t s ,  as discussed below. 
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di f fe ren t ia t ions  by d i sc ip l ine  and basic/applied research did not appear 
i n  the  data, the  la rger  left response a t  CERN [most bas ic  research,' . 
knowledge-oriented in s t i t u t ion )  and the l a rge r  r i g h t  response at ESTEC 
(most applied, hardware-oriented in s t i t u t ion )  b e  g e n e r a l y  conkistent 
with findings such as t h a t  of Lipset who reports t h a t  "those involved . . . 
in the more pure theo re t i ca l  fields of science, are more l i ke ly  t O  be on 
the left  than those i n  the  more prac t ica l ,  applied, o r  experimental 
Some in t e re s t ing  outcomes develop i n  cross-tabulating p o l i t i c a l  
i n t e r e s t  by le f t -center - r igh t .  Right-leaning resondents consider them- 
selves less in te res ted  i n  p o l i t i c a l  affairs than t h e i r  l e f t  and center 
colleagues. Table 7.4 displays t h i s  finding. Among those respondents 
T a b l e  7.4 
Pol i t icad  In t e re s t  by P o l i t i c a l  Orientation 
Orientation: 
Left Center Right -m 75;) 
Interest: 
Well Above Average 
Above Average 
Average 
Below Average 
Well Below Average 
9% 7% 2% 
35 19 a 
49 60 68 
4 8 18 
0 1 2 
l4 Seymour Martin Lipset, "The Activists:  A Profile," The Public 
-9 Interest No. 13 ( F a l l  1968), p. 46. 
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ranking themselves as leftists, 44% believe t h a t  
i n  p o l i t i c a l  in te res t .  This f igure drops t o  27% 
they are above 
among those i n  
average 
the cen- 
ter and 10% among the r i g h t i s t s .  
discussion rmn similarly.  
Figures for frequency of p o l i t i c a l  
One of the central  findings of American voting research is that of 
the pos i t ive  association between partisanship and p o l i t i c a l  interest. 
In  American terms t h i s  has meant that voters who consider themselves 
e i the r  committed Democrats o r  committed Republicans are  much more 
interested i n  po l i t i ca l  a f f a i r s  (especialSy elections) than so-called 
 independent^.^' 
po l i t i ca l  partisanship and the po l i t i ca l  speczrum data on European 
If one at tenpts  t o  draw a para l l e l  between American 
sc i en t i s t s ,  one is  struck by t h e  contrast  i n  the d is t r ibu t ion  of poli-  
tical interest. Several a l te rna t ive  explanations may be proposed: (1) I t  
is conceivable that since the American p o l i t i c a l  pa r t i e s  are said to  be 
r ea l ly  non-ideological coali t ions and do not correspond t o  l e f t  and 
r igh t  i n  any meaningful manner, then th i s  para l le l  i s  not r e a l l y  valid. -16 
(2) On t h e  other hand, these findings may not necessarily be character- 
ist ic of the sc i en t i s t s  i n  t h i s  sample, but ra ther  of a larger--= yet 
One of the most clear-cut demonstrations of t h i s  is given i n  
Bernard R. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and W i l l i a m  N. McPhee, Voting: 
(Chicago : 
The empirical l i t e r a tu re  i n  t h i s  area generally deals w i t h  
f*leftism'c and "Tightism" as expressed i n  parry preference ra ther  than on 
an independently generated scale, fur ther  complicating our problem. See 
Lipset, aum 
(eds.1, 
{ Belmont 
271 
unexplore erance between 
(3) I t  is a l so  p 
standing within 
t i f i c  community-and the scale they are  using is li 
respect t o  the  la rger  populat 
s t rong leftists i n  re la t ion  t o  the general p o l i t  
c e n t r i s t s  would actual ly  be moderate leftists, and the r i g h t i s t s  would 
really belong i n  the  (dis interested and uninvolved) center. This last 
explanation is refrected i n  the  words of one Br i t i sh  engineer at ESTEC 
i n  a charmingly unconscious way: 
I think sc i en t i s t s  are l i ke  any o t h e r  body o f  people-- 
they vary tremendously. 
very, very lef t  and you get people who are a good deal 
IesX left.  
Ycu get some people who are 
Regardless of th0 reasons which l i e  behind the relationships between 
i n t e r e s t  and place on the spectrum, it does appear tha t  the leftist 
posit ion represents something of a p o l i t i c a l  norm i n  the s c i e n t i f i c  
community.'' Since those  who espouse it tend to  show the greatest  
i n t e re s t ,  they might be expected t o  be more inf luent ia l  as well. Jus t  
l i k e  t h e  B r i t i s h  engineer, who found some s c i e n t i s t s  " ~ e r y ,  very l e f t "  
and others 'la good deal less  l e f t , "  many of the respondents observed the 
tendency toward: a l i be ra l - l e f t  consensus among t h e i r  colleagues. 
To explore t h i s  point  further, the question 'IJudging from your own 
experience and dis 
issues on which the majority of s c i e n t i s t s  and 
feel t h a t  there  are cer ta in  p o l i t i c a l  
ineers probably share 
intellectuals may be 
pp. 310-343. 
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elded a near1 n break between ''yes" and 
dents replying negatively 00 t h i s  question would continue by saying tha t  
scienzists , never 
sive" than the average person. 
were on the whole 1 i b  era1 " 
Typically, the  s c i e n t i f i c  education was seen as a socialization 
process which produces predispositions toward cer ta in  types of a t t i t udes .  
One interviewee, a Frenchman at ISPRA, proposed a mathematical formula- 
t ion: 
You have tt mean value w i t h  a Gaussian d is t r ibu t ion ,  and 
accordi 
surely 
others. 
af the ideas, ideas which are shared, This kind of 
international education produces it. 
a l o t  of people i n  the s c i e n t i f i c  community with very 
d i f fe ren t  opinions, but on the mean they are very close. 
ny experience the spread of t h i s  Gaussian is 
e r  for the sc iengi f ic  community than f o r  
ould say there is on t h e  mean-there a m  more 
You will find surely 
Another, a Brit ish s c i e n t i s t  from CERN noted: 
They rend to be more l i be ra l .  
go any fur ther  than tha t .  
take a national opinion pol l ,  opinions of s c i e n t i s t s  as 
opposed t o  the  rest of the population, you would f ind  them 
more t o  the left than t o  the  r i g h t ,  by conventional standards. 
I don't think tha t  YOU can 
I would say that i f  you would 
ding a fierce extreme, 
ds, I would say, the 
cmse science 
xtreae views and the generally lef t is t  consensus is borne 
out by of aur data. The fact of be ing-a  s c i e n t i s t  compounded by t he  
b ein 
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produces a r a the r  narrow spectrum 
public issues. 
learn from such dissensus as we are able t o  uncover, it i s  important 
not t o  lose s igh t  of the degree of  unanimity with which most of the 
p o l i t i c a l  questions were answered. 
ght concerning many 
Although i n  the balance of t h i s  study we sha l  
A tendency towards t h e  left, however, does not indicate adherence 
t o  something which could r i g h t l y  be ca l led  an ideology, i n  the sense of 
a codified doctrind associated with a p a r t i c u l a r  par ty  o r  p o l i t i c a l  
m0vement.l' It  i s  r a the r  a shared set of values tha t  produces a common 
p o l i t i c a l  sentiment of leftism. This is what t he  French, long habituated 
t o  such nuances, calf  gauchisme--and the s c i e n t i s t s  tend t o  b e  gauchisants. 
( left-oriented) ra ther  than gauchistes ( l e f t - a f f i l i a t e d )  . 
From t h i s  or ien ta t ion  derive two sets of d i s t i nc t ive ,  though diffuse, 
images associated with the l e f t  and the r ighr .  In the minds of m o s t  of 
these s c i e n t i s t s  t he  image of the  r i g h t  is r a t h e r  negative: 
t i e s  are s e l f - i n t e r e s t ,  power, militarism, tradit ionalism, and pessimism. 
its proper- 
In contrast ,  those properties associated w i t h  "left ism" rend t o  be 
idealism, generosity, ob jec t iv i ty ,  and optimism--adding up t o  a much 
more pos i t ive  picture.  
These generalized sentiments c rea te  a broad transnational consensus 
tha t  enables European s c i e n t i s t s  of diverse origins t o  f e e l  "at home" 
with each o ther  i n  facing the world p o l i t i c a l  arena. 
line" i n  any narrow sense. 
I t  is not a ''party 
I t  is r a t h e r  a sliaring of values and assump- 
t ions ,  s t y l e  of thought, and tone of voice, A few excerpts from the  
Th grrghs are adapted from Lerner and Teich, 
l*Int ernaei ," p ~ .  13-15. 
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eous, usua 
ta t ion .  Here, then, are 
is capable of an objective evaluation of the world's 
social problems without taking h i s  own pa r t i cu la r  interests 
in to  the account. 
--ltalian physicist  
. . . Right people are fundamentally f o r  themselves, for 
t h e i r  own par t i cu la r  group . . , Whereas the left-they 
think of the maximum good f o r  the maximum number. 
--hi t i s h  physicist  
. . . Rightists [ in  Germany] are very much f o r  good old 
traditim; they are very much for good old allegiance; 
they are very much for  good old so ld i e r s  and so on. I 
don't l i k e  it so much.. 
--Geman physicist  
We can. define two kinds of people. Those from the left 
think t h a t  generosity i n  other people is  the main thing. 
On the other hand, the  people from the  r i g h t  think t ha t  
power is  the main thing , . . What I c a l l  a l e f t  man is  
a l i t t l e  b i t  optimistic about the poss ib i l i t y  . . . f o r  
man t o  do better--not i n  a t r i v i a l  way, you see,  but t o  a 
b e t t e r  knowledge of nature and man. On the other hand, a 
pessimistic view of l i f e  is held by the  man from the r igh t .  
--Swiss physicist  
It is important t o  emphasize again tha t  the  prevalence of left ist  
sentiments is the r e s u l t  of a preferred general orientation coward 
roundly rejected by most of these scientists. A l t  
th 
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impose a fixed pa t t e rn  OT structure on t h e i r  views. 
compromise, problem-solving, and what se 
approach to  the p o l i t i c a l  problems of  th 
2. Scope of Interest 
Witfiin.the broadly left ist  conssnsus--uhich one of t h e  above-quoted 
respondents related t o  the internationalism of  science i t se l f - the  not 
unexpected tendencjr of the respondents w a s  toward a mu& stronger interest 
i n  in te rna t iona l  i s sues  than i n  loca l  o r  national ones. 
unexpected" f o r  the geographic mobility of the  respondents a5 well as 
&e cosmpolitanism or' s c i e n t i s t s  i n  general and the simple f a c t  o f  i n t e r -  
nationalism i n  the  organizations provided a p r i o r i  reasons t o  suspect 
the presence of t h i s  tendency.19 To these s c i e n t i s t s ,  loca l  and even 
most national issws seem t r i v i a l  in comparison t o  the implications of 
in te rna t iona l  issues.  Furthermore, t o  most, i n t e r e s t  and par t ic ipa t ion  
We say "not 
in  t h e  routine a c t i v i t i e s  of p o l i t i c s  on the  loca l  level--attending party 
meetings and rallies, campaigning, fund-raising-, etc.--are c lear ly  
unappealing prospects. Finally,  and perhaps most compelling, there is  a 
need f o r  a comon ground i n  po l i t i ca l  discussions between s c i e n t i s t s  of 
various na t iona l i t i e s .  
A German scientist from CERN (interviewed i n  the 1965 Lerner study) 
l9 Abrahamson notes t h a t  cosmopolitanism and geographic mobility 
art not p a r t  of  the  same dimension, but are re la ted ,  Mark Abrahamson, 
ification, and Geographical Mobility," 
X,  1 (June 1965), pp. 98-106. 
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expressed t h i s  we 11 : 
It is not the  Sw 
polit ics-large developments l i ke  the European Common 
Market, ETA, NATO, the United Nations, and 
armaments question. 
No evidence a t  a l l  was- found t o  contradict  t h i s  
study, even among those sc i en t i s t s  o were l iving i n  t h e i r  own country 
while working i n  an internat ional  laboratory. On t h e  contrary, mch 
support emerged, despite the absence of  a d i rec t  question bearing on 
t h e  scope of p o l i t i c a l  in te res t .  
a t  ISPRA, an I t a l i an  physicis t  from CERN, and a French physicist  from 
We c i t e  the words of a Dutch engineer 
ISPRA: 
I am not so much in te re i ted  i n  the national p o l i t i c s  of 
Holland, t ha t  is clear. 
is a government crisis i n  I t a l y  th i s  doesn!t touch you. 
Therefore you are most interested i n  the foreign policy of 
big countries l i ke  Russia, the United States, and such 
things as Viet Nam and ROW [June 19671 the Middle East 
crisis. 
If there is t i  government crisis 
land it doesn't really tow% you and also i f  t h e r e  
We normally t a l k  not about po l i t i c s  here but something 
different .  We t a l k  of a l l  the problems. Not p o l i t i c s  
normally, but international poli t ics--the trend of the  
world, not a question tha t  is par t icu lar  t o  a nation or 
something l i ke  tha t .  
When you go t o  dinner all discussions are based on in te r -  
national affairs because nobody is so interested i n  
national affairs of the other one. So internat ional  
affairs are discussed. 
One may consider t h i s  
orientazion and the  extrapol 
bias  in favor of a 
c lear ly  part of these sc i en t i s t s  
ection of the leftist 
r, mare open s 
attitude structures .  
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C. 
As the s c i e n t i s t s  are employed on the bas i s  of supranat 
sionalism, the well-being of the  organizations requires tha t  they remain 
aloof from a c t i v i t i e s  serving pr iva te ,  par t i san ,  o r  national i n t e re s t s .  
Each of the organizations hence imposes such a restriction as par t  of its 
employee regulations. 
in other non-scientific in te rna t iona l  bodies and reflects the Staff's 
In t h i s  respect the  situation: is similar t u  tha t  
privileged s t a t u s  i n  the  hose country. The staff members are well aware 
of these  ru les  and apparently adherence t o  them is qui te  general. 
Several qua l i f ica t ions  should be stressed, however In the first 
place, forms of  p o l i t i c a l  par t ic ipa t ion  a t  the  lower level--as we have 
already noted--such as attending par ty  meetings, campaigning, and so 
forth, are not l i ke ly  t o  capture the i n t e r e s t  of most scientists due 
t o  t h e i r  routinized character. Second, as the  i n t e r e s t s  of most scien- 
tists are  focused on the in te rna t iona l  plane, and as they a re  away from 
home, the types of a c t i v i t i e s  excluded are not those cent ra l  t o  the 
s c i e n t i s t s  i n t e r e s t s ,  while direct par t ic ipa t ion  i n  the issues which 
i n t e r e s t  them is structurally limited. F i n a l l y ,  some forms o f  p o l i t i c a l  
par t ic ipa t ion  are in f a c t  possible. 
Within this last  category, a c t i v i t i e s  which f u l f i l l  informational 
needs and take the  shape of public forums and discussion groups con- 
cerned with current in te rna t iona l  i s sues  are perhaps the  most common. 
The EURATOM centers, ISPRA and PETTEN, for example, qu i t e  na tura l ly  
en ter ta in  speakers on issues of European integration. The PMTEN "Europa 
Forumr1 meets as a small club every few weeks. Public lectures are a 
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more comnon fom at IS 
ment. The staff ass 
on a recent t r i p  t o  h Vietnam drew a s 
-large au iunt. An o f f i c i a l  
scheduled t o  speak on American Vietnam policy later 
On a di f fe ren t  level,  some of the top s c i e n t i s t s  involved i n  CERN, 
ESRO, and ELIRATOM have been among the part ic ipants  i n  the Pugwash Con- 
ferences on Sciende and World Affairs. This type of ac t iv i ty ,  promoting 
an East-West dialogue,,lpould probably appeal t o  many of the less prominent 
s c i en t i s t s  who comprise our sample, but the fact that they are  not 
general2y able t o  take p a r t  is more a function of t h e i r  lower professional 
leve l  than t h e i r  internationaL status. 
Under such circumstances, one of the  few measurable evidences of 
p o l i t i c a l  par t ic ipat ion is voting. 
the various European nations d i f f e r  considerably i n  t h e i r  pol ic ies  
toward non-resident voting. 
(only on the questiannaire) on t h i s  topic--one on current voting habi ts  
and one on former voting habits--are a b i t  d i f f i c u l t  t o  in te rpre t  and 
Unfortunately t h e  governments of 
Hence, the two questions which were asked 
g i e ld  lreally 'comparable data f o r  the various na t iona l i t i es .  Other 
a t  a number 
0 young t o  vote p 
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beyond smte simple statements. 
of ten 
try?" (n = 246) some 73% responded "ev 
said "frequently," and only 7% said "ne 
current voting habi ts ,  the proportion responding '.'every 
46%, with 10% still reporting "freque 
r i s i n g  t o  20%- 
both CERN and ESTEC), where, since non-resident cit izens at'@ not allowed 
t o  vote, few respondents reported having done so at a l l  since leaving 
t h e i r  country.'' Voting frequency of the French and Germans--for whom 
the  process of voting while l iving abroad was d i f f i c u l t  but not rmpos- 
sible--declined somewhat, but most respondents s t i l l  reported voting, If: 
not every time o r  frequently, at least occasionally. Among the  ISalians, 
who were encouraged by t h e i r  government to  vote while l iving abroad, 
pat terns  of voting appeared subs tan t ia l ly  unchanged. 
O f  those r 
you vote in  nat ional  e lect ions while 
The most precipitous drop was among the Bri t ish (at 
While some respondents (par t icular ly  among the British) mentioned 
i n  the interviews tha t  t h e i r  i n a b i l i t y  t o  vote o r  their separation from 
t h e i r  own country discouraged i n t e r e s t  i n  p o l i t i c a l  a f f a i r s ,  t h i s  d i d  
not seem t o  be the general case. The questionnaire and the interview 
schedule both asked respondents whether they fe l t  tha t  there had been 
%ny change i n  their level  of i n t e r e s t  s incezohing  here?" 
pend suggested t h a t  most respondents believed tha t  thera  had been no 
The overal l  
change; some 63% so indicated,  Another quar te r  of the  respondents 
Those few who sa id  tha t  they did s t i l l  vote probably maintained 
a residence i n  Britain. 
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claimed t h a t  th 
level.  Variatims i n  
tabulations- t h a t  were done. Nationality, location on 
spectrum, absalutt? lev 
experience do not show any regular differences.  
tha t  respondents a t  ISPRA appeared s l igh t ly  more l ike ly  t o  say t ha t  
t h e i r  level of i n t e re s t  had increased than respondents a t  other labora- 
t o r i e s .  Given the p o l i t i c a l  nature of EURATOM and the other evidence 
of broader p o l i t i c a l  content at ISPRA, t h i s  should not be surprising. 
The major finding i s  
* * I  
This completes g. qual i ta t ive  sketch of the shape of palstical 
i n t e re s t  among the internat ional  s c i e n t i s t s  and engineers i n  the sample. 
The task of filling i n  t h i s  s t ruc ture  with a treatment o f  t h e  respon- 
dents'  opinions on spec i f ic  issues of current import s t i l l  remains, 
however. I t  is t o  t h i s  task tha t  the  next three chap.ters are  devoted. 
CHAPTER VI11 
ISSUES: THE UNITING OF EUROPE 
A. Introduction 
The p o r t i o n  o f  the s tudy which dealt w i t h  t h  poiizical op in ions  
o f  the s c i e n t i s t s  attempted t o  s t r i k e  a balance between the extremes 
of over-generality and over-specificity.  I t  avoided, i n  other words, 
questions concerning highly current topics as well as those on the 
historical-philosophical plane. 
butions of opinion on those issues most s a l i e n t  to the  respondents-- 
respondents whose p o l i t i c a l  discussions, i n  the analogy of one ISPRA 
Frenchman, resembded "more those you can find i n  a weekly magazine 
than in a daily newspaper." 
I t  w a s  hoped thereby t o  uncover d i s t r i -  
Despite t h e i r  lack of top ica l i t y ,  the relevant questions were by 
no means immune t o  the winds of change, even over the 
term. The European milieu of April-July 1967, within 
tists framed and evaluated a range of policy choices, 
r e l a t ive ly  short  
which the scien- 
differed substan- 
t i a l l y  from t h a t  of today (mid-1969). Throughout this discussion the 
reader need bear i n  mind tha t  a t  least two very profound events which 
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mast inevitably shake the foundationscof European' l i fe  had ne i ther  taken 
place nor even been foreseen: 
w i t h  student demonstrations i n  May 1968 and developed i n t o  a nationwide 
upheaval, nearly toppling the  F i f th  Republic. 
government eventually achieved an overwhelming electoral victory,  it-- 
like a l l  of France--emerged from t h e  experience severely tarnished. 
Second, the rapid l i be ra l i za t ion  of t he  Communist regime i n  Czechos lo- 
vakia which was suddenly*crushed by the invasion of Russian troops i n  
August 1968. 
by these and other important but l e s s  dramatic occurences; t h e i r  responses 
must be viewed accordingly. 
cal envirmment, the s ingle  issue which might be sa id  t o  have dominated 
the European news media during the peziod of t h i s  study was the Middle 
East conf l ic t .  
itself, and t he  decisive ye t  inconclusive outcome demonstrated a t  once 
the f r a g i l i t y  and s t a b i l i t y  of world order, t h e  impotence of t h e  United 
Nations, and the r e l a t ive  ianimportance of the European ro le  i n  world 
a f f a i r s  i n  comparison with the ro les  of the United States and the Soviet 
Union. 
F i r s t  the unrest i n  France, which began 
Although the Gaullist  
The respondents were considering an environment unaffected 
On the other hand, i n  the immediate p o l i t i -  
The crisis which led up t o  the  June 1967 war, the  war 
Mu& more could be sa id  about the European scene i n  l a t e  Spring and 
ear ly  Summer of 1967. 
i t 5  first decade-a decade which, while witnessing continued economic 
prosperity i n  the  Six countries, saw hopes for expansion as well as hopes 
for rap id  p o l i t i c a l  union repeatedly Erustrated. 
nation: outside of the Community--Great Britain--was faced with severe 
The European Community was nearing the end of 
The major European 
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economic problems superimpose 
War--at least i n  Europe--seem 
ous European observe 
invasion from the East. The 
increasingly involved i n  a w a r  i n  Southeast Asia, a w a r  f o r  whose per- 
ceived aims there w a s  l i t t l e  sympathy among 
O u r  questions did not attempt t o  range broadly across the entire 
spectrum of idsues which comprised the  European p o l i t i c a l  environment. 
Rather, as the  p o l i t i c a l  opinion questions were limited t o  approximately 
40% of the interview and questionnaire format, they sought t o  deal w i t h  
a small n h e r  of important issue clusters . '  
t he  themes around which t h i s  and the next t w o  chapters a re  organized. 
This chapter deals with European integration-wits p o l i t i c a l  and economic 
aspectS, t he  shape which is envisioned for it, the choices hVOlVed, and 
the motivations behind it ,  
West re la t ions  and securi ty .  
dGtente, economic relat ions with E a s t e n  Europe, problems o f  nuclear 
weapons and disarmament, and integration of mil i tary forces. Chapter X ,  
f i na l ly ,  is devoted first t o  broader problems of internat ional  relations- 
These issue clusters  are  
Chapter I X  t r e a t s  cer ta in  aspects of East- 
In par t icu lar ,  it is concerned with the 
the future  of the  United Nations 
number of politico-technological 
and world government--and second t o  a 
issues--the "technological gap ,I1 the  
i t i o n  of our being allowed t o  carry out t h i s  study within 
ch as, say, the Vietnam War or thqpersonal i ty  of 
might have created undue h o s t i l i t y  o r  suspicion 
iza t ions ,  w e  also agreed t o  avoid matters o f  a highly 
among some staff members 
administrations of the organizations. 
have i n  turn embarrass 
an issue-cluster was t o  define the range of views observed on face ts  of 
t h i s  c lus te r ,  es tab l i sh  the  consensual view ( to  the extent it exists) ,  
examine the deviations, r e l a t e  views on various face ts  of the  i ssue  
c lus t e r  t o  each other,  and look for t h e  differences produced by cross- 
cuts of the prime independent variables (laboratory, na t iona l i ty ,  and 
sen ior i ty)  as well as other variables. We rely largely on marginals 
and cross-tabulations of quant i ta t ive  data while drawingifreely from 
cher interview t ex t s  and write-in camntents, The numbers are 
* 
empirically derived, but those who have no experience with this s o r t  
of survey analysis should bear i n  mind tha t  the ways i n  which they are 
combined and interpreted a re  dependent on the judgement and experience 
of the author. 
B. Economic and P o l i t i c a l  Union 
Support for the common economic i n s t i t u t i o n s  which have developed 
-war Eltrope is so widespread among the elites i n  the major nations 
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The success of t 
meant tha t ,  b 
European econ 
been b u i l t  s ince the e 
became so strong tha t  the idea o f  co l lec t ive  economic growth 
had ceased t o  be a matter of controversy. 2 
We fe l t  su f f i c i en t ly  confident t ha t  t h i s  asser t ion should be va l id ' fo r  
s c i e n t i s t s  and engineers working i n  joint. European organizations t o  
take it more o r  less as a base and go on from there i n  OUT questioning. 
The choices which-were examined thus concerned the geographic extension 
of  the European economic in s t i t u t ions  as well as the potent ia l  move- 
ment of integrat ion from the economic t o  the p o l i t i c a l  realm. 
The problem of e.qanding the European Economic Community--choosing 
between " l i t t l e  Europe" and "big Europe"--which has been a t  issue since 
the ear ly  1960's c lear ly  hinges on the  admission of Great Britain.  
Admission of Britain, whose application has twice been rejected by t h e  
French government, would undoubtedly be followed rapidly by the entry 
of several  of Bri ta in 's  smaller EFTA partners ,  leading t o  a European 
Community o f  not  s i x ,  but perhaps ten or even th i r teen  members. 
the evaluation of t h i s  choice which was sought in the question: 
you favor the forination of a wider European Economic ComrnuTlity tha t  
would include the  present EEC (Six) and o ther  Western European nations?" 
This choice was expected t o  be most crucial t o  EURATOM sc i en t i s t s  whose 
personal fortunes were d i r ec t ly  t i e d  t o  the p o l i t i c a l  structure of the 
European Community. 
I t  i s  
"Would 
Some nat iona l i ty  differences were also anticipated 
Daniel Lerner and Morton Gorden, 
(Cambridge: 
er t o  manus 
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ering national e. In 
Table 8.1 
Extension of t he  EEC in  West 
by Laboratory and Nationality 
ESTEC CERN rsnu 
. B r  Fr Ce It B r  Fr Ge It  Fr Ge It 
735)a (19) (20) (7) (25) (13) (17)  (19) (25) (35) (39) 
Yes 83% 68% 100% 100% 88% 100% 100% 95% 84% 91% 85% 
No 11 26 0 0 12 0 0  3 12 3 10 
DK 6 6 0 0 0 0 0  0 4 6 5 
These Wts are ident ica l  f o r  the  remaining tables i n  t h i s  chapter 
- 
a 
(except where indicated) and w i l l  not be repeated, 
narionality/laboratory crass-tabulation f o r  t h i s  question. 
t o t a l  of 384 respondents, only 26 (7%) disapproved of extending the EEC 
t o  other countries of Western Europe. Within t h i s  lop-sided distribu- 
t i o n  lies, i n  one sense, an even stronger unanimity, b u t  i n  another sense, 
a de f in i t e  ambivalence. The f i n e r  s t ruc ture  is revealed through analysis 
of write-in caments, interview t ranscr ip ts ,  and cross-tabulation with 
Out of a 
other questions. 
(EIJRATOM) , approve of the "big Europe" scenario. Even among the  26 
2, January l968), pp. 20-22-reached this same conclusion. 
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dissenters, more than a fourth qua l i f ied  thei 
annotating c ts which indicated t h a t  they w extension 
a t  some time i n  the  fu ture .  
examination of the questionnaires t h a t  about ha l f  of the  remaining dis- 
approvers were motivated i n  t h e i r  disapproval by a des i re  t o  f o s t e r  
rapid p o l i t i c a l  unification of the Six, but were def in i t e ly  in te res ted  
in eventual expansion. 
es by 
Further, it is apparent from individual 
'Rae fear t h a t  expanding the  EEC might slaw the  process of p o l i t i c a l  
in tegra t ion  is at t h e  root  of an ambivalence which we suspect underlies 
the apparent unanimity of this response. Consider t h e  following i n t e r -  
view exerpts, a l l  responses t o  the above question: 
In a way yes.  This means tha t  I think i t ' s  necessary t o  
reach a p o l i t i c a l  union t i n  Europe] and I would l i k e  t o  
see t h i s  union as big as possible. On the other hand i f  
there  w a s  a. union between the  Six and the  Seven but purely 
on an economic basis,  then I would b e  against  such a union. 
--EURATOM Dutch physicist  
These are d i f f i c u l t  problems . . . it is  qu i t e  d i f f i c u l t  for  
d i f f e ren t  nations to--wen when there a re  not too many--to 
reach a common point of view. Now if you take a r ea l ly  strong 
union and add more nations you make t h i n g s  more d i f f i c u l t .  
mean it may turn out like the United Nations: 
and discuss and nothing comes out of it. 
I 
people discuss 
--CERN French physicist  
Basically I would prefer  a l a r g e r  community, but again I have 
i n  mind this idea of  reaching as fast  as possible a p o l i t i c a l  
union. 
ge t t ing  other nations in to  the Common Market, i f  the Common 
Market would gradually develop i n t o  an organization of only 
economic cooperation and assistance,  then I would prefer  t o  
have only six nations. 
--EURATOM German phys ic i s t  
Now i f  the p o l i t i c a l  union becomes more d i f f i c u l t  by 
w a s  not phrased i n  terms which might force t h i s  hard choice 
between expansion of t h e  economic community and p o l i t i c a l  i n t eg r  
of t he  present grouping, and perhaps it kill not be necessary f o r  Europe 
28 8 
t o  create a "big 
Naturally, three of the four main na t iona l i t i e s  are able t o  view 
the question of expanding the Community €r 
than the fourth. 
and remaining outside of a European union. 
majority of Bri t i sh  respondents d id  approve of expanding the community-- 
by implication including Br i ta in- i t  is noteworthy t h a t  the British 
accounted for a s igni f icant  proportion of the disapprovers. 
d i f f e ren t  perspective 
To the Brit ish,  the choice is between joining the. EEC 
While the overwhelming 
The meaning 
of t h i s  Br i t i sh  response w i l l  become clear shortly.  
2. P o l i t i c a l  Integration: Preferences 
i~.. Approvsl of Union. The t h r u s t  of the above analysis suggests 
t h a t  is is necessary t o  look t o  the matter of  p o l i t i c a l  unification for 
further def in i t ion  of t h i s  opinion-cluster. 
favor of the formation of a p o l i t i c a l  union among the rS ix t?9 t  and 
"Would you favor a p o l i t i c a l  union on a wider sca le  i n  Europe?" probe 
t h i s  matter. 
The questions "Are you i n  
Their tabulations are presented i n  Tab le  8.2 (see following 
page) ' 
Again one may observe a strang consensual response approving the  
Aside from t h e  Br i t i sh  and French at concept a t  issue. 
Similarly Lerner and G 
t h e i r  national el i te  panels '* 
rt tha t  
among 
the  next e Eui.op8an C even t o  
se steps 
2 89 
Table 8.2 
Approval of European Pb l i t i ca l  Union, 
by Laboratory and Nationali ty 
ESTEC CERN ISPRA 
Br Fr Ge It TOTAL -Fr Ge It - 
- .  
Yes 57% 79% 95% 100% 88% 100% 100% 90% 88% 97% 97% 85% 
No 34 16 5 0 12 0 0 5  4 0 3  11 
DK o s 0 0  a 0 0 5  8 3 0  4 
Wider Uniona 
Yes 61% 56% 90% 83% 86% 87% 100% 94% 85% 91% 83% 8 196 
DK 7 19 5 17 0 13 0 0  5 6 6  7 
n= (31) (16) ( 2 0 )  ( 6 )  (21) ( 8) (16)(18) (20) (52)  (3s) (342) 
%e pre te s t  interviews led the  author t o  believe t h a t  t he  subject 
of wider p o l i t i c a l  union would arise so natural ly  out of t he  discussion 
t h a t  it would not be necessary t o  include a separate question with 
regard t o  it. This expectation w a s  not borne out i n  42 of  the l a t e r  
interviews. The number of those f o r  whom data  is avai lable  is given 
i n  parentheses, and the percentage for the  "wider union" question is 
based on th i s  number. 
four-fifths and up to 100% o f  each gmup favor a political union of "little 
Europe" and nearly the sane proportions favor? wider pol i t ical  integration. 
Even among the  deviating ESTEC respondents there  are healthy majorit ies 
i n  favor of p o l i t i c a l  unification and r e l a t ive ly  snrall numbers d i r ec t ly  
opposed. 
on the table ,  the EURATOM centers o f  PETTEN and FONTENAY show 100% 
favoring union of the S ix  and 80% and loo%, respectively,  favoring bzroUer 
Looking briefFy at the  sma r laboratories which are not shown 
union; ESDAC shows a response pat tern p a r a l l e l  t o  ESTEC, while HALOEN and- 
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IAEA, t h e  least "Eur of the centers are i t h  65% and 36% 
favoring union of the  Six (IAEA has 36% DK) and 66% and 55% approving 
wider union. 
Such strong approval as was found a t  the  large centers was not 
unexpected of course. P o l i t i c a l  integration-despite 
of progress i n  the realm of government action-has mer 
t h e  elites of  Western Europe for  some time. 
the  major European nations give evidence of t h i s  trend.* Deutsch et al,, 
fo r  example, report t ha t  i n  t h e i r  1964 study of e l i t e s  i n  France and 
Elite opinion surveys i n  
-- 
Germany, 67% of the French e l i t e  favor "some kind of 'supranational 
dominance'" i n  European integration, and v i r t u a l l y  a l l  of  the Geman 
e l i t e  do so as well. ' 
covered sintilax a t t i t udes  i n  France and Germany, but not. i n  Britain: 
The TEEPS study, report  Lerner and Gorden, dis- 
The p o l i t i c a l  in te rpre ta t ion  of Europe was given by the  
continental panels alone; we can now see tha t  the p o l i t i c s  
they desired were those of close European supranational 
cooperation. e B r i t i s h  . . , did not have such an mien- 
tatiun i n  mind. % 
The ambivalence which some of t h e  respondents showed towasd the  
expansion of a purely economic community is apparenrly based on a 
strong desire for rapid strengthening 05 p o l i t i c a l  t ies  between the 
Eurqaan nations; confirmation can be seen i n  the p o l i t i c a l  union 
' Karl W. Deutsch, Lewis  J. Edinger, Roy C. Macridis, and Richard 
L (New York: Charles 
S 
Lerner 
29 1 
arose naturally within the interviews, n 
spec i f i c  questions with which we are dealing here, but i n  all so r t s  of  
other  contexts. Only a few individuals did not speak i n  t h i s  vocabu- 
lary or were not quite ae ease with it. I para1 leli EPS 
findings, these individuals were primarily Brit ish;  
ETEC 
most were from 
The cross-tabulation of t h e  twa p o l i t i c a l  union questions, d i s t r i -  
buted by laboratory and na t iona l i ty ,  bespeaks t h i s  conclusion even more 
vividly.  Here (Table 8.3, below) it i s  c l ea r  that outside of the ESTEC 
Table 8.3 
Approval of Both, One, or  Neither Form of Pol i t i ca l  Union, 
by Laboratory and Nationali ty 
ESTEC C ERN ISPRA 
Br Fr Ge It Br Fr Ge It Fr Ge It 
Approve Both 52% 47% 85% 83% 81% 87% 100% 83% 90% 94% 83% 
Only Six 7 33 10 17 5 13 0 6  . S  6 14 
Orily Nider 14 13 5 0 5 0  0 11 0 0 0  
Neither 2 7 7 0 0  9 0  0 0  5 0 3  
’ n = (29) (15) (20)  ( 6) (21) ( 8) (16)(18) (19) (31) (3S)a 
aExcludes those who were not  asked about wider union and those DK 
Bri t i sh ,  the  number of respondents who apprwe of nei ther  form of p o l i t i c a l  - 
n for’ Eusqp is rnin:is&e. small s are unwilling= 
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ical union of litical 
integration as unrealistic, to  
There is a d i s t i n c t  consensual posi- 
t i on  on the  issue-cluster described so far. 
some 85% of  the  respondents approve both geographi 
European Community and some form of p o l i t i c a l  union. 
t h e  "Europeans"--they hope tha t  the  p o l i t i c a l  boundaries separating the 
existing nations w i l l  someday give way t o  a supranational community and 
they r e a l i z e  that--in the words of one interviewee--"the Six is  not 
Europe yet, it is j u s t  Six." 
Over the  e n t i r e  sample, 
ansion of the  
These 85% are 8 -
They differ among themselves as t o  means, 
being undecided about whether t o  seek a p o l i t i c a l  community on a 
smaller scale- first and then expand geographically, o r  t o  enlarge- the 
community first as an economic community. 
distinguishing various types according t o  t h e i r  schedule of p r i o r i t i e s ,  
but one f ee l s  i n tu i t i ve ly  tha t  t h i s  is not a cruc ia l  f a i l i n g ,  as it 
The data. is incapable of 
seems tha t  the respondents themselves are qui te  undogmatic on t h i s  point: 
and most would be will ing t o  follow whichever course appears more prag- 
matic f o r  t he  goal of "making Europe.t1 
The deviates are found i n  several  categories: the  Brit ish (13 i n  
number) and the  French (4) a t  ESTEC, the  French ( 5 )  and Italians (6 )  
It is worth noting parenthetically t h a t  some r e  
s t i o n  of wider p o l i t i c a l  on as including the Eastern 
o broad a union w a s  not intended 5 and responded t o  th i s .  
, but its consideration as. a poss ib i l i t y  is cer ta in ly  
Including the  Icy as well as t he  %o, but late 
293 
at ISPRA. The ESTEC and ISPRA French and the  ISPRA Itafian:. deviates 
are r e l a t i v e l y  few, comprise 20% o r  fesj-*of t h e i r  groups, and seem t o  
be, for the most p a r t ,  Europeans of a more limited sor t .  Excepting a 
handful, they are the  ones who are most strongly against  expanding the 
economic community on t he  grounds t h a t  it would weaken the  ties between 
ths Six nations. Perhaps because Qf'this st i l l  European or ien ta t ion  or  
perhaps simply because they are so few i n  number it is not possible t o  
distinguish them f r o m  t h e i r  colleagues on t h e  basis of other variables.  
The ESTEC Bri t i sh  deviates, on the  other hand, def in i t e ly  appear to 
have less enthusiasm f o r  European supranationalism both i n  the  economic 
and p o l i t i c a l  senses; i n  the conventional parlance, they are less "Euro- 
pean." The tone of t h i s  a t t i t u d e  appears, f o r  example, i n  one Qr i ton ' s  
evaluation of t he  importance of the  Economic Community: 
There i s  this removal of some tax b a r r i e r s  but,  again, not a 
great deal has been done i n  t h i s  way. 
i n  t h a t  t h e i r  tariffs 6n some things are a l i t t l e  b i t  lower than 
with the  rest of Europe, but i t ' s  not t e r r i b l y  s ign i f icant .  
Let us make no mistake. 
These Six work together 
The majority of  the Br i t i sh  s c i e n t i s t s  
i n  our sample a re  c l ea r ly  European, committed t o  seeing t h e i r  nation 
pa r t  of a supranational Europe. A t  CERN and a t  the smaller laboratories 
the percentage of Br i t i sh  f a l l i n g  outside of t h e  consensus is about the 
same as t ha t  of any other major na t iona l i ty .  In t h i s  respect the views 
of t h e  Br i t i sh  s c i e n t i s t s  differ s igni f icant ly  from those of  t h e i r  com- 
p a t r i o t s  i n  the  national panels of TEEPS. 
of t he  Br i t i sh  (63%) are a l s o  within the consensus. Those whom we have 
ca l led  "deviates," however, are of i n t e r e s t  t o  us due t o  several  other 
A t  ESTEC as well, the majority 
charac te r i s t ics  
affairs than the other ESTEC British: none of t he  deviates rank them- 
selves above average while 23% of the consensus group do so. 
discuss p o l i t i c s  less frequently: 
"often" versus 32% of the consensus group. 
more on the  right:  
r i gh t  on the p o l i t i c a l  spectrum while 38% of the deviates do so. 
They appear t o  be less in te res ted  i n  p o l i t i c a l  
They 
only 16% respond "very often" o r  
They a l so  consider themselves 
9% of the. consensual group place themselves on the  
10 
FinaIly, they have lower seniority:  10 of the deviates come from t h e  
low senior i ty  group (n = 24) while only 5 come from the high sen ior i ty  
group (n = 11). 
This l a t t e r  point leads t o  one of the few "tests" of  func t iona l i s t  
theory which can be made with t h i s  data and thus requires something of 
a digression, It  w i l l  be recalled t h a t  we had hoped t o  f ind  variations 
i n  response- pa t t e rns  w i t h  length of  stay i n  the  laboratory (seniority]. 
I t  w a s  hypothesized t h a t  through experience working i n  an international 
laboratory, s c i e n t i s t s  would develop a t t i t udes  increasingly favorable 
t o  European unity,  thus preparing themselves f o r  a l a rge r  role i n  the 
integration process. The t e s t ing  of t h i s  hypothesis was one of the 
important or ig ina l  objects of the study. 
ever, it became more and more evident t ha t  the da ta  was not l ike ly  t o  
As analysis progressed, how- 
allow a real test. Without. even considering the nature of p o l i t i c a l  
We recall t h a t  deviates i n  other laboratory/nationality groups 
could not be distinguished from t h e i r  colleagues on the  bas i s  of external 
variables . 
Lower in t e re s t ,  less discussion, A d  "rightness" are re la ted  to 
each other i n  the whole sample; see Chapter V I I .  
, it w a s  apparsnt tha t  t he  mal-dist f respondents with 
respect t o  sen ior i ty  would operate 
i n  Chapter IV,  charac te r i s t ics  inherent i of two of the 
three large laboratories (ESTEC and ISPRA) made it impossible t o  obtain 
a balanced sen ior i ty  dis t r ibut ion.  
dent variables,  the qua l i t a t ive  picture  of the respondents' p o l i t i c a l  
a t t i tudes  (which emerged i n  Chapter V I I )  suggested tha t  broad areas of 
Beyond such problems with indepen- 
agreement should &ist on spec i f i c  issue-clusters. 
t h i s  t o  be the case. 
the respondents--17 out  of every 2O--fit in to  the consensual position 
outlined above. 
changes over time; there are  simply t.oo few non-Europeanist respondents 
t o  allow one t o  see any differences when t fs l ic ingls  by sen ior i ty .  
We have already seen 
On the  matter of European integration, some 85% of 
With such global agreement it is impossible t o  detect  
This overwhelming consensus may be viewed at: di f fe ren t  levels  of 
explanation. It is possible tha t  the choices presented by the ques- 
t ionnaire  were not  r ea l ly  the crucial  ones t o  t h e  respondents--i.e., 
tha t  the questions were t"too easy" for t h i s  s e t  of respondents. 
a t  t h i n g s  i n  th i s  l i g h t ,  one may hypothesize tha t  changes i n  opinion 
pat terns  might s t i l l  occur as a function of sen ior i ty ,  but tha t  such 
changes are too subt le  to  be detected by the questions which were posed 
here. Alternatively,  one might simply take the data a t  face-value: 
bulk of  the s c i e n t i s t s  are highly Europeanist when they come to  the 
laboratories,  and they remain t h a t  way. 
Looking 
The 
This is where the ESTEC Bri t i sh  become interest ing.  Within t h i s  
group, those individuals with high sen ior i ty  are s igni f icant ly  more 
Europeanist than t h e i r  colleagurss with low senior i ty .  With respect t o  
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xperience, t he  c 
bers of course become qui te  small). 
vaxiables t h i s  leaves us with a$ least a he effect that. tik L 
In  the absence of other ''explainingff 
experience o f  working i n  a European in t e rn  
a Br i t i sh  s c i e n t i s t  "European" i n  h i s  p o l i t i c a l  outlook." The 
Br i t i sh  at ESTEC, f a r t h e s t  removed from t h e i r  colleagues i n  or ig ina l  
p o l i t i c a l  outlook,may be the ones most affected by the experience. 
onal laboratory may d e  
3. Po l i t i ca l  Integration: Expectations 
It is of limited value t o  ask abs t rac t ly  whether one would favor 
political integration of t h e  European states; Q person's preferences 
i n  h i s  '"est of a l l  poss ib le  worlds" may become unrecognizable when 
extruded through the mold of p o l i t i c a l  r e a l i t y .  
was considered important t o  ascertain the  extent t o  which the respon- 
dents looked upon European unification as a realistic praspect which 
they might hope t o  see within a f i n i t e  time-period. In other words, 
FOT this reason it 
were the s c i e n t i s t s  simply. paying l ig-service 
Europe, or  d id  they have a concrete notion of 
- 
t o  the idea l  of a united 
its coming about? 
One might hypothes li 
tend t o  leave before they 
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The qws is already p a r t i a l  
respondents employed such p 
and "when Europe is done" implied a ge ion on t h e i r  par t .  
Nonetheless, the quesrions '90 you think tha t  i t  w i l l  ac tual ly  occur?" 
and "If yes, how many years would you estimate th  
which followed the item asking approval o f  a p o l i t i c a l  union among the 
Six, and the question "DO you think t ha t  L t  is possible i n  the foresee- 
able future?? which followed the item concerned w i t h  a w i d e r  p o l i t i c a l  
union shed additional l i g h t  on t h e  i s sue . c lus t e r .  
t h i s  might take?" 
Let us f i r s t  take up the*ui ion of t h e ' S i r .  Over the e n t i r e  sample 
two-thirds of the subjects f e e l  t ha t  it w i l l  occur (67% y e s ,  23% no, 
10% D K ) .  
erences and expectations. 
union more than three-fourths (77%) f e e l  t h a t  it w i l l  occur, while only 
16% do not. 
s t a t e  t ha t  it w i l l  not occur, while on ly  11% f e e l  that  it w i l l ?  
those who favor a political union see it as a r e a l i s t i c  prospect. Some 
of the minority of respondents who Zavor p o l i t i c a l  Wion but responded 
negatively (or  DK) t o  the question of expectation, furthermore, may 
have been giving vent t o  an expression of momentary f rus t r a t ion  as much 
as anything e l se ,  s ince more than a f i f t h  s t i l l  responded t o  the follow- 
up question d how many years it w i l l  take, while a number 
of others qua l i f ied  t h e i r  "noes'' by writ ing i n  "not for a long time." 
ences and expectations sug- 
gests tha t  th  /na t iona l i ty  groups th  the weakest pref- 
erences should also have the weakest expectations and vice versa, and 
There is a high degree of in te rac t ion ,  however, between pref- 
Among the 325 respondents who favor such a 
Among the 44 who stand opposed t o  a p o l i t i c a l  union, 86% 
Clsarly -
The strong i n  
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ion of the Si 
Pavor, 
expect 46%b 79% 55% 86% 64% 92% 76% 68% 76% 83% 67% 
Favor, 
don't expect 12 0 40 14 
oppose 9 
expect 6 5 0 0  4 0 0 0  0 0 0  
Qpose 3 
24 8 24 21 12 14 30 a 
don't expecta 29 11 5 0 8 0 0 5  4 0 3  
Includes DK expect a 
'Columns do not all add to 100% since those few who were DK on 
questions of favoring union are omitted. 
preferences. 
play the greatest optimism: 
union of the S i x  do not see it coming about. 
and the Italians evi 
Across a l l  three laboratories the Europeanist French d i s -  
Very few of those French who favor pol i t i ca l  . 
In cuntrast, the Germans 
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years, 
tions i n  t h i s  response by lab 
but it d id  app 
shor te r  time sca le  than the othem--46% of them estimated 20 years o r  
chose "more than 20 years ," and 18% d id  not know. l2 Varia- 
atory/nar ional i ty  g r  s were irregular, 
t h a t  the ISPRA s c i e n t i s t s  envisioned a somewhat 
less, while 33% a t  CERN and 29% a t  ESTEC made comparable responses. 
While ten t o  twenty years may bet a r e l a t ive ly  short period in a 
h i s t o r i c a l  perspective, it evidently seems inordinately long for m y  
of these respondenits in vieu of their s t rong desires for  European 
unification. A number of typ ica l  interviews (which have been repro- 
duced here conversationally] may i l l u s t r a t e  this point.  
sngiileer a t  ISPRA: 
First a Belgian 
A: . . I have the feeling tha t  p o l i t i c a l  Europe is not 
made and i t  w i l l  take s t i l l  many, many years b e f o r e  
w e  a r r i v e  at such a concept. 
What kind of time scale? 
I have a fee l ing  of ten years, something l i k e  tha t .  
Q: 
A: 
Next an I t a l i a n  engineer from ESTEC: 
Q: 
A: Oh yes,  but not as ear ly  as they say. 
Do you think t h a t  the Six w i l l  eventually form some 
kind of p o l i t i c a l  union? 
I think tha t  
they w i l l  be  o b l i g e d  t o  do t h i s ,  but it w i l l  be very 
d i f f i c u l t .  
Do you have any i d e a  how far  i n  the future  t h i s  might 
be? 
Q: 
A: Oh, at least ten years. 
Finally,  a German s c i e n t i s t  a t  ESDAC: 
Q: Do youbel ieve  tha t  the Six w i l l  eventually forn a 
p o l i t i c a l  union? 
A: Well I hope so. . , . It is not possible t o  achieve a 
p o l i t i c a l  unification i n  ten years, you see. We have 
has its own a his of 2,000 years and cou 
l2 me most popular wriee-in comment on this question w a s  "after 
de Gaulle." 
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history and such individual is t ic  p 
Europs--Frenchmen, Englishmen and 
Q: Well how many years do you esti 
A: Oh, I would say 20, 30 years. 
Clearly the respondents ant ic ipate  unification of a t  least " l i t t l e  
Europe1* i n  the r e l a t ive ly  short-term future.  
scale  is  a dif€erent matter, however. 
t ha t  they thought wider p o I i t i c a l  union was possible i n  the fo~eseeab le  
Integration 
Only a minority 131%) indicated 
future;  more than hal f  (56%) did not foresee such a poss ib i l i ty ,  and 
13% gave no opinion.13 There was some interact ion between the expecta- 
t ion  of union of the Six and tha t  of a larger union. O f  those who 
s ta ted  tha t  a union of the Six would not  occur, only 13% ant ic ipated 
the broader union (82% said 
expectations ctid include a union of the Six, nearly half  a l so  f e l t  a 
wider union was possible. Evaluations of  the likelihood o f ' t h i s  wider 
and 5% w e r e  RK). Among those whose 
-
union varied widely across the different  laboratory/natianali ty groups. 
Table 8.5 (see following page) presents preferences and expectations with 
regard to a wider union i n  a fashion analogous t o  Table 8.4. 
This t ab l e  t e s t i f i e d  t o  the skepticism about p o l i t i c a l  integration 
of "big Europe" which mst of the respondents displayed. 
degree of opt idsm is shown by the  ESTEC Brit ish,  who, interest ingly 
enough, were next t o  the least favorable t o  the  idea. In  other words, 
The highest 
who do favor a wider p o l i t  union, most 
elites, pa ra l l e l s  
30 1 
Table 8.5 
Expectations and Preferen Union 
by Laboratory and Natio 
ESTEC 
Br F r  Ge It 
Favor, 
Favor 
don't expecta 13- 25 55 60 
oppose, 
expect 3 0 0 0  
Oppose, 
don't expecta 30 25 S 0 
n = (30) (16) (30) ( 5) 
expect 4?%b 32% 35% 20% 
0 
CERN 
B r  F r  Ge It  
38% 0% 21% 33% 
43 86 79 60 
6 0 0 0  
ISPRA 
Fr Ge It  
12% 19% 32% 
70 71 48 
0 0 3  
12 3 10 
(17j (31) ( 3 i j  
a Includes DK expect. 
Columns do not a l l  add t o  100% s ince  those few who were DK on 
questians of favoring union are omitted. 
expect tha t  it w i l l  occur, while i n  nearly a l l  of the other groups the  
majority of those favoring a union do not f e e l  it w i l l  come about i n  the 
foreseeable fu ture ,  
t h i s  point.  
i n  the  two tables ,  while every other group is more pessimistic about a 
wider union than a union of the Six. 
of the  last section, most of the ESTEC Bri t i sh  who oppose one type of 
p o l i t i c a l  integrat ion o 
who favor one type favor the other and are the  consens 
information which w e  get  here i s  that the p i c  
by these British ccnseEsuals is substantially more optimist ic  about 
-
X comparison of  Tables 8.4  and 8.5 fur ther  emphasizes 
The dis t r ibu t ion  of the ESTEC Bri t i sh  is v i r tua l ly  ident ica l  
Referring back t o  the terminology 
e other and are the deviates,  while most 
The added 
of Europe envisioned 
Is. 
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# 14 t h  of h, 
C. Integrative Motives 
What hopes do the  s c i e n t i s t s ,  so committed t o  t h e  uniting of Europe, 
place in  the accomplishment of t h i s  ai her s tud ies  have a uted 
various motives t o  the  e l i t e s  of major 
for integration. 
t h e  purpose of European integration as "generally, t o  give Europeans 
the means and resources t o  solve economic, soc iz l  and p o l i t i c a l  prob- 
lems currently insoluble by nation-states acting alone. ' I  
betterment ," "reinforce [ment 1 of the European bargaining posit ion i n  
wcrrld p o l i t i c s ,  I' and "strengthen [ing] t h e  European posit ion vis-a-vis 
the United States," follaw i n  that order.15 Unification for Germaw 
opean nations i n  t h  
Deutsch e t  a l .  report the  most popular French view of --
"Economic 
is  seen as a l l  things t o  all men-economic benefits  are s t ressed  by 
businessmen, p o l i t i c a l  benefits  (inside Europe) by po l i t i c i ans ,  and 
diplomatic benefits  [outside of Europe) by admmistrative and mass 
media elites 16 
Lerner and Gorden, dealing with t h i s  problem from the vantage 
point of t h e i r  e n t i r e  vas t  data set, ra ther  than from separate items, 
l i cy  p r i o r i t i e s ,  
er and Gorden 
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tp ro tec t ion ,  prosperity,  and p r e s t  
under llEuronational , Euramerican, and 
*'Euronational" scenario correspond 
"Euramerican" t o  the  Monnet model, and 9karatlantic" t o  such i n i t i a t i v e s  
as NATO and the Marshall Plan.) They conclude tha t  
there  is an emerging cons within, aiid a convergent 
c o n s e n s  between, the  el 
Further, that- t h i s  convergence goes i n  the  d i rec t ion  
postulated by our developmental constmct: 
ism t o  regionalism. The convesgence is base= the 
s h a r a  long-run expectations tha t  personal and public 
values (protection, prosperity,  p res t ige)  w i l l  be enhanced 
by the l a rge r  community of i n t e r e s t  embodied in the Euramer- 
ican and Euratlantic scenarios. 
of t he  European nations. 
from national- 
While t h i s  is a ra ther  general statement of motives, it corresponds 
well t o  the overa l l  frame wiihin which our respondents see unification 
operating. To a large extent it appears, i n  fact, t h a t  within the  con- 
sensual posit ion of these respondents, the sustaining value of integra- 
t i on  is so automatically taken f o r  granted tha t  i t s  spec i f i c  benefits  
are not of t e r r i b l y  high salience.  Among those who share the "European" 
or ien ta t ion ,  the purpose of "Europe" is beyond question. 
We d i d  not attack t h i s  face t  of t h e  un i f ica t ion  i ssue-c lus te r  
d i r ec t ly ,  but found t h a t  the relevant da ta  emerged wtihin the context 
o f  interviews mainly i n  aafysis of three questions. Wile the  three 
are taken up here i n  varying depth, they al l  share the aspect of  being 
concerned with United States-Europe re la t ions :  
At lan t ic  Economic Community, the second with "independence," and the  
the  first with an 
l7 Lerner and Gorden, Euratlantica,  pp. ff-58-6$. 
304 
t h i r d  with 
is a feeli a bes t  approximat 
for European unification the words of  one sc ien  -"If 
there is a Euture for Eur 
unity." 
peans the  means and resources t o  so lve  economic, soc i a l  and 
problems currently insoluble by nation-states acting alone," and i n  
kmerls  terms the enhancement of  t h e  public vaPues lfprotection, 
leading continent, i t ' s  only 1 
By this is meant in Deutsch's terms "generally [giving] Euro- 
prosperity, prestige." Above a l l ,  though, there is the  impression tha t  
pa r t i cu la r  reasons are not so important as the broad vision of a United 
Europe. 
This vision may be seen i n  terms of Europe-United S ta tes  re la t ions .  
Following the question on expansion of the EEC i n  Western Europe were 
two additional expansion proposals, t he  first suggesting an economic 
community with the nations of Eastern Europe, and the second suggesting 
such a community w i t h  the United S ta tes ,  
of the  respondents approved expansion t o  Eastern Europe, while  fewer 
than one-third (31%) approved expansion t o  the United S ta tes .  The 
l a t en t  reason behind this response appears clear-Eastern Europe is 
Close t o  two-thirds (62%) 
"Europe'f and the United States isn' t. l8 While "strengthening the  
unit." Relation also t r ea t ed  i n  the 
f o llawing chapter 
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European posit ion vis-a-vis t 
mary motivation for these E u r  rceiv 
outcome of the process. 
merely pro-Ewope. 
Such thinking is by no means anti-U .S. ; it is 
The d is t r ibu t ion  of responses t o  the r 
'Would you favor such an economic conrmunity 
is fairly smooth across the v a r i w  laboratory/ne;tionality groups. The 
strongest approval [actually a p lura l i ty )  is 44% among the CERN Brit ish,  
while most other approval levels range around 20-30%. This question, 
however, d r ~ w  an ex t r so rd ina r i ly  h igh  r a t e  of wri-te-in comments (half of 
a l l  respondents qual i f ied t h e i r  answers) and proper i n t e q r e t a t i o n  
requires taking these in to  account. 
both "yes" and "no1* respondents made very similar remarks and qualifica- 
Most impressive is the  fact that  
t ions.  
economic integrat ion is the building of Europe, and that  t h e  time t o  t a l k  
of  stronger Atlantic t i e s  was a f t e r  Europe was united onto i t s e l f ,  Often 
t h e  fact t ha t  the United States is so much larger and more powerful than 
the individual European countries was ci ted,  and it  was explained that 
unless Europe was united first, the inevitable r e su l t  would be  American 
domination of any integrat ive arrangement. Many comments on both "yest' 
and fmnotm responses deferred consideration 05 the  matter t o  the future  
The bulk of the  comments re f lec ted  feel ings tha t  the  purpose of 
i l e  there we variants  from this 
lly-oriented posit ion (for example feel ing as one Britisher did 
tha t  an Atlan de the world even more r ig id ly  
glhave-nots'l), it is a more broadly shared 
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notion than one might suppose from t h e  msrginal alone. 
A few interview excerpts may a l so  be illuminating. The words of a 
Bri t i sh  s c i e n t i s t  from ESDAI: suggest the shape of the position: 
Here I think one has t o  say why one is in te res ted  i n  
extending the Common Market, and i t ' s  not simply for 
economic reasons. 
one sort of a fookhold i n  international cooperation. 
i n  Europe, generally, Western Europe, t h i s  s o r t  of thing 
exists t o  some extent already. 
objections, but i t 's  a much more remQte prospect, you know. 
This could be integrated-very readily, given t h e  r i g h t  
p o l i t i c a l  circumstances, i n t o  a viable economic un i t  and a 
sensible p o l i t i c a l  u n i t -  With the United S ta tes ,  I ' m  not 
so sure t ha t  this is t rue  t o  anything like the same extent. 
I t 's  more f o r  the f a c t  t ha t  t h i s  gives 
Well, 
Eastern Europe, one has no 
Those of a French physicist  from CERN re f ine  it:  
I would be a b i t  worried by the f a c t  t h a t  there is so 
much difference presently between the weight of the  United 
States and tha t  of Europe which is not at all unified,  
strongly unified, 
and I don't  think i t ' s  at a l l  t h e  time for t h i s  now. 
A l l  the weight would go i n  one d i rec t ion  
Finally, a Belgian engineer from ESTEC may have put it most concisely: 
This is a funny question. The United States mustn't be 
included because nothing would be changed i n  t h i s  case! 
I t  is by and large a matter of independence. A unified Europe, 
regaining i t s  posit ion as a "leading continent," must be able t o  deter- 
mine its own destiny. After World War 11, t he  bipolar configuration of 
mili tary and p o l i t i c a l  power relationships l e f t  the individual European 
nations i n  a state of dependence t o  which they were unaccustomed. 
recent years, the gradual evolution of a more multi-polar system hers 
opened opportunities f o r  greater independence far a p o l i t i c a l l y  united 
Europe. 
dent posit ion i n  the Western Alliance," nearly three-fourths (71%) of our 
respondents rep l ied  affirmatively. This response, which again w a s  shared 
In 
When asked if they thought Europe "should take a more indepen- 
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across th ona l i t i e s ,  is fuz: 
by the  fact that a s igni f icant  proportion of the  negative 
qua l i f ied  by such coments as "after it is united." Even among those 
respondents who would approve a U. S. -European economic community, a 
majority (55%f favor a more independent posi t ion for  Europe. 
is the 'prest ige"  element of  the motivation for building Europe. 
Here, then, 
Finally,  as scientists and engineers, it is perhaps i n  their own 
fields t h a t  the need'to bui ld  Europe s t r i k e s  our respondents c loses t  to 
home. When asked i f  they thought "that the &technological gap' currently 
being discussed i n  the press is a serious problem for Europe," the vast 
majority of the respondents (75%) repl ied aff i rmat ively,  The t'oliow-up 
t o  th i s  question was open-ended and asked the respondent t o  suggesr 
whatever act ion might be necessary t o  close the  gap. Reponses ranging 
from short catch-phrases to lengthy proposals were recorded and by far 
the  most frequent (dis t r ibuted we1 1 across na t iona l i t i es  and laboratories) 
were those which emphasized more European cooperation and integrat ion.  
Nearly half  (12%) of  a l l  suggested actions were aimed i n  t h i s  d i rect ion.  
Drawing on the interviews again, one may c i t e  answers such as ,  
No, I have no solution fo r  t h i s  problem . % . but I have 
the feel ing that making Europe is something which is r e a l l y  
necessary, which is a fundamenta3 necessity t o  a r r ive  a t  a 
so lution. 
--EURATOM Dutch physicist  
Well, I feel tha t  the  only type of act ion t h a t  could have a 
chance t o  f i l l  t ha t  gap would be an action of the Gomanmity. 
I bel ieve if we don't build Europe, at least technological 
Europe, w e  have no chance. 
--EURATOM Belgian engineer 
Essent ia l  t o  remember here is the fact that .Lerner  and Gorden's so-called 
ltEuramerican scenario" emerges very c lear ly  from a significant proportion 
of the  respondents of a l l  major'nationalitie 
d i r e c t  e l i c i t a t i o n ,  
a 
0. The Structure of a United Europe 
Beyond the  outlines of European unification, which were drawn first 
i n  terms of preferences and expectations, and second in. tp?nns of Che- hopes 
vested i n  the process, the  images of ac tua l  s t ruc tu re  held by the  inter- 
national s c i e n t i s t s  and engineers become somewhat more diffuse.  In view 
of the f a c t  tha t  they do not possess the technical s k i l l s  necessary f o r  
sophisticated examnation of many of the  questions involved and i n  view 
of t h e i r  limited emotianal commitment t o  p o l i t i c a l  matters (we r eca l l  the 
"expert syndrome" described i n  Chapter V I I )  , such "thinning-out" should 
not be unexpected. 
i n  dealing with two segments of t he  s t ruc tu ra l  complex: 
locus of power i n  a United Europe, and second with the preservation of 
narional culrures.  
do no more than scratch the surface of a s t ruc tu ra l  image a t  two widely 
varying points,  i t  was f e l t  t ha t  there should be s igni f icant  material i n  
these topics.  
Ntve the less ,  the questionnaire! had mderate success 
first with the  
Wlvle the  response patterns for t he  two questions can 
The preservation of national charac te r i s t ics  might be 
expected t o  be a source of ambivalence toward European integration: Is 
there a perceived conf l i c t  i n  the  minds of the respondents between the  
des i re  f i t y ,  p ro t ec t i  d pres t ige  through t h e  elimination 
of national boundaries and the desire f o r  maintaining the special charac- 
ter of Europe-th 
f i e r c e l y  proud? 
f its parts-of which Eurapeans are so 
e other side,  t h  articular fonn of government f o r  
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Europeans w i l l  have t 
As p a r t  of the debate over "Europe des 
source of controversy between Gaullists and more supranationally oriented 
already been the  
-..-.111 
Europeans. 
i n g  which even remotely resembl a consensus cane out of 
, 
question OR. form of g i v e m e n t .  me proportions favoring a "strong 
cent ra l  power" (34%) versus "more power for the  s ta tes"  (47%) give a 
s l i g h t  edge t o  the s t a t e s .  But a large DK (17%), wide var ia t ions 
between the various laboratory/nationali ty groups (see Table 8.61, and 
an ambiguous set of comments apparently make it a wide-open issue. 
Table 8.6 
Preferred Form of Government, by Laboratory and Nationality 
ESTEC CERN ISPM 
Br F r  Ge I t  BY F r  Ge I t  F r  Ge I t  
Central Power 31% 53% 40% 148 205 31% 35% 26% 20% 40% 54% 
More f o r  
DK 29 17 15 43 16 46 6 26 32 26 10 
Sta tes  30 32 35 43 64 23 59 45 4a 34 36 
The: question itself and the  choices p red were apparently them- 
selves  ambiguous s ince there  are widely differ ing conceptions among the 
respondents of what const i tutes  strong o r  weak cent ra l  power. This makes 
t ' s  choice of 
example that, one form of government over the other. One may note 
31 0 
r e l a t ion  t o  any other  p a t t e  
ti Among those 22 resp , on earlier questions, 
approve e i t h e r  type of p o l i t i c a l  union for Europe, "more power fo 
states'' enjoys a wide (68% t o  18%) edge over "strong cent ra l  power." 
Strong centraJ power, t o  the extent it e x i s t s  i n  France (or  I t a ly ) ,  is 
qui te  d i f fe ren t  from t h e  American conception, and i t  is  l i ke ly  tha t  few 
respondents envisioned anything qu i t e  so d r a s t i c  for a European govern- 
ment." 
able t o  uncover it--incorporates a government largely para l le l ing  tha t  i n  
the  United States,  w i t h  certain powers delegated to a central authority 
with one pre 
Probably the most widely shared view--to the  extent t ha t  we are  
but with subs tan t ia l  loca l  aumnomy. 
The second aspect of the image of a united Europe is tha t  which 
m u s t  r a t iona l ize  a desire for p o l i t i c a l  integration w i t h  a des i re  t o  main- 
t a i n  cu l tura l  d i f fe ren t ia t ion .  To see if our respondents had succeeded 
i n  resolving t h i s  d i f f i c u l t y ,  w e  asked them "Do you think tha t .  the 
ex is t ing  cultures of Europe could maintain t h e i r  individuali ty within a 
united Europe?" 
no and 6% DR). 
w i t h  pos i t ive  responses ranging from 75% to  100%. 
The response was a resounding "yestt (88% yes versus 6% 
The cons-ensus covered a l l  laboratory/nationali ty groups 
Only a handful of 
errmtted to.second-guess h i s  own work, it seems 
l i k  l e  re 
W h i  
it 1 gov 
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s found any p a t  all. A greaf mpny p 
ary European examples which 
need not be iden t i ty  between culture and p o l i t i c a l  structure:  
Look ai: Switzerland, f o r  instance. This is a nation 
but the provincial  charac te r i s t ics  are s t i l l  there.  
one still has h i s  own language, his own culture and so 
for th .  
follaw. 
Every- 
We have a very good example i n  Europe which we can 
-E'URAm Italian engineer 
I mean the  Bavarians s t i l l  maintain t h e i r  individual i ty  i n  
Germany and the North Germans are cer ta in ly  qu i t e  d i f fe ren t  
hrom them. So there  is no d i f f i cu l ty .  
--CERN German physicis t  
There is no desire on, the par t  of the respondents t o  see a blending oE 
the various national t rad i t ions  and there i s  no reason, i n  t h e i r  minds, 
why p o l i t i c a l  integrat ion should lead t o  t h i s .  There is even a mild 
suggestion t h a t  European integrat ion might. f a c i l i t a t e  the  preservation 
of nat iona l  t radi t ions.  by r e s i s t i ng  the  t i d e  of ffAmericanization.ff20 
Such is the image of a united Europe. 
* * *  
In describing the p o l i t i c a l  opinions of  the  respondents on the  
i ssue .c lus te r  most s a l i en t  t o  them w e  find, first  of  a l l ,  a wide sharing 
o f  ideas-+ finding which is consistent wi th  the overal l  a t t i t ude  s t ruc-  
ture of  t h i s  group of  European sc i en t i s t s  described in Chapter VfI .  
Pol i t i ca l  integrat ion of the European nations is a basic goal, and the 
preferred framework is one of "big Europe" rather than "li t t le Europe." 
The widesz deviation from t h i s  consensus is found among a group of 
Brit ish respondents from ESTEC, Within t h i s  group, the frequency of 
2o See along these lines, Jean-Jacques S8wanlSchr@+ber, 
Athsnsurn, 19681, and Lemer and Gor [New York: 
Chapter I. 
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deviation is found t o  be higher among low sen io r i ty  
-ng en ior i ty ,  an ind ic  
t i o n  from the  general view of European p o l i t i c s  exists 
tists, it is s igni f icant ly  a l t e r ed  over time the  laboratory. 
Preferences were found t o  in t e rac t  with ectations and t h  
favored p o l i t i c a l  integration were more l i ke ly  t o  see it as ac tua l ly  
coming about i n  the  near future.  In general, however, integration of 
" l i t t le  Europe" (interpreted by a good many, it appears, a5 including 
Britain and the Six) w a s  viewed as a l i ke ly  occurence during t h e  next 
twenty years or so, while  l a rge r  integration was c lear ly  more speculative. 
The desire €or economic integration (as a s tep  toward p o l i t i c a l  communi- 
ty) was regionally based and did not extend, €or the  most par t ,  across 
t h e  A t l a n t i c .  
pean s c i e n t i f i c  community, a clear and realist~cally-structured 
Thus, within the internationalism professed by the EUTO- 
regionalism has developed i n  the minds of an important functional segment. 
How the  a t t i t udes  of these scientists develop wi th  respect t o  other 
issues will be seen i n  the two .succeeding chapters. 
CHAPTER IX 
ISSUES: EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND SECURITY 
This chapter describes the  p o l i t i c a l  views of our sample of in t e r -  
national s c i e n t i s t s  and engineers with respect t o  a number of crucial  
issues involving the larger world of which Western Europe comprises but 
one part. 
in tegra t ion  are most s a l i e n t  t o  these men and most in t e re s t ing  t o  us i n  
the  context of a study of t h e  functional ro l e  of technological collabora- 
t i on  i n  the European arena, such issues do not demarcate the p o l i t i c a l '  
horizon of  the respondents. 
r i d i n g  importance i n  determining t h e  future of the e n t i r e  world are 
problems which involve the continuing confrontation of  the "East" and 
the "West"--the Communist and non-Communist s t a t e s .  This confrontation 
is probably the most important s ing le  p o l i t i c a l  fact of the presant age. 
As a result of t he  tensions which it has produced, consideration of  its 
attendant issues leads immediately t o  concerns of mili tary secur i ty  and 
nuclear weapons. 
Although, as has been s t a t e d  repeatedly, issues o f  European 
O f  pa r t i cu la r  concern because of t h e i r  over- 
The European s c i e n t i s t s  and engineers working i n  in te rna t iona l  
laboratories are concerned, t o  varying degrees of CouTse, with a l l  of  
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these matters. 
f u l l  treatment of each, and,. 
t ions  of the s vey instrument t o  non-political 
p o l i t i c a l  questions about European integration, it was possible only t o  
deal with selected areas of the East-West, 'mi l i ta ry  security picture.  
The purpose of t h i s  study, however, did not allow a 
fact, after having dev 
Thus, this portion of the  analysis deals i n  turn with the dktente, the 
building of supranational mili tary forces 
eration of nuclear weapons. 
and the possession and pro l i f -  
Before proceeding wi th  the first of these 
.questions, the reader should be reminded once again t h a t  the response 
patterns under discussion were a r t icu la ted  during mid-1967, and while 
long-range a t t i tudes  may not have been affected by such subsequent 
deyelopments as the  invasion of Czechoslovakia, shorter-term expectations 
may well be d i f fe ren t  naw than they were at ~&e tine of the study. 
A. The Dgtenre 
As noted i n  Chapter VIII, the poss ib i l i t y  of opening up an economic 
community between Eastern and Western Europe was welcomed by a sizable 
majority o f  the respondents, Table 9.1 (see following page) which p ~ e -  
sen ts  t he  d is t r ibu t ion  of t h i s  response by laborat&y and na t iona l i ty ,  
shows t h a t  although some dissenters exist i n  each group, t he  general 
fee l ing  is widely shared throughout the sample. 
0 ti e no while 
Italians (except at CERN) displayed the  strongest opposition. We suspect 
Overall <including the 
r e f l e c t  a mingling of two 
P 
Europe, and (2) attitudes toward a 
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Table 9.1 
Economic Community with Eastern Europe, 
by Laboratory and Nationality 
ESTEC CERN ISPRA 
B r  Fr Ge I t  Br Fr Ge It Fr Ge It  
( 3 5 ~  (19) (29) ( 7) (2s) (13) (17) (1 9) (251 (3.5) (39) 
Ye?p 43% 53% 70% 29% 22% 69% 88% 79% 48% 57% 41% 
No 37 26 20 57 24 31 6 21 32 26 49 
DK 20 220 l o  14 4 0 6 0  20 17 10 
a These ifnits are  ident ical  f o r  the remaining tables  i n  t h i s  chapter 
and w i l l  not be repeated. 
rapprochement between E a s t  and West. Ear l ie r ,  i n  exploring issues  con- 
cerned with European integrat ion,  t h i s  response w a s  taken as an indication 
of a strong des i r e  on the p s r t  of the s c i e n t i s t s  not t o  exclude the Eastern 
poztion of t h e  continent from integrat ive arrangements-evincing consciow- 
ness of a peculiarly "European" en t i t y .  Here it is taken as indicative 
not only of a desire  to see the "Iron Curtain" breeched, b u t  of  a t  l ea s t  
a mild, long-term expectation tha t  something as concrete as an economic 
(and by implication a po l i t i ca l )  community may eventually emerge. 
Variations in the response a re  not en t i r e ly  easy t o  account f o r  i n  
term of other response pat terns .  In par t ,  of course, they reflect 
I t  is noteworthy tha t  the percentage i n  favor of including Eastern 
E w e  among respondents identifying themselves as  left ist  (66%) is not 
far di f fe ren t  from tha t  among respondents ident i fying themselves as 
rightist (53%). 
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approval o r  disapproval of the wh 
so some deviance may be explained on these grounds, 
approval among the I t a l i ans  a t  ESTEG and 
might be based i n  part on t h e i r  des i r e  t o  see t i gh te r  integration of 
the Six precede expansion. 
The r e l a t ive ly  high leve l  of German approval may have been due i n  p a r t  
t o  the  overall  strong German response toward large-scale supranational- 
i s m  i n  Europe, and in part to' the fact t h a t  such a community with Eastern 
Europe would have special  advantages for Germany i n  t e r n  of its reunifi-  
cation ambitions.' 
The low level of 
e French a t  ESTEC 
(See Chapter V f I I ,  p a r t i cu la r ly  Table 8.3.) 
CERN showed the most receptiveness t o  t he  Eastern 
European commnity and i t  i s  not  i l l o g i c a l  t o  assume t ha t  t h i s  i s  i n  
some way associated with the  broad openness which t h e  organization (and 
the Western high energy physics community) has shown toward participa- 
t ion  by Eastern Enrapean physicists.  
In any case, these a re  l imited variations within a frame of consen- 
sual approval of greater cooperation w i t h  the East. 
d i ten te  between East and West is  so widely taken €or granted within the 
The whole notion of 
-
s c i e n t i f i c  communities of the various Western European countries t ha t  
we felt it would be superfluous to ask respondents i f  they favored the 
* Our finding is consistent with tha t  of Karl Deutsch, e t  al.,  
(New York: Char les -&anerfs  
n te l lec tua ls ,  i n  
i n  favor of act 
the E a s t  (pp. 170-171). 
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concept.3 The survey found no evidence t o  contradict  t h i s  assumption. 
The question-which w a s  asked on t h i s  top ic  dea l t  with expectations of 
d i ten te  ra ther  than preferences and w a s  phrased i n  the following manner: 
"DO you feel tha t  the ddtente which has been developing i n  recent years 
between the West and the European Communist countries is par t  of a 
l a s t ing  trend?" 
8% no, 17% DK) and comments such as '1 hope so'' followed nearly every 
pes i t ive  interview reply. Table 9.2 shows that the unanimity of this 
The response w a s  an overwhelming affinaation (75% yes, 
among the most widespread of those with which w e  have deal t .  
Table 9 . 2  
Expectation of  Dgtente, by Laboratory and Nationality 
ESTEC CERN ISPRA 
Br F r  Ge It Br F r  Ge It  Pr Ge I t  
Yes 74% 84% 70% 100% 80% 77% 65% 74% 80% 66% 64% 
No 14 0 5 0 1 2 0 6 5  0 11 15 
DK 12 16 25 0 8 23 29 21 20 23 20 
Expectations tha t  the dgtente is part of a las t ing  trend range from 
64% t o  loo%, and i n  those groups where optimism is weakest, it is replaced 
not by pessimism but ra ther  by uncertainty. 
respondents (if one may extrapolate motives from the  interviews t o  the 
About one quarter of the 
Deatsch et a1 make it c l ea r  tha t  t h i s  is not the case i n  h is  
broader German e l i t e  sample (Ibid. ,  and p. 153), but note tha t  there is 
'%ridespread sympathy" for  greater contact with Eastern Europe among 
French e l i t e s  (p. 66). 
--* ' 
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entire sample) were simply unwilling t o  state categorically t h a t  t h e i r  
hopes would be f u l f i l l e d  i n  the  foreseeable future; most chose t o  say 
tha t  they d idn ' t  know, while a few expressed the  equivalent of "no, there  
are too many fluctuations i n  East-West re la t ions  to  be able t o  pro jec t  
any l a s t ing  trends. 
The expectation of G t e n t e  transcends the division of t h e  sample -
i n to  laboratory/nationali ty groups. Furthermore, inspection reveals 
no consistent r e l a t ion  between the response patterns of these groups on 
the question a t  hand and on the question of an economic community includ- 
ing t h e  East. Two points should be noted, however, with respect t o  the 
dgtente question. F i r s t ,  it appears tha t  rhe s c i e n t i s t s  are not deeply 
involved i n  t h i s  issue,  a t  l ea s t  i n  comparison t o  the issue of European 
integration. In  the interview s i tua t ion ,  the question on dgtente pro- 
voked mainly general o r  pfatitudinous responses with fen indications of 
high infonnatiqn level.4 
r e f l e c t  a de f in i t e ly  optimistic frame of mind wi th  respect t o  European 
Second, although expectations of dgtente 
o r  even U.S.-Soviet re la t ions ,  fo r  at l ea s t  some of t he  respondents t h i s  
evaluation was based on a f e a r  of a growing threa t  from a common enemy-- 
China. 
the immediate s tage  within which it was expressed. 
Thus, one mst be careful not to projec t  such optimism beyond 
This, of course, might be a t t r ibu ted  as well t o  the  way i n  which 
the question was posed. 
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B. Supranational Mili tary Forces 
The atmosphere of 
sion over the future  ro le  of Chin 
is consistent with a general impression of other  e l i t e  and-publi 
studies which indicate  tha t  Europe does not f e e l  
Such feel ings go back at least as far as the  mid-19SOtr, as Lemer and 
Gosden. fowd: 
Consistently, throughout the  decade, the fear tha t  the  
Soviet challenge was primarily mil i tary was discounted 
i n  favor of a predominantly pol i t ical  evaluation. Thus, 
while the challenge was perceived throughout the decade 
. . . it was never evaluated primarily i n  mil i tary terms 
by any panel.5 
The absence of  a d i rec t  n i f i t a r y  threa t ,  coexistent with a strong 
alliance involving the nuclear capabi l i ty  of the United Sta tes  ( to  counter 
unanticipated mil i tary pressures),malces the  mi l i ta ry  component of Euro- 
pean integrat ion a r e l a t ive ly  low p r i o r i t y  subject. In discussions of 
European integrat ion,  i n  f ac t ,  the  mil i tary aspect d i d  not a r i s e  spon- 
taneously i n  a s ingle  interview, I t  was evidently not  highly sa l i en t  
e i the r  as a motivating force f o r  integrat ion o r  as an outcome of i t .  
this respect, the s c i e n t i s t s  do not differ from the  vast  majority of  other 
European e l i t e s  whose vision of European integrat ion Deutsch characterizes 
as “primarily nonmilitary i n  purpose.ff6 This is not t o  say t ha t  European 
In 
Daniel Lerner and Morton Gorden, 
p. ‘.285. 
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mili tary integrat ion w a s  not discussed 
the whole concept of integrat ing nat 
posed as one of a range of options. 
Attitudes toward the general concept--”Would you approve the integ- 
ra t ion of B major pa r t  o your own country’s armed forces in to  a perma- 
nent supranational force?”--were ascertained first. 
auspices wits proffered: European, NATO, and United Nations. Although-- 
and one r i sks  sounding a t r i f le  repetitious--a broad consensus dominated 
Then a choice crf 
the responses t o  the f irst  part of the question, one c lear  national dif-  
ference, consister,t across laboratory lines, is evident and more d i f fe r -  
ences crop up i n  the second [auspices) part of the question. 
some 78% ctf the  respa approved the abstract  concept of integration 
Overall, s 
of t h h r  n a t h n * s  armed forces into some supranazional structure. 
11% opposed integration and an additional 11% gave no opinion. 
Only 
Table 9.3 
(see following page) presents the laboratorylnationali ty dis t r ibut ion o f  
t h i s  question as well as t h e  dis t r ibut ion of the subsequent question on 
auspices. 
The c l a r i t y  and significance of the national divergence on the first 
par t  of t h i s  problem is beyond question. 
sharp contrast  t o  respondents of a l l  other  na t iona l i t i e s  (including those 
smaller ones not shown),show a level of support j u s t  barely over a 
The French respondents, i n  
t of the sample as a whole, 
a l l  other groups. Further, the 
response is consistent across the three major laboratories.  While it is 
important t h a t  entists go along with 
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Table 9.3 
Approval and Auspi 
by Laboratory and Nationality 
ESTEC CERN ISPRA 
B r  Fr Ge It 
Approval 
Yes 80% 53% 85% 100% 84% 54% 100% 841 60% 97% 77% 
No 11 21 10 0 12 23 0 11 24 3 8 
DK 9 26 5 0 4 23 o s  16 0 1s 
Auspices, i f  such a force were created 
European 26% 53% 45% 43% 12% 54% 41% 37% 56% 60% 51% 
NATO 17 0 20 29 16 0 18 0 0 14 10 
Uid 37 0 15 29 63 8 18 26 8 20 1s 
Other, DK 20 it? 20 0 8 38 24 37 36 6 23 
majori t ies  of scientists of other na t iona l i t i es ,  it might be ins t ruc t ive  
t o  attempt an interpretat ion of  the reasons behind the  weakness of t h e i r  
approval. 
Such an interpretat ion comes d i rec t ly  out o f  examination of the 
second half  of the question, 
d i f fe r ing  notions. 
type o f  animal than a European force, while an integrated United Nations 
force is even more d i f fe ren t  from these two than they are  from each other.  
In v i r tua l ly  a l l  e5 except the French, however, approval fo r  a l l  three 
types of supranational auspices is evident. Only nch, is 
approval very t i g h t l y  
national force, he had i n  mind specif ical ly  a European 
proposed t h a t  two main sorts of a t t i t udes  governed the: 
The three options proposed represent widely 
An integrated NATO force is an en t i re ly  d i f fe ren t  
awn: if a French s c i e n t i s t  approved of a supra- 
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question, and although 
tended t o  show up i n  a given respan 
mi l i ta ry  a t t i t ude .  
pa r t i cu la r  auspices o f  i 
aim of eliminating national armies. Responses such as following, 
f r o m  an Italian s c i e n t i s t  a t  ISPRA, typ i fy  t h e  attitude: 
A: Yes, I would approve [of military integration]. The 
idea  is  t o  eliminate them, so I have no d i f f i c u l t y  
i n  approving it. 
Under which auspices would you prefer t o  see it: 
European, NATO, or United Nations? 
Q: 
A: I t ' s  important only t h a t  we have an in te rna t iona l  
organization. I t  is not important which is  the 
organization, only tha t  it is r ea l ly  international.  
On the other hand, there is the attitude which views favorably an inte- 
grate& militazy force within the structure of a United Europe. Impor- 
tan t ly ,  many respondents mentioned tha t  they would p re fe r  t o  see the 
formation of such a force follow the p o l i t i c a l  unification of Europe 
ra ther  than precede it, since,  i n  the words of one Briton, "suf f ic ien t ly  
strong p o l i t i c a l  leadership m u s t  come f i r s t  
-c-.l.e 
2 
In t h i s  a t t i t ude ,  the 
supranational force is merely one somewhat secondary aspect of an 
integrated Europe. 
The two a t t i t udes  (andlor t h e i r  admixture since,  we repeat, they 
a l l y  exclusive) were present i n  a l l  of t he  laboratory/ 
ch ever, ti- 
a re jec t ion  of the  
in approval w i  
s id a C  
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What I am for is 
so f don't think is 
press a l l  of them, ra ther  t h  
one. 
SUPP 
A cha rac t e r i s t i c  French t ra i t  of re jec t ing  questions of too unspecified 
a nature,' combined with a lower French evaluation OS the United Nations 
and NATO as ef fec t ive  internat ional  organizations, produced this response 
pattent.  
supranational force with spec i f ica l ly  European auspices resulted.  
among t h e  French the p a r a l l e l  percentages of 
the table and "European auspices" i n  the bottom half . ,  Cross-tabulation 
shows these t o  be inainly the same individuals .) 
wftere the European atzitude w a s  dominant, approval of the  
mote 
i n  the top ha l f  of 
Among Germans and I ta l ians  a t  the  three laboratories,  t h e  European 
response was more or less  of the same magnitude as tha t  of t h e  French, 
and it consistently led a l l  o ther  choices. 
European integration. 
Here again is the  emphasis on 
NATO, the  United Nations, and "DK" did draw a 
cer ta in  percentage of those who approved the supranational force concept, 
and a t  least the l a s t  two of these may be a t t r ibu ted  t o  the e f fec t  of 
t h e  ant i -mil i tary a t t i t ude .  Among the Bri t ish,  the United Nations was 
the number one choice a t  both CERN and ESTEC and-this rather surpriSing 
finding is indicat ive first of the continuing high regard of Bri t ish 
in t e l l ec tua l s  for t h i s  i n s t i t u t ion ,  and second of the re l a t ive  weakness 
of the European a t t i t ude ,  and hence its domination by the ant i -mil i tary 
view. In general, the poor showing of NATO [over the en t i r e  sample it 
drew only 10% of the responses, compared t o  25% for the United Nations 
Daniel Lerner, "Xnterviewing Frenchmen," American Journal of 
Sociology, LXIX, 2 (September 1956), pp. 187-194. 
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and 44% for Europe) seems t o  be the r e s u l t  
place was left  for it between the  European and ant i -mi l i t  
The Atlantic defense scenario w a s ,  however, mentioned i n  a number of 
write-in comments which suggested jo in t  par t ic ipa t ion  of an American 
and an integrated European force within the NATO structure. 
the  fact tha t  
The qua l i t a t ive  impression which one received from l i s t en ing  t o  
the intemiewees as well as m later examination af t he  typescripts 
suggeszs tha t  the s c i e n t i s t s '  views on the subject of a supranational 
m i l i t a r y  force were not nearly as highly-developed as t h e i r  views on 
European integration. More vagueness and generali ty i n  phrasing, i n  
addition t o  longer pauses, were taken as indications tha t  the subjects 
had not thought about these questions i n  great d e t a i l .  
w a s  a seemingly Iesser willingness t o  get involved in t h i s  area of 
discussion. 
{outside of a p o l i t i c a l  union) had arisen since the defeat of EDC i n  
1954, and as most Europeans never seemed t o  develop r ea l  enthusiasm for 
the MLF-AMF concept, the lack of saliency of t h i s  question may come as 
no great shock. 
forces-we r e c a l l  the  absence of a sense of mili tary th rea t  mentioned 
earlier--and the anti-mili tary bent of many s c i e n t i s t s  no doubt a l so  
contributed heavily. 
Further there 
A5 few real proposals for an integrated European force 
The lack of r ea l  motivation f o r  developing large armed 
a 
It  w a s  more than an i so la ted  interviewee who, when 
e approved integration of 
national force, re tor ted  at first, Tor what? 'To f i g h t  against  whom?" 
country 's  amy i n t o  a supra- 
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C. Nuclear Weapans 
1. National Forces 
The f i n a l  matters considered under the rubr ic  "East-West Relations 
and Security" relate t o  the  complex problem of nuclear weapons. 
more than i n  any other area among our questions, the domestic s i tua t ions  
of t he  various n a t i o n a l i t i e s  i n  the. sample diverge. 
a l l ,  has been privy t o  American nuclear technology since 1954 ( a f t e r  it 
developed its own weapons) and is thus a charter  member of the "nuclear 
club." 
of the  Bri t ish deterrent force was v i r tua l ly  halted i n  the early 1960's 
and it is no longer regarded by most Brit ish as a high-ranking national 
p r io r i ty .  France, on'the other hand, is a r e l a t ive  newcomer t o  the 
"club" and its small but independently developed force de frappe was, 
i n  mid-1967, cent ra l  t o  t h e  Gaullist vision of France. 
Here, 
Britain,  first of 
For various economic and p o l i t i c a l  reasons, however, development 
--
While s t i l l  a 
controversial  issue i n  France, the force de frappe is a very def i i i i te  
f ac t  of European l i f e .  
weapons is based above a l l  on independent renunciation of any intention 
t o  build o r  procure a national nuclear force. In par t icu lar ,  the a t t i -  
tude of the Soviet Union toward German possession of atomic weapons as  
-4 
The German posit ion wi th  regard t o  nuclear 
w e l l  as t h e  Amrican guarantee of protection have been important i n  
maintaining the German position. 
t ions t o  aspects of the  Non-Proliferation Treaty, no Gennan government 
has ever taken a posit ion advocating independent possession of nuclear 
weapons. I t a ly ,  f i na l ly ,  while it is one of the nations with a techno- 
logical potent ia l  for constructing nuclear weapons, has never shown any 
serious incl inat ion toward such a policy, and,given its re la t ive ly  low 
mile there have been some German objec- 
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level  of mil i tary expenditure, is not l ike ly  t o  do so le 
future. 
In l i g h t  of this r 
response among scientists of these na t iona l i t i es  should be expected on 
t h  national nuclear policy, In fact, the 
al  policy, would you be i n  favor of possession of 
thermonuclear weapons by your-own country?" w a s  the only one in t he  
en t i r e  questionnaire which drew a strong reversal  across na t iona l i t i es .  
While the French and Br i t i sh  sc i en t i s t s  were s p l i t  around the 50% mark, 
with a majority (54%) and a p lu ra l i t y  (46%) respectively i n  favor, the  
G e m s  and I t a l i ans  showed overwhelming majorit ies against  nuclear 
weapans with only a very few (8%, 13%) i n  favor. (None of the  other 
nationalities--Benel~ers, Austrians, Swiss, o r  Scandinavians-showed 
more thm a minute percentage i n  favor,)  
bution of this response by laboratory and nat ional i ty .  
Table 9.4 presents the d i s t r i -  
Table 9.4 
Approval of Nuclear Weapons f o r  Own Country, 
by Laboratory and Nationality 
ESTEG CERN ISPRA 
B r  Fr G e  I t  
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pat te rns  across all  of t h e  laboratories.  
t i o n  t o  t h e  national nuclear 
I t  is not 
stronger az CERN than at ESTEC and ISPRA. 
laboratories are concerned exclusively with non-military , peaceful 
research, the proportions of Br i t i sh  and French s c i e n t i s t s  and engineers 
who have been involved i n  mi l i ta ry  and atomic energy research is higher 
at ESTEC and ISPRA than a t  CERN. CERN, w e  recall, has the  highest pro- 
p o e i o n  d academically-based respondents, and the p o l i t i c a l  culture of 
academia with respect t o  nuclear weapons has l i k e l y  been car r ied  over 
Although a l l  t h re  
t o  t h a t  center. In any case, there c l ea r ly  is not consensus among the --
Gritish and French s c i e n t i s t s  with respect t o  t h e i r  countries'  nuclear 
po l ic ies ,  and there c lear ly  is consensus among the Germans and I t a l i ans  
with respect t o  the i r s .  
L 
There i s  a ce r t a in  amount of emotional apposition t o  nuclear weapons 
among s c i e n t i s t s  at a l l  the laboratories,  and many of the Br i t i sh  and 
French who d i d  favor nuclear possession by t h e i r  own country s a i d  t h a t  
they d id  so re luc tan t ly  o r  noted (par t icu lar ly  the French) t h a t  they had 
not favored the i n i t i a l  decision t o  build a nuclear force, but  now tha t  
the government had spent the money there was no sense i n  sinply throwing 
away the  results. Overall, however, the  comonly held view of strong 
s c i e n t i f i c  opposition t o  nuclear weapons w a s  not substantiated by t h i s  data. 8 
* This finding d i f fe rs  from t he  one reported i n  Daniel Lerner and 
Albert H. Teich, "International Sc ien t i s t s  Face World Po l i t i c s :  A Survey 
at C W '  (M.1.T. Center f o r  International Studies Document No. C/68-2, 
January 19681, p .  34, where strong Br i t i sh  sentiment for un i l a t e ra l  
d 
t e l a rger  proportion of non-academic types in the  present sample. 
was found and the difference i s  probably accounted for in 
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this  view pertains m 
tmce of national nuclear PO 
of those nations which already possess nuclear weapons was far from uni- 
versal ,  and ,weakest i n  the  most basic -research-oriented i n s t i t u t i o n  
[CERN), there w a s  subs tan t ia l  support f o r  national weapons. 
2. A European Force 
With regard t o  possession of nuclear weapons by "Europe1' rather 
than any single European nation, the picture is qui te  d i f fe ren t .  Propor- 
t ions favoring possession among the Brit ish and French contingents i n  all 
laboratories are reinforced, the Germans do a complete about-face and 
show heavy majorities i n  favor, and the I t a l i ans  a l so  follow s u i t ,  
although not 85 strongly. Table 9.5 shows the dis t r ibu t ion  f o r  this 
. .  
Table 9,5 
Yes 
NO 
DK 
Approval of Nuclear Weapons fo r  Europe, 
by Laboratory and Nationality 
ESTEC CERN ISPRA 
B r  Fr Ge I t  B r  Fr Ge It Fr Ge I t  
60% 58% 75% 43% 52% 62% 53% 37% 60% 71% 49% 
29 11 10 57 40 38 24 47 16' 17 31 
12 32 15 0 8 0 24 16 24 11 20 
question, which read l i t e r a l l y ,  "Would you favor possession of such 
weapons by a future European mil i ta ry  force?" 
nuclear weapons does n o r c a r r y  over t o  a e 
t h i s  as an indicatinon t h a t  f o r  many of the  s c i e n t i s t s  opposition t o  
national weapons is based not only on moral 
of scale, cost ,  and u t i l i  -al l  of which 
less a t t r a c t i v e  proposition for individual European st 
b on grounds 
onal possession a 
Altbugh there is a recognition th ssion of nuclear weapons 
wouldbe inevitable and probably necessary i n  a unified Europe, t h e  
sc ien t i s t s - '  approval'of the concept tends t o  lack e n t h u s i a s m .  There is 
a fee l ing  tha t  an integrated Europe would probably ac t  more responsibly 
than any s ingle  nation i n  handling such a force, and tha t  its possession 
is  pa r t  of regaining t h e  s t a t u s  of "a leading continent." A few quora- 
t ions from the interviews might  suggest the tone of t h i s  response: 
Well, I t o l d  you I am very reluctant t o  consider these 
questions. Basically I would say nuclear weapons as such 
are very undesirable. 
have nuclear weapons i n  t h e i r  possession, however, ne have 
jus t  t o  face the fact and i n  t h i s  respect I think t h a t  i f  
we have a European p o l i t i c a l  community and a European force,  
t h i s  force would have t o  b e  equipped with nuclear weapons 
because otherwise , . well, the po l i t i c i ans  wouldn't 
be in a posit ion t o  argue with other po l i t i c i ans  who have 
nuclear weapons. 
As t he re  are ce r t a in  nations who 
--Geman ESTEC s c i e n t i s t  
If there was r ea l ly  a European force, as I was t e l l i n g  you 
previously, an army is meaningful only if it is powerful 
a t  an in te rna t iona l  level and as f o r  being powerful a t  an 
in te rna t iona l  level,  w e l l ,  you need nuclear weapons. 
- - I ta l ian  engineer at CERN 
. I would like t o  see a l l  nuclear weapons destroyed. 
event they not, and there  s Id be nuclear weapons, 
I think that a European force should have then--but not any 
individual country. 
In the 
--French engineer a t  ISPRA 
This is another aspect of the  independent ro l e  f o r  Europe which w a s  first  
discussed i n  Chapter V I I I .  Reluctant acceptance of nuclear weaponry is 
a pr i ce  which must be paid f o r  genuine independence. 
3. 
There is a school of s t r a t e g i c  thought among diplomats and strate- 
g i s t s  i n  the  United Sta tes  and a number of Western European nations which 
holds t h a t  since two of the  major European nations already have nuclear 
weapons, possession of nuclear weapons by a fu ture  integrated European 
force would not contradict  the letter or the  s p i r i t  of non-proliferation. 
This school appears to be adhered t o ,  consciously or unconsciously, by 
a large number of  t h e  s c i e n t i s t s  i n  our sample. 
majority (54% overall)  of t he  s c i e n t i s t s  favor nuclear possession by 
an integrated European force, while only a minority d i r ec t ly  r e j ec t  it 
(31%). 
approve the  notion of non-prczliferation, 
t ha t  the present nuclear powers should try t o  l i m i t  the fur ther  4pread 
of nuclear arms i n  the world?” drew an almost unanimous verdict  across 
As we hzve seen, a 
Siruultaneausly, an overwhelming majorSty--86% versus 4% aga&nst-- 
The question--Wo you think 
the various laboratory/nationality groups, as may be seen i n  Table 9.6. 
Yes 
No 
DK 
Table 9.6 
. Approval ‘of Non-Proliferation Concept, 
by Laboratory and Nationality 
ESTEC CERN ISPRA 
Br Fr Ge It  B r  Fr Ge It  Fr Ge It 
94% 58% 85% 100% 92% 85% 88% 89% 68% 100% 79% 
0 16 0 0 8 0 6 0  16 0 5  
6 27 15 0 0 15 6 11 16 0 15 
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The s t ranges t  d i ssen t  came from t h e  French, and r a the r  than d i r e c t  
on , t h e  response 
one nation among t h e  four which has 
recently concluded Non-Pmli 
French s c i e n t i s t s  toward the concept tended t o  be phrased i n  te 
similas to  the  government l i ne ,  namely tha t  non-proliferation alone w a s  
meaningless, that it aimed at  perpetuating the posit ion of  the  two super- 
p w e r s ,  and t ha t  real reduction of tensions should involve a t  least sone 
sacrifices by the United Sta tes  and the  Soviet Union. 
mom often expressed a t  ESTEC and ISPRA than a t  CERN, probably f o r  rea- 
sons similar t o  those discussed with respect t o  national nuclear policy. 
Comments of the same natura as those voiced by the French were a lso  given 
[and annotated on the  questionnaires) by s c i e n t i s t s  of other na t iona l i t i e s .  
In these  cases, however, objections were oveniden  by feelings that some 
progress toward disarmament was b e t t e r  than none. 
This posit ion was 
Generally, questions concerning nuclear weapons were t rea ted  more 
a r t i cu la t e ly  and in greater depth than other aspects o f  East-Nest 
re la t ions  and military secu r i ty ,  The s c i e n t i s t s ,  in a l l  laboratories 
and acrass all the na t iona l i t i e s ,  seemed t o  have devoted more thought 
t o  such matters and had b e t t e r  structured ideas about them, Neverthe- 
less, the i 
when t h i s  area w a s  brought up. 
iewer could often sense a ce r t a in  coldness which developed 
The respondents seemed almost relieved 
when the  interviewer went on t o  the next subject area. 
area of p o l i t i c a l  and in te rna t iona l  l i f e  which the  s c i e n t i s t s  wovld 
preger not t o  think about, this is evidently it. 
If there  is an 
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* * *  
This chapter has been a r a the r  brief discussion of several  
of  the  s c i e n t i s t s '  views on East-West re la t ions  and mil i ta ry  security.  
I t  is evident t h a t  the broad transnational consensus developed i n  the  
previous chapter which dominates a t t i t udes  toward European integration 
does not extend i n t o  a l l  other areas of policy. 
on varying national s i tua t ions ,  d i c t a t e  d i f f e r ing  orientations on p r i -  
marily domestic matters such *as possession of national nuclear weapons. 
Chapter X, which concludes Part Three of the d isser ta t ion ,  brings 
Facts of l ife,  based 
together a number of diverse issues where t h i s  sameypattenn--consensus 
on European as well as more international issues, punctuated by diver- 
s i t y  on cer ta in  types of domestic issues--is fur ther  developed. 
CHAPTER X 
ISSUES: INTERNATIONALISM AND TECHNOLOGY 
This chapter draws together two somewhat disparate  sub-topics 
i n  concluding the  discussion of s c i e n t i s t s '  p o l i t i c a l  a t t i tudes .  First, 
having built up a case for a regional or ientat ion among the respondents, 
it is now necessary t o  place t h i s  or ientat ion in  perspective. 
general conception of the  s c i e n t i f i c  viewpoint incorporates an interna- 
t ionalism of much broader dimensions than has  been documented thus far. 
Such i d e a l i s t i c  yet important notions of world-wide community as one 
of ten hears from eminent academic s c i e n t i s t s  (for example i n  the cele- 
1 brated manuscript o f  the  Russian physicis t  A ,  D .  Sakharov ) have aot y e t  
been seen i n  t h e  images of our respondents' p o l t t i c a l  thought. 
port ion of  t h i s  chapter attempts t o  evaluate the extent t o  which this 
wider internationalism e x i s t s  among the  scientists i n  the European in t e r -  
nat ional  laboratories.  
nationalism might interact with-Euzouean .regionalism. 
The 
The first 
Further, it examines the ways i n  which wider in te r -  
' F i r s t  published in t h i s  country i n  the New York Times, July 22, 
1968. 
333 
334 
The second ha l f  of the chapter assumes a much more limited task. 
the  thinking of these scientists on several issues It aims t o  exp 
which intermingle technological and p o l i t i c a l  content. 
are the  s c i e n t i s t s  pa r t i cu la r ly  in te res ted  i n  such matters and what 
special  viewpoints are they able t o  bring with them? 
technological issues which the  European p r  
age were selected f o r  exploration: 
drain," and the "space race." Varying national and professional emphases 
on these issues are treated.  
To what extent 
Three such pol i t ico-  
n subs tan t ia l  cover- 
the "technological gap," t he  "brain 
A. Internationalism and Regionalism 
A preference for supranational European f o m  over individual 
nation-states is evident beyond question i n  the data 
been reported. 
has already 
In t h e i r  strong consensual approval of transnational 
a c t i v i t i e s  i n  t h e  economic, p o l i t i c a l ,  and mili tary domains, the respon- 
dents t e s t i f i e d  t o  t h e i r  recognition of the growing interdependence of the 
various Western European countries. * Aware, however, of na t iona l i s t  
trends, even a t  the subnational level (as v i s ib l e  during 1967 i n  Brittany, 
Wales, Scotland, and Flemish-speaking Belgium, f o r  example) and desirous 
~n item on the ques t i  re which asked d y if the  respon- 
g h t  t ha t  the "nati  e is  becoming et' appeared t o  
a high degree of ambiguity. The scientists in t e rp  
variously as normative and evaluative, and respmses ranged ac 
* -statet1 and "obsolete" compounded d i f f i c u l t i e s ,  
asked responded pos i t ive ly  against  27% ne 
en oiiittid-from our analysis. 
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of preserving the  unique character of Europe which is based on t he  cul- 
tural ind iv idua l i ty  of its par t s ,  they envi 
f o r  the  region, maintaining cobon pol ic ies  toward external affairs, 
developing the economies of economic and technological scale, and yet 
ion 
re ta in ing  considerable local autonomy, 
In opting for  transnational solutions t o  the major p o l i t i c a l  and 
soc ia l  problems of the  age, the scientists do not differ qua l i t a t ive ly  
from o the r  infzuential classes in European society.  
from the  conclusions of Lerner and Gorden's e l i te  panel survey: 
To quote once again 
Indeed, there has been a convergent consensus i n  Europe, 
over t h e  l as t  decade, t h a t  national options are not viable 
and that transnational choices are the only r e a l i s t i c  alter- 
natives.  
the form which was familiar t o  previous generations and even 
t o  t h e  ear ly  years of the generations nor i n  charge.3 
We have witnessed t h e  passing of nationalism i n  
I t  is not any wild idealism t h a t  has shaped t h i s  consensus; it is merely 
pragmatism-a realistic appraisal  of the desirable and t h e  possible. 
s c i e n t i s t s  d i f f e r  from the non-scientific e l i t e s  mainly i n  the  in tens i ty  
The 
of t h e i r  des i re  fo r  c loser  in tegra t ion ,  and the breadth of t h e i r  consensus 
on t h e  shape of Europe, which transcends, for the most p a r t ,  differences 
i n  national viewpoint. 
permeates t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  thought, 
A "Europeanist," t ha t  i s ,  reg iona l i s t ,  outlook 
We have already seen, however, that with regard t o  supranational 
mi l i ta ry  in tegra t ion  a t  least, a ce r t a in  degree of i n t e r e s t  i n  the  United 
Nations (and hence extra-European internationalism) ex is t s .  Indeed it 
Daniel Lerner and Morton Gorden, 
(Cambridge : 
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w a s  among the  B r i t i  
of European in tegra t io  
interest i n  the  Un 
on the  basis of th 
alism and wider internationalism represent conf l ic t ing  loy 
least competing scopes of i n t e re s t .  Two questions dealing 
of the United Nations i n t o  a-world government were asked o 
dents, and analysis of t h e i r  numerical tabulation enriched by considera- 
t ion of the o r a l  interview responses provides some ins ights  i n to  t h i s  
matter. 
0 
The f irst  question demanded an evaluation of the  prospects f o r  
international organization on a world-wide scale. 
it related the  general problem t o  the  fate of a pa r t i cu la r  body--the 
United Nations--whose f o r m e s  were a t  a r e l a t ive ly  low ebb at  #e time 
of the survey. 
can be transformed eventually i n t o  a world government?“ 
were not very strong. Less than one fourth of the t o t a l  number of respon- 
dents (24%) thoughtthat i t  could. Fourteen percent rendered no judgement, 
Unwittingly, however , 
The question read: “DO you think t h a t  t h e  United Nations 
Expectations 
while almost two-thirds responded negatively. Part of t h i s  pessimism 
a low evaluazion of the United Nations as a viable organization 
r a the r  than skepticism of the. world government idea. 
write-in comm 
fee l ing  . 
A large number of 
(35) to t h i s  effect t e s t i f i e d  to the strength of t h i s  
On the  other hand, despite their low expectation, the willingness 
e such a worl wa 
t o  the question “In principle,  would you favor your own national 
337 
gove giving ain e 
in sone form of world government?" 
entists sa id  yes, whil 
Table 10.1 presents the laboratory/ 
Table 10.1 
Expectation and Approval of World Government, 
by Laboratory and Nationality 
\ 
ESTEC CERN XSPRA 
Br Fr Ge It  Br Fr Ge It  F r  Ge I t  
(35)a (19) (20) ( 7) ~v (25) (35) (39) 
Expect world government: 
Yes 
NO 
DK 
51% 16% 10% 43% 40% 54% 18% 26% 20% 9% 10% 
43 53 75 29 40 31 65 Si3 76 77 69 
6 32 15 29 20 15 ia 16 4 14 20 
Y%S 83% 42% 55% 100% 76% 100% 82% 79% 68% 63% 82% 
NO 9 37 35 0 20 0 6 11 16 17 a 
DK 9 21 10 0 4 0 12 11 16 20 10 
These 'rnrrs are ident ica l  for the remaining tables  i n  th i s  chapter a 
(except 10.3) and w i l l  not be repeated. 
both of these questions. 
co~pes from the Bri t i sh  and C and the  Bri t ish and French 
a t  CERN. 
w i l l  eventually be transformed orld government. El 
The grea tes t  optimism about world government 
. .  
These groups show 40% t o  SO% believing tha t  e United Nations 
much lower, generally ranging from 10% t o  20%. Responses 
f surrender of sovereignty t o  a poten t ia l  world government 
at  least-a p l  i t y  and usually a strong 
i n  st d 
G 
s 
t h e  d is t r ibu t ion  of the cross-tabulation of these two questions 
eas i ly  predictable. (See Table 10.2.) Most laboratory/nationality 
Table 10.2 
Approval and Expectation of World Government, 
by Laboratory and Nationa3fty 
ESTEC CERN ISPRA 
B r  Fr Ge It B r  F r  Ge I t  F r  Ge I t  
Favor, expect 49% 16% 10% 43% 36% 54% 18% 26% 20% 6% 10% 
Favor, don't 
expect 34 27 45 58 40 46 65 53 48 57 72 
Oppose I 
expect 3 1 1 0 0  4 0 0 0  0 0 0  
Oppose, don't. 
expect 6 3T 35 0 16 0 6 11 16 17 8 
groups are divided between those respondents who would favor a world 
government but don't expect t o  see one, and those who would favor it and 
do expect it. 
us l i t t le :  The Britis a1 displaying greater confidence i n  t h e  
Differences between 1aboratoryLnationality groups t e l l  
Nations than mo na t iona l i t i e s  are r e l a t ive ly  
ench does no 
is  the  finding that of 
those who would not appr 
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, that they would ra ther  concern elves  with concrete 
matters. 
i n  mind, of course, the fact tha t  these two questions 
measure only a very limited aspect of what has been cal led here "wider 
internationalism." 
"internationalism" would require a much broader range 
has been employed i n  the present study. 
measursmsnts-of this natute,  w e  have chosen t o  deal  with the elements 
Even an incomplete understanding of t h i s  concept of 
questioning than 
Rather than attempting t o  make 
of receptiveness t o  and expectation of a p o l i t i c a l  community roughty 
analogous to  a European community but 'on a world-wide scale.  Approval 
of such a community evidently implies formal surrender o f  a major p a r t  
of  the power of national self-determination t o  a body i n  which t h e  
majority of nations do not share e i t h e r  the cul ture ,  the values, o r  the 
h i s t o r i c a l  t rad i t ions  of  Europe. 
heu r i s t i c  indication of internationalism as  any. . The general willingness 
of t h e  respondents t o  see t h e i r  nations surrender sovereignty t o  such a 
This, one might argue. is as good a 
hypothetical c o m i t y  is 2 profound statement indeed. Despite the 
f ac t  that  we have no other e l i t e  (non-sciencistj data wi th  which t o  
compare these responses, w e  cannot help but be  impressed by the strong 
vote of confidence given the notion of world-wide p o l i t i c a l  community 
by these:.scientists.  The impressiveness of t h i s  response is qual i f ied 
only by t h e  fact tha t  such a world government is so obviously an ideal  
under present conditions, that constraints  of  r e a l i t y ,  which might other- 
wise shape response pat terns  in to  more conventionally na t iona l i s t ic  forms, 
axe relaxed, and internationalism ndght be r e l a t ive ly  easier t o  express 
at  this l eve l  of abstraction than on more mundaae issues. 
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In any case, it is necessary t o  ask wha e 
pat terns  have t o  the pat terns  of approval and expectation w i t h  
opean integration? F i r s t  of a l l ,  for most respondents there 
appears t o  be l i t t l e  interact ion between receptiveness t o  European unifi- 
cation and approval of world government. Among those respondents who 1 .  
r union of  t he  Six or a larger  type of European p o l i t i c a l  
integration o r  both, 75% woud approve surrender of sovereignty t o  a 
world government. Among those who oppose any type of po l i t i ca l  union 
i n  Europe, the proportion favoring world government was nearly the same 
(68%). 
world-wide internationalism do not confl ic t  i n  the minds of the respon- 
dents. Further, it suggests tha t  most of the small minority of respon- 
dents who did not dispIay strong regional is t  sentiment were nevertheless 
This is one very good indication tha t  European regionalism and 
narrowly nat iona l i s t  i n  thefr-outlooks. The absence of interact ion 
was found within the ESTEC B r i t i s h  (where the grea tes t  number of non- 
Europeanists came from) t o  the same degree as i n  the sample as a whole. 
Examination of other questions concerning acceptance of European inte-  
gration yields pa ra l l e l  resu l t s .  
On the  other hand, expectations of European integration--not of the 
Six, but crf "Big Europe"--do seem t o  be linked w i t h  expectations of world 
government. Table 10.3 (see fallowing ge), from which those respondents 
who were not =ked about la rger  Ehopean in te  at ion have been eliminated, 
shows zhe cross-tabulation of the two questions ( in  raw numbers, not 
percenfages) . 
the United Nations might someday be transformed in to  
much stronger among those who believe a w i d e r  a world governnmnc 
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Tab1 
Expectation of  Wider Europe 
by Expectation of World Go 
Yes 
No 26 125 20 
DI 8 14 18 
-.L - - 
European union is feasible  (33 out of  96) than among those who do not 
(26 out of 171). 
nat iona l i ty  groups which are most skept ical  of  world government. Gther- 
wise, within and across these groups, no evident differences (such as by 
This linkage appears as well within those laboratory/ 
sen ior i ty ,  professional level ,  etc.) appear between those who seem opti- 
mist ic  with regard t o  the l ikelihood of world government, and those who 
do not. 
Once again, though, t h e  division is perhaps not as deep as the 
tabulations make it  seem. 
view responses and comments) envisioned a world government with anywhere 
near *e same degree of concreteness as a united Europe, while at the 
other extreme only a 
None of the respondents (judging from inter-  
nking, without 
viewed i t  as a distant 
goal--something f o r  whi hope, but not expect t o  see very soon. 
wider European 
t, there  w a s  no 
b i l i t i e s  for wid 
While r mentioned tha t  they thought European 
integration migh effects on the  Third World--if the 
European caunzriss did not take steps t o  assure the 
developing nations--most saw no conflict  between the building of Europe 
and the  development of grea te r  world unity. 
i n  t he  interviews, i n  fact, re f lec ted  the idea that an integrated European 
s t a t e ,  ra ther  than the individual European countries, could i n  some remote 
The mast common view expressed 
fu ture  become pa r t  of a broader world federaZion. Thus, the question 
asking whether the respondent would agree t o  his  country giving up S M B ~  
of i t s  SOlveFei 
in the fillow.ing manner: 
ED par t i c ipa t e  in  a world government was of ten  answered 
As I s a i d t o  you, f am already for giving up German 
sovereignty far a European government. Wow i f  t h i s  
process could be continued, I cer ta in ly  would l i k e  t o  
have f ina l ly  a united world and everyone a c i t i zen  of 
t h i s  . . . it would r e a l l y  be the  idea l .  But I do not 
believe it w i l l  happen very soon. 
--ISPRA Gennan s c i e n t i s t  
Well, I wouldn't put it l i k e  tha t .  I would say t h a t  by 
, you're not talking 
authority, you're 
Re e' 
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expense of broader internationalism. 
The same s o r t  of reasoning which led respondents t o  the conclusion 
thaz in tegra t ion  of t he  European states is a necessity was exten 
a world-wide scope. In the words o f  one Dutch EURATOM s c i e n t i s t :  "I 
don't  believe in a real independence of countries; I think t h i s  is 
impossible." Nevertheless, t he  problems confronting broader uni f ica t ion  
aaw formidable i n d e d ,  and respondents' ideas of such uni f ica t ion  were 
necessarily qui te  vague. 
typical examp le : 
This same Dutch EURATOM s c i e n t i s t  provides a 
I can imagine t h a t  a world government could e x i s t .  
don't  know exactly now it would be made and how it would 
be controlled. A t  the moment we think tha t  democracy is  
the best way of government, but i f  t h i s  i s  also possible 
with the e n t i r e  population of the  world I don't  know. 
Personally, I hope we w i l l  find some way t o  do it. 
I . 
Of a l l  the subject area on the  p o l i t i c a l  portion of t h e  questionnaire, .  
t h i s  one seemed t o  evoke the least emotional involvement. 
national s c i e n t i s t s ,  without losing the basic idealism of  t he  s c i e n t i f i c  
approach,are too sophisticated t o  place much stock i n  t h i s  notion. 
words of an ESTEC Briton provide an appropriate summary o f  our discussion: 
The i n t e r -  
The 
I would cer ta in ly  favor a world government, but I think 
t o  work for a united Europe is a far more promising 
prospect a t  the moment. 
put any real e f f o r t  i n to  now. 
That's the only place I would 
B, Polit , ics and Technology 
In concluding t h i s  set of four chapters devoted t o  the  p o l i t i c a l  
a t t i t u d e s  of in te rna t iona l  s c i e n t i s t s ,  it is necessary t o  descend from 
the somewhat erhereal realm of world federazion t o  a number of mnre 
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mundane p o l i t i c a l  problems. Under t h  11 
J 
we discuss three glibly-labeled issues which 
technological component: the  "technological gap:" t 
the  %pace race." While the response pa t te rns  which these 
duced are not s t r i c t l y  ed t o  the  various PO sed 
previously, they nevertheless provide illuminating examples of how scien- 
tists think on such politicq-technological problems, 
1. The "Technological Gap" 
The long smoldering problem of differences i n  the level of techno- 
logical development between the United States  and Western Europe became 
the subject of heated p o l i t i c a l  debate during 1966.4 At that time 
Italian Foreign Minister Fanfani received widespread publ ic i ty  for h i s  
statements QA &e gap and discussion arase within such p o l i t i c a l  organs 
as the NATO Council of Ministers, the QECI3, the Western European Union, 
and the EEC, as well as i n  the American and European press .' 
t h i s  debate are the growing recognition of science and technology as 
indices of cational power, and the continuing American dominance (easily 
Underlying 
See the discussion in  Chapter I.  The in te res ted  reader is also 
and Documents , '' 
rch-April 1967) ; 
* See Albonetti, l*Technological Gap," p. 1, 
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extrapolated i n t o  the fu%ure) i n  a number 
such as computers, space exploration, and 
technological collaboration appears t o  be 
European hopes f o r  resolving the gap, the  
of f r o n t i  our" are- 
microelectronics. As increased 
one of the  bes t  and most obvious 
in te rna t iona l  organizations i n  
this study represent pa r t i cu la r ly  in t e re s t ing  locales i n  which t o  sample 
s c i e n t i f i c  opinion on the  problem. 
In the discussion of motivating forces behind the respondents' Euro- 
peanist  attitudes i n  Chapter VIII, it w a s  observed t h a t  a s igni f icant  
proportion of the  s c i e n t i s t s  spontaneously ra i sed  the idea of European 
in tegra t ion  i n  discussions of t h e  technological gap. Our treatment of 
the  gap was broader than reported i n  t h a t  context, 
p o l i t i c a l  and technological fac tors ,  the gap w a s  used as the first ques- 
t i o m  in  the p o l i t i c a l  section of the questionnaries (and i n t e r v i m  for- 
mat), creating, as it were, a bridge between a discussion of the respon- 
dent ' s  professional i n t e re s t s  andhis p o l i t i c a l  opinions. 
asked i n  two parts--"Do you think t h a t  the  'technological gap' currently 
being discussed i n  the press is a serious problem for Europe?" and "If 
yes,  what s o r t  or' action do you think would be required t o  solve it?" 
Since it does mix 
The question was 
A broadly-based consensus of  three-fourths of the  sample (75%) agreed 
t h a t  the gap w a s  a serious problem. 
d i s t r ibu ted  between ('no , I t  20%, and tlDKgf S%.) 
(at a l l  laboratories) than others tended to downgrade the.seriousness of 
t he  pmblem, 
the  ttyes" column, Britain dipped t o q  62%. There was not a great deal of 
var ia t ion  by laboratory , although CElw (even excluding the Brit ish) was 
s l i g h t l y  legs certain of t he  seriousness of t he  gap than e i t h e r  of t he  
(The reaainder of the sample was 
More Bri t i sh  respondents 
While France, Gemany, and I t a l y  a l l  showed about 85% i n  
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other major centers. 
Despite the  r e l a t ive ly  high e l  of agreement among the  scien 
there is some evidence t o  suggest t ha t  t h i s  question, which was asked 
with spec i f i c  reference t o  Europe, was more narrowly interpreted than 
m y  others. 
i s sue  of the  technological gap is more closely related t o  the  respondents' 
In  t h i s  regard, it is reasonable t o  suppose tha t  since the 
awn experience than many of t h e  other p o l i t i c a l  questions, they tended t o  
deal with it on a somewhat lower level of abstraction--that is, i n  terms 
of personal impressions r a the r  than more remote opinions, Such a hypo- 
thesis would explain the lower level of concern with the gap a t  CERN--a 
laboratory quite conscious of i t s  equality w i t h  American high energy 
physics establishments-and among the British-in whose country the gap 
has not been dramt ized  as mJl as on the continent. 
with the qualitative finding that many respondents prefaced t h e i r  BnswerS 
about the  gap with such qualifying phrases as "1 can only (o r  best) speak 
about my own f i e l d  I .Ir I t  i s  a l so  consistent with t h e  pa t te rn  of 
responses which appeared on the  second ha l f  of the question, which 
requested solutions t o  the gap. 
It is consistent 
The discussion i n  Chapter V I 1 1  emphasized the tendency t o  opt f o r  
European integration as a solution f o r  the gap. The question was open- 
ended, s . ~  t h i s  finding, which is  based on an empirically-derived classi- 
€ication of e essed responses, is pa r t i cu la r ly  impressive. More than 
40% of the  240 specific proposals put fo r th  by t he  respondents were 
347 
directed at increased coop 
eGressed, however, included, besides Eu 
government p6liCy towards science and technologytf[22%), ftprovide more 
money f o r  research" (la%), and "modernize management attitudes" (9%). . 
The European in tegra t ion  response w a s  uniformly strong across the 
various na t iona l i t i e s  (35.45%). Other responses, hawever, showed sane 
marked differences which seemed t o  correspond roughly t o  national situa- 
t ion  and i n t e g r a t i  
t ions.  Significant concentrations included: F'tench i n  the "modemizs 
management a t t i tudes t1  category (15%), Germans i n  "provide more money for. 
research" ( 2 6 5 ) ,  and I t a l i ans  i n  "change government policy towards 
science and technologyff (35%), 
responses probably r e f l e c t  some basic gripes which French, German, and 
ltaliaa scientists have d i rec ted  aga ins t  t h e i r  respective nations foe 
some time. 
in te rpre ta t ion  of  a question asked about Europe as a whole. 
Whether based i n  folklore OF f a c t  these 
This is a f a i r l y  rare example i n  t h e  survey of a parochial 
One might observe tha t  the various categories of solutions t o  the  
gap appear ne i ther  t e r r i b l y  or ig ina l  nor t e r r i b l y  profound. 
while the  necessity t o  reduce responses t o  the lowest common denominator 
d id  a ce r t a in  amount of i n fus t i ce  t o  individual expression, the responses 
were ne i the r  very original nor very profound. 
p o l i t i c a l  one and outside of its consideration within the  context of 
"regaining Europe's place as  a leading continent," and its use as a 
In fact, 
The issue is primarily a. 
I t  should be noted, parenthefically,  t h a t  fewer than one-fifth of 
these in tegra t ive  proposals suggested the  establishment of more in te r -  
national s c i e n t i f i c  organization3 such as the  ones i n  which the respondents 
were employed. 
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w i t h  which t o  contend for  
ons, most of the scient  
the arguments over the gap and have no special  knowledge re la t ing  t o  it 
or its solution. 
2. The "Brain Drain" 
Closely re lated t o  the technological gap--seen by some as ef fec t  and 
by some as contributing cause--is the phenomenon a l l i t e r a t i v e l y  dubbed 
by some unknown Bri t ish journal is t  as the "brain drain."' ( I t  is known 
t o  the French i n  a literal but picturesque t ranslat ion as "l th&orragie  
de matibre grise.") 
even intra-national)  migration of s c i en t i s t s  and engineers in  search 
This phenmenon consists in the international [or -- 
. of be t t e r  professional opportunities, be t t e r  working conditions or  pay, 
and/or greater societal recognition. 
of  the asymmetry of flaw direct ion,  primarily out of large areas into 
It is known as 8 ftdraintl because 
a limited number of  s c i e n t i f i c  centers.  
s o r t  of migration of scholars and other highly-skilled individuals--docu- 
mentation on it goes back hundreds of years.8 I t  is, i n  fact, recognized 
There i s  nothing new about t h i s  
tha t  governments have had pol ic ies  concerned with regulating t h i s  flow of 
' References on t h i s  subject include, f o r  example, James A. Wilson, 
V, 1 (Autumn 1966), pp. 
genieurs vers les Etats- 
(February l966), pp. 38-53; and 
(New York: Macmillan, 1968). 
reven Dedijer, t r tEarlyt :  Migration," i n  Adam (ed.), The -
pp. 9-28. 
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and the  
talent as back in his tory  the  period of Ah 
the less ,  contemporazy emphasis on the ties betw 
development of national power (economic and mi l i ta ry-pol i t ica l )  have 
made t h e  bra in  drain a controversial  p o l i t i c a l  issue.  Although the  
dra in  affl icts developing nations probably t o  9 greater extent than Western 
Europe, it i s  spoken of here primarily as theTpr0blem 6f E u q m  sciaa- 
tis- and engineers migrating to  the Unkted- Sta tes .  
In the  intemiews and questionnaires, immediately subsequent t o  
discussion of t he  technological gap, the bra in  drain was introduced 
with t h e  question: "DO you t h i n k  t ha t  the 'b ra in  drain'  i s  a serious 
problem f o r  Western European science?" The degree of concern shown by 
respondents over t h i s  issue w a s  subs tan t ia l ly  below t ha t  which was shown 
over t h e  gap:  
responded affirmatively,  while 30% responded negatively, and 8% gave no 
opinion. lo 
var ia t ions  across laboratory lines and t o  some extent these variations 
r e f l e c t  the  sever i ty  o f  the problem i n  the respective nations. Relatively 
strong majorit ies were i n  evidence among the Germans (745) ,  British (62%),  
and Dutch (67'51, whose countries lose non-negligible proportionspof t h e i r  
s l i g h t l y  fewer than two-thirds of the s c i e n t i s t s  (62%) 
The various na t iona l i t i e s  i n  the  sample displayed regular 
Ibid p. 14. -* ' 
lo A foliim-up question; er respolldents thought 
in te rna t iona l  laboratories were capable of stemming the  flow is not 
discussed here. 
17% no, and 32% DK. 
The marginal f o r  t h e  question w a s  as follows: 51% yes,  
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scientifi eering manpower United States e 
among the  respondents France 
[48%] and Belg 
anomaly was among the Italians whose evaluation of the  seriousness of 
t he  drain w a s  high (69% yes) but whose actual drain is 
&t of  the  French. 
re ths losses are m u d  smaller.'' The only 
arable  to, 
Aside from the I ta l ians ,  the responses appear t o  follow the  same 
form as those concerning the technological gap and the same explanatory 
mechanism is hypothesized t o  be operative. 
national response and national situation--which appears despite the fact 
tha t  the question was asked wi th  reEerence 20 Europe-is accounted for 
The correspondence between 
i n  rems of the proximity of the issue-area t o  the respondents' personal 
[naziond] experience. 
responses t o  the question of  personal working preferences ("If you were 
t o  leave this organization, have you any preference as t o  where you would 
like to work?" 
It is notwortlay, in  l i gh t  of t h i s  finding, that 
See Chzpter V ,  Section C.3) mirrored the data on the 
brain drain. 
stronger desires t o  return' to t h e i r  own countries, while Br i t i sh ,  Germans, 
and most of a l l  Dutchmen. showed notably weaker desires. 
Frenchmen and par t icu lar ly  I ta l ians  showed re la t ive ly  
The average annual number of sc i en t i s t s  ami engi 
t o  the U.S. (ye as a percenta 
ou f suen s (1959) for these three coun- 
tr astoni I%. (B. Thomas, "Modern Migra- 
tl. Adams 
l2 The comparable average loss figure is 0.9% f o r  France, that for 
Belgium is no% available. (Ibid.) -
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Differential rates of emigration from various European countries 
were recognized By the  s c i e n t i s t s  and incorporated i n t o  a fair  number 
of t h e i r  answers. Some 22 write-in comments (about 40%' of  a l l  comments 
on t h i s  question) 'noted that the d ra in  w a s  more of a problem fo r  some 
countries than others. Britain,  where the  grea tes t  aiount of Brain drain 
discussion has  taken place, w a s  frequently mentioned as having the w o r s t -  
problem. 
less accurately : 
A Fzench scientist f r o m  ISPRA summed up the situstion more o r  
I believe i t  is a problem for the  English. Bon. 
absolutely not a problem for the  French. 
few French sc i en t i s t s  and enF;neers going t o  t h e  United 
S ta tes .  I r ea l i ze  tha t  t h e  s i tua t ion  is d i f fe ren t  in 
Germany, Holland, and even i n  I t a ly .  So I would say there  
is  a problem of t h i s  type fo r  some countcies of Europe, but 
not for  France . 
Often respondents re la ted  the  bra in  drain t o  the technological gap, 
I t  is 
=e are  very 
blaming the sme:root problems--unwillingness of European governments and 
industry t o  invest  heavily i n  research, lack of coordination between the 
various countries--for both phenomena. Interviewees, however, were 
seldom emphatic about the seriousness of the drain.  Frequently expressed 
was the notion tha t  Europeans r ea l ly  prefer  the s ty les  of l iving,  the 
traditions and the cultures of Europe and the desire t o  immigrate t o  the  
United S ta tes  permanently was tempered by the f ac to r  of "feeling more at 
home" i n  Europe.13 Approximations of the idea t h a t  "Europeans would l i ke  
t o  work i n  t he  United S ta tes  and l i v e  i n  Europe" were heard repeatedly. 
Several respondents, furthermore, ra ised questions about the number of 
l3 Obviously those Europeans who - have irmnigrated t o  the United 
S ta tes  could be expected t o  give different  viewpoints! 
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Europeans who return from the United S ta tes  each year. 
3. 
The t h i r d  politico-technological issue with which the survey dealt- 
the exploration of space--is of a ra ther  d i f fe ren t  nature than the other 
two issues and the a t t i tudes  which w e  sought t o  tap were not r e s t r i c t ed  
to  a European focus, but included more general aspects, Space explora- 
t ion was chosen 
characterization as a rapidly-growing, future-oriented area of science 
and technology, which due t o  i t s  extremely high costsf and incompletely 
r inclusion i n  the survey primarily because of its 
recognized benefits  has important p o l i t i c a l  consequences. The fact t ha t  
one of the organizations included i n  the study (ESRO) is engaged i n  the 
f i e l d  made its consideration doubly interest ing.  
From its dawn in late 1957 to  the time of this  survey less than a 
decade l a t e r ,  the Space Age had progressed a t  an unprecedented pace, 
fact, i n  mid-1967, the two major space-faring nations were approaching 
the "home stretch" in  what could only be termed a "race" t o  land the first 
manned vehicle on the moon. Although the value of unmanned space explora- 
In 
t ion w a s  widely accepted, c r i t i c i sm of the  wastefulness of t h i s  manned 
race was a f a i r l y  common theme par t icular ly  i n  in t e l l ec tua l  and s c i e n t i f i c  
circles l4 Furthermore, the record of manned space exploration w a s  
blemished for t he  first t i m e  j u s t  p r i o r  t o  the  beginning of the survey 
l4 See the report  on American sc i en t i s t s '  views of the space race by 
Donald A. Strickland, lvPhysicistst V i e w s  of Space Politics," Public Opinion 
, XXIX, 2 (Swnner 19651, 
Poll  of 
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w i t h  t he  deaths of the  three American astronauts i n  December 1966 
once again during the  period of t h e  survey with the 
cosmonaut in April 1967. 
A ser ies  of four questions was asked near the conclusion of the 
p o l i t i c a l  segments of the questionnaire and the interview. The first two 
dealt- spec i f ica l ly  with t h e  moon race, asking fzrst for prediction of the  
winner and second for an evaluation of the  program's worth. 
question asked respondents 
the last raised a broader question about space and internat ional  rela- 
t ions.  
The t h i rd  
0 
opinions about European space e f fo r t s ,  while 
Our concern w i t h  these questions does not merit an extremely deep 
analysis of them, so that  the following w i l l  be simply a presentation and 
discussion of the marginals for these questions enriched by consideration 
of selected cross-tabulations and comments. 
The scientists were most re luctant  t o  predict  the outcome of the 
Many s ta ted  tha t  the unavai labi l i ty  of data on which t o  moon race. Is 
base any ra t ional  judgements (par t icular ly  from the Russian s ide)  made 
such guessing f r u i t l e s s .  Generally, the matter was t reated as a f r ivo-  
lous question (which in retrospect perhaps it  was) and a healthy 
majority (64%) refused t o  venture an opinion and were recorded as  DK. 
Among those who d id  pick a winner, the  United S ta tes  enjoyed a moderate 
(21% t o  14%) edge. The fac tor  of nat iona l i ty  d id  not appear t o  enter  
i n t o  this rqpanse  pat tern,  but s c i e n t i s t s  of a l l  na t iona l i t i es  a t  ESTEC, 
perhaps because of t h e i r  professional involvement i n  space research , were 
on on t h i s  topic  
t o  the moon-the 
country do you think 
o r  the Soviet Union?" 
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s l igh t ly  more w i l  
66% at  ISPRA. 
(L prediction, there was no more agreement a t  
The weight of t 
th i rd  of 211 respondents co 
It is interest ing,  though, tha 
Much greater  willingnes3 t o  express an opinion-but no more 
unanimity--was found on t he  second question. 
"that this moon race is worth t h e  investment of money and human resources 
that  it is costing these two countries?" the  respondems showed nearly 
Asked i f  they believed 
an even break. A s l i g h t  majority--53%--felt that it was worth the invest- 
ment, while 39% f e l t  it was not and 8% gave no opinion. 
reply mag E S E C  scientists and engineers (58%) was only s l igh t ly  above 
t h e  average and otherwise t h e  laboratories did not vary widely. Bri t ish 
respondents, a t  ESTEC and par t icu lar ly  a t  CERN, seemed t o  place a lower 
evaluation on the moon race than other  nationalities--only 39% of the 
The posi t ive 
Bri t ish said they thought it was worthwhile, while 57% said it was not. 
Altogether, the question and consequently the response pattern 
obtained appear t o  have mingled a t  l eas t  two separable elements. Opinions 
about the value of manned space f l i g h t  and lunar exploration were mixed 
with opinions about the  appropriateness of a "race" between the two super- 
s. Indic a re  t h a t  the res 
space f l i g h t  a r  exploration were a go re favorable 
suggested by this marginal. 
within the interviews deprecated the value of sending men t o  the moon. 
Few comments either on the questionnaires or 
e 0 
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gave commmts),were chief ly  concerned about p r i o r i t i e s :  more pressing 
problems on earth such as  hunger and economic underdevelopment. On the  . 
other hand, twice as many of the  commentators (21%) maintained tha t  they 
approve of the idea, but not as a race.16 This reinforces our conviction 
that the major negative element i n  the question w a s  t ha t  of a race-- 
dupl icat ive competition on so vast  a scale. 
In order t o  relate the issues of space exploration t o  t h e  European 
scene, t h e  question on the value of the moon race w a s  followed by one 
asking if the subject thought t ha t  "Europe's e f fo r t s  in  space exploration 
are appropriate i n  scale  and scope.'' 
t r a s t  t o  the f irst  asked for preferences rather  than e.qectations and i n  
contrast  t o  the  second w a s  re la t ive ly  unambiguous, something approaching 
a more diprar-cut division w a s  i n  evidence. 
(S9%) c lear ly  f e l t  tha t  Europe's e f fo r t s  were not appropriate. 
thought they were while 13% were recorded as DK. 
dent, too, tha t  by "inappropriate" the sc i en t i s t s  meant "too small" ra ther  
than "too large." 
that  Europe's e f fo r t s  were not  appropriate voluntarily added comments t o  
the effect  t ha t  the e f f o r t s  needed t o  be enlarged; v i r tua l ly  no one gave 
the opposite comment. While the  notion t h a t  European countries e i ther  
individually or together should set up programs of manned space f l i g h t  
w a s  never expressed, European slowness i n  entering the  prof i table  fields 
Here, on a question H h i c h  in con- 
The majority of respondents 
Only 28% 
I t  was more than evi- 
About one-third (37%) of the respondents who indicated 
l6 Many o f  these comments came from Britons and i f  one adjusts the 
Bri t ish response pat tern accordingly it be&ins t o  look more l i k e  those of  
the  other na t iopa l i t i es .  
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of s c i e n t i f i c  and technological (par t icu lar ly  communications) space 
ons w a s  repe 
relationsh$ps 
In a predic t ive  (although undramatic) display of se l f - in t e re s t ,  
the respondents (of a l l  na t iona l i t i e s )  from ESTE 
t h e i r  colleagues i n  the  other international cent 
of t he  ESTEC respondents (73%) replied t h a t  they did not think Europe's 
e f fo r t s  were appropriate; nearly ha l f  went on t o  add (voluntarily) t h a t  
they ought t o  be enlarged. Outside of ESTEC (and ESDAC, whose r e su l t s  
para l le led  i t s  s i s t e r  establishment) the response patterns of the other 
centers did not d i f f e r  greatly among themselves. 
Responses from these laboratories outside of ESTEC and ESDAC did 
uncovenp at least cme tional in t e re s t ing  piece of infomat ion ,  however. 
The question did not distinguish between the national space e f f o r t s  of 
t h e  various European countries and the j o i n t  e f fo r t s  represented by 
ESRO, ELDC (European Launcher Development Organization) , and CETS 
(European Conference for  Telecommunications by S a t e l l i t e ) .  
* 
Although 
their common ethos generally made s c i e n t i s t s  at each of the international 
laboratories conscious and knowledgeable about the  others,  the  question 
on European space e f fo r t s  revealed a surprising depth of ignorance at  
the other laboratories about ESRO's activities. t h i s  could be 
a t t r i bu ted  t o  the fact t h a t  ESRO had not yet suc l y  launched any 
s a t e l l i t e s .  In responses such as g, showing a 
virtually complete ignorance of ESRO and ELDO, were not unusual a t  
CEIZN and ISPRA: 
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I don't think they should be doing more unless they jo in  
forces t o  do it. ime they do ra ther  l i t t l e ,  
but I don't see t h a t  any of the countries,  even Bri ta in  or 
France, could do much more under present conditions . . 
u n t i l  they jo in -  i n  a l a rger  scheme . . . I don't think any 
European country can r ea l ly  have a space program of any 
s igni f icant  size. TRey could obviously, when they decide 
t o  jo in  forces.  
A t  the  presen 
--French engineer from ISPRA 
The sect ion on space concluded on a somewhat i dea l i sg i c  note. Respon- 
d m t s  were asked io t ake  the long view on space exploration and its p o l i t i c s  
and pronounce t h e i r  judgement on one of the notions dearest to  the  hearts 
of  the p o l i t i c a l  advocates o f  space exploration. The question, i n  a some- 
what leading fashion, read: "DO you think tha t  the cost  of space expiora- 
t i on  will eventually lead those nations in te res ted  i n  i t  t o  cooperate on 
a world-wide scale i n  such effor ts?"  While t h i s  item was su f f i c i en t ly  
vague to provoke a rather high rate of DK (19%), the majorfty (62%) 
indeed did give its endorsement to  t h i s  expectation. Once again, i n  an 
unsurprising deviation, ESTEC s c i e n t i s t s  displayed greater  i n t e re s t  i n  
matters r e l a t ing  t o  space and their "yes" response (69%) was s l igh t ly  
stronger than tha t  of the other laboratories.  
l i t t l e  d i f fe ren t ia t ion  among the various groups, 
Otherwise there was 
Responses t o  t h i s  
question were noticeably lukewarm; t h e i r  tone might be characterized as 
Ityes , it would be nice" rather than "yes, I really expect this t o  
happen." Among the  r e l a t ive ly  scarce write-in comments, the most fre- 
quent followed flyestl responses and fell i n t o  an empirical classiEicat ion 
a m w t i n g  t o  "1 hope so." 
To summarize the  s c i e n t i s t s ' .  views on these four aspects of the pol i -  
tics of outer space one should note first t h a t  ESTEC s c i e n t i s t s  displayed-  
t h e  greatest in t e re s t .  They were strongest  i n  the desire (which w a s  
however shared by the other laboratories) to  see 
p a r t  in space research, and they were most convinced of 
value of such a c t i v i t i e s .  Few s c i e n t i s t s  from any of the  laboratories 
were wi l l ing  t o  make a guess on the outcome of the "race t o  the moon." 
Most did consider it t o  be a valuable enterpr ise ,  although not as a 
"race." Overall, while views on policy r e l a t ing  t o  outer  space were not  
as consensual as views on m y  other topics,  the  na t iona l i ty  and labora- 
t o r y  variables did not reveal many s igni f icant  d i f fe ren t ia t ions .  
+ * *  
In concluding this survey of the p o l i t i c a l  thinking of a sample 
of internat ional  s c i e n t i s t s ,  we have gone from an analysis of the i r  
underlying bbl ie f  pat terns  t o  an examination of some very spec i f ic  
types of opinions. Midway through this process, we uncovered a range 
of thought on the European integrat ion i ssue-c lus te r  which bespeaks a 
highly a r t icu la ted  form of regional sentiment. The first par t  of t h i s  
chapter revealed the  ways i n  which this regionalism in t e rac t s  with the 
more global internationalism usually a t t r ibu ted  t o  s c i e n t i s t s .  
seen that the  tww,o "isms" coexist on d i f fe r ing  levels of idealism and 
abstrackion and hence do not conf l ic t .  
represents more or less a digression on some polit ico-technological 
It  was 
The second h a l f  of t h i s  chapter 
issues and it w a s  seen that the technological content, through its more 
direct re la t ion  t o  the s c i e n t i s t s '  own experience, produces a number of 
more parochial interpretat ions.  
Looking back a t  Parts Two and Three of t h i s  study it is apparent 
t h a t  three major t asks  s t i l l  l i e  undone: ty ing  together the various 
loose ends, s r  ping back t o  look a t  &e p o l i t i c a l  r o l e  of internat ional  
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laboratories in a better perspective, and drawing such general conclu- 
sions as the data allows. 
to Part Four (Chapter XI]. 
It is with this goal in mind t ha t  we turn 

PART FOUR 
3b1 Preceding page Mank 
- 

CHAPTER X I  
.INTERNATIONAL LABORATORIES AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 
This is not the sort of study a t  the end of which one niay s i t  back 
and, with the aid o f  several  s ta t i s t ica l ly-va l ida ted  key tzbles o r  a few 
well-supported crucial  proposit ions,  s t a t e  with authority:  "Thus, the 
original hypothesis is ( i s  not) supported.lf The problem-area is too 
diffuse, the subject-matter is too l i t t l e  explored, the methodology too 
inexact, and the data  too limited t o  permit such luxuries.  
must be s a t i s f i e d  w i t h  a s e r i e s  of somewhat imprecise statements whose 
Hence one 
values l i e  primarily i n  the fac ts  t ha t :  (1) they are data-based and not 
merely armchair speculation, ( 2 )  they deal w i t h  important aspects o f  an 
in te res t ing  yet unexplored problem, and (3)  they const i tute  bases from 
which t o  develop further--much-needed--investigation. 
The attitudes and behavior of scientists and engineers i n  in te r -  
nat ional  laboratories have been explored i n  order t o  gain some insights  
i n t o  the fuzure societal ro l e  which large-scale s c i e n t i f i c  collaboration 
may play i n  Europe. First the 
scientific ro le ,  tha t  is, what cans the  laboratories do through performing 
Two avenues of approach have been taken: 
__I_ _ _  - __ 
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t h e i r  intended technical functions t o  build the  s c i e n t i f i c  and techno- 
logical capacity of Europe? Second, t h e  p o l i t i c a l  role--& 
laboratories do d i r ec t ly  i n  terms of the  func t iona l i s t  model t o  f o s t e r  
p a l i t i c a l  in tegra t ion  of the European s t a t e s ?  This chapter, without 
forge t t ing  its apologia, attempts f o  synthesize, from t h e  findings 
reported in t he  body of the work, some t en ta t ive  answers t o  the above 
questions. 
A. Sc ien t i f i c  Role 
Within t he  concept of the s c i e n t i f i c  r o l e  there axe really two 
functions which an international laboratory nay perform. The first con- 
sists simply of carrying out its assigned s c i e n t i f i c  tasks and yielding 
&a srrFts of research results which comprise its technical snissiorr. The 
second function, somewhat more d i f f i c u l t  t o  assess, rests on the labora- 
tory ' s  a b i l i t y  t o  a f f ec t  scientific development outside i t s  walls, in a 
larger sense, through such actions as countering the brain drain and 
fostering greater s c i e n t i f i c  interchange arnong other i n s t i t u t ions  i n  the  
member states. 
1. Assets and L iab i l i t i e s :  A Balance Sheet 
Part Two of study examined, through the eyes of  the  respondents, 
ernationaL laboratories: 
t ion .  If one should be 
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res, but these f ea tu r  
structure ra the r  than 
It  has been repeated many times tha t  the  in te rna t iona l  atmosphere 
of t he  various l a b o r a t ~ r i e s  made them similar t o  each other i n  a number 
of respects and i n  these respects they are d i s t i n c t  from nearly a l l  o ther  
research environments t o  be found i n  Europe. The basis of most of  these 
s i m i l a r i t i e s  is not the in te rna t iona l  sponsorship but the  e f f ec t  of i n t e r -  
nationalism a t  the individual level--the mixture of s c i e n t i s t s  sf many 
d i f f e ren t  na t iona l i t i e s  and backgrounds i n  relati irely even proportions. 
The fact that such mixtures occur i n  present-day Europe only under in t e r -  
national sponsorship is t h e  r e s u l t  of various s i t ua t iona l  fac tors ,  t h e  
most important of which is the technological gap. In many f i e l d s  o f  
science and technology, the d i f f e ren t i a t ion  i n  level of  advancement 
between major European countries (from the s c i e n t i s t ' s  point of view) is 
ra ther  small compared to the perceived difference between the common 
l eve l  of these countries and the United S ta tes .  In most cases, then, a 
s c i e n t i s t  from a major European nation who wishes t o  go abroad in  search 
of b e t t e r  opportunities f o r  study o r  work is l i ke ly  t o  see greater advan- 
1 tage i n  going t o  the  United S 
This factor,  compounded by the reluctance of univers i t ies  i n  many European 
than another European country. 
This assertion is supported by the data on respondents' previous 
l i v ing  abroad and t h e i r  expressed preferences on future moves. 
ual i f ica t ions ,  ha 
The internat ional  aspect of 
t he  larger  organizational context--is similar in  a l l  three models and i s  
both pleasant and f a c i l i t a t i v e  f o r  the performance of research. 
poss ib i l i t y  of recru i t ing  spec ia l i s t s  from t h e  broad European consti tu- 
ency ra ther  than a basical ly  national constituency, is one inportant 
advantage. 
brings to s c i e n t i f i c  teamwork, discussed i n  sohe d e t a i l  i n  Chapter V I ,  
is another. . I n  dditian, the personal rewards which par t ic ipants  derive 
from the cross-cultural  experience, although vaguely unders.tood, are 
universally acclaimed by the  s c i e n t i s t s .  Evaluations of  the re la t ive  
inefficiency of communication resul t ing from mixtures of national s ty les  
of work and d i f fe ren t  languages varied. 
The 
The stimulation which divers i ty  of cul ture  and background 
The best approximation would 
seem t o  be tha t  such inefficiency was nearly universal but rebatively 
minor i n  its detrimental e f fec t .  Finally, there is a vircual  absence 
of conf l ic t  based on o r  re la ted  t o  nat ional i ty  considerations. 
an the individual level ,  the  mixing of na t iona l i t i es  i n  the s c i e n t i f i c  
In sum, 
, as one might w e l l  
ever, is only a second-order e . Its contr i -  
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laboratories operate-as demonstrated i n  two out o f  t h  
which we have dea l t .  One is speaking here of the  e f f e  
complication and p o l i t i c a l  disruption on professional morale and this is 
re f l ec t ed  i n  the  responses which the  s c i e n t i s t s  gave when they were asked 
t o  compare thair  present environment t o  o ther  (national) environments with 
which they were familiar. Awareness of such p a r t i c u l a r i s t i c  phenomena as 
*%bureaucracyis and l tholi t ical  problems a t  the  top" c l ea r ly  took precedence 
ee mdels with 
f bureaucratic 
over more un ive r sa l i s t i c  aspects of the in te rna t iona l  s i t ua t ion .  
ESTEC, and above a l l  a t  ISPR4, complications stemming from the  in t e r -  
n a t i o n a l  s t a tus  of t h e  organizations are responsible for the severe d i f f i -  
A t  
c u l t i e s  which the laboratories have encountered. 
the problems are considered by the  s c i e n t i s t s  t o  be of a p o l i t i c a l  
In  both of  these cases, 
0 
( i r r a t iona l )  nature, o r ig ina t ing  i n  re la t ionships  of the  member states, 
and t h e i r  gravity is such t ha t  the  advantages of t he  in te rna t iona l  environ- 
ment a re  a l l  but forgotten. A t  CERN, on the other hand, where the organi- 
zation has been r e l a t ive ly  f r ee  from upper-level disputes between nations, 
the advantages o f  internationalism on an individual level take on much 
greater significance. 
It there a lesson t o  be learned from these three cases? If so, i t  
is l ike ly  to  be tha t  from t he  point of view of accomplishing a given 
scientific or technological task,  t h e  advantages of an international 
establishment are f r ag i l e ,  and they are eas i ly  outweighed by the vas t ly  
increased p o s s i b i l i t i e s  f o r  p o l i t i c a l  dispute and organizational stale- 
mate opened up through in te rna t iona l i sa t ion  of sponsorship. This by 
itself, however, should not be taken as a denigration of  the  international 
laboratory concept, since first, the  achievement of a purely scientific 
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aim is only par t  of the value potent ia l  of an internat ional  l abora toy ,  
ces ages 
of the internat ional  s t ruc ture  may predominate. 
A reasonable approach t o  proper u t i l i za t ion  of the  international 
laboratory concept would seem t o  be one which makes use of i ts  inherent 
(albeit f rag i le )  advantages whPZe minimizing the  possib 
ruption from p o l i t i c a l  confl ic t .  Fundamental research ventures which 
require a cer ta in  minimum, critical size-either i n  terms of equipment 
or  staffing--would appear most sui table  under t h i s  l i n e  of reasoning. 
Cr i t ica l  s ize  is necessary i n  order t o  minimize the potent ia l  scope of 
disputes over means once the needs have been agreed upon by member states. 
That fundamental research should be the preferred type of ac t iv i ty  
rests upon a very simple prernise--the 
froan confl ic t ing national in te res t s .  
not assume po l i t i ca l  coherence of the 
t h e  likelihood of disruptive confl ic t  
increased distance of such work 
In other words, given thaZ one can- 
member s t a t e s ,  one must recognize 
or even organizational paralysis 
resul t ing from t h i s  lack of coherence, par t icu lar ly  if Costs are  high 
and/or the' work of the organization re la tes  d i rec t ly  t o  indus t r ia l ,  
n i l i t a r y ,  o r  p o l i t i c a l  p ro f i t  poss ib i l i t i es .  Thus there  is greater 
assurance that a laboratory w i l l  be given t he  organizational environment 
which w i l l  pennit it: t o  pursue its s c i e n t i f i c  mission, i f  it is devote+ 
damental research, more remote 
ed by conditions outside of the  organization) is a reasonable expec- 
f ic and technological ventures are 
tfr t iona l  laboratory frame. Smalle 
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applied establishments, such as PETT work- 
able even without assuming much political coh ir relatively 
low costs make them less sensitive to instability. But large applied 
centers of ISPRA’s genre evidently fare poorly under such conditions and 
2 are unable to perfarm adequately with respec+ te their scientific aims. 
One might hypothesize that under circumstances where political cohesion 
cannot be- asswued, joint planning and coordination of efforts through some 
form of central direction would be more likely to yield acceptable results 
in projects of a technological nature, and much of the international 
ambiance could be duplicated by encouraging national centers to accommo- 
date large numbers of foreign professionals I 
2. Institutional Relationships 
Consideration of purely scientific (or technological) aims is not 
the whole story, however, and one must look further into the ways in which 
international laboratories interact with national scientific institutions 
in order to evaluate more fully their scientific impact, Conversely, it 
is evident that institutional relationships may also affect the ability of 
a laboratory to perform its scientific tasks. The data points to a 
number of significant conclusions on this matter. 
Before outlining these conclusions, however, it is worth mentioning 
brieEly a few of the important aspects of the institutional question which 
cannot be explored with the data, The internationalization of 
Our sample contains only 3 large laboratories, of course, so it 
’ difficult to make sweeping generalizations; but one must recall that 
ese 3 are the only large iliterna+tional laboratories in existence. 
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technological fy-based industry through the  purchasing prac t ices  of inter- 
influence. Forcing nations t o  a 
ce is another. While the  metric system is used qu i t e  
generaIly throughout European science and technology, such me 
gauges of metal, s i ze s  of screw-thread, and standards of pur i ty  and 
qua l i ty  i n  chemicals and metals s t i l l  vary from one country t o  another 
and t he  existence of large international laboratories can undoubtedly 
help t o  reduce such differences. Direct influencing o f  t h e  type of work 
t h a t  goes on i n  national ins t i tuxes  is a th i rd  aspect. 
t ha t  it provides research material for some 700 phys ic i s t s  outside,of 
t h e  ~ r g a n i z a t i o n . ~  The facilities provided by ERN and ESRO a l so  serve 
CERN estimates 
ectly t he  needs of national groups i n  the member nations: many scien- 
tists come t o  CERN for short periods t o  carry out experiments; a l l  of the  
experiments which ESRO fzunches belong t o  national s c i e n t i f i c  groups. 
We can only mention these i n  passing and suggest t ha t  there are many other 
such ef fec ts ,  but our data does not include such matters. 
The primary me'ans by which in s t i t u t iona l  relationships may be 
approached with t h i s  data is v i a  the career patterns of t he  respondents. 
... . . . . .  
ontracted out c -I satellite t o  
g of Matra [Fran 
a Aeroplan Alctizbolaget (Sweden), - Ltd. TUnited Kingdom). 
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Detailed information was col lected about the professional backgro 
motivations, and fu ture  plans of respondents. 
a few insights-a% the level of  the individual--on the  interact ions 
between the internat ional  laboratories and national science s t ructures .  
An important way to  begin exploration o f  t h i s  topic  is t o  ask what 
This information yielded 
is the  r e l a t ion  of the  internat ional  laborator ies  t o  the  famous %rain 
draintt--i. e 
engineers? 
European s c i e n t i s t s  with opportunities t o  do advanced work i n  "big science" 
f i e lds  without leaving t h e i r  continent, and cer ta in ly  th i s  function was 
mentioned often enough by the survey respondents a Nevertheless, with 
respect t o  the overal l  magnitude of the drain (which, as was observed 
earlier, affects different countries t o  varying degrees) it would seem 
that the number of  posit ions avai lable  i n  the internat ional  centers is 
not t e r r ib ly  large. Furthermore, the number of  respondents who reported 
d i r ec t  personal experience with the phenomenon comprises only a small 
proportion of the laboratories '  populations. Within the en t i r e  sample, 
a t o t a l  of 11 respondencs reported tha t  they were "drawn back" t o  Europe 
from the  United S ta tes  by an internat ional  laboratory. (See p ,  177,) 
This number is so small tha t  it is meaningless t o  t r y  to: project  any 
quant i ta t ive trends from it. 
t i o n  stimulated by the internat ional  laborator ies  does exist; but that 
it is far from massive. 
Europe ( to  one of the internat ional  laboratories) a f t e r  completing t h e i r  
educations in America. 
the United S ta tes ,  and how many would have returned to  Europe anyway is 
the international migration of European scientists and 
One of the stated goals of the laboratories is t o  provide 
One may only conclude tha t  a reverse migra- 
A handful of other  respondents returned t o  
How many of these men would have stayed on i n  
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an open question. On the other hand, f u l l y  one-fourth of chose respon- 
dents who sa id  they were consid alte e 
d t o  come t o  the international lab i n  
one of these job p o s s i b i l i t i e s  w a s  i n  the United States.  
t ion  was only asked on the interviews, the absolute number of such respon- 
dents is ra the r  small (133, but despite its mall absolute size (which 
precludes d i f f e ren t i a t ion  by laboratory andfor nationali ty] it may well 
be indica t ive  of a meaningful trend. 
t h a t  a l l  th ree  major international laboratories have given s c i e n t i s t s  
and engineers who might otherwise have been tempted t o  go t o  the United 
As this ques- 
In al l ,  it is  probably fa i r  t o  say 
S ta tes  .. a re l a t ive ly  a t t r a c t i v e  a l te rna t ive .  
There is, however, ano the r s ide  t o  t h i s  story.  I t  was observed i n  
Chapter V t ha t  commitment--the a b i l i t y  and des i re  t o  return home-decreased 
with time spent i n  the  laboratory. 
laboratories may operate more or l e s s  as “way stations”: they a r r ive  at 
t h e  labs with f u l l  intention o f  returning t o  t h e i r  countries, but as the  
years pass f i n d  tha t  t h e i r  ties with home grow weaker. 
decide t o  leave, given a continuing technological gap, t h e i r  probabili ty 
of going t o  the United S ta tes  is much higher than it would have been had 
they remained a t  home.’ This is t u  some extent speculation, but it 
For some s c i e n t i s t s  the international 
When they f i n a l l y  
Although w e  have l i t t l e  d i r ec t  d 
e ly  t h a t  s c i e n t i s t s  
substantiate t h i s  asser- 
ies with r e l a t ive ly  
low pay scales- as Britain and Hol hes i t a t e  t o  return 
home from a high-paying international laboratory and face a sa la ry  cut of 
50%. 
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should be recal led nearly ha l f  of those respondents who s 
they had a country preference f o r  t h e i r  next job chose a count 
than t h e i r  own. The United States  was f a r  and away the most frequently 
named country, and few s c i e n t i s t s  from any major European country chose 
any o ther  maj European country. 
I t  is impossible t o  state with any degree of certainty how these 
The most masonable countervail ing migration tendencies balance out. 
approach to the problem would be t o  suggest tu0  of the  fac tors  which 
could influence the balance. 
.I 
The internal  s c i e n t i f i c  and technological 
s i tua t ions  of the individual countries are of central  importance, f o r  
they are  responsible for the drain i n  the f i r s t  place,  
t i v e  t h i s  s i t ua t ion  is, t h e  more l ike ly  a s c i e n t i s t  is t o  look else- 
wbre upon leaving t h e  internat ional  lab. The low- commitment of t h e  
ESTEC Bri t i sh  [including those of low senior i ty)  may be understood in  
t h i s  l i gh t .  
The less a t t r ac -  
The laboratory's h i r ing  procedures and i t s  degree of s t ab i l -  
i t y  are  a l so  determinants, 
worlds in t h i s  respect, since i t s  pract ice  of making career appointments 
ISPRA has perhaps the worst-of-all-possible 
4 
encourages sc i en t i s t s  i o  break t i e s  a t  home--indeed ISPP3 sc i en t i s t s  
reported the fewest professional ties i n  t h e i r  own countries--and its 
unstable p o l i t i c a l  s i tua t ion  may w e l l  encourage (or even force) some of 
its staff members t o  depart prematurely. I t  would be no surprise i f  m y  
ISPRA scient is ts .  end up i n  American nuclear research establishments. 
This fac tor  of career versus short  term appointments i n  internat ional  
laboratories leads d i rec t ly  in to  the  o ther  major aspect o f  these labora- 
t o r i e s '  i n s t i t u t iona l  relationships--%hat of personnel interchange. 
Evidently a certrain amount of in te rna l  continudty is necessary i n  order 
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t o  maintain the  s c i e n t i f i c  competence of  
a long-term commitment mus 
the  center. A core staff with 
t 
appears, however, tha t  t is t o  the benefi 
n t i s t s  and engineers, the laboratory a 
scientific establishment. t o  employ the greater portion of. the profes- 
simal s t a f f  on a re la t ive ly  short-term b 
stmdpoint ,  a short-term commitment implies greater independence from 
organizational i n s t ab i l i t y ,  and probably leads t o  a more sat isfactory 
pattern of career development f o r  most. 
view of the laboratory, individual independence from organizational 
i n s t a b i l i t y  should improve morale, o r  a t  least decrease the probabili ty 
of developing very poor morale. 
among a l a r g e  proportion of the  professional sta€f should, fur themme,  
lintit t h e  potential scope of national conflict-insofar as more indivi-  
duals w i  11 gain t h e i r  reward's through professional achievement ra ther  
From the operational point of 
The absence of a career orientazion 
than position. Finally,  in  terms af 
national s c i e n t i f i c  ins t i tu t ions  and 
should be stsengthened t o  the extent 
warm bodies. 
L 
ins t i tu t iona l  patterns, links between 
the internat ional  laboratories 
that  they are based on a t r a f f i c  i n  
The weakness of exchange between national s c i e n t i f i c  ins t i tu t ions  
i n  Europe has been mentioned several 
( in  Chaptar Iv) i n  the  surprisingly small number of respondents who 
r opaan country other than t h e i r  own. I t  
s i n  t h i s  study. I t  was ref lected 
was discussed e present chapter as resul t ing from a 
ren t ia t ion  among European c es 
e international 1aboratork;es are i n  a 
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posit ion t o  f u l f i l l  an important function by encouraging such interchange. 
How well they are succeeding is qu i t e  d i f f i c u l t  t o  judge. The data reveals 
t h a t  al l  three major centers draw upon the academic, government, and indus- 
trial sectors,  although i n  varying proportions. 
from t h e  nature of its research, has the  c loses t  t i e s  t o  the  academic 
world. 
of t h e i r  staffs horn university posit ions.  
tists and engineers a t  each of these two establishments came front industry, 
and about one-third from government, with the remainder coming from aca- 
CERN, as one might expect 
ESTEC and ISPRA, on the other hand, draw much smaller proportions 
About one-half of t he  scien- 
demic posts.  
h i t o n s  and Frenchmen drawn from government posts and very few Frenchmen 
drawn from univers i t ies .  
Differences by narionali ty were also apparent, w i t h  more 
I t  w i l l  be reca l led  t h a t  a large proportion (60%) of the  respondents 
were between t h i r t y  and for ty  years old, and most (85%)  had been pre- 
vious ly  employed ra ther  than coming t o  the international laboratories 
d i r ec t ly  from t h e i r  s tud ies ,  I t  appears, then, tha t  a large number of 
the s c i e n t i s t s  and engineers are a t  a good s tage  i n  t h e i r  careers from 
the point of view o f  promoting personnel interchange between the in t e r -  
na t iona l  laboratories and national i n s t i t u t ions .  In terms of t h e i r  
fu ture  plans, many of those respondents who expressed a preference seemed 
t o  display a des i re  t o  remain i n  an in te rna t iona l  atnosphere. About one- 
fourth of  the  respondents sa id  they had no preference, and nearly a t h i r d  
of those remaining gave only vague r ep l i e s  such as tfresearch." Among 
the others,  "international organization" w a s  the  most popular choice, 
followed by industry, government, and universities, i n  t h a t  order. Cross- 
tabulation indicated tha t  choice of a national s ec to r  was determined 
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primarily by the respondent's sector of origin,  but respondents originat-  
ing from a l l  sectors  were equally l ike ly  t o  choose an internation 
organi za ti on. 
Personnel interchange involving the three major sectors  of national 
s c i e n t i f i c  employment is evidently taking place at a l l  of the large in te r -  
national laboratories.  
par t icu lar  by the prac t ice  of sending s c i e n t i s t s  t o  the internat ional  
centers on temporary leave, and ESTEC is a major beneficiary of  t h i s  
practice.  I t  is weakened, on the other hand, f i r s t  by the laboratories '  
pract ice  of making large numbers of  career appointments (such as ISPRA 
does) and second by t h e  f a c t  tha t  a substant ia l  proportion of the scien- 
tists who go t o  the internat ional  labs apparently are not interested 
either in  returning home o r  i n  going t o  another European country. CERN, 
working i n  high energy physics--a field with t rad i t iona l ly  strung intes- 
change--is c lear ly  the l i v e l i e s t  center i n  th i s  r e  pect.  
I t  is strengfhened i n  the government sector  i n  
I t  has the 
great advantage af being the  foremost European laboratory i n  a dynamic 
area of  basic research, and it has capi ta l ized on its advantage by main- 
ta ining act ive v i s i t o r ,  fellowship, and summer student programs. Not 
only CERN, however, but a l l  of  the internat ional  laboratories have a 
genuine poten t ia l  for developing closer  ties among the s c i e n t i f i c  
connmrnities of the various European countries. 
B. Pol i t i ca l  Role 
I t  has b k  proposed tha t  i n  addition t o  affect ing Europe's future  
through performance of s c i e n t i f i c  and technological functions, the 
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internat ional  laboratories are capable of p 
effects. 
laboratories were explored i n  an attempt t o  assess some of these effects 
from the  perspective of the individual s c i e n t i s t ,  
be treated i n  tws broad categories: 
The p o l i t i c a l  a t t i tudes  of the s c i e n t i f i c  
Our conclusions may 
those r e l a t ing  t o  the shaping of 
a t t i t udes ,  and those 
1. Atti tudes 
To summarize i n  
r e l a t ing  to the  action potent ia l  of t he  sc i en t i s t s .  
a few words the  major findings with regard t o  the 
sc i en t i s t s '  p o l i t i c a l  a t t i t udes ,  i t  appears t h a t  an a t t i t ude  pattern 
highly favorable to  increased p o l i t i c a l  integrat ion in  Europe i s  p rac t i -  
ca l ly  universal among s c i e n t i s t s  of  a l l  na t iona l i t i es  i n  a l l  laboratories.  
Because of the  strength of t h i s  consensus it proved a l l  but impossible t o  
detect  var ia t ions i n  a t t i t ude  s t ruc ture  which might be a t t r ibu ted  t o  
e f fec ts  of the laboratory experience. 
Given the demographic homogeneity o f  the respondents, a broad sharing 
of  p o l i t i c a l  a t t i tudes  is not an unreasonable expectation. 
ma j o r  sociological charac te r i s t ics  normal 1 y associated w i t h  po l i t i ca l  
or ientat ions show remarkably l i t t l e  d i f fe ren t ia t ion  among the respondents. 
The d is t r ibu t ion  by age is sharply peaked i n  the thirty-to forty-year old 
bracket. 
highly educated. 
it should be a safe assumption tha t  through t h e i r  occupational s ta tus ,  a l l  
of the respondents can be considered as belonging t o  the  'professional 
middle class." Religion was a lso  not explored d i rec t ly ,  but it seldom 
arose i n  interviews and other studies  suggest that it is less of a fac tor  
Most of the 
Ninety-five percent of the respondents are  males; nearly a l l  are 
While soc ia l  class was not ascertained independently, 
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among s c i e n t i s t s  than i n  the  general population.6 One is left  with nation- 
a l i t y ,  s c i e n t i f i c  function, and exposure t o  the  international s i tua t ion .  
O f  these, na t iona l i ty  proved t o  be the most important discriminator-- 
although it must be recognized tha t  cer ta in  def in i t iona l  complications with 
regard t o  the other variables made them d i f f i c u l t  t o  work with. 
3y s c i e n t i f i c  function is meant the  degree t o  which if respondent's 
professional i n t e re s t s  and a c t i v i t i e s  may be characterized as e i the r  
abs t rac t / theoie t ica l  or applied/practical .  Separating the  respondents 
i n to  s c i e n t i s t s  versus engineers e i t h e r  by t i t l e  of educational degree 
or t i t l e  of present posit ion did not yield differences on most issues.  
Similarly, the  se l f - repor t  question by which respondents described the 
nature of t h e i r  work on a sca le  ranging from basic research through applied 
research, development, engineering to technical semice turned out to be 
of l imited value. 
gave the  most useful r e su l t s .  
what was sought under the  heading o f  individual s c i e n t i f i c  function, but 
since the laboratories do have di f fe ren t  s c i e n t i f i c  characters which are 
of importance i n  other pa r t s  of the study, and since the or ig ina l  expecta- 
t i o n  of inter-laboratory differences was borne out by the data, substan- 
t ia l  use w a s  made of t h i s  variable. 
The grossest measure--that is, the  laboratory itself- 
This is by no means a pure indicator of 
With regard t o  exposure t o  the international s i tua t ion ,  a simple 
dichotomy about the poin t  of  245, years was employed. 
iz ing  effects which operate very rapidly--over, say, a period of a few 
If there  are social-  
For example, Bernice Eiduson, Sc ien t i s t s  : Their Psychological 6 
World [New York: Basic Books, 19621, pp. 217-220. -
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weeks OT months-it is possible t h a t  they wer 
handed slice. 
sen io r i ty  w a s  d i s t r ibu ted  at ESTEC and ISPRA (the reasons for which are 
discussed in  Chapter IV) made the  use of other dividing points impracti- 
cal. Fusthemore, t h e  size of  the  samplsplesant t h a t  after d i v i  
laboratory and nat iona l i ty ,  it w a s  not p rac t i ca l  t o  employ a sen io r i ty  
scale with more than two values. The sa& reason--small sample size-- 
made it impossible t o  control f o r  previous in te rna t iona l  exposure ( t r ave l ,  
foreign l iving, etc.1--a f ac to r  which might well have blurred the e f f ec t s  
o f  the laboratory experience on p o l i t i c a l  views. Since t h e  sample was 
r e l a t ive ly  large with respect t o  t h s  available population (about 202) ,  
t h i s  i n t r i n s i c  l imi ta t ion  suggests that a repeat interview study might 
have been more successful i n  measuring attitude change than a study of 
this form. 
On the  other hand, t he  highly unbal 
In any case, much of t h i s  discussion is academic, because the scope 
of agreement on most o f  the major European issues w a s  strong enough to 
overwhelm any in te rna l  d iv is ions ,  
European collaboration was so universal t ha t  it could eas i ly  be--and in 
fact was--taken for granted, Beyond t h i s ,  the  da ta  revealed nearly 
unanimug approval for p o l i t i c a l  integration of " l i t t l e  Europe" and 
expansion of the  core group of s ix  nations t o  include orher Western 
European powers. 
any regular fashion. 
seeing Europe regain its world posit ion as a "leading continent." 
Support €or the ex is t ing  organs of 
Expectations on these  matters d id  vary, although not i n  
Motivations were traced t o  a common hope--that of  
The 
i l i t y  of reported data and conclusions from other  e l i te  studies 
permitted certain comparisons t o  be made. Evidently it would have been 
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desirable  t o  base such comparishns e i the r  on s c i e n t i s t s  i n  national 
r o l  independently f o r  the s c i e n t i f i c  f and the in t e r -  
national factor .  
did a t  l e a s t  demonstraze tha t  the s c i e n t i  
seemed t o  be ;t more in tense  desire  for c 
Failing t h i s ,  comparisons with national e l i te  panels 
n t h i s  study displayed what 
and rapid p o l i t i c a l  integra- 
t ion,  and cer tainly a much more broadly transnational consensus on these 
European issues  than the national e l i t e  panels. 
Differences between the  various laboratories and national grdups 
turned up primarily on issues (such as national nuclear weapons) where 
national s i tua t ions  diverged widely, or where the character of a par-  
t i c u l a r  laboratory suggested a strong influence i n  one direct ion or 
mother. 
deviators were found among the  Bri t ish.  
tists presented a t t i t ude  patterns which paral le led t h e i r  colleagues from 
other European nations (and thus differed s igni f icant ly  from t h e i r  non- 
sc i en t i s t  compatriots), s ign i f icant  numbers of B r i t i s h  s c i e n t i s t s  and 
engineers, par t icu lar ly  at ESTEC, ref lected t h e i r  domestic p o l i t i c a l  cl i-  
mate i n  showing a d i s t i n c t l y  lower degree of European sentiment. 
i n  t h i s  group t h a t  increased experience i n  the internat ional  laboratory 
seemed t o  make a difference: 
On mtters concerning European integration. t he  most consiszent 
WhZle most af t h e  Bri t ish scien- 
I t  was 
as described i n  Chapter V I I I ,  the  proportion 
t a n t i a l l y  higher among ri t i s h  with 
se who were re la t ive ly  new i n  the internat ional  
-&eavily qua l i  
n 
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for movement with regard European orientatian.  The vas t  majority were 
strongly i n  favor of the European idea before they 
national laboratory, and thus d id  not need t o  be "convertedw by the 
experience. 
survey,  European integration is c l ea r ly  the  most salient t o  the  scien- 
t o  the  in t e r -  
Among the  various p o l i t i c a l  issues explored through the  
tists. The in te rna t iona l  laboratories,  however, serve mainly to bring 
together scientists with similar views on t h i s  matter, r a t h e r  than t o  take 
s c i e n t i s t s  with diverse views and shape them in to  a consensus. The 
invariance of t h i s  European sentiment was pa r t i cu la r ly  s t r i k i n g  i n  view 
of the variety of motives which brought the s c i e n t i s t s  t o  the l a b s  as 
well as the profound variations i n  organizational morale, 
stronger professional or ien ta t ion  of CERN s c i e n t i s t s  r e l a t i v e  t o  t h e i r  
Apparently the 
opposite numbers at  ESTEC and LSPRA does not imply a lesser degree of 
Europeanist sentiment there. Furthermore, t h e  d i f f e r ing  experiences which 
ISPRA, ESTEC, and CERN have had with the p o l i t i c s  of European integration-- 
mirrored so c l ea r ly  i n  t h e i r  morale--have not produced measurable e f f ec t s  
on t h e  s c i e n t i s t s '  p o l i t i c a l  views. Despite t h e  fact t h a t  ISPRA scien- 
tists i n  pa r t i cu la r  often pointed discouragingly t o  t h e  f rx i t r a t ions  o f  
t ry ing  t o  "build Europe" and t o  the  i r r a t i o n a l  behavior of the Six partners,  
t h e i r  preferences and expectations were remarkably similar t o  those of 
s c i e n t i s t s  a t  ESTEC and CERN. Only in the laboratories of IAEA i n  Vienna 
and Seibersdorf, where both the  population and the sample were r e a l l y  too 
small t o  make any precise evaluations, d id  the Europeanist trend appear 
r a the r  weak. 
wide body located in tecfrnically neut ra l  Austria, this is understandable. 
Indeed, under the  very special  circumstances of a world- 
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h t s i d e  of the sphere strict1 
on such i s sues  w a s  lower 
nat ional  s i t ua t ions  seemd t o  be the prime causes f o r  splits such as the 
one which appesred,on nuclear weapons. In eff t h  e question- 
approval of national possession of nuclear weap@ns--&?ant qui te  d i f fe ren t  
things t o r e i e n t i s t s  of d i f fe ren t  na t iona l i t i es - - for  example, Britons 
and Germans. Varying national or ientat ions t o  such external bodies 
and problems as t h e  United Nations, NATO, and the  non-proliferation 
t r ea ty  also produced s p l i t s  between s c i e n t i s t s ,  par t icu lar ly  under con- 
di t ions of lower salience.  Finally, p o l i t i c a l  questions with a techno- 
logical  contsrtt which could be related t o  personal experriences and 
impressions of the scientists w e r e  subject EO more parochial interprets- 
* 
t ions than others. 
Before gaing on to discuss whar sorts of actions the scientists who 
possess these a t t i t ude  pat terns  might be l i k e l y  t o  par t ic ipa tec in ,  it is 
worth making a final assessment of the laboratory as an a t t i t u d e  shaping 
experience. 
cohesion and technological integrat ion discussed ear l ier-- i .e . ,  that the 
Such an assessment echoes the relat ionship between p o l i t i c a l  
sis f o r  t he  l a t t e r  ra ther  than a product of it. 
ts' p o l i t i c a l  a t t i t udes ,  the cohes n e x i s t s  and, 
In 
d values and methods of sci 
c s c i e n t i f i c  t irely sat i s  f a c t o 7  
dual level .  In 
laboratory s i tua t ion .  It nonnally exists among the s enrists p r i o r  t o  
their ent ry  i n t o  the laboratory, and in the  most extrema- example, ISPRA, 
it might be sa id  t o  p e r s i s t  desp i te  t he  laboratory's s i tua t ion .  
2. Action Potential  
Irr a pragmatic sense, t h e  degree t o  which these s c i e n t i s t s ,  so 
heavily or ien ted  t Q w a r d s  European integration, might themselves contri-  
buse d i r e c t l y  t o  t h e  process is more important than whether o r  not they 
possessed t h i s  or ien ta t ion  before coming t o  t h e i r  present jobs. Looking 
a t  things i n  t h i s  l i g h t ,  it i s  not necessary t o  hyTothesrze an a t t i tude-  
shaping ro l e  for the laboratories at a l l ,  The relevant question becomes 
simply whether the sc i en t i s t s - - the i r  p o l i t i c a l  i n t e r e s t s  possibly but 
not necessarily shaped or strengthened by t h e  in te rna t iona l  experience- 
ase wi l l ing  and able t o  pa r t i c ipa t e  i n  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i v i t i e s .  
The concept of  the s c i e n t i s t ' s  p o l i t i c a l  ro l e  is broadly interpreted 
and is  based l e s s  on h i s  des i re  t o  enter the p o l i t i c a l  arena [since, as 
we have seen, most s c i e n t i s t s  appear t o  be repelled by the "irrational" 
nature of p o l i t i c a l  a c t i v i t i e s )  and more on the vague (but oft-expressed? 
notion tha t  since science i t s e l f  is becoming more and more important i n  
society,  those who hold the  keys t o  its power mast somehow gain an 
increased influence on soc ie ty ' s  decisbon-making stnacture. 
Don I(. Price, i n  distinguishes two broad ways 
i n  which American s c i e n t i s t s  have par t ic ipa ted  i n  p o l i t i c a l  life-as 
Ynsiders" and tfOutsiders . I 1  The "Insiders , I r  he says, 
are l i ke ly  t o  accept the subordination of science t o  the 
value systems established by the  nation's p o l i t i c a t  t r ad i -  
t i on  and in te rpre ted  by the authority of its government, 
and they can get  along without much confidence 
h a d  
cient  
of present po l i  
y of the t r a d i t i  
for science t o  be subordinated to a sy  tern of organized 
authority based on tradi-cional values. ? 
For purposes of t h i s  discussion, we may consider four  types of p o l i t i c a l  
a c t i v i t i e s  in which the sci 
might conceivably par t ic ipa te  a t  some stage during t h e i r  s c i e n t i f i c  careers.  
The first of these corresponds loosely t o  Pr ice 's  notion of  the "Outsider," 
while the  other three are mare or less "Insider" roles-implying opera- 
tion within t rad i t iona l  p o l i t i c a l  values. 
involves organization in to  in t e re s t  and/or pressure groups with the ob jec- 
t i v e  of influencing leg is la t ion  o r  policy implementation. 
consis ts  of the  par t ic ipa t ion  of s c i e n t i s t s  as individuals i n  partisan 
activities. 
of f ice .  
mental agencies conprises the  t h i r d  form. 
f ina l ly ,  consists of employment i n  ostensibly non-political posit ions as 
ists i n  European internat ional  laboratories 
The f i r s t  of the a c t i v i t i e s  
The second 
Included here  is the  poss ib i l i t y  of s c i e n t i s t s  running for  
Acceptance of administrative posts a t  varying levels  i n  govern- 
The fourth type o€ ac t iv i ty ,  
s c i e n t i f i c  advisors. 
The data incorporates a number of factors  which night be relevant 
(Cambridge : Harvard Univer- 
Price is aware, the  
ch shapes the scienc 
e have been unable, opean countri  
count of such differences as good descriptions of 
t h e  various w t i o n s  are not readi ly  available.  To the extent 
a model for the  future  by 
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t o  assesslllsnt of t he  s c i e n t i s t s '  action po ten t i a l  under of these 
forms. 
were used i n  Chapter VI1 t o  delineate the 'place1* of  p o l i t i c s  i n  the 
I t  is  worth looking pa r t i cu la r ly  a t  several  of those items which 
l i ves  of the respondents. 
it should be pointed out t h a t  the a b i l i t y  of t he  in t e rna t iona l  s c i e n t i s t s  
Before beginning this examination, however, 
t o  pa r t i c ipa t e  i n  any of the above form of p o l i t i c a l  a c t i v i t y  is t o  
some exten t  limit& by fac tors  implicit in t h e i r  career patterns.  Most 
a c t i v i t i e s  of a d i r ec t ly  p o l i t i c a l  nature a re  excluded f o r  s c i e n t i s t s  
as long as they remain on the staff of  t h e  in te rna t iona l  laboratory. For 
them t o  j o i n  i n  par t i san  o r  national p o l i t i c a l  affairs would i n  n o s t  
cases be a violation of t h e i r  in te rna t iona l  c i v i l  servant s t a t u s ,  X 
ce r t a in  proportion of the respondents--estimated from data obtained over 
p a r t  of the sample as approximately 200aS--hopa t o  remain in t h e i r  present 
posts:' indef in i te ly .  
who idea l ly  would l i k e  t o  s tay  on indefinitely) aims t o  go t o  another 
international body f o r  t h e i r  next posstion, 
An additional group (there is some overlap with those 
A l l  of these scient is ts  would 
be unlikely t o  take pa r t  in most of the p o l i t i c a l  a c t i v i t i e s  under discus- 
s ion.  
States, or at  least not t o  return t o  their own country, These men, too, 
S t i l l  another group of s c i e n t i s t s  intends t o  go t o  t h e  United 
w i l l  under most circumstances remain outside of the p o l i t i c a l  arena i n  the 
sense we are Th0 proportion of respondents who intend 
t o  mtwn t o  t h e  mainstream of s c i e n t i f i c  and technological life i n  the i r  
cerned with it. 
See Appendix 2, Question 34. This item w a s  used only on the i n t e r -  
). Its in te rpre ta t ion  w i t h  reg  PRA respondents is - 
s and would idea l ly  ' although most are on career ap 
s t ay  for indefinite terms, a majority gave answers such as "this depends cm:. 
what happens t o  the. p o l i t i c a l  situation." - -  
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who are a t  least able t 
e s c i e n t i s t s  t o  p a r t i c i  
l a r l y  on European integrat ion issues--was d i  
most r e spaden t s  i n  their interview and questionnaire responses, these 
opinions a re  highly in te l lec tua l ized  and, 2s w a s  pointed out i n  Chapter 
V I ,  they are not backed by a very deep emotional involvement. A strong 
commitment t o  the goals and values of science i t s e l f  and a d i s t a s t e  for 
the " i r ra t ional i ty"  inherent i n  p o l i t i c a l  l i fe  underlie t h i s  phenomenon. 
One recalls the  words of theBritish s c i e n t i s t  from ESTEC cited i n  
Chapter V I 1  : 
Sc ien t i s t s  are t e r r i b l y  busy and very in te res ted  i n  what 
they're doing. They're interested next i n  t h e i r  families, 
i n  a change of scene, and i n  their recreation, Anyway, 
i t ' s  only t h e  few who f e e l  very strongly po l i t i ca l iy  among 
s c i e n t i s t s  2nd engineers. 
Strong feel ing is one of the  prerequis i tes  f o r  the  type of %utsider" 
p o l i t i c a l  ac t iv i ty  which corresponds t o  our first category. In  the past 
it has been only on r e l a t ive ly  infrequent occasions t h a t  s c i e n t i s t s  have 
feelings amang substant ia l  numbers of scientists. 
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on the  p a r t  of s c i e n t i s t s .  This w a s  the  case i n  
i n  t h e  United S ta tes  when the famous atomic s c i e n t i s t s '  movement arose. 
More recently, large numbers of  academic American s c i e n t i s t s  have been 
wi l l ing  t o  become involved i n  causes which appear perhaps l e s s  critical 
bug which s t i l l  cut deeply i n t o  values widely shared i n  the sci 
conmarnity. 
debate and opposition to  the Vietnam War,' The matter of European in te -  
gration, although highly s a l i e n t  i n  the  p o l i t i c a l  a t t i t u d e  structure of 
s c i e n t i s t s  i n  in te rna t iona l  laboratories,  has none of these qua l i t i e s  
Obvious examples would be the a n t i - b a l l i s t i c  missile (ABM) 
which might stimulate such strong feeling. 
t o  in tegra te  the European nations might be very undesirable from the 
s c i e n t i s t s '  viewpoint, but they do not pose a d i r e c t  th rea t  t o  world 
peace or the existence of c iv i l i za t ion .  
t i e d  t o  a bas ic  and widely shared value--such as opposition t o  the use of 
technology for purposes of mass destruction--and s c i e n t i s t s  cannot' r ea l ly  
claim e i t h e r  special  knowledge or  special  respons ib i l i ty ,  
of meaningful "outsider" p o l i t i c a l  organization among European s c i e n t i s t s  
(including those from international laboratories) focused on t h i s  issue 
Consequences of the f a i l u r e  
The i s sue ,  furthermore, is not 
The poss ib i l i t y  
hence seems remote. 
Partisan ac t iv i ty ,  including running for p o l i t i c a l  office-the second 
forms of activity-may be summarily dismissed on similar of O U T  
grounds. Given the set: of or ien ta t ions  toward the p o l i t i c a l  world 
There are indications, however, t h a t  na tura l  scientists have been 
less ac t ive  than other academicsiin opposition t o  the  Vietnam War. 
Howard S&uanan and Edward 0. Ea-, "DO Most Professors Support the 
War?, *' , V, I (November 1967), pp. 32-35. 
See 
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discussed i n  Chapter VI1 and summarized above, the l ikelihood of most of 
the s 
Furthermore, group factors  which might legit imate i n  h i s  own mind and the 
minds of h i s  colleagues a s c i e n t i s t ' s  par t ic ipat ion i n  an issue-oriented, 
scientist-dominated campaign (such as the atomic s c i e n t i s t s '  movement) 
would not be present in party po l i t i c s .  This study did not  inquire about 
respondents' p o l i t i c a l  party a f f i l i a t i o n s ,  but  the survey done a t  CERN i n  
1965 asked questionnaire recipients  t o  indicate  not a direct p o l i t i c a l  
a f f i l i a t i o n ,  but merely which par ty  came closest  to  representing t h e i r  
own views. Only the t i n i e s t  f rac t ion  of the sample specified a party,  and 
many replied bluntly "none." This i s  2s good an indication as any o f  how 
small i s  t h e  s c i e n t i s t s '  propensity t o  join i n  par t isan affairs. 
t5 becoming i rested i n  par ty  affairs seems rathe 
10 
The th i rd  form of par t ic ipat ion,  movement i n t o  administrative posts 
in government, appears t o  have subs tan t ia l ly  w i d e r  appeal. 
l ike ly ,  however, that among the  respondents s o  inclined, most would deny 
It is qui te  
tha t  t h i s  is a form of p o l i t i c a l  par t ic ipat ion a t  a l l .  
with it here  as a r e su l t  of our ra ther  loose interpretat ion of p o l i t i c a l  
par t ic ipat ion which is meant t o  encompass such roles  as might allow the  
Europeanist a t t i tudes  of the s c i e n t i s t s  t o  have a d i rec t  influence on pol i -  
cies of governments. Certainly, under such an interpretat ion,  government 
We are dealing 
lo A single  avowed Marxist was encountered among the sc i en t i s t s  
resent study-- a t  there  were' 
of others ab 
we 11 beyond eagues. Even t h i s  
s p o l i t i c a l  involve- 
individual,  however, w a s  a s c i e n t i s t  , and he indica 
his p o l i t i c a l  interests and a c t i v i t i e s  would<remain avocational. 
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administrative posts bear c l  
respondents who were previ 
one those 
While many had been engaged i n  research, a s igni f icant  share-primarily 
Bri t ish and French--could be classed as middle-level technical execw 
tives.12 These arer the  individuals on ent] arid 
those who w i l l  re turn t o  t h e i r  f o w a r  posts,  plus  those scientists who do 
not caw out of government but w i l l  enter its service upon leaving the 
internat ional  laboratory, comprise a major proportion of the  sc i en t i s t s  
with a p o l i t i c a l  action potent ia l .  
The factors which might i n h i b i t  a sc ien t i s t  from undertaking Chis 
type of a c t i v i t y  do not depend very much on h i s  general evaluation o f  
p o l i t i c s  o r  on the strength of h i s  emotional involvement i n  par t icu lar  
issues. Rather they revolve around h i s  willingness to foresake research 
for adminisltration. 
s h i f t  takes place most often when an individual f ee l s  tha t  he has passed 
Among academic s c i e n t i s t s  a t  least, t h i s  type of 
the  peak of h i s  research productivity,  generally when he passed h i s  mid- 
fo r t i e s ,  and often la te r ,  The r e a l  influence which t h e  s c i e n t i s t s '  p o l i t i -  
ca l  views may exert i n  such a ro le  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  assess. Three limita- 
t ions on poten t ia l  influence are,  however, worthy of mention. First, the 
'' Price, i n  ses the fact that policy- 
separable i n  the  U.S. 
the mixture may not be as complete among 
making and adminis 
it cer ta in ly  exists to  some extent. 
le.  Since w e  sampled primarily i n  
in i s r r a t ive  personnel, the numbers 
probably not rea l ly  represe 
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scientist s non-poli tica 
posts which the s c i e n t i s t s  would be l i ke ly  
agencies, often i n  the 
doubt l imi t s  the scope 
by national administrations. While Br i t i sh  respondents often seemed t o  
believe t h a t  t h e i r  domestic s t a tus  would be enhanced through their par t i -  
cipation i n  an international venture, many Frenchmen reported tha t  t h e i r  
colleagues in  government service a t  home looked down upon those who went 
abroad t o  work, par t i cu la r ly  i n  an international organization, 
Although t h e  * ‘ sc i en t i f i c  advisory culture” is not as widely diffused 
-g E 
s c i e n t i f i c  adqi 
various forms of p o l i t i c a l  participation open t o  the international scien- 
tists. This appeal is a function, i n  large measure, of the fact t ha t  
becoming an advisor does not e n t a i l  conflicting ro l e  obligations. 
sory work is viewed as technical and non-political, allowing th> scien- 
tist t o  r e t a i n  his  virginal, apo l i t i ca l  status as well as h i s  professional 
commitment t o  research. 
BR governments as it is i n  the  United S ta tes ,  t he  mle of 
probably has the  widest po ten t ia l  appeal of  a l l  the 
Advi- 
Because of these charac te r i s t ics ,  it is a l s o  a 
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laboratory. The scientist's a b i l i t y  t o  develop h i s  domes On 8 
once a t  the  internat ional  center,  is limited (s 
course) by the  laboratory's  s c i e n t i f i c  standing as well as by the  network 
of personal contacts he is able  t o  maintain. 
Through thu role of advisor, the scientist often dealing w i t h  
broadly based and important issues i n  which science is a v i t a l  par t  of 
the context, but whose effects are f e l t  by large areas of society.  In 
the European se t t ing ,  the presence i n  such ro les  of men whose basic  p o l i t i -  
ca l  incl inat ion is  toward European integrat ion is cer ta in  t o  a s s i s t  t h a t  
cause. I t  i s  recognized tha t  in  providing what i s  ostensibly technical 
advice, the s c i e n t i s t  is incorporating h i s  own underiying p o l i t i c a l  
assumptions. 
point  of view of the policy-maker whose job it is t o  separate the technical 
content of  the advice from its underlying p o l i t i c a l  tone. 
naive t o  expect dramatic r e su l t s  from t h i s  sort of  influence in a short  
period, but as the science advisory cul ture  grows i n  Europe, and as 
internat ional  s c i e n t i s t s  take t h e i r  places within i t ,  its ef fec ts  are 
certain t o  be f e l t .  
This theme has been much discussed, most often from the 
It would be 

APPENDIX 1 
Questionnaire 
This appendix consists of the actual questionnaire employed i n  the 
survey. 
reproduced here, it should be  noted that the French and German versions 
were printed in exactly the same format, with all questions laid out in  
the same way. 
and collected personally, thus providing a verbal introduction in  addi- 
t ion to  the writtsn covering l e t t e r ,  should a l so  be noted. 
Although, for reasons of economy, on ly  the English version is  
The fact that virtually a l l  questionnaires were distributed 
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3 5  Preceding page Mank 
Dear Sir :  
and Public Policy,yr ia the Po l r t i ca l  Scieiice Department at the 
Massachusetts Irzstitute of Technology. Before begiiujiig graduate 
studfes &a the Social Scieiices, I received a Bachelor of Science 
degree iii Pliysics from MIT. I a greseiatly engaged in col lec t ing  
data f o r  my thes ia ,  a s t u d y  of the experredce and e f fec t s  o f  
workhg in an i n t e r a a t i ~ n a l  scientific orgauraation. 
internat ional  s c i e n t i f i c  laboratorzes in ihroye, is one of the 
instruments by which I am gathering my data. I earnestly s o l i c i t  
your help, and X would sincerely appreciate y o u r  taking the time 
t o  answer my questions. . 
fessional and Ijersonal background, your current experience in 
t h i s  organization, aud your views on some current issues.  Some 
questions are  ra ther  open-ended and require you to write a brief  
response iil  your o w n  w o r d s .  Others hzve been wri t ten,  to save 
tune, i n  a f o r m  where you are asked t o  se lec t  the one response 
which comes closest  t o  your feeliligs, from a choice of several 
possible responses. In these cases,  1 have l e f t  space f o r  you t o  
exparid m d  comment on your choice. 
In all cases, I am interested in your personal views and ex- 
periences. Your responses w i U  be completely confidential .  The 
adm;inisCration of this organization has no responsibi l i ty  for 
this study, aad no connection with i t ,  other than the f a c t  that 
they have given m e  permission t o  gather my data here. 
Since m a n y  people who have helped me m t h i s  study have ex- 
pressed an i n l e re s t  i n  ay findiiigs, I am planning to  couqile a 
short  report  outl ining their,, a f t e r  I complete my thes i s .  If you 
would lirce t o  receive a copy o f  this report ,  please hand a card 
with your name and address on i t  t o  ay wife  or nayself when we 
return t o  co l lec t  this  questionnaire. 
I arrl a doctoral candidate working in  the new f i e l d  o f  "Sciexice 
The attached questionuaire, which I am distributi t lg in several  
The questionnaire consists o f  four pa r t s ,  covering your pro- 
Thanl: you sincerely for your a s s i s t a x e .  
Yours very t ru ly ,  
c2Li3d1%+d 
A l b e r t  8. Teioh 
Date : 1V67 
Organisation, location: 
Mvision arid Group: 
T i t l e  of position: 
Grade : 
Nationality : 
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1-1 
1-2 
1-3 
1-4 
1-5 
SECTION I 
PROFESSIOPIAL BACICGROUND 
Please give a b r b f  description o f  your present work: 
In which branch of science or engineering would this work be 
classified? 
Do you consider thPs work to  be: ,/fileme place a check m a r k  f v( 
next t o  the one whfch applieoJ 
a. Basic Research 
7- b. Applied Research - c . Development 
d. Engineeriag and Design 
, e. Technical Semrioet 
f. Adm&nf8tX'atiG& 
g. Other f~pecify: 1 
fn which specif ic  area o f  science or engineering do your own 
deepest interests l i e ?  
Please complete the f o l l o w i i i g  information about your ,aightar 
education : Tear Name o f  
Demee Field Received School C o u n t m  
H i e e a  t Degree 
Other Degresa 
1-6 When did you begin workiilg zz1 this organization? 
Y e a  Mouth 
397 
3 
1-7 Reasons f o r  coming t o  t h i r  Organi2atiOn: 
For each of the fo l lowiug  fac tors ,  please glace a check mark in 
the column which describes how itnportast t h i s  fac tor  was t o  you 
in  your decision to  come to  this orgaaization. Also please 
indicate which factor you f e e l  w a s  
you, by Elacing a checx mark ir. the ap 
ONE MOST 
lMpORTANT €msor t aa t  Factor Xwortant 
a. Opporturlity t o  pursue a 
particuLar type of work 
b- Dusire t o  work w i t h  a 
par t i cu la r  irldividual or 
- - - 
group - - - - - - - - c.  dual i ty  of equipment 
d. Higher sa la ry  
e .  Eesire t o  work with people 
f. Location 
Q. Job secur i ty ,  tenure 
h. Lack of opportunities irr 
own spec ia l ty  ir, own 
- - - - 
- - - o f  other na t iona l i t i e s  - - - - - - - - 
- - - - couatry 
i. O t h e r  (Specify: 
1 -  - - - 
1-8 Preirious employment : 
If you were employed i n  aisother job immediately before coming t o  
this o r g a n i z a t i o r t ,  please comlplete the following informatioil about 
that positioii.  If you came t o  t h i s  organization d i r ec t ly  a f t e r  
completing your s tud ies ,  please check here/ and go 011 t o  the 
next question. 
Type of organizati,odL ( e .  g., gover.merit Laboracory, i idus t ry ,  etc. ) : 
Country: 
Y e a r  s ta r ted :  Year errded: 
B r i e f  descrLptLon of work: 
Reasons for leaving: 
4 
1-4 
2 -1 
2 -2 
2-3 
2 -4 
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arid you have ir: 
nat iona l i t i es?  
A p e a t  deal 
rue 
Very l i t t l e  
i%me at all - 
.SECTION I1 
CuiLREiJT EXPERIENCE 
Y 
This section is csncerned with your personal 
experience aid observatious since corning t o  
t h i s  orgzuization. ’ 
Compared t o  your previous experience, would you say the wey one 
does sc i en t i f i c  work ili th i s  organizatioxi is : 
7 e r y  different  
Samwfiat different  - Gemrally the same 
7  
Comtlesnts L 
Are there any characteriszics of t h i s  laboratory which might make 
i t  easrer t o  perfom research o r  o the r  technical a c t i v i t i e s  thaz. 
i n  a national or wiiversity laboratory? 
Y e s  - 
.- 
- 4 ,  *..- -
If yea, please explaiii: 
Are there any sharacterfs t ics  which might wake i t  more difficult? 
Y e s  
S O  
- 
t o  be mch o f  a problem? 
Yes - 
NO -
Comments : 
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2-5 Have you four-d any differences in tra g scientists and 
eiigineers from different countries wh the w a y  they 
approach problems 7 
Yes 
NO 
- -
Please explain : 
2-6 In wiversities and in some nJtional laboratories, one finds 
* to work tomther in 89 international lab such as this one? 
scientists f r o m  many countries working together. Do you think 
it is easier-or m o r 8  difficuZt for peopls of' mgay nstionalitios 
Easier -  More difficult 
No difference 
Comments : 
2-7 Do you feel that the etmosphere in f h i s  organization is providing 
you with a reamnable mount of intellectual stimulation? 
Yes - 
rJ0 
-.111 
Comments : 
2-G Considerhig your rezsons f o r  cotling to this orgaiization, how 
satisfied w o u l d  you s a y  you =re with the w a y  thiiigs have 
developed? 
C o ~ i p l e  t e ly sat is f ic d 
Very bat ; i sr i eu  
- - 
Sat i s f ied -  Somewhat tlilsatisfied - Very unsatisfied 
Comments : 
6 
2-9 How sat i s f ied  
Satisfied -  Somewhat unsatisfied - Sery uneatisfied 
Comments : 
2-1ci Have and yo= family encow&ered any di f f i cu l t i e s  in  
g to l i f e  in this comwfty  wad this country? 
Yea 
IJO 
- -
ff yes, please explain: 
2-11 Have you found that the people from this organization ahd their 
families tend tG forn a community aft6r workizg hours? 
Ye8 
NO 
-1 
Please eacplakn : 
2-12 Would you say that the t i m e  you have spent i n  this  organization 
has improved your prafess ional  standarLg in your own country? 
Yes 
140 
- - 
Comments : 
2-13 If you were t o  leave this orgaaization, have you any preference 
as to  where you would l ike  to  work? 
Yes 
I?o 
- -
X f  yes, what type of organizatioii and i u  which aountrp? 
40 1 
t I 
..:uestions 2-14 through 2-16 apply to those 
iadividuals who are not Aratiouals o f  the 
coulitZ"y k~ which this laboratory is loc- 
ated. If you are  a c i t i zen  of the eouut ry  
in  which this f a c i l i t y  is located, please 
go o n  t o  question 2-17. -- 
7 
2-14 About how often do you go back to your owx country? 
Every week 
* Every month 
Every few months 
Once a year 
Less t h a  once a year 
- 
- 
I- 
2-15 Do you s t i l l  maiittain professional t i es  there? 
Cormtients : 
2-16 Do- you t r y  t o  keep up with national l i f e  in your country 
through newspapers, radio,  o r  other means? 
Yes 
i d 0  
- - 
If y e s ,  how? 
(For all respondents ) 
2-17 Which newspapers aid weekly rrlzgazines do you read here? 
2-16 About how often do you discuss c u r r e n t  po l i t i ca l  issues with 
your colleagues here? 
Very often - 
O f t 8 i l  -  Occasionally 
Rarely 
Never 
- 
L 
Comments : 
402 
8 
2-19 About how strong do you f e e l  your om; interest in public 
affairrr (po l i t i c s ,  international affairs, etc.) i s ,  compared 
with tnat of y o u r  colleagues here? 
We31 above average 
Above average 
- -  Average - B e l  ow average 
Well below average - 
Comments : 
2-20 Do you f e e l  that there has been any change in  your  level of 
intereet in public affairs since comifig here? 
No change 
Increase 
Decrease 
-.---- - 
7 
Comments : 
3-ia 
b 
s x n o r ?  III 
c m N T  ISSU%S 
This section i s  concerned with your personal 
views 011 a number of  current public i ssues .  
In most questions you are asked Co reply 1 "yes" o r  lq1107', or choose orhe response from a 
limited number of choices. Please note that 
there is  space provideu for  you t o  elaborate 
oa your answers il" y o u  wish. I 
Do you thinl; that the "techr,ological gap" currently being 
discussed in the press, is a serious problem for Europe? 
Y e s  
XO 
- -
If yes, w h a t  sort of  action do y o u  think would be required to 
801- it? 
403 
3-2a Do you think that the "bra- drain" i 
Western European science? 
1x0 -
b If yes, do you thinlc tha t  LnternatJLonal organiszationa such a6 
this on8 are capable of' counteracting it iia some 
Yes 
xi0 
- 
I
ColaPlentsi . 
3-3a Would you favor the formation o f  a wider European Economic 
Community tha t  would include the present EEC ( S i x )  and other 
Western European countries? 
Ye S 
NO 
- 
- 
b Would YOU favor such a comniunity includirtg Eastern -0p4an 
countries ? 
Yes 
No 
-. -
c Would you Favor such a community fncluding the United States? 
Yes 
I f 0  
- - 
Comments : 
3-4a Are you in favor of the formation of a political union among 
the I' S ix " ? 
Yes 
i?o 
- -
b Do you t h W  that i t  w i f l  actualLy occur? 
Yes - 
iro -
c If' yes, how rnany years would you estimate that t h i s  mfght take? 
5 and 10 year 
Between 10 and 20 years 
More than 20 years 
- - 
404 
10 
3-5 If a political union did occur in Europe, which w o u l d  
to your own preference--a u f o a  witti a strong centrai authority, 
or a w.ioi'L with mare Fower reserved f o r  the member states? 
S5rci.g central power -  Nore power f o r  the states  
Comments : 
3-6 Do you feel that the existing cultures of I b o p e  couSd m r n F n t a i n  
their indiwfdualie within a united Europe? 
Yes 
NO -
Cotrnnents t 
3-7 Do you think- that tile idea o f  a "iiation state" is becoming 
obsolete ? 
Yes 
i.l c: 
L -
Comments : 
3-%a ou approve the integratiori o f  a major part 
8s armed forces into a permanent sup 
405. 
3-9 Concerning Europe's role in the t 
that Europe should take a more indepen 
Yes 
iJo 
- -
commei1ts : 
feel that the ch has beex develo in 
years between the Buropean CO 
couaatr%ea is part of' a lasting tread? 
Yes 
iJo 
0 
---.-u 
Cornmeats : 
3-11 Do you thirk that the United PJatfomcan be transformed, 
eventually, into a world  government? 
Yes 
NO 
- -
commernts : 
3-l2a In principle, would you favor your own national government 
giving up a certain amount o f  i t s  sovereignty to participate 
in some form of world government? 
Ye 0 
B O  
-- 
b Do you f e e l  that the majority o f  your own coaltrymen agree 
with you? 
Yes 
IJO 
- -
ents : 
3-13ia A s  a matter o f  POliCY, d you be in 
gosrassioa of t lear w e  by your own ? 
Ye5 
iJo - 
3-11 
3-19 
3-16 
3-17 
12 
b 
Comments : 
do you think 
o limit 
Yes 
iJo 
- - 
Comments : 
lear iasuas to space, which t r y  do you 
the "race to the moon", the ed States or 
the S o v i e t  Union? 
United States 
Soviet  Union 
- 
Cotnmelrts : 
Do you feel that this  moon race is worth the investment: of 
money and hulaaii resources that i t  i s  costing these t w o  countries? 
Yes 
NO 
- -
Comments : 
Would you say that BurOpe'S efTotrzs in spac% exploraOion are 
appropr3late in scale and scope? 
BO? 
13 
9-18 Do yau think that- the cos t  o f  space exploration w i l l  eventualLy 
lead those nations irrterested io i t  to  COOper8te OA a world- 
wide scale in such e f fo r t s?  
Y e s  . 
NO 
--
Comments  : 
3-19 Judgiag from your own experieace’iad discuasion8, do you feel 
that thsre  are oertaia pol i t ica l  isclues on which thc ntajosity 
of  scientists and engineers probably share a copllllop outlook? 
Yes 
No 
--
If yes, 011 which issues? 
2-20  Do you feel that  the experience o f  working in an internat ional  
atmosghere has changed your  perspective on yo= home cowltry? 
Yes 
iJo 
- -
Please explain : 
2-21 Have your viewpoiats on any issues changed since coming t o  
this organization? 
Yes 
NO 
- -
If yes, on which issues? 
3-22 After having worked together with people from the various 
’ ‘ i J a t i O M  o f  m o p 8  in this organizatiou, would you Say that 
you are now more optimistic o r  less optimistic about the 
poss ib i l i t i e s  of p o l i t i c a l  unif icat ion in Europe than you 
w e r e  before you came here? 
Mora optimistic - Leas optimistic 7
Camments : 
14 
4 4  Where w e r e  you born? 
C O u l l t r y  City or town 
Year o f  birth 
e duc at ion? s 
4-2 D i d  you lire anywhere e l s e  before beginning your higher 
Yes 
XO 
- - 
If yes,  where? 
C o u n t r y  City or town 
4-3 Father's nationality 
bfother Is  nationalit;y 
4-4 Marital status: - Single 
iviarried 
Divorced 
- 
-.--.-- 
k i i  doWe d - 
Remarried - 
4-5 If married, please complete the following information con- 
cerning your wife : 
Wife Is iiationallty 
Wife's preseiit occupation 
Previ\,us occupations 
4 4  lJumber o f  children 
409. 
4-7 Do your childrer p - t o  sckrooi i 
YbS 
7
No -
they go to local sshoo schools f o r  children o f  
tionality, or intsrnat al schools ( for children 
inadities 17 
LocaL ro&ools 
Schools for chixdren of your nationality 
- -  ZatenurtioW achools - Other (Speciw: ) 
4-13 Travel: In the following l is t ,  please Glace check mark8 in the 
appropriate colturrns t o  indicate thooc areas you have visitad 
professionally and as a tourist. 
PROFESS IOi4AL 
TRAVZL TOUl?ISI.I 
Sone of Western Europe 
_cI Most o f  Western Purope 
Eastern Europe 
S o v i e t  Union 
united States 60 C W a  
%ddle E a s t  
Asia 
Africa 
L a t m  America 
Oxher areas (which? 
.- - - 
I - - _. - - - -- - - 
- - 
- -- 
-- - 
4-9 Excluding your prsser,t situatiqn, Cave you lived in any foreign 
countries f o r  three mcnths or  loirger? 
4-10 Which languages do you speak? 
16 
410 
11 on 
Pal  
Moderate left  
you vote in aational elections in 
Every t iue 
Frequently 
Occasionally 
Rarely 
Never 
b How often d i d  you vote in  natlonal elections w h i l e  laving 
in your 0% country? 
Thank you for your cooperatioi~. 
APPENDIX 2 
Interview Format 
Questions are l i s t e d  below i n  the sequence i n  which they were asked. 
In cases where the tex t  of an interview question was ident ica l  t o  tha t  
used on the questionnaire, t he  question is not reproduced here, but 
reference is made t o  the appropriate number. For these questions, see 
Appendix 1. For each subject the interviewer noted the following infor- 
mation: (I) Laboratory, (2) Nationality, (3) Date and time of interview, 
(4) Duration of interview, (5) Place and circumstances o f  interview, and 
(6) Miscellaneous impressions. 
1. 
2. - 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6 .  
7, 
8. 
Could you please t e l l  me something about your work here a t  ( lab)? 
How long have you been working here? 
what were you doing before you came here? 
Haw did you happen to  come t o  (lab)? 
Were you considering any other p o s s i b i l i t i e s  at the time? 
What reasons made you decide t o  come here? 
what do you consider to be  your primary f i e l d  of specialization? 
Is the work that you're doing here pretty much within tha t  area? 
41 1 
412 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12 * 
13 
14. 
1s. 
16. 
17. 
13. 
19 * 
20. 
21, 
22 * 
23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
mere did you do your higher education? 
Did you work here  else between the  univers i ty  an 
prirrvious t o  
Did you have any experience i n  working with s c i e n t i s t s  and engineers 
of  other na t iona l i t i e s  i n  your previous jobs? 
Have you found doing research here a t  (lab) d i f fe ren t  from your 
previous experience? 
42-2 
42-3 
(Alternative f o r  13 and 14: 
you could take (lab) and place i t  i n  (your own country), staff it 
en t i re ly  with (people of your own country), how would th i s  make 
working a t  (lab) d i f fe ren t  f o r  you? 
To consider a hypothetical s i tua t ion ,  i f  
Q2-3 
Have you noted any differences i n  t r a i n i n g  o r  mentality among scien- 
tists and engineers from di f fe ren t  countries which affect the way 
they approwh problems ? 
Do you work i n  a (research) te rn?  
Could you t e l l  m e  a l i t t l e  about i t ?  
Do you oenerally find yourself able t o  complete your work i n  a normal 
of f ice  day, o r  do you tend to  take work home or work outside of 
normal hours ? 
4 
42-7 
42-9 
44-1 
44- 2 
44- 3 
Are you married? 
413 
29. 
30. 
31. 
32. 
33. 
34. 
3s. 
36.  
37 * 
38 
39. 
40. 
41. 
42. 
43. 
44. 
45. 
46. 
47. 
48. 
49. 
50. 
44- 7 
Does your wife have any outside occupation, other than taking care 
of the  home? 
Has she had any i n  the past?  
How happy is she with l i fe  in (lab location)? 
Have you found thac the  friends you've made here are m s t l y  from the 
organization, o r  from the area where you l ive?  
Looking for a'mment touards the  fiatwe, you've said tha t  you've been 
here f o r  (x) years; have you given any thought as t o  how much longer 
you would like t o  remain here? 
42-13 
42-12 
Could YOU tell me about the travelling yvu've done? Liv ing  abroad? 
44- 10 
Q2-14 
Q2- 15 
Do you have much family there? 
42-16 
42-17 
Do you ever f ind  yourself discussing politics (current issues) with 
your colleagues here? 
Could you tell me a l i t t l e  about your most recent such discussion? 
42- 19 
42-20 
43- la, b 
Q3-2a, b 
Do you believe t h a t  the S i x  w i l l  eventually form some s o r t  of  p o l i t i c a l  
union? Do you favor it? 
SI. (If yes) Q3-4c 
414 
52 
53 
54. 
55.  
56. 
57. 
58 
59 
60. 
61. 
62 
65- 
64. 
6 5 .  
66, 
67 .  
68. 
69. 
70. 
71. 
Q3-3a, b, c 
43-5 
43-6 
43-7 
Q3-8a b 
43-9 
43-10 
43- 11 
Q3-12a, b 
43- 13a, b 
43-14 
Do you think that your own national government should take serious 
steps toward the adoption of unilateral nuclear disarmament as 
official policy? 
43-15 
43-16 
QS- 17 
Q3- 18 
43-19 
43-20 
43-21 
43-22 
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